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As a senior scholar in the field once told me, being a microstate researcher takes 
you to places most people can only dream about. The obvious downside of this is 
that it arouses the jealousy of colleagues, friends, and family members, who 
accused me of first having selected my cases for field research, and then fitting 
these into an appropriate research design. However, although it is true that I 
have very much enjoyed San Marino’s food, St. Kitts and Nevis’ rum cocktails, 
Seychelles’ beaches, and Palau’s diving and snorkeling sites, during field research 
I actually had to work much harder than at home.  
I owe the fact that I managed to obtain the information I needed within 
the short period of time that was spent in each of the four microstates first and 
foremost to my interview respondents, who were with few exceptions very eager 
and enthusiastic to discuss the details and peculiarities of their countries’ 
political systems with me. In this sense, a great advantage of the smallness of the 
microstates that I studied is the great accessibility of even the most high-ranking 
officials, whom I could invite for interviews while encountering them in pubs, 
supermarkets, petrol stations, or even on the beach. 
In addition to the respondents themselves, I am particularly indebted to 
a small number of local people who greatly assisted me in planning my 
interviews, and who I can now proudly call my friends. In particular, I would like 
to mention Valentina Rossi, Jeffrey Zani, and Marianna Bucci in San Marino; 
Natasha Leader, Virginia Browne and Kate Orchard in St. Kitts and Nevis; Franky 
Baccus, Chantal Poonoosamy, Dedrey Serret, and the University of Seychelles 
students in Seychelles; and Sunny Ngirmang and Lydia Ngirablosch in Palau. My 
field research has been facilitated financially through sponsorship by the Leiden 
University Fund / van Walsem and the Netherlands Institute of Government. 
Of course, the completion of this dissertation could not have been 
achieved without the support and encouragement that I received from my 
supervisors and colleagues. I would particularly like to thank my promotores – 
Ingrid van Biezen and Jan Erk – for not only providing me with the necessary 
guidance, comments, and suggestions that helped me to improve my work, but 
also for the more personal and practical discussions that greatly increased my 
work pleasure and significantly eased the challenge of finishing this book. My 
gratitude also goes to my fellow PhD-students, and in the first place to Fransje 
Molenaar and Cynthia van Vonno, with whom I was happy to share an office for 





Jan Heine, Jessica Kroezen, Maudy Lohaus, Tom Louwerse, Honorata Mazepus, 
Tim Mickler, Lotte Melenhorst, Daniela Piccio, Benjamin Pohl, Joeri Veen, and 
Kavita Ziemann for their suggestions and comments during PhD-seminars and 
discussions, and for being such nice colleagues in general. In particular I would 
like to thank my paranimfen, Rosalie Belder and Jannine van de Maat, for their 
friendship and company during my studies.   
I am aware of the fact that I could not even have started this PhD-project 
- and much less finish it - without the rock-solid support and enduring 
encouragements of my family and my closest friends. I want to thank my parents 
and my sister Anne for providing me with a foundation on which I could always 
fall back if necessary. My parents have always stimulated me to take full 
advantage of my capacities, and without this lasting encouragement I would 
certainly not have made it to this point. Most of my fellow PhD-students will 
agree that the pursuit of a doctoral degree is a process that is marked by 
alternating periods of good and bad fortune. The possibility to share these 
experiences with someone who is able to put problems into perspective is every 
day of invaluable significance. With this in mind, I would like to end by thanking 
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1. What this Dissertation is About 
According to several recent publications, small states or microstates are 
comparatively more likely to have democratic systems of government than larger 
states (Diamond and Tsalik 1999; Anckar 2002b; Srebrnik 2004). Based on the 
data of aggregate indices of democracy such as Freedom House, these large-N 
quantitative analyses have disclosed a statistically significant negative 
correlation between population size and democracy. Although a satisfactory 
explanation of this pattern has not yet been found, the argument that a limited 
population size fosters good governance, republicanism, and democracy was 
already formulated by the ancient Greek philosophers, and is therefore one of the 
most ancient debates in political science. The finding that microstates from 
around the globe are exceptionally likely to develop and maintain democratic 
systems of government therefore appears to validate centuries-old theories 
about the political consequences of size. In addition, not only has the average 
population size of countries continuously been decreasing since the late 19th 
century (Lake and O'Mahony 2004), but more and more states have initiated 
programs of decentralization and devolution of powers and competences to 
smaller, sub-national units. This unmistakable trend towards smaller polities and 
administrations is buttressed by academic publications that emphasize the 
virtues and advantages of smallness (cf. Schumacher 1973; Katzenstein 1985; 
Weldon 2006). 
Whereas the argument that ‘small is democratic’ (Ott 2000) hence now 
prevails in the literature, there are also studies that point in another direction. 
Relying less on formal political structures and large-N databases, the available 
case studies of small state-politics primarily highlight the intense personal 
rivalries, corruption, patron-client relationships, and social pressure and 
intimidation that supposedly undergird small state-politics. According to some of 
these studies the democratic institutions of microstates are largely a façade, 
beyond which a much harsher and less democratic - if not dictatorial - reality can 





incompatible with the more dominant quantitative literature that was described 
before. In order to avoid the limited focus on formal structures as well as the 
idiosyncrasies and lack of generalizability that characterize case studies, this 
dissertation offers a small-N comparative approach that is based on in-depth 
analyses of four microstates around the globe. Using Dahl’s twin dimensions of 
contestation and inclusiveness as a framework to conceptualize democracy 
(1971), on the basis of field research in San Marino, St. Kitts and Nevis, 
Seychelles, and Palau the image that follows from the case study-literature is 
largely confirmed. Due to the fact that similar political patterns are identified in 
microstates that otherwise are as different as possible on virtually all 
background variables, many of the outcomes of the analysis can be viewed as 
(generalizable and universally applicable) political  effects of size. 
 
2. The Exclusion of Microstates in the Broader Academic Literature 
In comparative political research, the smallest countries in the world are mostly 
excluded. Although there are significant differences with regard to the threshold 
that scholars apply to exclude small states, almost all publications in this field do 
employ a cut-off point that results in the elimination of microstates.1 In Samuel 
Huntington’s seminal work The Third Wave, for example, all countries with less 
than one million inhabitants are excluded (1991: 43), and in Arend Lijphart’s 
Patterns of Democracy no countries with less than a quarter of a million people 
are analyzed (1999: 52). Even though the resulting number and proportion of 
excluded states may be quite high, many scholars do not provide any motivation 
or justification for their decision to leave out microstates. The academics that do 
give explanations for excluding small states often rely on somewhat questionable 
or unconvincing reasons. From a scientific perspective it seems hard to think of 
any persuasive reasons that would justify the omission of a large group of cases, 
especially in light of the broadly accepted view that all available observations (or 
a representative sample of this) should be analyzed in order to avoid selection 
bias. The generalizability and applicability of comparative political studies to 
small states can be questioned if no small states are included in these analyses in 
the first place. 
A survey of the most well-known and renowned publications in the field 
of comparative politics and democracy demonstrates that a variety of reasons 
                                                
1 There are different ideas about what a ‘microstate’ is. In the second chapter of this dissertation I 
motivate and defend my decision to apply the term to the (twenty-one) UN-member states with 
less than 250.000 inhabitants, and in the remainder of the book I refer to this group of states 





are applied to exclude microstates. Among the most recurrent and prominent 
motivations are: 
 
1)  that microstates represent only a tiny proportion of the world’s 
population (e.g. Moore 1995: 7); 
2)  that microstates are not ‘real’ or fully independent states (e.g. 
Vanhanen 1997: 61); 
3)  that other authors in this academic field exclude microstates as well 
(e.g. Lijphart 1999: 52); 
4)  that there is a structural lack of data on microstates (e.g. Powell 
1984: 4). 
 
The first of these arguments alludes to the relative insignificance of microstates, 
and authors who refer to this reason often also mention the fact that microstates 
are unknown to the larger public. If the overall aim of comparative political 
research is however to derive knowledge from the comparison of different 
political systems, it is not clear why the number of people that a system serves 
should be a factor of significance. In terms of scientific value, each case, no 
matter how small, can derive new insights into the workings of politics. As a 
matter of fact, it could actually be argued that more knowledge can be acquired 
by studying the systems of contemporarily understudied nations, instead of 
those that we already know much about.  
The second argument can be seen as an attempt to set microstates apart 
from other states, by denying them the classification as a state. The validity of 
this argument is dependent on the specific definition of a ‘state’ that is employed. 
On this point, microstates however relatively easily meet the most common 
criteria of statehood;2 all of them have a certain territory and population, and all 
(being UN-members) are recognized as sovereign states by other states. 
According to Tatu Vanhanen, microstates are excluded in his study because “the 
nature of their political institutions may depend more on foreign support than on 
domestic factors” (Vanhanen 1997: 61). This hypothesis is however not 
subjected to any empirical test, and even if it were true the question remains 
whether this does not also go for many larger states, and why it would be a 
decisive factor in the first place. 
                                                
2 As they were first codified in the Peace of Westphalia (1648), which is contemporarily still 





The third and fourth arguments are related to each other, in the sense that 
the application of them actually contributes to the problem that the fourth 
motivation refers to. In his book, Lijphart for example argues that: 
 
“In comparative analyses of democracy, the smallest and least 
populous ministates are usually excluded; the cutoff point tends to 
vary between populations of one million and of a quarter of a million. 
Here, too, I opted to be inclusive by selecting the lower cutoff point” 
(Lijphart 1999: 52). 
 
Although the initial reason for selecting any cutoff point is not made explicit in 
this reasoning, it is likely to result from a lack of data. In similar fashion, the lack 
of data-argument might elucidate Huntington’s explanation that “[b]ecause of 
their small size they [microstates, WV] are, unless stated to the contrary, 
excluded from analyses of third wave countries in this study” (Huntington 1991: 
43). Whereas it is true that there is a structural lack of data on microstates, it can 
be asserted that this is primarily a consequence of the fact that earlier studies 
and databases excluded these countries, and it appears that this pattern can only 
be reversed if future studies would decide to pay attention to this group of 
countries as well.  
The exclusion of microstates potentially creates another problem: it can 
introduce biases in the existing analyses. In global comparative studies that 
exclude microstates, a regional bias can be identified due to the clustering of 
microstates in two world regions: the Caribbean and Oceania.3 In addition 
however, precisely because so little is known about microstates, it is at present 
largely unclear to what extent their political systems differ from those of larger 
states. This may be especially problematic for studies that aim to assess 
worldwide patterns of democracy and democratization, since the results of these 
analyses could be distorted as a result of microstate-exclusion. Finally, perhaps 
the most serious downside of the fact that microstates are so under-researched 
is the lack of knowledge about the operation of politics on a small scale (at the 
national level at least). Precisely on this issue, there is however increasing 
evidence suggesting that microstates are different from larger states, in the sense 
that they appear significantly more likely to develop and maintain a democratic 
system of government.  
 
 
                                                
3 This bias is reinforced by the fact that these regions primarily consist of microstates, with only a 





3. Statistics on Democracy in Microstates 
As mentioned before, in recent years several publications have highlighted the 
statistical association between smallness and democracy (e.g. Hadenius 1992: 
123-126; Diamond and Tsalik 1999: 117-119; Ott 2000: 115-121; Anckar 2002b: 
377; Srebrnik 2004: 330-332).4 In table 1.1 all UN-member states have been 
classified according to their population size5 and Freedom House-ranking of 
2011 (Freedom House 2012). Concerning population size, the countries have 
been grouped into progressively smaller categories, ranging from countries with 
less than five million inhabitants to countries with less than 100.000 people. In 
the table, the statistical association between population size and democracy is 
clearly visible; the smaller the population size category, the greater the 
proportion of ‘free’ countries. Whereas less than forty-five percent of all 193 UN-
member states can be classified as free, this figure rises to almost sixty percent 
when only the eighty countries with less than five million people are examined. 
The scores rise further to over seventy percent for countries with less than one 
million inhabitants, and to over eighty-five percent for states with populations of 
less than half a million. Among the very smallest countries in the world, the 
percentage of free countries is over ninety percent, with only a slight difference 
between the twenty-one UN-members with less than a quarter of a million 
inhabitants and the twelve ones that only have less than a hundred thousand 
people.  
In addition to the observation that the number of free countries rises 
progressively as the population size of a country decreases, the table also 
demonstrates that the proportion of outright authoritarian states (in the ‘not 
free’ category) is extremely small or even nonexistent among the very small 
states. Less than one quarter of the not free-states (eleven out of forty-eight) has 
a population size of less than five million, and among the twenty-nine countries 
with less than half a million inhabitants only one full-blown authoritarian state 
exists, which is the Sultanate of Brunei. Even though the simple categorization in 
the table speaks for itself and clearly confirms the existence of a pattern, this is 
                                                
4 It should be emphasized however, that all of these studies (except for Hadenius) use Freedom 
House-scores as a basis to measure democracy, which is a logical consequence of the fact that this 
is the only aggregate index of democracy that also takes microstates into account. Well-known 
alternatives to Freedom House such as the Polity scales and the Economist’s Democracy Index 
exclude countries with less than half a million inhabitants, and are therefore inadequate when it 
comes to examining the statistical correlation between smallness and democracy. The fact that 
almost all of the analyses on size and democracy rely on Freedom House-scores is important to 
underline, since it implies that the validity of these findings largely depends on the accuracy of 
Freedom House’s methodology and scoring mechanisms. 
5 Population size figures have been retrieved from the CIA World Factbook, which has a July 





substantiated by the chi-square and Spearman’s rho-values that have been 
presented at the bottom of the table. Both statistics demonstrate that the 
relationship between the two variables is significant at the 0.001-level, with the 
Spearman’s rho-value of 0.31 indicating that there is a moderately strong 
relationship between the variables, which is positive in the sense that as 
population size increases, the chance of a less free political system increases as 
well.6 
 
Table 1.1: Freedom House-Rankings (2011) and the Population Size of Countries 
  Not Free Partly Free Free 
 N N % N % N % 
All countries 193 48 24.9 59 30.6 86 44.6 
< 5 million inhabitants 80 11 13.8 22 27.5 47 58.8 
< 1 million inhabitants 40 4 10.0 7 17.5 29 72.5 
< 500.000 inhabitants 29 1 3.7 3 10.3 25 86.2 
< 250.000 inhabitants 21 - - 2 9.5 19 90.5 
< 100.000 inhabitants 12 - - 1 8.3 10 91.7 
χ2  28.600,  p = 0.001 
Spearman’s rho: 0.31, p < 0.001 
 
4. Research Question 
The statistics presented in table 1.1 confirm the conclusions that have been 
reached in earlier studies. Whereas microstates are persistently excluded from 
analyses of comparative democracy, statistics indicate that these countries 
constitute the most democratic group of states in the world; a situation I would 
like to refer to as the microstate-paradox. Although it is unquestionably clear 
that a statistically significant association between population size and Freedom 
House-scores exists, contemporary research has been surprisingly unsuccessful 
in finding a satisfactory explanation for this pattern (Srebrnik 2004: 339). Over 
the lengthy period of time that the scholarly debate about the issue has been 
going on, many suppositions, assumptions, ideas, and hypotheses with regard to 
the relationship between size and democracy have been formulated and 
presented, but so far none of these have been embraced as universally valid. In 
this light, it should be noted that most of the existing research is quantitative and 
statistical in nature, and has not progressed much beyond the point of revealing 
and explicating the statistically significant correlation between the variables. 
                                                
6 In the dataset, countries have been classified according to population size category (with value 
‘1’  for countries with less than 100.000 inhabitants ranging up to value ‘6’ for countries with 
more than five million) and according to Freedom House-ranking (with value ‘1’ for ‘free’ 
countries and value ‘3’ for ‘not free’ countries). As the value of the population size category 
increases, the proportion of ‘partly free’ and ‘not free’ countries increases correspondingly; hence 





Often, the lack of information and knowledge on microstates which results from 
a lack of (scholarly) attention is cited as a justification for this quantitative bias. 
As a consequence however, more in-depth, qualitative and comparative analyses 
of microstate-democracy are exceptionally rare, and the very few that do exist do 
not examine the very smallest countries in the world. 
The current study aims to fill this gap in academic understanding by 
employing a more comprehensive, qualitative approach to the question of how 
politics and democracy are affected by a small population size. Specifically, in the 
present analysis the more quantitative Freedom House-based material and data 
is left aside, to make room for a more rigorous, in-depth investigation of the 
practical consequences of smallness for a political system. Whereas the findings 
of the analysis may shed light on the long-standing question why size and 
democracy appear to be related, this study recognizes that answers to this 
question cannot be found as long as the specific political effects of size are 
insufficiently understood. In order to fully assess the consequences of size for the 
functioning and performance of democracy, as will be explained in detail in 
chapter four this latter concept is defined along the lines of Dahl’s dimensions of 
contestation and inclusiveness (1971). As a consequence, the research question 
that this study aims to address can be formulated as follows: 
 
“What are the consequences of a small population size for the nature 
of democratic contestation and inclusiveness?” 
 
It is important to underline that the lack of data has compelled earlier studies 
(e.g. Dahl and Tufte 1973) to address this question from a more theoretical 
perspective, the present analysis is (one of) the first to make an attempt to find 
empirical answers, by conducting an in-depth qualitative analysis of four 
microstates around the globe. 
 
5. Scientific and Societal Relevance of the Study 
As mentioned above, small states are usually excluded from comparative political 
research. As a consequence of the lack of academic attention, not much is known 
about this group of cases, and especially not from a comparative political 
perspective. The few case studies of individual small states that have emerged in 
recent decades do shed some light on the political systems of these states, but 
this information is not extrapolated to the broader notion of the influence of 
smallness on democracy. In terms of the scientific relevance of this research 





group of relatively unknown and unstudied cases must be emphasized. In this 
respect, the findings of the analysis can also be compared to the scarce material 
that already exists on small states (e.g. Freedom House-scores), in order to 
function as an extra check on the reliability and accuracy of these publications. In 
addition, the results of the present study could provide extra incentives to other 
scholars to include microstates in their samples, which would be a development 
of which the entire field of research on comparative politics and democracy 
could benefit. 
In addition to the importance of examining an unfamiliar group of 
countries, the apparent proclivity of small states to democratic forms of 
government is scientifically appealing. Whereas the establishment of democracy 
in developing countries has been quite a challenge, small states appear to 
constitute a major exception to this pattern. Moreover, small states also appear 
to contradict some of the variables that have emerged from the democratization-
literature as democracy-stimulating. For example, there is a broad strand of 
literature with identifies economic development as one of the strongest 
stimulators of democratic development; an assumption that is also known under 
the label of modernization theory (cf. Lipset 1959; Przeworski et al. 1996). 
However, many small, democratic states in the Pacific or Africa are among the 
least developed countries in the world, yet continue to produce democratically 
elected governments. In addition, these small states also constitute a falsification 
of the belief that democracy can only exist in ‘Western’ settings (Huntington 
1996). Smallness thus appears to have the capacity to overcome the otherwise 
supposedly democracy-undermining aspects of poverty and a non-Western 
cultural and societal background, and one potential conclusion of the present 
research may be that smallness should be added to the existing list of 
democracy-stimulating variables. 
From a more societal or practical political point of view, the relevance of 
the project is to be found in its contribution to the already-existing discussion on 
decentralization and devolution. In recent years, the notion of subsidiarity and 
politics-of-scale has gained prominence not only in academia (e.g. Weldon 2006) 
but also in politics, and the current study could contribute to this discussion by 
examining how smallness affects the political system at the national level. If it 
turns out that smallness is found to stimulate the development of a democratic 
political system with perhaps a higher quality of representation, the study could 
provide an extra impetus to the arguments in favor of decentralization. In 
addition, as Diamond and Tsalik (1999) note, for newly democratizing countries 





the people, as a consequence of which the chances of successful democratization 
may potentially be enhanced.  
By analyzing the political systems of microstates, it may not only be 
discovered how their smallness has affected the conduct of politics and 
democracy in these countries, but also how these countries have structured their 
political systems. In this regard, the democratic microstates may potentially 
serve as guiding examples for other new democracies. On the other hand, it is 
possible that negative effects of smallness with concern to democracy or politics 
in general are identified in the research; particularly if these phenomena can be 
observed across various and multiple small states. Depending on the nature of 
these potential shortcomings, the study could also shed light on possible 
strategies that small states can pursue in order to cope with or circumvent the 
challenges that they are facing. Since this analysis is in some ways the first 
comparative, qualitative study of small state-politics, the likelihood that as of yet 
unknown patterns will be found is relatively high. 
 
6. Outline of the Dissertation 
The research puzzle outlined in section three is addressed in the following seven 
chapters of this dissertation. In the second chapter, an historical and 
chronological overview of the existing literature on the influence of state size on 
politics and democracy is offered, which ranges from the ancient Greek 
philosophers to the present. On the basis of this overview, a number of potential 
effects of smallness may be listed, which can be employed as expectations in the 
analytical part of the dissertation. The third chapter of the dissertation focuses 
on the existing literature on small states, paying attention to the major political 
features that emerge from the relatively rich case study-literature on 
microstates. Although quite a number of remarkable political features can be 
extrapolated from the analyses of these small states, the findings of these 
publications are mostly not connected to the debate on the effects of smallness, 
which is therefore the principal aim of the third chapter. Chapter four briefly 
summarizes the main issues and expectations that follow from the two 
theoretical chapters, after which a theoretical model for the current study is 
outlined and presented, and a number of expectations are formulated. 
Additionally, in this chapter extensive attention is paid to methodological issues 
such as case selection.  
In chapters five to eight, the findings of the field research and in-depth 
analysis of the four cases that have been selected for comparison is presented 





the Republic of San Marino and the Federation of St. Kitts and Nevis in chapters 
five and six, attention is paid to those of the Republic of Seychelles and the 
Republic of Palau in chapters seven and eight. Each of these chapters concludes 
with an assessment of the influence of size on these countries’ political systems 
and democracy. Chapter nine, finally, is a concluding chapter in which the 
findings of the four case studies are compared and contrasted, in order to find 
out on which aspects these countries are politically similar, and where the 
differences between them can be observed. In addition, in this conclusion some 
suggestions for future research are offered. 
As mentioned before, in the chapters to come it appears that many 
comparable patterns and findings emerge from the in-depth analyses of the 
political systems of the four microstates. In all four of them, political contestation 
is basically driven by interpersonal rivalries rather than ideological and 
programmatic differences. In addition, to a greater or lesser extent the politics of 
all four microstates are characterized by the dominant position of the 
government vis-à-vis other institutions, which can impede on the functioning of 
the legislature and the political opposition, the judiciary, the media, and the civil 
service. Regarding inclusiveness and participation, it is found that the closeness 
between citizens and politicians primarily serves to enhance particularistic 
tendencies, which is demonstrated by the predominance of patron-client 
relationships in all four cases. Although electoral participation figures are found 
to be comparatively high, it also appears that voting behavior and turnout can 
chiefly be explained by the particularistic considerations that are at the root of 
them. In summary therefore, it can not only be ascertained that size does have a 
major impact on the conduct of politics and the specific nature of democracy in 
microstates, but also that smallness in some ways seems to weaken or 










From Plato to the Present 
 
The Theoretical Debate on Size and Democracy 
 
 
1. Introduction: the Influence of Geographical Factors on Politics 
The notion that geographical factors have an influence on societies and cultures is 
broadly accepted in the social sciences. The presence or absence of water, 
mountains, deserts, forests, and rivers affects the way people live, as does for 
example the climate zone in which a particular society or civilization evolves. In 
an article on the sociological impact of insularity, David Pitt for example highlights 
how geographical boundaries and physical remoteness and isolation influence 
social dynamics and identities (1980: 1054).1 The extent to which these factors 
also affect politics is another issue however, and is the subject of an extensive and 
ongoing debate. Matters of this sort have generally been dismissed or have not 
found their way into mainstream political science, perhaps because of the 
deterministic character of their presumptions and the fact that geographical 
circumstances are ‘fixed’, in the sense that they do now allow for human 
modification (Ott 2000: 18-19).  
Out of the many geographical factors that can be supposed to impinge on 
politics, a lot of scholarly attention has been directed toward geographical 
isolation or remoteness. Although isolation can also result from geographical 
factors such as mountains and deserts, the geographical barriers caused by water 
have figured most prominently in the literature, in which insularity (or 
‘islandness’) has occasionally and repeatedly been proposed as a feature that 
affects politics (Dommen 1980; Selwyn 1980; Anckar and Anckar 1995; Clague et 
al. 2001; Srebrnik 2004). Due to the fact that many of the world’s smallest states 
are island nations and vice versa, the variable of insularity is often linked to state 
size, rendering it sometimes hard to disentangle the separate effects of the two 
variables (Anckar 2008a: 436-437; Gerring and Zarecki 2011: 12). The primary 
independent variable of the present analysis is state size, but many of the 
microstates that are investigated in the remainder of this dissertation are indeed 
                                                
1 In this article, Pitt point specifically to ‘social islands’, as opposed to natural or geographical 
islands. In particular, attention is paid to social boundaries on islands, which leads to ethnocentric 
attitudes and stronger feelings of collectiveness, even though many islands are vulnerable and 





also island nations.2 Furthermore, the political effects of both variables are 
supposed to be of a largely similar nature, since both political and oceanic 
boundaries create the social and psychological isolation that is hypothesized to 
affect politics. Even though the focus of the present analysis is on smallness and 
not on insularity, it should therefore be kept in mind that the two variables are 
closely related and interconnected.3 
In addition to its influence on politics and - more specifically - democracy, 
state size has also been hypothesized to explain variations in for example 
economic development or foreign policy and international relations. Whereas 
these phenomena are obviously linked to politics and democracy, in the present 
chapter I will only occasionally touch upon them and focus primarily on the direct 
political consequences of state size as they are supposed to affect the likelihood 
and quality of democratic governance. In the next chapter, where the academic 
literature on the different characteristics of microstate-politics and -democracy is 
discussed, more attention will be paid to some of the economic, historical, 
international political and sociological features of this particular group of 
countries, even though the focus remains explicitly on the political consequences 
of size.  
Although state size is currently not regarded as a major explanatory factor 
of democracy, the philosophical and academic debate about the relation between 
the two variables has been going on for centuries, if not millennia. In the present 
chapter, a largely chronological overview is given of this theoretical debate, which 
ranges all the way from the ancient Greek philosophers to the present. As this 
outline reveals, academic thinking about size has been marked by major 
fluctuations over time. Whereas smallness was broadly deemed to be an asset in 
some centuries, at other times it was perceived to be a disadvantage or even a 
threat. Each of the sections in this chapter covers one of such periods, and all 
sections conclude with a summary of the main theories and expectations that 
follow from the literature of that time, and their implications for the nature of 
microstate-democracy. Weather implicitly or explicitly, a large part of the 
                                                
2 Exceptions are the four European microstates (Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco, and San Marino). 
3 In several publications in which the effects of both insularity and size on democracy are 
examined, the interconnectedness of these variables is further confirmed (Hadenius 1992; Clague 
et al. 2001; Congdon Fors 2007). However much the variables are overlapping in terms of either 
their political effects or the classification of countries, from an analytical and theoretical 
perspective it however appears practical to keep them separated, especially since large island 
states or small continental and landlocked countries (i.e. cases in which only one of the two 
variables is present) might score markedly different from the other cases. In this context, the 
present study is explicitly focused on state size, and therefore only examines island states that fall 





literature that is discussed in the current chapter departs from a certain 
conceptualization and operationalization of the size-variable. In chapter 4, which 
deals with conceptual and methodological issues, the specific definition of state 
size that is employed in the present study is outlined and motivated.  
 
2. Small is Good: from Plato to Rousseau 
The debate about the influence of state size on politics and government goes all 
the way back to the ancient Greek philosophers.4 Whereas the ancient Greek city-
states (the poleis) had varying organizational structures, their relative smallness 
and geographical proximity to each other allowed the Greek thinkers to accurately 
estimate and theorize about the political effects of size. In light of the ubiquity of 
small city-states, it is perhaps unsurprising that essentially all sources from this 
time emphasize the benefits of smallness for the quality of politics. In their 
writings, Plato and Aristotle highlight the virtues of smallness with regard to 
effective and high-quality government, and statesmen like Pericles are known to 
have expressed more or less similar views. Whereas the ancient Greeks had 
differences of opinion with regard to the desirability of democracy, they generally 
did agree on the inherent advantages of smallness. In fact, a variety of arguments 
in favor of smallness can be observed in the writings of Plato and Aristotle, who 
primarily emphasize the significance of face-to-face contacts between citizens 
(Plato 1960: 771; Aristotle 1996: 1326b). Plato refers to the presence of “mutual 
intimate acquaintance and social intercourse of all kinds” as the major advantage 
of smallness, whereas Aristotle stresses that citizens “must know each other’s 
characters” in order to judge and to distribute offices by merit (ibid.). According to 
Aristotle, the election to offices and the decision of lawsuits will go wrong if 
citizens do not have knowledge of each other, because then these will be settled 
haphazardly (Aristotle 1996: 1326b).5  
In the fifth and sixth books of Plato’s renowned dialogue (The) Laws, 
several notions with regard to the size of the polis are being presented, which 
according to Plato should be adhered to in order to prevent for an “excessive glut 
of population” (Plato 1960: 740). With regard to the size of the territory of the 
state, Plato argues that it should be large enough for the satisfactory conservation 
of a certain number of men, but not larger (Plato 1960: 737). The adequate 
population size of a state is, according to Plato, dependent on the territorial size of 
                                                
4 For an extensive discussion of the writings of various philosophers on state size, cf. Dahl and 
Tufte (1973); chapter one. 
5 This argument is interesting because, as becomes clear later on, one of the later objections to 
smallness focuses exactly on the fact that public officials of small states know many citizens in 





a state, and on the characteristics of the neighbors of the state (ibid.). However, 
Plato mentions the (quite specific) number of 5.040 citizens as an optimal 
population size.6 In any case, he argues, the population should not become too 
large and should be kept constant; as an ultimate solution to disproportionate 
population growth Plato proposes the transportation of citizens to colonies (Plato 
1960: 737).  
In Aristotle’s Politics, it becomes clear that this philosopher has similar 
ideas about the proper size of a state as his tutor, since he notes that “experience 
shows that a very populous city can rarely, if ever, be well governed” (Aristotle 
1996: 1326a). Hence, according to Aristotle, there must be an upper limit to the 
number of inhabitants of a state (or city). Unlike Plato, Aristotle does not mention 
a specific number as the maximum ceiling of population size, but he does argue 
that a state must be large enough to be self-sufficient, yet small enough to be 
capable of constitutional government (Aristotle 1996: 1326b). Aristotle 
furthermore warns for the risk that strangers and foreigners could acquire the 
rights of citizens, seeing that in large states, nobody would identify them as 
strangers (ibid.). The philosopher not only discusses the appropriate population 
size of a state, but also the size of its territory. In this regard, it is being 
emphasized that the state must be large enough to be self-sufficient, but also that 
it must be large enough to “enable the inhabitants to live at once temperately and 
liberally in the enjoyment of leisure” (Aristotle 1996: 1326b). On the other hand, 
Aristotle however argues that the territory and the citizens “should be taken in at 
a single view”, because a small and succinct country is easier to defend than a 
larger and less well-organized one (ibid.). 
The emphasis of Plato and Aristotle on the desirability of intimate, face-
to-face relations between citizens has remained one of the most prominent 
arguments in the theoretical literature on smallness, and even contemporary 
authors refer to this advantage in explaining the association between smallness 
and democracy. Regarding (representative) democracy, in addition to intimate 
and personal relations between citizens themselves, the opportunity of face-to-
face contacts between citizens and public officials is of obvious significance. 
According to contemporary advocates of smallness, the proximity between 
                                                
6 The main reason Plato has for selecting this specific number is that 5.040 can be divided by all 
other numbers from 1 to 12, except 11 (Plato 1960: 771). Hence, the citizens and the land of the 
state could be adequately subdivided into smaller parts. It should be kept in mind that the figure of 
5.040 corresponds to the number of heads of households, and that females, slaves, and foreigners 
are not included in this figure. The number of 5.040 households would correspond to a number of 






citizens and their representatives generates increased levels of political efficacy, 
awareness, participation, and, eventually, legitimacy, which in one way or another 
are all supposed to contribute to democratic government (Dahl and Tufte 1973: 
65, 87-88). Furthermore, contemporary analyses on the sub-national level 
demonstrate that smaller polities and municipalities are indeed marked by higher 
levels of attitudinal homogeneity (Black 1974; Kasarda and Janowitz 1974; Wilson 
1986). At the same time however, as will be discussed later on, intimate face-to-
face contacts and homogeneity of attitudes are currently not exclusively regarded 
as a positive quality, as various scholars now primarily tend to emphasize the 
democracy-undermining effects of such relationships. 
The belief that small state size is a virtue when it comes to the quality of 
government remained widely embraced well after the ancient Greeks, and is also 
expressed in the publications of for example Montesquieu and Rousseau. However 
much politics had changed since the Classic times, city-states were still common 
political systems in the European Renaissance and Enlightenment-eras, meaning 
that the advantages and disadvantages of smallness could easily be witnessed and 
examined in reality. As the main alternative to small city-states, the map of Europe 
was comprised of several large empires, which without exceptions were ruled as 
autocracies or monarchies. In addition to reiterating the emphasis of the Greek 
philosophers on face-to-face contacts, and by contrasting small city-states with 
some of these larger empires, in their writings Montesquieu and Rousseau add the 
arguments that smallness fosters liberal government (in which individual rights 
and liberties are respected), and generates increased political involvement and 
efficacy of citizens. Moreover, these thinkers emphasize that the limited distance 
between citizens and their representatives also results in amplified feelings of 
emotional attachment to the public interest among citizens (Rousseau 1995: II, 
101). In light of their significance in relation to politics and democratic 
governance, it is no wonder that these lines of argument still figure prominently in 
the literature on the political consequences of size.  
In Montesquieu’s De l’Esprit des Lois it is being argued that a republic, in 
contrast to a monarchy or a despotic government, has to be small in order to 
survive (Montesquieu 1949: VIII, 16). The theoretical basis for this supposition is 
that only in a small republic, citizens will have a good overview and attachment to 
the public good; in greater republics interests become “particularized” (ibid.). 
According to Montesquieu, “in a small one [republic, WV], the interest of the 
public is more obvious, better understood, and more within the reach of every 





(Montesquieu 1949: VIII, 16).7 However, not only is a republic only able to survive 
when it is small, but smallness also unavoidably leads to a decrease in 
authoritarianism; a small monarchical state would eventually transform itself into 
a republic (Montesquieu 1949: VIII, 17). For Montesquieu, the size of the state is 
therefore directly and inevitably related to the nature of its regime; small states 
are naturally governed as republics, whereas “a large empire supposes a despotic 
authority in the person who governs” (1949: VII, 19). 
In Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Du Contrat Social, Montesquieu’s view that the 
size of the state is inextricably connected to the nature of its government is 
confirmed. According to Rousseau, “democratic government suits small states, 
aristocratic government those of middle size, and monarchy great ones” 
(Rousseau 1995: II, 108). Just as there is an appropriate size for a human being, 
there too is a ‘natural’ size for a state, Rousseau argues. In fact, he reiterates 
Aristotle’s argument that the state must be large enough in order to be 
sustainable, yet small enough to be adequately governed (Rousseau 1995: II, 88). 
Additionally, the argument of emotional detachment is introduced, as Rousseau 
argues that in large states, “the people have less affection for their rulers, whom 
they never see, for their country, which, to their eyes, seems like the world, and 
for their fellow-citizens, most of whom are unknown to them” (ibid.). Hence, 
Rousseau emphasizes that in a democracy citizens should have access to their 
political leaders, and they should be able to communicate with each other.  
Another argument in favor of a small-sized state that Rousseau introduces 
relates to the extent of influence of individual citizens; in a state with a small 
number of inhabitants, the political influence of one person is much larger than in 
a state with a large number of inhabitants (Rousseau 1995: II, 100-101). For 
Rousseau influence is directly related to freedom, since a small state in which 
citizens have more influence will also be characterized by a greater degree of 
liberty (ibid.). Population size is thus invariably associated with liberty, 
attachment to the public interest, and the nature of government: Rousseau argues 
that “the less relation the particular wills have to the general will (…), the more 
should the repressive force be increased. The government, then, to be good, 
should be proportionately stronger as the size of the population increases” 
                                                
7 Montesquieu specifically discourages large republics, and envisages that people in large states 
will lose sight of the public interest: “[i]n an extensive republic there are men of large fortunes, and 
consequently of less moderation; there are trusts too considerable to be placed in any single 
subject; he has interests of his own; he soon begins to think that he may be happy and glorious, by 
oppressing his fellow-citizens; and that he may raise himself to grandeur on the ruins of his 
country. (…) In an extensive republic, the public good is sacrificed to a thousand private views; it is 





(Rousseau 1995: II, 101). As a final point, Rousseau also distinguishes between 
the population size and the territorial size of the state. For a state to be successful 
the two must be in harmony with each other, which means that the territory can 
maintain all inhabitants, and that there are as many inhabitants as the territory 
can provide for (Rousseau 1995: II, 90).  
   
Table 2.1: The Effects of Size According to the Classic Literature 
Argument: Expressed By: Expectation for Microstates: 
Smallness creates increased 
community cohesion due to 
face-to-face contacts and 





Increased cohesiveness and 
social intimacy among citizens 
In small states, citizens have a 
better notion of the public 
interest, and are more 
emotionally attached to it due 








Increased political awareness 




Small states are more likely to 
be governed in a republican, 
liberal, or democratic manner 
than larger states, because 







Increased liberty, political 
influence, efficacy, and 
participation among citizens 
 
The advantages of smallness as they are outlined by Montesquieu and 
Rousseau can be seen as additions to the points made by Plato and Aristotle. The 
notion that smallness generates increased attachment to the public good and 
higher levels of citizen involvement still figures prominently in the more modern 
academic literature, and the argument that it fosters more liberal forms of 
government is endorsed by many contemporary scholars as well. It can thus be 
seen that well into the 18th century, the dominant belief in political thought with 
regard to state size remained that smallness was to be valued. In table 2.1, the 
three principal arguments that emerge from this classic literature have been 
presented, combined with the names of the thinkers that have expressed them. In 
the third column, the expectations with regard to the characteristics of small 








3. Small is Bad: Nationalism and the Founding Fathers 
Whereas the Enlightenment-philosophers still vigorously advocated a limited 
state size, this position rapidly became less fashionable over the course of the 19th 
century, as various thinkers now started to emphasize the benefits of largeness. 
This transformation in political thought was partly a consequence of new ideas 
and suppositions, but was also in large part fueled by real-life political events. 
City-states remained common political organizations throughout the Middle-Ages, 
Renaissance, and Enlightenment, even though larger empires and monarchies 
existed in these periods as well. Present-day Germany, the Low Countries, 
Switzerland, and most notably Northern Italy used to be carved up in numerous 
city-states, principalities, and other petty states, which varied extensively in the 
extent to which they allowed for the participation of citizens in political affairs. In 
large part, the writings of especially Rousseau were based on real-time 
observations in small states like Venice, Corsica, and of course his own birthplace 
of Geneva. 
However, as the French Revolution unfolded and the political ideology of 
nationalism spread across Europe, many city-states were absorbed into larger 
political units, culminating in the Italian and German unifications of 1861 and 
1871 respectively. On the other side of the Atlantic, the American Revolution and 
Declaration of Independence had already in 1776 resulted in the creation of a very 
large, yet republican and liberal state, thereby demonstrating the fallaciousness of 
the assumption that republicanism and liberty could only exist in small polities. As 
Lake and O’Mahony demonstrate, the average size of states increased from 1815 
onwards, and reached a peak in the late 19th century (2004: 701-703). Around 
1880 small city-states had all but disappeared from the European political scene, 
and among the very few ones that lingered are the contemporary European 
microstates of San Marino, Monaco, and Liechtenstein.8    
In conjunction with the practical vanishing of small states, a new 
theoretical perspective on state size emerged in this period, emphasizing the 
advantages of largeness instead of smallness. Among the first thinkers to express 
this new line of opinion were the U.S. Founding Fathers Alexander Hamilton, 
Thomas Jefferson, and James Madison, whose views on size are among others 
articulated in the Federalist Papers. At the American Constitutional Convention in 
1787, state size and decentralization were actually among the most hotly debated 
issues, and several Founding Fathers closely reappraised and reexamined 
                                                
8 Andorra is also a European microstate, but never was an independent city-state. Instead, it used 
to be a suzerainty jointly ruled by the President of France and the Bishop of Urgell, and until the 





Montesquieu’s and Rousseau’s ideas on this issue. In the Federalist Papers, 
Hamilton and Madison discuss some of the notions of Montesquieu and Rousseau 
regarding size, but arrive at rather different conclusions. For example, in The 
Federalist number 9, Hamilton sketches a pretty grim picture of the consequences 
of applying Montesquieu’s ideas about state size to the United States;  
 
“If we therefore take his [Montesquieu’s, WV] ideas on this point as the criterion of 
truth, we shall be driven to the alternative either of taking refuge at once in the arms 
of monarchy, or of splitting ourselves into an infinity of little, jealous, clashing, 
tumultuous commonwealths, the wretched nurseries of unceasing discord and the 
miserable objects of universal pity or contempt” (Hamilton 2008: IX, 45-46).  
 
Hamilton’s negative interpretation of Montesquieu’s arguments seems to relate 
primarily to stability and peace; small states are deemed more likely to generate 
conflict and turmoil. According to Hamilton, the advantages of small size and large 
size can be combined by creating a confederation of states (Hamilton 2008: IX, 46-
47). In such a political system, the security of the states would be guaranteed by 
their (military) cooperation, whereas the states would still be allowed to govern 
themselves. 
In The Federalist number 10, James Madison discusses Montesquieu’s 
assertion that smallness leads to less particularized and more homogenous 
interests and a stronger appreciation of the public good among citizens. Contrary 
to Montesquieu however, Madison believes that republicanism is enhanced when 
the interests of the population diverge; 
  
“The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and interests, 
the more frequently will a majority be found of the same party; and the smaller the 
number of individuals composing a majority, and the smaller the compass within 
which they are placed, the more easily will they concert and execute their plans of 
oppression. Extend the sphere and you take in a greater variety of parties and 
interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common 
motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or is such a common motive exists, it will 
be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength and to act in unison 
with each other” (Madison 2008: X, 54).  
 
Whereas Madison thus supports Montesquieu’s idea that smallness leads to more 
homogenous interests, he argues that this is actually a disadvantage for a republic, 
because Madison believes that pluralism will create the conditions for liberalism.9 
If there are many different interests and factions within society, according to 
Madison the danger that one faction will attempt to dominate other factions is 
reduced, since the other factions can join forces to counterbalance the dominating 
                                                
9 In this light, Madison’s argument can be translated into the existence of more and stronger 
checks and balances on executive power, which not only consists of the presence of a political 






faction. Furthermore, whereas it would be possible that a faction acquires 
supremacy in one state of the confederation, this influence is according to 
Madison very unlikely to extend to the other states in the union.  
In line with Hamilton and Madison, Thomas Jefferson also advocates a 
large rather than a small republic, and especially emphasizes the virtues of 
representative democracy as opposed to direct democracy (cf. Dahl and Tufte 
1973: 9). Although Jefferson is especially known for advocating a weak central 
government in combination with strong state governments, he also believed that 
representative democracy enables the existence of republican government on a 
large scale, thereby rendering Montesquieu’s reservations about a large state size 
basically obsolete. In various letters, Jefferson asserted that “democracy is the 
only pure republic, but impracticable beyond the limits of a town” (Jefferson 
1893: 15: 65).10 Instead of this ‘pure’ form of democracy, Jefferson believed that 
representation would be a next-best solution to organize politics in the United 
States with its vast dimensions. 
Madison’s and Jefferson’s arguments on the advantages of largeness have 
been opposed by the Anti-Federalists, most notably in Clinton’s Cato, number 3, 
where it is argued that a perfect union can never be established in a state with 
such vast dimensions (Storing 1981: chapter 3). However, the establishment of a 
democratic political system in the United States of America and its consolidation 
and achievements in the decennia that followed unmistakably revealed that a 
republic can exist in (very) large settings as well, albeit in a representative instead 
of a direct form. In combination with the rise of nationalism and the concept of the 
nation-state, this development principally led to the demise of the idea that 
democracy can only exist in small settings. The 19th-century views with regard to 
state size are also expressed in John Stuart Mill’s Representative Government:  
 
“When the conditions exist for the formation of efficient and durable Federal Unions, 
the multiplication of them is always a benefit to the world. (…). By diminishing the 
number of those petty states which are not equal to their own defense, it weakens the 
temptations to an aggressive policy, whether working directly by arms, or through 
the prestige of superior power. It of course puts an end to war and diplomatic 
quarrels, and usually also to restrictions on commerce, between the States composing 
the Union; while, in reference to neighboring nations, the increased military strength 
                                                
10 Specifically, in his letter to John Taylor Jefferson also wrote that “[i]t must be acknowledged that 
the term republic is of very vague application in every language. (…). Were I to assign to this term a 
precise and definite idea, it means a government by its citizens in mass, acting directly and 
personally according to rules established by the majority; and that every other government is 
more or less republican in proportion as it has in its composition more or less of this ingredient of 
direct action of the citizens. Such a government is evidently restrained to very narrow limits of 






conferred by it is of a kind to be almost exclusively available for defensive, scarcely at 
all for aggressive, purposes” (Mill 1975: XVII, 398). 
 
Just like Hamilton and Madison, Mill thus also promotes a federation of small 
states instead of a large number of independent republics. The argument is 
different however; whereas Madison mainly addresses the benefits of diverging 
interests in a large state, in line with Hamilton’s ideas Mill argues that large 
(federal) states will generally be less aggressive towards their neighbors, and the 
temptation to go to war will be diminished.  
 
Table 2.2: The Effects of Size According to the Late 18th and 19th-Century Literature 
Argument: Expressed By: Expectation for Microstates: 
Smallness leads to more 







homogeneity among citizens 
In small states, a majority of 
citizens can more easily 
oppress the minority, due to 
the decreased number of 




Decreased number of political 
alternatives, interests, and 
factions 
 
Decreased liberty for political 
minorities 
Whereas direct democracy is 
suitable for small states, 
republicanism on a large scale 





Increased tendency to forms 
of direct democracy 
 
Seeing that Hamilton’s and Mill’s objections to smallness are primarily 
related to international politics, Madison and Jefferson are the primary ones to 
challenge the domestic political arguments advanced by Montesquieu and 
Rousseau. Rather than contradicting their claims however, these Founding 
Fathers turn them upside down by arguing that face-to-face relations and 
homogenous interests (regardless of their relation to the public good) are a peril 
rather than an asset when it comes to liberal government, and by arguing that 
representative democracy facilitates republicanism on a large scale. Until at least 
the end of the First World War, when the German, Ottoman, Russian, and Austro-
Hungarian Empires collapsed, the European trend with regard to state size was 
also towards larger instead of smaller countries. Whereas the appearance of many 
new, smaller states after 1918 may be interpreted as a reversal of this pattern, 
this phenomenon can be more adequately explained on the basis of the 





state than as a renaissance in thinking about state size. The two main arguments 
with regard to the political effects of size that follow from the late 18th and 19th-
century literature have been summarized in table 2.2. 
 
4. Small is Vulnerable: the Post-War Perspective 
After the two World Wars, academic theorizing about the consequences of state 
size and smallness shifted to the domain of foreign policy and international 
relations. Studies of small state-international behavior from the 1950s and 1960s 
reflect the pessimistic or realist view of international relations at the time, and 
primarily discuss strategies that small states can pursue in order to guarantee 
their survival (Fox 1959; Vandenbosch 1964; Rothstein 1966, 1968; Vital 1967; 
Sveics 1969). It should be noted however, that the small states described and 
analyzed in these publications would presently not be regarded as very small. In 
her analysis of small state-behavior during the Second World War, Annette Baker 
Fox examines the diplomatic strategies pursued by Turkey, Finland, Norway, 
Sweden, and Spain, and finds that a policy of abstinence and neutrality may be 
successfully pursued if larger powers can be convinced of the advantages of the 
neutrality of these states (1959: 180-181). After having analyzed the cases of 
Czechoslovakia, Israel, and Finland, David Vital reaches similar conclusions, 
ominously emphasizing that “in an international conflict (…) there can be no 
simple and straightforward compensation for material weakness” (1967: 129). 
The best strategy for small state-survival, therefore, is based on cooperation in 
international organizations (Vital 1967: 129-131). Vital furthermore points to the 
fact that in small states, the link between domestic and foreign policy is more 
obvious than in large states. 
Taking the lessons of Fox and Vital to the Cold War-context, Robert 
Rothstein argues that a position of non-alignment is sometimes tactically viable 
for small states, but only in the case of a bipolar power structure (Rothstein 1966: 
404-405; 1968: 32-37). Rothstein further mentions the fact that small states are 
highly supportive of international organizations, and explains this by the fact that 
these organizations are generally based on equality between their member-states 
(Rothstein 1968: 39-41). This conclusion is shared by Amry Vandenbosch, who 
argues that the UN Security Council was actually created by large states because 
“their interests ran the risk of being swamped by the multiplicity of small states” 
(1964: 299). According to these authors, the UN can be seen as “a great boon” for 
small states, and the fear that they would dominate international organizations 
has been expressed by other contemporary scholars as well (Rapoport 1968; 





emphasizing that small states must rely on their socio-political strength resulting 
from the fact that they are close-knit communities (1969: 39). Small states can 
pursue a strategy of ‘national resistance’, which essentially entails resistance to 
the aggressor on the basis of ‘the spiritual strength of the community’ (Sveics 
1969: 69). This argument traces back to the earlier mentioned ideas of Aristotle, 
Montesquieu, and Rousseau, as it relates to the increased community cohesion 
and attachment to the public interest among small state-citizens. 
Whereas the military disadvantages of smallness were emphasized in 
later publications as well (Schou and Brundtland 1971; Plischke 1977; Harden 
1985; Espíndola 1987), the pessimism of the early postwar period also gave way 
to thinking in terms of opportunities (East 1973; Warrington 1998; Ingebritsen et 
al. 2006; Oest and Wivel 2008). The most recent publications in the field, which 
are regularly less theoretical and more based on real-world observations, indicate 
that microstates can actually use their sovereignty as a bargaining tool in 
international relations (e.g. Carney 1989; Sutton and Payne 1993; Stringer 2006). 
As these authors argue, the earlier mentioned equal position of small states in 
international organizations can for example be exploited by exchanging one’s vote 
for military and economic gains.11 In any case, it should be emphasized that the 
literature on smallness in relation to international relations, security, and foreign 
policy practically always conceptualizes state size in terms of military capacity. 
This choice is most straightforwardly articulated by Vandenbosch, who answers 
the question how size should be defined as follows: “obviously size alone, whether 
of population or area, is not a conclusive test. (…) The test has been military 
power, both actual and potential” (1964: 293).  
In addition to the consequences of smallness with regard to foreign 
policy, in the postwar decades many scholars began to examine the effect of state 
size on economic development and performance. Like the discussion on foreign 
policy, initially this strand of research generally entailed a fairly pessimistic view 
on small state-development, emphasizing the lack of natural and human 
resources, capital, and the inherently small domestic markets of microstates 
(Robinson 1960; Knox 1967; Selwyn 1975; Dolman 1985; Payne 1987). 
Furthermore, these studies have highlighted the dependence of small states on a 
single export commodity, as a result of which fluctuations in the world market can 
have detrimental effects on their economies (Benedict 1967a: 2-3; Knox 1967: 35-
38; Khalaf 1976: 423-424; Payne 1987: 52-53). A comparative study by Simon 
                                                
11 Carney and Sutton and Payne refer to this kind of small state-political behavior as ‘international 






Kuznets demonstrates that the share of foreign trade in small state-economies is 
generally higher, and that many small states concentrate their trade on one larger 
state, resulting in what this author calls a “satellitic” position of small states vis-à-
vis their larger neighbors (1960: 22-23). The literature on small state-economies 
also shares the deterministic outlook of the early authors on smallness and 
international relations, in stressing the fixed disadvantages of small states when it 
comes to economic development. According to Knox, the only advantage of small 
states vis-à-vis their larger counterparts is the fact that their greater levels of 
social cohesiveness allows for swift economic readjustments if these are 
necessary (1967: 44). In terms of its relevance for small state (domestic) politics, 
the notions that follow from this literature are therefore again to be found in 
greater attachment to the public good, increased levels of social cohesion, and 
vulnerability and dependency on external actors. 
Over the course of the 1960s and 1970s, the negativity with concern to 
small-state development gave way to a more ambiguous view, in which both 
advantages and disadvantages of smallness were highlighted. This transformation 
was primarily due to real-world observations, according to which small states 
were found to perform no worse, or even better than larger states in terms of 
economic development (Schumacher 1973; Khalaf 1976, 1979; Kohr 1977; 
Katzenstein 1985; Baldacchino 1993; Streeten 1993; Armstrong et al. 1998; 
Armstrong and Read 2000, 2003; Easterly and Kraay 2000; Alesina and Spolaore 
2005). In his renowned book with the indicative title Small Is Beautiful, economist 
Ernest Schumacher argues that small size may be an advantage to economic 
development, as “there is a tremendous longing and striving to profit, if at all 
possible, from the convenience, humanity, and manageability of smallness” 
(Schumacher 1973: 59). According to Schumacher, the contemporary “idolatry of 
gigantism” is unjustifiable, since “man is small, and therefore, small is beautiful” 
(1973: 61).  
Later publications have found empirical support for Schumacher’s 
arguments, and among the most prominent of these is Peter Katzenstein’s Small 
States in World Markets (1985), in which the economic success of smaller 
European states is explained on the basis of their corporatist political and 
economic arrangements. According to Katzenstein, small European states have 
been marked by greater degrees of consensus, proportional representation, 
centralization, and cohesion (1985: 87-94). These political factors are 
hypothesized to result from the vulnerability associated with smallness, which 
creates “an ideology of social partnership” (Katzenstein 2003: 11). Although these 





Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden, Switzerland, and Austria, Katzenstein emphasizes 
that the political arrangements of these countries are in large part the result of 
their size, which suggests that the arguments should also be valid for other small 
states (Katzenstein 1985: 80).  
In line with Katzenstein’s observations, the most recent scholarly works 
on the issue tend to find that small state size may actually be an advantage when it 
comes to economic growth. Easterly and Kraay, for example, find that per capita 
income levels are higher in small states than in large states, even though economic 
volatility and trade shocks are also more pervasive (2000: 15). According to these 
authors, the main economic advantage of small states is that their economies are 
generally more open, as a consequence of which they have much higher trade 
shares (Easterly and Kraay 2000: 8-10). In various publications, Harvey 
Armstrong and his colleagues argue that the group of microstates is too diverse to 
draw any universally valid conclusions about the influence of size on economic 
performance (Armstrong et al. 1998: 654; Armstrong and Read 2000). Differences 
in economic performance are found to be principally related to region, natural 
resources, and opportunities for the development of a tourism-industry.  
Another study that reaches more neutral conclusions about state size and 
economic development is Alesina and Spolaore’s The Size of Nations (2005). The 
main argument of these authors is that the association between size and economic 
growth is marked by a trade-off between the benefits of largeness and the costs of 
heterogeneity (Alesina and Spolaore 2005: 6-7, 217). Whereas a larger population 
size implies a greater market and better conditions for trade, it also implies a 
more heterogeneous and less harmonious population, and less favorable 
conditions for democracy. Furthermore, the authors find that economic success is 
primarily related to the nature of the trade regime, in the sense that small states 
generally fare better in a free-market environment, whereas trade restrictions 
seriously hamper their opportunities for economic growth (Alesina and Spolaore 
2005: 172-173). Scholars studying the association between state size and 
economic performance generally conceptualize size according to population 
figures. The limited domestic market and workforce of microstates, which many 
scholars believe to obstruct economic development, are of course directly related 
to population, and not to for example territorial or military size. The economic 
flexibility which according to for example Knox and Alesina and Spolaore results 
from amplified social cohesion in microstates, is also principally connected with 
population size. 
Although the postwar literature is primarily oriented towards the 





explicitly most of these analyses do express a number of assumptions and 
suppositions with regard to the (domestic) political effects of smallness. Whereas 
some of these theories are in line with the views that were expressed by earlier 
thinkers, others are new, and are more often based on real-world evidence and 
observations. In any case, it is remarkable that whereas this literature generally 
regards smallness as an obstacle to economic and military capacities, its 
expectations with regard to politics are much more positive. The supposed 
homogeneity of interests in smaller settings is assumed to prevent internal 
divisions and conflicts, which in turn is believed to benefit the efficiency, 
flexibility, and stability of government. Since the average state size had been 
declining again since at least the First World War (Lake and O'Mahony 2004: 703), 
these expectations could often be buttressed by empirical observations. In table 
2.3, the main arguments and theories that follow from the postwar literature on 
the effects of state size have been summarized.  
 
Table 2.3: The Effects of Size According to the Post-War Literature 
Argument: Expressed By: Expectation for Microstates: 
External threats pressures 
entail that small state-
societies are necessarily more 






Increased social cohesion 
among citizens 
Due to vulnerability, small 
states are marked by greater 
degrees of centralization, 








Increased political consensus 
and uniformity 
Small states have greater 
levels of homogeneity and 
consensus, increasing the 




Increased homogeneity of 
interests 
 
Increased chance of 
democratic government 
 
5. Small is Personal: Sociological Consequences of Smallness 
Whereas international relations and economic development thus take the 
spotlight in the postwar small-state literature, scholarly interest in domestic 
political and societal characteristics of microstates resurfaced in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s. This new academic attention and curiosity can be linked to the 
momentous process of decolonization that had already started in the early 





consequence of decolonization, the number of small states in the world rose 
rapidly, especially after many Caribbean, African, and Pacific island states gained 
independence over the course of the 1970s and 1980s. As a direct outcome of this 
development, on behalf of the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, Burton 
Benedict and others published the edited volume Problems of Smaller Territories 
(1967a), in which attention is paid to demographic, political, economic, and 
sociological aspects of small states.12 Whereas the negative and pessimistic tone of 
the early postwar publications on smallness is certainly reiterated in the volume, 
a number of new insights that deserve further discussion come up as well. 
In addition to the problems associated with economy and foreign policy, 
Benedict and his coauthors identify small state-obstacles in the fields of public 
administration, ethnic diversity, emigration, and multiple-role relationships 
(Benedict 1967a: 6-9).13 In a chapter on political aspects and consequences of 
smallness, D.P.J. Wood repeats the problems of small territories related to 
economy and foreign policy, but eventually affirms that “perhaps the gravest 
disadvantage of being small lies in the field of human relations” (Wood 1967: 33). 
According to Wood, in small societies roles of kinship are unavoidably ensnared 
with roles of office, and personal relationship therefore have a profound influence 
on public affairs; “the political decisions are left squarely with those who have 
known each other since childhood” (Wood 1967: 34). As a result, Wood argues, 
“[p]rivate roles of kinship and obligation are entangled with public roles of office”, 
with conflicts of interest as the obvious consequence (1967: 33). Whereas the 
development of intimate personal relationships and an increased sense of 
community has constituted one of the main arguments of the in favor of small 
societies from the ancient Greeks until the 1960s, for Wood the consequences of 
smallness in relation to personal relationships are chiefly negative. 
In the fourth chapter of the volume, which deals with some sociological 
aspects of smallness, Benedict discusses the question whether community 
cohesion, which was until then always seen as one of the major assets of small 
states, is an advantage or a disadvantage for a society. The answer is largely 
negative; the author emphasizes that the outcome of social cohesiveness is not 
necessarily constructive, since evidence suggests that small communities 
                                                
12 In addition, four chapters are devoted to case studies on Honduras, Luxembourg, Polynesia, and 
Swaziland. 
13 Specifically, Benedict argues that in small territories, the costs of administration will absorb a 
relatively great proportion of the national income, ethnic heterogeneity will cause greater political 
problems than in larger territories, citizens are more likely to emigrate due to a lack of economical 
and educational opportunities (resulting in a brain drain), and problems of patronage and 
clientelism that stem from multiple-role relationships. The latter pattern is also hypothesized to 





sometimes experience deep personal antagonisms and animosity between 
different persons or social groups, which certainly do not benefit the political 
system (Benedict 1967b: 49). A second political aspect of smallness that Benedict 
describes is the omnipresence and omnipotence of government (Benedict 1967b: 
53-54). Since the society of small states is so diminutive, the political elite is likely 
to dominate and be active in every section of the community, and the 
pervasiveness of government is assumed to result in clientelism and social 
dependency (ibid.). As a consequence, Benedict concludes, the development of a 
political opposition in small societies is likely to be undermined. The belief that 
smallness fosters particularistic relations between citizens and their 
representatives was earlier articulated in The Social System by the renowned 
sociologist Talcott Parsons (1951). In the volume, Parsons argues that “[s]maller 
and simpler organizations are typically managed with a high degree of 
particularism in the relations of persons in authority to their subordinates” (1951: 
508). 
The issue of government supremacy is also discussed in the last chapter 
of the volume, which deals with executive-legislative relations in small territories. 
The author of the chapter, A.W. Singham, observes that at least for the British 
West Indian territories, legislatures are habitually subordinate to the executive 
(Singham 1967: 135). Additionally, it is found that “small societies (…) present 
real difficulties in the development of harmonious relationships between the 
political executive and the civil service” (Singham 1967: 148). In small societies, 
Singham concludes, the executive, the legislature, and the administration do not 
cooperate on the basis of an equal relationship, but instead the executive 
dominates the other two institutions. Regarding the public administration, 
Singham finally notes that its costs are likely to constitute an excessive burden on 
the budgets of small states. In addition, it is noted that the civil service of small 
states is often highly politicized as a consequence of particularism, and that 
changes in government often coincide with large turnovers in the public 
administration, thereby undermining the quality and experience of the civil 
service (Singham 1967: 137-139). 
The edited volume States, Microstates, and Islands by Edward Dommen 
and Philippe Hein (1985) constitutes a second publication in which sociological 
consequences of smallness are highlighted. Of particular interest is François 
Doumenge’s chapter on the viability of small tropical islands, in which a range of 
issues leading from climatologic and geological characteristics to anthropological 
and political features are discussed. In terms of sociology, Doumenge highlights 





in island states, since insularity increases attitudes of group identity (1985: 87-90, 
102-103). According to the author, “[i]slanders are never happier with their 
insularity than when asserting that they are completely different from their 
neighbors”, which augments the risks of fragmentation and ethnic tensions 
(Doumenge 1985: 102, 113). In short, Doumenge not only challenges the 
conventional idea that small states have more homogenous and consensus-
oriented societies, but also asserts that heterogeneity may present additional risks 
and setbacks for small island states. 
Many of the issues discussed in Problems of Smaller Territories and States, 
Microstates, and Islands resurface in the edited volume Politics, Security, and 
Development in Small States (1987) that is published by Colin Clarke and Anthony 
Payne. In addition to eight case studies,14 several chapters in this volume devote 
attention to political, social, economic, and security issues in small states. 
Scholarly interest in the effects of smallness was reinvigorated in the 1980s not 
only as a consequence of the emergence of many new, sovereign microstates, but 
also due to the 1983-US invasion of Grenada (Operation Urgent Fury). In a first 
chapter on the political aspects of smallness, Paul Sutton examines a number of 
factors in both the domestic and the international contexts of small states. On the 
domestic level, Sutton distinguishes five political characteristics that he believes 
to be related to small population size; 1) institutional fidelity, 2) governmental 
pervasiveness, 3) exaggerated personalism, 4) concerted political harmony, and 
5) pragmatic conservatism (Sutton 1987: 8).  
With regard to the political institutions of small states, Sutton 
demonstrates how many small states that are former British colonies (which 
represent the bulk of small states) have retained the Westminster-Whitehall 
system of government after gaining independence (Sutton 1987: 9-12). As an 
explanation for this pattern, Sutton points to the relatively increased length and 
intensity of colonization in microstates, as a result of which the people in this 
former colonies have come to regard these political institutions as autochthonous 
(Sutton 1987: 8-9). As the second and third points, Sutton points to the 
phenomena of governmental pervasiveness and exaggerated personalism in small 
settings. According to Sutton, in small states, 
  
“[g]overnment is said to dominate, since it seeks on the one hand to duplicate the 
range of services offered in the larger states, and on the other is subject to fewer 
constraints from countervailing sectors, pressure groups, or non-governmental 
institutional activity” (Sutton 1987: 12).  
 
                                                





Just like Benedict and Singham, Sutton also highlights the consequences of 
governmental dominance for the impartiality of the civil service and the judiciary. 
With regard to the increased personalism of small-state politics, Sutton points out 
that smallness may generate negative effects such as a greater concentration of 
power in the hands of a few individuals, decreased functional specialization, and a 
tendency towards authoritarianism or even dictatorship (Sutton 1987: 15-16). 
Political leaders of small states are also found to be in office for comparatively 
longer periods of time than leaders of other, larger states.    
On the issue of political harmony, Sutton finds that small states are on the 
whole more liberal, more democratic, and less instable than larger states (Sutton 
1987: 17). This increased stability is mainly attributed to increased attitudinal 
homogeneity among the inhabitants of smaller states, which creates better 
foundations for the implementation of representative democracy, and is also 
assumed to foster political participation. On average, smallness is furthermore 
linked to political centrism or conservatism, which is according to Sutton an effect 
of the homogeneity of interests in small states, and results in the absence of a 
strong political opposition. In a later publication with largely the same content, 
Sutton emphasizes that “government patronage is (…) an important and 
ubiquitous part of the political system” in small states (2007a: 203). Furthermore, 
it is being argued that the influence of the civil society is generally less important 
than in larger states, and that there is a tendency to confuse local interests with 
national interests (a phenomenon that is labeled as 'parochialism'; Sutton 2007a: 
211). 
Regarding sociological aspects, which constitute the main topic of the 
second chapter, David Lowenthal notes tendencies towards 1) conservatism and 
tradition, 2) intimacy, and 3) “obsessive” autonomism. The natural propensity 
towards conservatism and tradition in small states stems from the fragile and 
vulnerable nature of these states, in which small changes can have very strong 
consequences (Lowenthal 1987: 36). Especially with regard to demographic, 
economic, and ecological features, small states are highly vulnerable, and “any 
major change comes at the risk of catastrophic loss” (Lowenthal 1987: 37). In line 
with many earlier studies, Lowenthal points to the high degree of intimacy and 
personal contact in small states. Whether or not they like each other, inhabitants 
of small states will generally know each other very well, and will have to deal with 
each other in multiple occasions and while fulfilling different societal roles 
(Lowenthal 1987: 38-39). If a society is very small, there is a great chance that 
bonds of family will also have an influence on public affairs, thereby increasing the 





smallness may serve to reinforce ethnic tensions, which tend to be more stringent 
and more likely to result in violence in smaller states (Lowenthal 1987: 40-41).  
 
Table 2.4: The Effects of Size According to the Sociological Literature 
Argument: Expressed By: Expectations for 
Microstates: 
Smallness leads to more intimate 
societies in which people combine 
societal roles, as a result of which 






Increased tendency to 
the development of 
multiple-role relations 
and conflicts of interests 
Small-state politics is driven by 
personal relations, and social 
cohesion can generate intense 
personal antagonisms and feuds, 















Smallness leads to the absence or 
weakness of counterbalancing 
institutions, as a result of which 
government occupies a supremely 
powerful position in small states, 










Increased tendency to 
executive dominance 
versus other institutions 
 
Increased likelihood of 
particularism  
 
Political leaders of small states 
remain in office for a comparatively 





Decrease in the 
frequency of government 
alternation 
As a consequence of the fact that 
small states are comparatively 
prone to lengthy and intensive 
colonization, they are more likely to 







Inclination to retain 
(democratic)  political 
structure of colonizer 
Small state-politics are marked by 
conservatism and democracy, due to 





Increased likelihood of 
democratic government; 
tendency to political 
centrism & conservatism 
Due to homogeneity, small states 
are more harmonious and liberal 
than large states, and offer greater 
opportunities for the participation 
of citizens  
 
Sutton 









In more recent publications on small state-societies, the aforementioned 
effects of smallness are confirmed and further examined (Farrugia 1993; Sutton 
and Payne 1993; Sutton 2007a; Baldacchino 2012). In an article that essentially 
focuses on foreign policy and security features of small states, Sutton and Payne 
also underscore a number of negative sociological and political consequences of 
smallness, such as patron-client relations, the lack of a political opposition, the 
personalization of politics, and the domination of the system by a handful of 
individuals (Sutton and Payne 1993: 587).15 These findings are confirmed in a 
publication of Charles Farrugia on the challenges of administration in small states, 
in which the blurring of institutional boundaries due to multiple-role relations is 
emphasized (Farrugia 1993: 224). In addition, Farrugia points to the sharp 
personal polarization that can beset small state-politics, and it is highlighted that 
the interference of public and private roles creates problems in the policy-making 
process (Farrugia 1993: 223). In a recent publication by Godfrey Baldacchino, the 
authoritarian and personalistic tendencies of small-state politics are reconfirmed 
(2012). In table 2.4, the main arguments with regard to the effects of size that 
follow from the late 20th-century sociological literature are summarized.  
 
6. Small is Democratic: Optimism Rediscovered 
After economic, international, and sociological small-state features had been 
examined in the 1950s and 1960s, Robert Dahl and Edward Tufte’s seminal work 
Size and Democracy (1973) represents a primary and pioneering attempt to 
empirically investigate the relation between smallness and democracy. Regarding 
their conception of size, it can be noted that the authors look at population, 
territory, population density, and socio-economic characteristics, and conclude by 
saying that each variable may influence democracy, which means that they will all 
be employed in the study (Dahl and Tufte 1973: 17-20). With regard to 
democracy, the authors distinguish two main criteria: citizen effectiveness and 
                                                
15 Specifically, the authors argue that “[i]n small states the role of the individual takes on great 
significance. Politics can and usually does focus on personality. Political mobilization is organized 
around the individual so that factions and patron-client networks abound. In the hands of assertive 
or charismatic leaders, these platforms can easily be transformed into mechanisms for the 
domination of the political system. This is especially worrying when the pervasiveness of politics 
in small states is taken into account. (…). Would-be dictators, in short, have little to stop them once 
they are in office. The public service can easily be intimidated or corrupted and the opposition 
silenced or cowed. Power becomes centered in one person (and his or her immediate circle) who 
come to regard any challenge to their position as a threat to the security of the state. Change from 
within becomes almost impossible to organize openly or peacefully. In such circumstances, a 
temptation to resort to assassination, coup, or invasion almost naturally follows” (Sutton and 






system capacity (Dahl and Tufte 1973: 29). Whereas citizen effectiveness refers to 
the opportunities of citizens to participate in their political system, system 
capacity alludes to the capacity of states to respond to the preferences of their 
citizens. Dahl and Tufte assume that there is a trade-off between the two criteria; 
in small polities citizen effectiveness and participation should be high, but system 
capacity can be expected to be low. Conversely, in a larger polity citizen 
effectiveness should be lower, and system capacity is hypothesized to be higher 
(1973: 23-24).  
A first test that the authors carry out reveals that the policy-making 
process in small states is much less complex than in larger states, which is 
primarily caused by the greater number of social organizations and groups in 
larger states (Dahl and Tufte 1973: 40). Regarding political efficacy and 
participation, the authors test two contrasting hypotheses; one posits one the 
basis of Rousseau’s theories that levels of efficacy and participation are higher in 
small polities due to the amplified political influence of single citizens in small 
societies (cf. Riker and Ordeshook 1968), but the other one expects diminished 
efficacy and participation due to the scarcity of differing political viewpoints, 
factions, and political alternatives (which relates to Madison’s arguments). On the 
basis of existing data on political participation in smaller and larger European 
democracies and the United States, Dahl and Tufte find that “political participation 
and sense of effectiveness among citizens do not depend to any significant degree 
on the size of a country” (Dahl and Tufte 1973: 65).  
In the fifth chapter of their volume, Dahl and Tufte examine the 
opportunities for communication between leaders and citizens, and the various 
mechanisms of citizen control of government in small and large democracies. With 
regard to communication between leaders and citizens, Dahl and Tufte find some 
notable differences between small and large democracies; in smaller settings 
direct, reciprocal communication between leaders and citizens is possible and 
occurs frequently, which results in a better perception of the preferences of 
citizens among leaders, which in turn enhances the prospects and quality of 
responsiveness (Dahl and Tufte 1973: 87).  In addition to improved 
communication between politicians and citizens, Dahl and Tufte also observe that 
communication between political leaders occurs more frequently and more 
directly in small societies. Finally, the notion of Benedict and Wood with regard to 
multiple-role relationships is confirmed by Dahl and Tufte, who argue that 
political leaders of small states are generally less specialized, and often perform 






The subsequent chapter in the volume deals with the extent to which 
smallness affects political competition and political conflict. With regard to this 
subject, the authors depart from the hypothesis that political competition is 
stronger in large settings, due to the presence of more diverse interests. As an 
effect, the likelihood of the existence of a formal opposition in large states is 
greater, and mechanisms for dealing with political conflict are expected to be 
more institutionalized (Dahl and Tufte 1973: 92-93). Furthermore, in small states 
the authors expect less conflict between political groups, but when they occur, 
group conflicts are assumed to be more personal, more explosive, and more likely 
to polarize every part of society (ibid.). On the basis of data from Swedish and 
Dutch communities and Swiss cantons, Dahl and Tufte are able to accept most of 
their hypotheses.  
As the findings and conclusions from the chapters on participation, 
communication, and competition are combined, the authors are able to construct 
a model in which they detect a trade-off between the costs of participation and the 
costs of dissent; in societies with small numbers of inhabitants it is more difficult 
to oppose the majority view because it will be less easy to find allies and there will 
be less opportunities to participate in institutions that do not concur with the 
dominant political ideas (Dahl and Tufte 1973: 108). On the other hand, in 
societies with more inhabitants, the possibility of reciprocal communication 
between leaders and citizens diminishes, and citizens will be less inclined to 
participate in politics because the effects of participation are reduced. With regard 
to the aspect of citizen effectiveness, therefore, the authors conclude that there is 
no ‘optimal’ size of a polity. The final two chapters of Size and Democracy deal 
with Dahl and Tufte’s other aspect of democracy: system capacity. By comparing 
small and large democracies on the occurrence and frequency of internal conflict, 
economic capacities, cultural capacities, and the capacity for independence and 
autonomy, the authors find that small countries are more dependent on 
international trade and imports, but that with regard to the other three features, 
no significant differences exist between large and small countries.  
As a whole, the study of Dahl and Tufte is very much hampered by data 
deficiencies, as a consequence of which many of the formulated hypotheses 
cannot be subjected to empirical testing. In addition, it is worth noting Dahl and 
Tufte’s conceptualization of smallness; some of the countries they examine, such 
as Austria, Sweden, and the Netherlands, would not be classified as ‘small’ 
countries by most (contemporary) standards. As a final remark, it should be 
mentioned that the most interesting findings of the study are not obtained from 





generalizability of their findings to comparisons at the inter-national level is 
therefore in question. 
Whereas Dahl and Tufte are by and large inconclusive about the relation 
between size and democracy, subsequent publications mainly highlight the 
positive effects of smallness with regard to democratic development. This is in 
large part due to a number of statistical analyses in which size is seemingly almost 
accidentally found to significantly affect levels of democracy, even though these 
analyses do not pay attention to the causal mechanism that could underpin this 
association (Hadenius 1992: 125; Stepan and Skach 1993: 11-13; Diamond and 
Tsalik 1999: 118-119; Clague et al. 2001: 26).16 Already in advance to these 
publications however, Arend Lijphart examines the relationship between state 
size and his concept of consociational democracy, and notes that all European 
consociational democracies are in fact small countries (Lijphart 1977: 65). On the 
nature of this link, Lijphart argues: 
  
“What is the explanation of this strong empirical relationship? Small size has both 
direct and indirect effects on the probability that consociational democracy will be 
established and will be successful: it directly enhances a spirit of cooperativeness and 
accommodation, and it indirectly increases the chances of consociational democracy 
by reducing the burdens of decision-making and thus rendering the country easier to 
govern” (Lijphart 1977: 65). 
 
Lijphart thus repeats Dahl and Tufte’s idea of enhanced cooperation and 
communication in smaller societies, and argues that the people and the political 
elite will generally know each other better when the number of citizens is lower. 
In fact, Lijphart directly dismisses homogeneity as the reason for democratic 
success, which he contributes solely to “more closely linked elites” (1977: 66). The 
author also repeats Aristotle’s argument of governability; he believes small states 
to be better governable because they are less complex, and “the number and 
variety of groups and individuals whose interests and attitudes have to be taken 
into consideration are fewer” (Lijphart 1977: 68). Moreover, since small states 
only seldom play a significant role internationally, they tend to refrain from 
developing an active foreign policy, which decreases the chance that they are 
                                                
16 Axel Hadenius appears to be the first one to discover this statistical association, and reports that 
“it appears, if we consider the size of the population, that the real micro-states, with a population 
of less than 100,000, have surprisingly high values for democracy” (Hadenius 1992: 125). In 
similar fashion, Larry Diamond and Svetlana Tsalik find that: “[o]ne of the most striking features of 
the distribution of democracies (liberal and otherwise) around the world is also, curiously, one of 
its least discussed theoretically: its significantly greater incidence in very small countries, with 
populations of less than about one million inhabitants” (Diamond and Tsalik 1999: 117). While 
these scholars find evidence for the existence of a statistical relation, they do not really present any 





involved in international conflicts, which in turn promotes the chances of 
democracy (Lijphart 1977: 69). 
The most elaborate study on size and democracy that was written after 
Size and Democracy is most likely Dana Ott’s Small Is Democratic (2000). The 
leading hypothesis of Ott’s book, which is the published version of her doctoral 
dissertation, is that “small states are more likely to become democratic than large 
states”, but in addition Ott also investigates the consequences of smallness for 
democratic consolidation, access to information, political instability, and political 
violence (Ott 2000: 111). In the analysis, Ott employs a composite measure of 
smallness that involves both population size (less than one and a half million 
inhabitants is regarded as small), and population density (Ott 2000: 18) In total, 
237 countries17 are included in the study, which is longitudinal in character and 
examines data that were collected for the period between 1973 and 1995 (Ott 
2000: 109). In conceptualizing democracy, Ott makes use of the Freedom House 
scores and the Coppedge-Reinicke Polyarchy scale. After the statistical part of the 
study, Ott presents the results of her fieldwork in two small countries, the Gambia 
and Trinidad and Tobago,18 in order to illustrate the effects of smallness on 
political systems in practice. 
The results of Ott’s analysis reveal that small states are much more likely 
to be democratic than larger states (Ott 2000: 118). The presentation of the 
descriptive statistics alone already demonstrates that small states have over the 
years always been more democratic than larger states: 
 
“In 1973, while 27% of large states received the rating “Free”, 47.7% of small states 
received this ranking. In 1983, 27.3% of large states were considered democratic, 
while 44.4% of small states were so rated. In 1993, 28.7% of large states received the 
highest freedom ranking, while 67.4% of small states received this ranking” (Ott 
2000: 115). 
 
These descriptive statistics are later on supported by a regression analysis, in 
which a dummy variable for small countries turns out to have a highly significant 
effect on the likelihood of a democratic political system (Ott 2000: 120). 
Furthermore, the relationship is found to be consistent when controlling for the 
effects of GDP per capita. In testing the influence of size on the preservation of 
democracy, Ott confirms the notion that small states are more likely to remain 
                                                
17 This figure also includes a number of semi-independent territories, dependencies, and colonies. 
18 It may be remarked that the countries that Ott has selected for her field research are not very 
small; although both meet Ott’s selection criteria for small states, both the Gambia and Trinidad 
and Tobago have more than one million inhabitants, and it is unclear whether the effects of size on 






democratic than large states, seeing that “[w]hile large states were democratic for 
27.3% of the period where Freedom House data was reported, 55.9% of small 
states were democratic for this period” (Ott 2000: 121-122). 
The qualitative part of Ott’s study, in which the outcomes of case studies 
in the Gambia and Trinidad and Tobago are reported, largely supports the 
findings of the quantitative analysis. In both countries, the existence of multiple-
role relationships, easy and open access to political leaders, increased 
opportunities for political participation, and the continuing support of the political 
elite for the democratic political system have according to Ott contributed to the 
development of democracy, even though democracy was abolished in the Gambia 
after a military coup in 1994. In Ott’s view, the size of the population has thus had 
a profound impact on the politics of these two states, and the effects of size have 
been largely positive. However, in the conclusion the author points out, in rather 
vague terms, that smallness does not inevitably generate democracy, but that it 
creates “an environment in which positive developments may or may not occur” 
(Ott 2000: 188-190). 
Whereas Ott succeeds in demonstrating the association between 
smallness and democracy, unfortunately the analysis largely falls short in 
explaining this connection. On closer inspection the two case studies could equally 
well be used as evidence for a negative relation between smallness and 
democracy. For example, Ott asserts that most citizens of the Gambia believe that 
there is only a very weak political opposition in this country (Ott 2000: 141-142, 
153-154). In addition, Ott points to the increased power of political elites in small 
states, and argues that in the Gambia, there is a lack of alternative sources of 
information since the only noteworthy newspaper is owned by the government 
(Ott 2000: 144-145, 149). Finally, Ott describes how the main political party of the 
Gambia (which has been in government since independence) dominates the 
bureaucracy and uses state resources in election campaigns (Ott 2000: 155). 
Whereas the situation concerning access to diverse information is better in 
Trinidad and Tobago, here the government has used state resources in election 
campaigns as well (Ott 2000: 181).  Moreover, “in both the Gambia and Trinidad 
and Tobago, opposition has proved to be a difficult endeavor” (Ott 2000: 182). 
The differences can in part be explained by the procedural and formalistic 
definition of democracy that is employed in the statistical part of the book, as a 
consequence of which more informal aspects of politics are largely left out of the 
large-N analysis. 
Subsequent to Ott’s analysis, research on politics and democracy in 





of publications, these authors study small-state parliaments (1996), political 
parties (1997; 2000), popular heterogeneity (1999), direct democracy 
instruments (2004a), and the statistical association between smallness, insularity, 
and democracy in general (1995; 2002a, 2002b, 2006; 2008a; 2008b). On the 
issue of homogeneity, in several papers it is found that there is little evidence for 
increased categorical homogeneity in small settings, whereas levels of attitudinal 
homogeneity are indeed found to be higher (Anckar 1999: 42-43). Regarding 
direct democracy mechanisms, it is found that despite the facilitating environment 
that is created by size, instruments of direct democracy are not more often used in 
microstates than in other states (Anckar 2004a: 386-387). Finally, in a more 
recent article Anckar finds that microstates are especially prone to majoritarian 
democracy, but that they often adopt consensus-oriented features within this 
framework (Anckar 2008c: 81-82). 
Whereas the plethora of published articles by the Anckars are valuable in 
the sense that they provide information and data on (previously unstudied) 
microstate-political institutions, just like Ott’s book they are less successful when 
it comes to accounting for the relation between smallness and democracy. 
Although several hypotheses with regard to this relation are rejected, and others 
are presented and formulated, the analyses do not result in a convincing argument 
or theory on microstate-democracy (Diamond and Tsalik 1999: 117-118; cf. 
Srebrnik 2004: 339). In a reviewing article, Anckar arrives at the conclusion that, 
despite the many publications in the last decades, “the mechanisms that link small 
size and democracy remain under-researched” (Anckar 2008b: 81). Whereas it 
can be concluded that a large variety of suppositions and hypotheses with regard 
to the link between smallness and democracy have been formulated over time, the 
contemporary academic literature largely fails to uncover or empirically test their 
significance. 
Although the wide majority of publications confirm the negative 
association between size and democracy, some scholars have found evidence 
against this relationship (Barro 1999; Gerring and Zarecki 2011). According to 
Gerring and Zarecki, democracy works better in larger settings due to 1) dispersal 
of power among a larger number of institutions, 2) better opportunities for 
conflict mitigation, 3) stronger democracy-supporting institutions, and 4) more 
institutionalized procedures of rule (2011: 8-10). Whereas the absence of these 
circumstances in small states was also noted in part of the sociological literature 
on smallness (e.g. Benedict 1967b; Lowenthal 1987), Gerring and Zarecki 
explicitly link them to the functioning of democracy. In this respect, the authors 





empirical evidence for their hypotheses in their subsequent quantitative analysis 
(Gerring and Zarecki 2011: 12-15).  
 
Table 2.5: The Effects of Size According to the Size & Democracy Literature 
Argument: Expressed By: Expectations for 
Microstates: 
Policy-making in small states is 
less complex due to a decreased 








Decreased number of 
veto-players 
  
In small states, reciprocal 
communication between citizens 
and politicians is possible and 





Dahl and Tufte  
Ott 
Increased accessibility of 
politicians, and increased 
communication between 





As a result of homogenous 
interests, there is less political 
competition in small states, which 










Smallness leads to a spirit of 
accommodation among the 
political elite, which increases the 





consensus on elite-level 
 
Greater likelihood of 
democratic government 
 
Small countries are more likely to 
be democratic due to increased 
opportunities for participation, 





participation of citizens 
 
Increased support for 
democracy among elite 
 
Small countries are less likely to be 
democratic due to the absence of 
strong institutions and 






institutions ignored or 
circumvented 
 
In table 2.5, the main theoretical arguments about the influence of size on 
politics - and in this case especially democracy – as they follow from the size and 





literature is positive about the consequences of smallness for democratic 
development, many of these arguments relate to those expressed by the Classic 
and Enlightenment-philosophers. The open access and reciprocal communication 
between politicians and citizens that are highlighted by Dahl and Tufte and Ott are 
for instance directly borrowed from earlier writings of Montesquieu and 
Rousseau, which indicates that this literature continues to be relevant. By 
contrast, the arguments of Gerring and Zarecki are closely connected to both 
Madison’s arguments and the sociological literature on size, as these scholars 
essentially reiterate the arguments of Benedict, Lowenthal, Sutton, and Farrugia. 
This shows that the Classic ideas about the effects of size on politics have all but 
lost their appeal, and are – with some modifications and adjustments – still 
dominant in the literature. Now that the chronological overview of the literature 
on the political effects of size is completed, the main expectations and conclusions 
that follow from this literature are discussed in the conclusion. 
 
7. Conclusion: the Expectations that Follow from the Literature 
The global tendency towards smaller states that started after 1918 is at present 
still ongoing. In recent decades, large states like the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia 
have fragmented, separatist regions like Eritrea, Timor-Leste, and South Sudan 
have become autonomous states, and small dependencies and overseas territories 
like Palau have acquired independence and statehood.19 Whereas presupposed 
economic and international political drawbacks used to be seen as major 
arguments against smallness, more recent empirical studies call these theories 
into question. By contrast, the sociological and socio-political literature on size 
remains rather discouraging, and the findings that follow from this literature can 
generally be interpreted as democracy-undermining. On the other hand, as can be 
seen in the introduction contemporary statistics appear to suggest the existence 
of a strong association between smallness and democracy, although satisfactory 
explanations for this pattern remain lacking. In short, due to these contradictory 
theories at present the effects of size on politics and democracy are largely 
uncertain and ambiguous, and in some ways a disparity between theories and 
empirics can be observed; whereas theorizing about the (socio-) political effects of 
smallness remains mostly pessimistic, in practice most empirical analyses do 
point to a greater incidence of democracy in small settings.  
                                                
19 In addition, several of the remaining overseas territories and dependencies appear to be 
increasingly pursuing autonomy and statehood. In the Danish autonomous country of Greenland a 
2008 referendum has opened the way for future independence, and the French overseas territory 





 On the basis of the philosophical and academic literature on the relation 
between size and politics, a great number of expectations and theories can be 
listed. On closer inspection, many of the hypothesized positive and negative 
consequences of smallness can however be classified into four aspects or sub-
dimensions of democracy.20 In table 2.6, these four sub-dimensions have been 
listed in the first column, followed by the positive and negative expectations with 
regard to the presence and development of democracy in the second and third 
columns. In this way, it can be observed how the expectations with regard to the 
influence of smallness on the presence of political alternatives, the horizontal 
balance of power between institutions, the relations between citizens and 
politicians, and the extent of citizen participation diverge, which also illustrates 
the continuing indeterminacy of the academic debate.  
 





Consequences of Smallness 
Democracy-Undermining 





- Tendency to consensus, 
stability, and harmony 
- Increased liberty and 
republicanism 
- Greater homogeneity of 
interests 
- Decreased number of 
factions and interests 
- Less political competition, 
weakened political 
opposition 







- More effective and efficient 
government 
- Executive dominance in 
relation to other institutions 
- Infrequent alternation of 
power 






- Increased accessibility of 
politicians; more (direct) 
contact 
- Increased responsiveness 
- Increased social cohesion and 
attachment to the public good 
- Conflicts of interest due to 
multiple-role relations 
- Prevalence of clientelism, 




- Increased political efficacy 
- Increased political awareness 
- Increased political 
participation and involvement; 
more direct democracy 
- Decreased political role for 
minorities and opposition 
(supporters) 
                                                
20 These four sub-dimensions will be used as the conceptual framework of democracy on the basis 
of which the analytical part of this dissertation is conducted. For further discussion, see section 3 





In academic publications that are not or only indirectly focused on small 
states, some of the characteristics and effects that are presented in table 2.6 have 
been confirmed. For example, the notion that smaller settings are more 
homogenous has been examined by comparing US municipalities of different sizes 
(Black 1974; Wilson 1986), and the idea that political participation is stronger in 
smaller settings has been analyzed by studies on turnout (Hansen et al. 1987; 
Blais and Carty 1990; Blais and Dobrzynska 1998: 242-243; Blais 2000: 24-29; 
Franklin 2002: 158-159; Gaarsted Frandsen 2002; Veenendaal 2009; Remmer 
2010) and party membership (Mair and van Biezen 2001: 10; Weldon 2006). Most 
of these publications are not specifically focused on microstates however, which is 
probably at least partially an effect of data deficiencies. In this sense, the case 
study-analysis in chapters to come will shed more light on the applicability of 
these findings to this particular, under-researched set of cases.  
The main conclusion that follows from this discussion of the theoretical 
literature on size is that the influence of smallness of politics as of yet remains 
largely unclear. Whereas various empirical studies have observed a statistical link 
between size and democracy, it has turned out to be very difficult to find 
theoretical explanations in support of this evidence. As a result, it appears that at 
this point, statistical analyses will not be able to offer new insights into this 
relationship, and instead a different, more qualitative approach now seems to be 
the most fruitful way forward. In this respect, a first step that could be taken is to 
examine the relatively extensive case study-literature on microstates, which 
remarkably until now has hardly ever been compared to the more theoretical 
literature. In the next chapter therefore, an overview is given of the more case-
oriented, empirical literature on microstates. On the basis of this discussion, it can 
be examined in how far the theories and suppositions that follow from the present 








Personalism, Executive Dominance, and Particularism 
 
The Academic Literature on Microstates 
 
 
1. Introduction: The Polis Revisited: the Re-Emergence of Microstates 
Out of the twenty-one microstates that are analyzed in the current dissertation,1 
none was a member of the United Nations before 1974, when Grenada was the 
first of them to join. Whereas the autonomy of the European microstates was 
already recognized for centuries, none of them had joined the UN at its founding 
in 1945, due to the reluctance on the part of larger states to accept microstates as 
full members.2 Of the four European microstates Andorra’s political status was 
always somewhat indistinct, as the territory was jointly ruled by two Co-Princes 
that resided outside the Principality.3 A process of political reform that started 
with the creation of representative political institutions in the early 1980s and 
culminated with the enactment of a new constitution in 1993 brought this 
situation to an end, and ascertained the complete sovereignty of Andorra, which 
was validated with UN-membership in that same year. The other three European 
microstates of Liechtenstein, Monaco, and San Marino joined the UN in the early 
1990s as well, which marked the definite recognition of their statehood 
(Duursma 1996: 492-494).  
 Outside of Europe, the acquirement of United Nations-membership by 
microstates mostly coincided with the attainment of decolonization and 
independence. In this light, it can be pointed out that the decolonization of island 
microstates generally occurred at a later stage than decolonization in Asia and 
Africa, which entails that many microstates actually form part of Huntington’s 
                                                
1 This number results from the decision to apply a cut-off point of less than 250.000 inhabitants 
as a criterion for classification as a microstate. In addition, UN-membership is applied as a scope 
condition to exclude non-independent territories and dependencies. In the next chapter, more 
attention will be paid to the explanation and justification of these parameters.  
2 This was not so much a denial of the sovereignty of these microstates, but rather an 
unwillingness to bequeath microstates with all the rights that full UN-membership entails. Larger 
states were especially concerned that small states would form a majority and therefore dominate 
the General Assembly (Duursma 1996: 131-136).   
3 From 1278 onwards these used to be the Count of Foix and the Bishop or Urgell, but due to the 
transfer of the former’s claims to France in 1607, the French President is the current second Co-





third wave of democratization (1991).4 In the Pacific Ocean, the island nations of 
Samoa,5 Nauru, and Tonga became independent in 1962, 1968, and 1970 
respectively, and as such emerged as the first independent microstates outside of 
Europe. In the Eastern Caribbean, Grenada was the first island microstate to be 
granted statehood in 1974, with the other five island states in this region 
following between 1978 and 1983. The 1974-Carnation Revolution in Portugal 
resulted in the decolonization of all of its colonies, one of which is the 
contemporary African microstate of São Tomé and Príncipe, which became 
independent in 1975. One year later, the Republic of Seychelles became the 
second independent African microstate. The Pacific microstates of Tuvalu, 
Kiribati, and Vanuatu acquired statehood in 1978, 1979, and 1980 respectively, 
and in this region the former US Trust Territories of the Marshall Islands (1986), 
the Federated States of Micronesia (1986), and Palau (1994) have become the 
world’s youngest microstates.6 
 A remarkable aspect of the seventeen non-European microstates is that a 
wide majority of them is a former Anglo-American colony; ten of them used to be 
British colonies, and three were American Trust Territories. The remaining four 
were Australian (Nauru) and New Zealander (Samoa) trusteeships, a Portuguese 
colony (São Tomé and Príncipe), and a jointly ruled British-French condominium 
(Vanuatu). Whereas most of the larger former British islands in the Caribbean 
and the Pacific are now independent states,7 larger French islands such as 
Martinique and Guadeloupe in the Caribbean, Mayotte and La Réunion in the 
Indian Ocean, and New Caledonia in the Pacific have not acquired independence. 
In general, the French have thus retained much more of their island colonies, and 
it is telling that the only ex-French colony among the contemporary independent 
microstates is Vanuatu, which was jointly ruled with the United Kingdom.8 Since 
                                                
4 Since Huntington excludes countries with less than one million inhabitants in his analysis, these 
cases are not examined in the volume. However, inclusion of these countries would have resulted 
in about twenty additional cases of third wave-democratization, which means that Huntington 
excludes about one third of available cases from his analysis.  
5 Until 1997 this microstate was known as Western Samoa (to distinguish it from American 
Samoa). 
6 As twenty-one microstates thus became member of the United Nations in the twenty-year 
period between 1974 and 1994, it is somewhat remarkable and perhaps revealing that since then 
no new ones have entered. In many dependencies and overseas territories independence 
movements continue to struggle for autonomy and self-government, but support for these 
movements seems to be fading rather than growing. 
7 Some of the smaller islands, such as Anguilla, the Turks and Caicos Islands, the British Virgin 
Islands, Montserrat, and the Cayman Islands in the Caribbean, and the Pitcairn Islands in the 
Pacific, continue to be part of the United Kingdom.   
8 This is also demonstrated by the fact that the United Kingdom was a strong proponent of 
independence of Vanuatu (at that time still the New Hebrides), whereas France opposed it for a 





microstates are particularly prone to retain the political institutions that they 
inherited from their colonizer (Farrugia 1993: 223; Sutton 2007a: 202-203), it is 
no surprise that the Westminster majoritarian model of government 
predominates in this group of countries (Anckar 2008c: 75). 
 






Nauru 9.322 21 1968 Australia 
Tuvalu 10.544 26 1978 UK 
Palau 20.956 459 1994 USA 
Monaco 30.539 2 1297 - 
San Marino 31.817 61 301 - 
Liechtenstein 35.236 160 1866 - 
St. Kitts and Nevis 50.314 261 1983 UK 
Marshall Islands 67.182 181 1986 USA 
Dominica 72.969 751 1978 UK 
Andorra 84.825 468 1278/ - 
Antigua and Barbuda 87.884 443 1981 UK 
Seychelles 89.188 455 1976 UK 
Kiribati  100.743 811 1979 UK 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 103.869 389 1979 UK 
Tonga 105.916 747 1970 UK 
Federated States of Micronesia 106.836 702 1986 USA 
Grenada 108.419 344 1974 UK 
St. Lucia 161.557 616 1979 UK 
São Tomé and Príncipe 179.506 964 1975 Portugal 
Samoa 193.161 2.831 1962 N-Zealand 
Vanuatu 224.564 12.189 1980 UK-France 
 
 In table 3.1, the twenty-one microstates that are at the heart of the 
current dissertation have been listed and ranked on the basis of their population 
size and territorial size. In addition, in the fourth and fifth columns the year in 
which the microstates gained independence and the former colonial powers who 
ruled the countries before this time have been presented. Despite the fact that 
they have been exceptionally understudied, in the last decades a small yet 
insightful body of literature on various political aspects of the microstates has 
emerged. Due to the fact that these countries are clustered in four regions of the 
                                                
9 Data have been retrieved from the CIA World Factbook (2011), and area size has been 
presented in square kilometers. For the four European microstates no colonial powers have been 
listed, since these countries were never formally colonized. The years in which they gained 
statehood have been presented in italics, since these dates are not official, and because the 






world, many of these publications however focus exclusively on the microstates 
in one region (e.g. the Eastern Caribbean microstates), or are case studies of only 
one microstate. However different the microstates may be, and however 
differing conclusions these various publications may draw, on the basis of these 
books and articles an image of the various political aspects that microstates 
share can be acquired.  
 Whereas an extensive overview of the theoretical debate on the political 
effects of size was offered in the previous chapter, the present chapter will 
discuss the more empirical case study-literature on the political characteristics 
of microstates, as it has appeared after their re-emergence on the international 
political scene in the 1960s and 1970s.10 This case study-literature is not only 
different from the theoretical literature in the sense that it is more empirical and 
to a larger extent based on real-world observations and evidence, but also 
because it generally does not – or at least not explicitly – employ size as the 
major explanatory variable of political characteristics.11 This is primarily a 
consequence of the fact that only one or a few cases are studied, as a result of 
which findings are often treated and explained as idiosyncrasies of the cases 
under scrutiny. As is shown in the current chapter however, many of these 
apparent idiosyncrasies are observable in microstates around the world, which 
suggests that they are in fact no idiosyncrasies at all, but rather can potentially 
be listed as political consequences of smallness.    
 In the present chapter, the nature and characteristics of microstate-
democracy are discussed.  This discussion is structured on the basis of Dahl’s 
conceptualization of polyarchy, which identifies democracy as consisting of the 
two separate dimensions of contestation and inclusiveness (1971: 3-4). For 
reasons that are more comprehensively discussed in chapter 4, in the present 
study these dimensions are further subdivided into the following four sub-
dimensions:  
 
1) Contestation I: the presence of political alternatives and a political opposition; 
2) Contestation II: the horizontal balance of power between institutions; 
3) Inclusiveness I: the relations between citizens and politicians; 
4) Inclusiveness II: the political participation of citizens. 
 
                                                
10 Exceptions are the European microstates, on the politics of which a handful of earlier empirical 
studies exist. 
11 In this sense, whereas the literature discussed in the previous chapter was primarily variable-






In the current chapter, these four sub-dimensions provide structure to the 
discussion of the case study-literature on microstates, since the chapter offers a 
sequential outline of the ranking of microstates on each of the four sub-
dimensions. 
Whereas the literature discussed in the previous chapter assumes size to 
be the primary explanation of democracy and other political characteristics, this 
chapter commences by outlining a number of explanations of microstate-
democracy that assume this phenomenon to be spurious in nature; i.e. that 
attempt to explain it by pointing to co-varying factors such as (colonial) history 
and geography.12 The third, fourth, fifth, and sixth sections of the chapter delve 
into the case-study literature on four components of democracy in the 
microstates, which in sequence are the presence of political alternatives and 
political opposition (section # 3), the horizontal balance of power between 
institutions (# 4), the relations between citizens and politicians (# 5) and the 
political participation of citizens (# 6). In the conclusion of the chapter, the 
central notions and features that follow from the case study-literature are 
connected with the theoretical literature on size that was discussed in the 
preceding chapter. 
 
2. Explaining Democracy in Microstates: Spurious Correlations 
The theoretical literature on size and democracy that has been discussed in the 
previous chapter generally considers size to be the main explanatory variable of 
political (and economic and international) developments, and therefore also of 
democracy. By contrast, large-N studies on democracy that have added size as 
only one many independent variables, and that have discovered statistical 
correlations with democracy, mostly attempt to explain this effect by pointing to 
a co-variance between size and other variables (cf. Hadenius 1992; Stepan and 
Skach 1993; Barro 1999; Clague et al. 2001). In essence, these scholars therefore 
argue that the statistical correlation between size and democracy is spurious in 
nature, and that size is not at the root of this association. In addition to these 
quantitative large-N studies, a number of more theoretical publications also 
endorse this view. The primary variables to which size has been linked in order 
                                                
12 According to some authors, the effect of size on politics can be seen as necessarily indirect, and 
therefore always depends on at least one intervening variable (Ott 2000: 129). However, 
whereas the theoretical literature on size that was discussed in the previous chapter generally 
adopts size as the primary explanatory factor of a certain political framework, many other 
authors have linked size to one of the more often-mentioned democracy-stimulating factors. The 





to explain democracy are religion, geography and insularity, colonial history, and 
international politics and foreign policy. 
 Culture and religion have occasionally been proposed as explanations of 
microstate-democracy, most notably by Axel Hadenius (1992: 126-127). After 
having discovered a statistical correlation between smallness, insularity, and 
levels of democracy, this author stresses that “it is more interesting to observe 
that island states are far more Protestant dominated than others” (Hadenius 
1992: 126).13 When Hadenius adds Protestantism to the model, the significance 
of the relationship between size and democracy disappears. According to Dag 
and Carsten Anckar however, who embark on a review of Hadenius’ findings, 
these conclusions are erroneous, primarily because all Protestant nations in 
Hadenius’ sample are actually island nations (Anckar and Anckar 1995: 215-
216), which renders it impossible to control for causality. In addition, the 
Anckars argue that Protestantism may have a different meaning and different 
implications in different world regions, which makes it vulnerable to conceptual 
stretching (1995: 217). In Pacific island microstates for example, Protestantism 
was imported from outside and has been blended with traditional religions and 
customs, thus creating subtypes that are incomparable to the Western European 
type of Protestantism. When the religious characteristics of the twenty-one 
microstates are examined, it becomes clear that this group also includes a 
number of predominantly Catholic nations, which are no less democratic than 
the Protestant microstates.14  
 It was already noted in the previous chapter that the variable of size has 
often been linked to insularity, because most microstates (and all non-European 
ones) are island nations. According to a number of authors, insularity is actually 
at the basis of the ostensible statistical connection between size and democracy 
                                                
13 This line of argument builds on Max Weber’s (1958) thesis that Protestantism stimulates 
capitalism and individual responsibility. The notion that certain cultures and religions foster 
democratic development whereas others undermine it has been most prominently raised by 
Samuel Huntington (1984: 207-209; 1991: 72-73; 1996: 70), who argues that ‘Western 
Christianity’ is conducive to democracy whereas for example Islam and Confucianism are not. 
This argument has been confirmed by other authors (Bollen 1979: 582-583; Hadenius 1992: 118-
121; Barro 1999: 175-177; Bruce 2004), but has also been strongly refuted by others (Sen 1999; 
Stepan 2000; Norris and Inglehart 2002). As the accuracy of the hypothesis thus remains unsure, 
the debate on it is highly contentious, with the recurring accusation of ethnocentrism being 
expressed (cf. Said 2004: 293). 
14 In addition to the four European microstates, São Tomé and Príncipe, Dominica, St. Lucia, the 
Federated States of Micronesia, and Seychelles all have Roman Catholic majorities (CIA World 
Factbook 2011). In fact, the only non-democracy among the microstates is a Protestant country; 
the Kingdom of Tonga. Although Protestantism is thus clearly not the driving factor of democracy 
in microstates, it should be noted that allegedly democracy-undermining religions and ideologies 
like Islam and Confucianism are not present in the microstates, as all of these countries have 





(Stepan and Skach 1993: 11-13; Clague et al. 2001: 23; Baldacchino 2005: 35-36; 
Congdon Fors 2007; Anckar 2008a: 454-455). It is a common supposition in the 
literature that island countries are more likely to democratize than non-island 
states, primarily because of their geographical isolation and remoteness. From 
an external point of view, isolation implies that conflicts or turmoil in other 
countries cannot spillover to island nations, which therefore creates a much 
more stabile political environment. Internally, isolation is supposed to stimulate 
social cohesion and a sense of community, and in that sense island status can be 
supposed to further exacerbate the sociological consequences of smallness 
(Clague et al. 2001: 23; Anckar 2008a: 437).   
Although the overlap between size and insularity renders it difficult to 
disentangle the separate effects of these variables on democracy, and both small 
countries and island countries display comparatively higher levels of democracy, 
it should be remarked that whereas the smallest countries (the twenty-one 
studied in this dissertation) are with one exception all democracies, the same 
cannot be said of all island states, since many larger island nations are non-
democracies (e.g. Cuba, Fiji, Haiti, Madagascar, and Singapore). As a result, it 
appears that the positive effects of insularity primarily materialize in the case of 
small islands, which would mean that the democracy-stimulating effect of size 
surpasses that of insularity. 
 In addition to the geographical factor of insularity, some authors have 
argued that their geographical location rather than size renders microstates to 
be democratic. In an article by Carlo Masala (2004), various hypotheses that aim 
to explain the link between smallness and democracy are tested for significance, 
but these are all rejected as the author comes to the conclusion that the 
association between the variables is an accidental result of the fact that many 
small island states are located in the proximity and sphere of influence of larger, 
democratic states, since “[a]ll micro-islands studied here are located in areas that 
should be classified as belonging to the indirect sphere of influence of the United 
States or democratic regional powers (like Australia)” (Masala 2004: 252).15 
Moreover, Masala argues that both the US and Australia actively promote 
democratic governance in the Caribbean and Pacific island states, respectively, 
which can fulfill the function of a “rim and buffer” (Masala 2004: 254).16 In line 
                                                
15 Translation by author from original German text: “[a]lle hier untersuchten Mikroinseln befinden 
sich in Gebieten, die dem mittelbaren Einflussgebiet der USA oder demokratischer 
Regionalhegemone (wie Australien) zugeordnet werden müssen”. 
16 Specifically, Masala argues that “Beide Staaten, sowohl die USA als auch Australien, agieren aus 
ihren eigenen Interessen heraus als aktive Unterstützer (…) demokratischer Staatsformen in den 





with these ideas, other scholars have argued that the geographical clustering of 
microstates increases the spread of democracy due to demonstration effects.17 
According to Benjamin Reilly, for example, the Caribbean and Pacific regions are 
the most democratic areas in the developing world, primarily as a result of the 
presence of so many democratic microstates (Reilly 2002: 355-356). 
 The prevalence of democracy in microstates has also repeatedly been 
explained on the basis of their (colonial) historical characteristics (Caldwell et al. 
1980: 954, 960; Baldacchino 1993: 31-34; Payne 1993a: 58-60; Sutton 1999: 68-
69; Srebrnik 2004: 333). In the literature, it is repeatedly pointed out that most 
microstates are former British (or Anglo-American) colonies, experienced longer 
and more intense periods of colonial rule, and mostly acquired independence by 
means of a relatively tranquil and skillfully managed process of decolonization. 
Furthermore, several authors emphasize the tendency of microstates to stick to 
the type of government they inherited from their former colonial rulers (Sutton 
and Payne 1993: 586-587; Anckar 2004b: 215-217; Sutton 2007a: 202-203).18  
Regarding the length and intensity of colonialism, the argument has often 
been made that microstates, being island nations, were among the first countries 
to be colonized. Furthermore, due to their small dimensions, the impact of 
colonization in small island nations is hypothesized to be amplified. Both the 
increased length and intensity of colonization are supposed to engender a better 
socialization in democratic values and traditions among the populations of 
microstates, which in turn creates a better environment for the development of 
democracy after independence.19 In addition to the intensity and durability of 
                                                                                                                                 
as well as Australia, out of their own interests act as active supporters (…) of democratic forms of 
government in the Caribbean and South Pacific micro-islands”). 
17 In the academic literature on the causes of democratization, regional and demonstration effects 
have repeatedly been heralded as a major explanatory variable in accounting for the spread of 
democracy (Starr 1991: 371-377; Gasiorowski 1995: 893; Gasiorowski and Power 1998: 744-
745, 764-765; Doorenspleet 2004: 318).    
18 Although the notion that their Anglo-American colonial background can explain democracy in 
microstates has been contradicted by several authors (Diamond and Tsalik 1999: 118-119; 
Anckar 2002b: 384-385), the correlation between the variables of size and colonial heritage is 
certainly remarkable (Clague et al. 2001: 27, 31). According to Anckar and Diamond and Tsalik 
however, there is strong evidence for an inverted relationship, in the sense that ex-British 
colonies are in general more likely to be democratic because many of them are so small. This 
argument is buttressed by the observation that among all states in the world, only less than half 
of the former British colonies is now a democracy (Anckar 2002b: 384-385).   
19 According to Godfrey Baldacchino, colonialism played a particularly influential role in 
microstates due to the fact that most of these islands had a very weak native population that was 
rapidly annihilated by the colonizers, or had no native population to begin with (1993: 31). As a 
consequence, many microstate-societies were actually created by colonial powers, which had 
ample opportunities to politically educate the subdued native or imported slave population. 
According to Caldwell and others, the extended colonial ties have made microstate-populations 
more ‘westernized’ than other third-world societies, in large part because they were part of the 





colonization, the smooth transition to independence of microstates has been 
cited as beneficial to the establishment of democracy. As Baldacchino argues, 
“few [microstates] actually struggled for independence; for many, the process 
was undramatic, somewhat haphazard, or even sudden” (1993: 31; italics in 
original).20 Finally, multiple scholars emphasize that due to the propensity of 
microstates to preserve the institutional structure of their former colonizers, it is 
evidently plausible that the maintenance of democratic norms and procedures 
can be explained on this basis as well (Sutton 1987: 8-12). 
 A final variable with which size has been linked in order to explain 
democracy is the element of international relations and foreign policy, which in 
the case of microstates primarily entails vulnerability and dependence. 
According to various scholars, the foreign policy of microstates can be 
understood in terms of the model of international patron-client relations (Carney 
1989; Sutton and Payne 1993: 589; Seibert 1999: 12).21 As Masala points out, 
democratic governance in microstates can be explained on the basis of these 
clientelistic international relations, in which American and European patrons 
demand adherence to democratic norms and procedures in exchange for 
economic and military support (2004: 254).22 In a seminal article, Steven 
Levitsky and Lucan Way argue that linkage to (Western) democratic countries 
generally provides a greater stimulus to democratization than leverage from the 
West (2005: 21). Linkage may exist on different terrains, such as economics, 
                                                
20 The gradualist decolonization of microstates has also been referred to in other publications, 
where attention is also paid to the fact that the process of decolonization occurred on the basis of 
extensive negotiations and consensus between colonial authorities and microstate-
representatives (Ott 2000: 70; Srebrnik 2004: 333). In fact, the progress towards independence 
was often initiated and fueled by the authorities in London rather than by local grassroots 
groups, and self-government was actually frequently opposed by large segments of the 
microstate-societies. The progress towards independence was mostly also stringently controlled 
by the colonial powers, which had the competence to postpone the attainment of independence if 
for example no adequate constitution could be decided upon (cf. Ghai 1988: 4-6 for the Pacific 
microstates). In some microstates (e.g. St. Kitts and Nevis, Vanuatu, and Kiribati), independence 
was delayed due to lingering tensions between various islands, which had to be resolved before 
London would permit self-rule.  
21 According to Christopher Carney, who has developed a conceptual framework to apply patron-
client relations to international relations, this type of relationship should be distinguished from 
plain dependency-relationships, primarily on the grounds that the patron-client relationship is 
voluntary and based on a certain degree of affection and solidarity (1989: 46-47). In 
international politics, the role of the client state is to deliver ‘intangible goods’ such as ideological 
convergence, international solidarity, and strategic advantage to the patron state, in exchange for 
material goods such as financial, economic, or military support. In order to keep receiving 
material support, the client state needs to display continuing international solidarity and loyalty 
to the patron state, for example by voting according to the interests of the patron state in the UN 
General Assembly. 
22 The provision of aid and other forms of external investments has often been linked to 
democratization in the academic literature (Wright 2009), although this finding has been 





geopolitics, and socio-cultural aspects, but the authors argue that geographical 
proximity is the most imperative factor (ibid.: 23). Furthermore, and of interest 
to the present study, the authors point out that the effects of linkage are 
augmented in the case of small, economically and militarily weak states.23  
 Whereas the global re-emergence of microstates after the 1970s has 
resulted in the recurrent observation of a statistical link between smallness and 
democracy, many scholars hence do not accept explanations of this phenomenon 
on the basis of the classical theoretical literature on size that was discussed in 
the previous chapter. When it comes to analyzing the effects of size on politics 
and democracy in microstates, which is the aim of this dissertation, the theories 
debated in this section have to be taken into account, since findings that appear 
to be caused by size might actually result from factors with which size correlates. 
This does not only pertain to the incidence of democratic government in 
microstates, but might apply to other political features of these countries as well. 
Now that the concept of democracy has been somewhat further explicated and a 
number of alternative explanations of microstate-democracy have been 
presented, the following four sections will discuss the findings of the case study-
literature on microstates with regard to the four sub-dimensions of democracy. 
Since the (case study literature on the) political systems of the cases that have 
been selected for in-depth analysis are extensively discussed in chapters to 
come, the discussion in this chapter focuses on literature on the other seventeen 
microstates. 
 
3. Contestation in Microstates: Political Alternatives and Opposition 
Seeing that out of the twenty-one microstates in the world, only one is not 
classified as an electoral democracy by Freedom House (the Kingdom of Tonga), 
in virtually all microstates political alternatives have the right and opportunity to 
enter the contest for political offices. The presence of this condition of democracy 
is not only confirmed by Freedom House, but also in the case study literature on 
individual microstates. Whereas a majority of the Pacific microstates operates 
without political parties, which complicates the identification of a political 
opposition, in all other microstates the existence of political alternatives can be 
confirmed on the basis of the presence of multiple political parties in parliament. 
This means that formally and institutionally, Dahl’s requirement of contestation 
                                                
23 In addition to the size of the state, the significance of linkage increases further when no 
competing issues on Western policy agendas exist, and when no alternative regional power 
supports the non-democratic regime (Levitsky and Way 2005: 21-22). Levitsky and Way argue 
that the combination of leverage and linkage will yield the most promising situation for 





for public offices is adhered to by almost all microstates. However, the case 
study-literature on microstates reveals that a focus on this formal and 
institutional condition obscures the fact that political competition in microstates 
appears to be of a markedly different nature than in larger democracies. 
 Whereas political and partisan competition in larger democracies mostly 
revolves around political cleavages, substantive political interests, and political 
programs and ideologies, to a large extent this appears not to be the case in 
microstates. Regarding the European microstates, in his publication on Monaco 
Georges Grinda for example points out that: 
 
“Unlike many countries, here is no ideological confrontation in the usual sense of 
the word. Indeed, the political movements, although existing and very active, have 
nothing in common with party organizations in neighboring countries, where an 
organized structure, a government programme, and the conquest of power are the 
objectives. Such movements are associations, in civil law, and on very general 
themes differentiated more by the respective sensitivity of their leaders and their 
members than by ideological forces” (Grinda 2007: 72). 
 
In similar fashion, David Beattie points out that between the two main parties of 
Liechtenstein,24 there is “little if any difference in their political and social 
philosophies” (2004: 189). Until 1993 formal political parties did not exist in 
Andorra’s Consell General de les Valls, as they were technically outlawed (Eccardt 
2005: 82), but according to Joan Becat the two parties that emerged after 199325 
are “necessarily personalized due to the smallness of the electorate and the 
demographic basis of Andorra” (2010: 155).26  
 With regard to parties in the Eastern Caribbean microstates, similar 
observations have been made. As Peters points out, political parties in these 
countries are basically personalistic, as the demise of a political leader usually 
results in the downfall of the entire political party (Peters 1992: 109; cf. Grenade 
2004: 4; Will 1991: 49 for the example of Grenada).27 This notion is confirmed by 
Duncan and Woods, who argue that politics in the Anglophone Caribbean is 
highly personalized: 
 
                                                
24 These are the Fatherland Union (Vaterländische Union - VU), and the Progressive Citizens’ 
Party of Liechtenstein (Fortschrittliche Bürgerpartei in Liechtenstein - FBP).  
25 These are the Liberal Party of Andorra (Partit Liberal d’Andorra) and the Social-Democratic 
Party (Partit Socialdemòcrata). 
26 Translation by author from original French text: “forcément personnalisés compte tenu de 
l'étroitesse du corps électoral et de la base démographique andorrane”. 
27 As Will points out, “In 1989 the partisan landscape of Grenada was highly complicated (…), 
with the remnants of Mitchell’s NNP competing against Blaize’s TNP, the NDC which was led by 
three highly independent personalities (including Brathwaite), and the GULP, a highly 
personalistic party made up of a mesmerized and loyal, but increasingly senior rural ‘crowd’ 





“Governing and opposition elites know each other personally. (…) It contributes to 
often reducing political discourse and conflict over policy issues to personal 
conflicts. In other words, personalities matter in island democracies and sometimes 
the cleavages that emerge in the population are as much a division over different 
personalities as over policy and ideological issues” (2007: 209). 
 
The primacy of personalistic over programmatic contestation seems to entail 
that political parties are not really distinguishable on the basis of their 
ideological orientations. As Peters argues;   
 
“While the people in the Caribbean have the right to elect a government every 5 
years, they do not so based on national issues. There seems to be no defined 
“common good”. Political campaigns run by those who wish to represent the people 
are not centered around issues, but rather on personalities and charisma” (1992: 
38-39)  . 
 
Whereas this observation applies to the entire region, similar findings have been 
reported about the individual Eastern Caribbean microstates. For the case of 
Dominica, Cecilia Babb for example notes that:  
 
“None of the parties espouse a clear national economic, political, and social 
ideology, and their only role seems to be to compete with each other for 
management of the state apparatus” (2005: 2). 
 
In St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Hillebrand and Trefs make a comparable 
observation, noting that: 
 
“The competition between PPP and SVLP28 determined the country’s two-party 
system from 1961 to 1974. It focused more on their respective leaders than on their 
ideological differences” (2005: 596). 
 
 In addition to the relative insignificance of ideological and programmatic 
contestation, in the Eastern Caribbean the personalization of politics has also 
resulted in the concentration of power in the hands of single individuals, leading 
to a culture of authoritarian leadership and oppression (Peters 1992: 54). In all 
six Eastern Caribbean countries, political emancipation was initiated by trade 
unions which later transformed into political (Labour) parties, and unified and 
mobilized the population under the banner of working-class ideals. However, in 
reality these unions advocated the political and economical emancipation of 
blacks rather than representing an authentic left-wing or socialist ideological 
platform (Emmanuel 1983; Peters 1992: 38-39). As a result of the fact that these 
parties managed to remain in office for decades, the leaders of these parties 
established highly personalistic and often quite authoritarian regimes. The most 
                                                





illustrious examples of these are found in the Bird family’s dynasty in Antigua 
and Barbuda (1960-2004), and Eric Gairy’s rule of Grenada (1967-1979).29   
 The personalistic instead of programmatic nature of political parties and 
political competition also emerges in the case study-literature on the African 
microstate of São Tomé and Príncipe (Seibert 1999: 193; Frynas et al. 2003: 16). 
Santomean politics is repeatedly described as extremely personalistic, and 
political parties appear to be based exclusively on interpersonal relations and 
conflicts (Seibert 1999: 316-317). It is worth quoting Seibert at length about the 
nature of politics in this African microstate: 
 
Because of small size and insularity, social and political life in São Tomé and 
Príncipe is marked by a small-town mentality. Among the small elite most people 
know each other personally and some are interrelated by kinship ties. The spatial 
and societal distance between rulers and ruled is small. Many citizens are 
acquainted with details of the politicians’ private lives. In such an intimate 
environment, national politics resembles the characteristics of micro-politics: 
political actions stem from essentially personal relations based on individual 
contact rather than the indirect, administrative relationships and formal contacts 
that dominate in a larger society. Consequently, politics in São Tomé and Príncipe is 
highly personalized, while personal issues are frequently politicized. The effects of 
strong personalism in small states are considered as potentially positive, as rulers 
are personally accessible and can be held directly accountable for their actions, but 
also potentially negative, since administrative decisions are based on personal 
factors rather than on impartial rules (1999: 316-317). 
 
Since the reintroduction of multiparty-democracy, three parties have always 
managed to win seats in the 55-member Santomean National Assembly, but 
these parties are not cohesive and exist of temporary alliances between 
individuals. Apart from the prevalence of personalistic politics, this is also a 
consequence of the general absence of cleavages in the country’s society, and the 
parties therefore do not advocate divergent interests (Seibert 1999: 316).30 
Competition seems to be primarily oriented towards the question who can 
control the state apparatus and state resources, of which the benefits are 
continuously distributed to political supporters (Seibert 1999: 320-321). In turn, 
support for political parties and politicians from among the citizens seems to be 
                                                
29 According to Hillebrands and Schwehm, “[t]he political dynasty of the Bird family has 
dominated the politics of Antigua and Barbuda since the colony was granted self-government in 
the late 1950s” (2005a: 61). On Gairy’s leadership in Grenada, Archer points out that: “Gairy had 
no difficulty in completely dominating his own party. Gairy insisted on one-man rule, and there 
was no group of leaders around him. From the moment Gairy assumed the premiership in 1967 
to his removal from office some 12 years later, he controlled every significant state decision in 
Grenada” (1985: 96). 
30 Specifically, Seibert argues that: “There are no big differences between the parties with regard 
to alternative political programs. (…) The parties do not mirror different socio-economic 
interests” (1999: 316-317). This conclusion is confirmed by Frynas et al., who point out that “[i]n 
Santomean politics, differences between the main parties are often only superficial. Personalities 





primarily determined by family and friendship relations. In this light, the popular 
explanation of the abbreviated version of the country’s name, STP as “somos 
todos primos” (“we are all cousins”), indeed seems adequate. 
 In the Pacific microstates, finally, the absence of political parties entails 
that politics is automatically more personality-oriented. In various publications, 
the personalistic nature of political competition is mentioned for the cases of 
Tuvalu (Panapa and Fraenkel 2008: 5, 9), Nauru (Wettenhall and Thynne 1994: 
70; Hughes 2004: 6; Connell 2006a: 56), the Marshall Islands (Meller 1990: 56-
57), Kiribati (Van Trease 1993: 17, 56, 67, 79-80, 83), and Tonga (Campbell 
2006: 276). In an article on the characteristics of leadership in the Pacific islands, 
Abby McLeod emphasizes the pervasiveness of personalistic ‘big-man’ leadership 
in the region, and points out that “[i]n Melanesia, legislators are accountable to 
the people on their own terms – that is via the distribution of wealth – not in 
terms of delivering upon legislative, policy and party-based ideological 
promises” (2007: 29). In the somewhat larger Pacific microstates in which 
political parties do play a role (e.g. Samoa and Vanuatu), partisan competition 
camouflages the more personalistic contestation that undergirds it (Van Trease 
2005: 324-327; Morgan 2008: 135).31  
  Although the twenty-one microstates are located in completely different 
parts of the world, have reached markedly different levels of socio-economic 
development, and differ on characteristics like culture, religion, and 
demographics, on the basis of the case study-literature it can be ascertained that 
all of them are characterized by the prevalence of personalistic politics and the 
relative insignificance of ideological and programmatic competition. This finding, 
which in the previous chapter was expressed by among others Benedict (1967a: 
49), Sutton (1987: 15-16), Lowenthal (1987: 38-39), and Farrugia (1993: 223-
224), therefore appears to represent a political feature that in all probability is a 
key effect of the smallness of these microstates. Due to the fact that these case 
studies are case-oriented and do not attempt to extrapolate or compare the 
observed political features to other microstates, many of these authors 
apparently fail to recognize the effects of smallness on the politics in the cases 
they study, and rather treat their results as idiosyncrasies of the particular 




                                                
31 According to Van Trease, in Vanuatu “[d]ividing up the spoils has become the focus of coalition 





4. Contestation in Microstates: The Horizontal Balance of Power 
In addition to the relative insignificance of ideology and political programs, the 
case study-literature on microstates also confirms the supposition of executive 
dominance as an effect of smallness. In the previous chapter, it was discussed 
how Benedict (1967b: 53-54), Sutton (1987: 12), and Gerring and Zarecki (2011: 
8-12) have noted that the governments of microstates are supremely powerful in 
relation to other political and societal institutions, leading to a distorted 
institutional balance of power in microstates. In the context of the personalistic 
politics in microstates, executive dominance often entails that individual 
politicians are able to accumulate vast powers, leading to personality cults and 
big man-leadership. To this it can be added that the political leaders of 
microstates have been found to remain in office for a significantly longer period 
of time than their colleagues in larger states (Sutton 1987: 16), which obviously 
increases their opportunities to establish and consolidate their power bases. 
 Out of the four European microstates, three are principalities and 
therefore have a Prince (or in the case of Andorra two Co-Princes) as head of 
state. Although Liechtenstein and Monaco refer to themselves as constitutional 
monarchies and are also recognized as such by for example Freedom House, the 
Princes of these microstates unquestionably occupy a much more active and 
powerful position in their political systems than their counterparts in larger 
European monarchies.32 In both countries, executive and judicial power is 
traditionally located in the hands of the Prince, who delegates this power to self-
appointed government ministers and judges.33 Additionally, both Princes have 
the right of initiative, the right to convoke and dissolve parliament, and have 
extensive veto-powers, which means that the entire legislative process depends 
on consensus between the Prince and parliament. Whereas the survival of 
Liechtenstein’s government is dependent on the confidence of both Prince and 
parliament, Monaco’s government is responsible to the Prince only, and the 
Monegasque National Assembly has no control over the executive (Grinda 2007: 
76, 88).34  
                                                
32 The specific political arrangement of both Monaco and Liechtenstein has in several 
publications has been described as a division or balance of power between the Prince and the 
people (cf. Beattie 2004: 174; Grinda 2007: 53; Marxer 2007: introduction). 
33 Since 2003, Liechtenstein’s Prince and parliament jointly select and appoint judges (Beattie 
2004: 246). 
34 Due to these factors, the influential and active political role of the Monegasque and 
Liechtensteiner Princes seems to render a classification as semi-constitutional monarchies more 
accurate, and their constitutional position appears more similar to those of for example the 





As a consequence of the fact that the constitutional and practical political 
role of non-elected leadership in Monaco and Liechtenstein is thus quite 
extensive, it can be questioned in how far these countries fulfill Dahl’s 
requirement of contestation for the main political offices (Dahl 1971: 4). The 
Monegasque and Liechtensteiner Princes are the most powerful players in the 
political systems of their respective countries, and especially in Monaco elected 
politicians in the National Assembly have a very limited political role as they do 
not possess the competence to effectively control the government. As Grinda 
argues: 
 
“The National Council has no right to restrict the Government’s political 
responsibility; only the Prince can do this. The National Council has no control over 
the executive since it cannot oblige member of government to resign, nor does it 
have the right to interrogate, research or investigate the actions of government” 
(2007: 88). 
 
 Whereas elections in these microstates are undoubtedly free and fair, and 
the condition of inclusiveness is therefore absolutely adhered to, for the main 
political position – the monarchy – no elections are being organized. In this 
sense, it is hard to agree with Freedom House’s ranking of these countries as full-
fledged democracies. In the Andorran political system a similar situation used to 
exist, but the once omnipotent Co-Princes now occupy a modest and mainly 
ceremonial political role, comparable to that of the British or Belgian monarchs 
(Colliard 1993: 386).35 In short, personality-oriented preeminence of the 
executive can certainly be noted for the cases of Liechtenstein and Monaco, 
whereas this appears to be no longer the case for Andorra. 
 As described in the previous section, personalistic leadership and 
executive dominance also characterize Eastern Caribbean politics. In his analysis 
of politics and democracy in this region, Peters for instance remarks that:  
 
“What is peculiar about the Eastern Caribbean system is the absolute authority that 
government somehow inherits. Government officials are able to circumvent laws 
that they have enacted. They are able to use public resources for personal gain 
(1992: 9) 
 
                                                
35 In contrast to other monarchies Andorra’s suzerains do not have to be noblemen, and it is quite 
remarkable that both of them are no monarchs in their own territories, since one of them is a 
president and the other a bishop. In former times, there was an informal division of power 
between the politically-dominant French president and the spiritual and religious authority of 
the Bishop of Urgell (Colliard 1993: 382). Currently, the Co-Princes retain a real veto when it 
comes to the ratification of international treaties, and they also appoint judges on the advice of 
the government (Colliard 1993: 386-387; Eccardt 2005: 84). Furthermore, Andorrans have 
absolutely no say in the selection and appointment of their co-Princes and their respective 
representatives in Andorra. Apart from these regulations however, Andorra’s co-Princes function 





The conclusions of Peters on executive dominance are in large part shared and 
confirmed by Paul Sutton, who highlights how Eastern Caribbean Prime 
Ministers have managed to dominate their legislatures, judiciaries, 
bureaucracies, and media (1999: 73-75). With concern to the power of Caribbean 
prime ministers, Sutton points out that “[s]hort of defeat at a general election the 
prime minister is invincible” (1999: 73). In case studies on individual 
microstates, executive dominance is generally substantiated. For instance, in an 
article on Dominica Anthony Payne highlights the relative weakness of non-
governmental institutions: 
 
The weakness of the civil service and state institutions in general, and the absence 
of a viable civil society continue to constitute key structural constraints to further 
development” (2008: 328). 
 
On the case of Grenada, Archer highlights how Westminster structures have 
amplified the authoritarian elements of the system (1985: 94; cf. Hinds 2008: 
396 on this issue), and in addition describes how “institutions and mechanisms 
outside of government which limit the power of a prime minister in metropolitan 
countries are poorly developed” (ibid.). Finally, in their chapter on elections in 
Antigua and Barbuda, Hillebrands and Schwehm illustrate how the Bird-dynasty 
has not only crushed the opposition, but also destabilized and manipulated the 
media and the judiciary in the country (2005a: 61). 
 In line with O’Donnell’s observations in larger third wave democracies, on 
the case of São Tomé and Príncipe Seibert warns that “[t]he democratization 
process runs the risk to remain restricted to the creation of institutions based on 
formalist perceptions of liberal democracy” (1999: 244). In particular, Seibert 
describes how the bureaucracy of this African microstate has been politicized as 
a consequence of government patronage, arguing that: 
 
“The public administration is perceived as the representative of the ruling party 
rather than a neutral broker between competing interests representing an 
overarching national interest. Civil servants do not possess an ethic of neutrality” 
(1999: 244). 
 
Seibert primarily links executive dominance in São Tomé and Príncipe to the 
country’s ‘goldfish-bowl society’ and intimate social relationships, as a result of 
which formal institutional roles fall victim to personal relationships, which limits 
their neutral and impartial functioning. According to Seibert, the smallness of the 
microstates, and the ensuing close personal bonds between the elite and the 
people however also prevented the regime from becoming as oppressive as 





 In the literature on Pacific microstates, governments have also been 
observed to dominate their political system at the expense of other institutions. 
On the case of Tuvalu, Goldsmith argues that government is the largest employer 
and therefore dominates the microstate’s economy (2005: 105-107), whereas 
Panapa and Fraenkel highlight that “the opposition functions not as check or 
balance agency” and “parliament is seen as the arm of the government-of-the-
day” (2008: 2, 13). In Nauru, Kun et al. observe that: 
 
“The majority of Nauruan parliamentarians do not fully understand their roles and 
responsibilities. There is a sense that parliament merely rubber stamps legislation 
presented by the government” (2004: 14). 
 
As Hill finds in the Federated States of Micronesia, also in the Pacific the 
independence and impartiality of the civil service is undermined by government 
patronage, and “[w]ithin the public service corruption occurs in the form of 
nepotism and is an obstacle to the hiring of the most competent public servants 
and the most qualified contractors” (2004: 5). 
 The three larger Pacific microstates (Tonga, Samoa, and Vanuatu) have at 
times experienced less democratic forms of government. As in Liechtenstein and 
Monaco, Tonga’s monarchy continues to play an influential role in this 
microstate’s politics, rendering it the only non-democracy in the group of 
twenty-one microstates.36 The Tongan parliament, judiciary, and press are all 
reported to be acting in the interest of the country’s monarchy, which 
undermines their potential democratic role. Whereas Samoa was the first Pacific 
island nation to become independent in 1962, until 2000 political rights were 
reserved to Samoa’s traditional leaders (the Matai) only (Huffer and So'o 2003: 
281-282).37 The enduring authority and control of the Samoan Matai with regard 
                                                
36 Tonga has been ruled by the Tupou-royal dynasty since at least 1875, but the origins of the 
monarchy of this microstate according to some sources goes back to the 10th century. The 
microstate’s government consists of ministers appointed by the King, who mostly have 
traditional titles as well (James 1994: 242). In recent years, pro-democracy forces united under 
the Human Rights and Democracy Movement have made inroads into Tongan politics, and in 
2006 the first commoner (Feleti Sevele) was elected prime minister of the island nation 
(Koloamatangi 2009: 231-232). However, when King Tupou IV’s nephew Tu’ipelehake who had 
played a major role in reconciling the King, nobles, and pro-democracy advocates died in a car 
accident in the same year, the stability of Tongan politics became further imperiled, culminating 
in the 2008 riots in Tonga’s capital Nuku’alofa. In 2010, a major legislative reform that 
represented a major step in the direction of constitutional monarchy and therefore democracy 
was implemented. As a consequence of this law, a majority of Tongan legislators is now popularly 
elected, and the country’s Freedom House rating on political rights went from ‘5’ to ‘3’ (Freedom 
House 2012).  
37 The authority of traditional leaders on the local level of politics was augmented as a 
consequence of the Village Fono Act, which allowed for the chiefly council (Fono) of each Samoan 





to elections, the judiciary, and the media are the primary reasons for Freedom 
House to give the country less-than-perfect ratings,38 and the influence of chiefs 
in many ways seems to consolidate rather than decrease (Macpherson 1997: 44, 
48; Freedom House 2012). In Vanuatu, the Anglophone Vanua’aku Party 
managed to remain in office for eleven years to the detriment of the 
Francophone opposition (Huffer and Molisa 1999: 102; Morgan 2008: 117). In 
this period, Vanuatu was autocratically ruled by Father Walter Lini, who brought 
the country into the Soviet block and advocated ‘Melanesian socialism’ in the 
region (Morgan 2008: 121).39 After the end of the Cold War, Vanuatuan politics 
became characterized by infighting between big man-politicians for power and 
influence, with endemic instability and factionalism as a result (Huffer and 
Molisa 1999: 102; Van Trease 2005: 298; Paterson 2009: 251). 
 In addition to the earlier observed prevalence of personalistic over 
programmatic contestation, the current section has revealed that microstates are 
particularly prone to executive dominance in relation to other institutions. 
Whereas this occurs in the form of powerful, institutionalized non-elected 
leadership in some of the European and Pacific microstates, it happens in the 
form of charismatic big man-rule in the Eastern Caribbean, São Tomé and 
Príncipe, and other Pacific island nations. In all these cases, executive dominance 
comes at the expense of other institutions, of which the functioning is 
undermined by a lack of resources and the multiple-role relations that result 
from smallness. The fact that only one microstate (Andorra) is a possible 
exception to this pattern, whereas all other microstates around the globe 
experience this effect, indicates that executive dominance can almost certainly be 
recognized as a universally valid political consequence of smallness.  
 
5. Inclusiveness in Microstates: Relations between Citizens and Politicians 
Whereas it can on the basis of the discussion in section two be argued that 
personalistic politics and executive dominance are common features in other 
third wave-democracies as well, it can also be ascertained that size has an effect 
                                                                                                                                 
seven held Matai-titles, which is indicative of the dominant role that traditional leaders continue 
to play in the Samoan system. 
38 Samoa receives a score of ‘2’ on both political rights and civil liberties (Freedom House 2012). 
39 In the aftermath of the 1980 Coconut War in which the island of Espiritu Santo attempted to 
break away from the rest of the archipelago, Lini used the argument of stability to establish a 
personalistic and repressive rule. However, at the end of the 1980s conflicts within the 
leadership of the Vanua’aku Party erupted, and in 1991 Lini was ousted from the party 
leadership (Premdas and Steeves 1994: 69; Ambrose 1996: 53). After 1991, the exclusion of the 
Francophone part of the population and Vanuatu’s alignment with the Soviet block came to an 





on the influence of these factors. In similar fashion, whereas particularism is a 
widespread phenomenon in many new, non-Western democracies (O'Donnell 
1996), as the literature on the political consequences of size reveals, it can also 
be determined that smallness increases the likelihood of particularism (Benedict 
1967b: 53-54; Lowenthal 1987: 38-39; Farrugia 1993: 223-224). Since 
personalism, governmental pervasiveness, and particularism are all features that 
emerge in both the academic literature on new democracies and in the 
theoretical literature on the political effects of size, it can be questioned in which 
way their size renders microstates different from other third wave-countries. In 
general, it appears fair to say that size aggravates or intensifies the political 
factors that characterize new democracies. This is certainly the case with regard 
to the particularistic nature of citizen-politician linkages. 
 Although the influence of particularism in the European microstates is 
uncertain, the case study-literature on these countries does point to a general 
awareness about its potential drawbacks as a result from size. For example, as 
Catudal and Duursma reveal most of these microstates hire policemen and 
judges from abroad, since “with nearly everyone related to one another, citizens 
feel that only outsiders can serve impartially” (Catudal 1975: 197). In Monaco, 
for example, “the majority of the judges in the Monegasque courts and tribunals 
have to be French nationals” (Duursma 1996: 285), whereas in Liechtenstein 
“foreign judges may never constitute a majority” (Duursma 1996: 149). Until 
1993, Andorran judges were appointed by the Co-Princes, but this situation has 
changed and at present “judges should be preferably, but not necessarily, of 
Andorran nationality” (Duursma 1996: 357).  
 In the literature on the Eastern Caribbean microstates, clientelism, 
patronage, and nepotism are recurring and defining characteristics of politics. As 
Peters argues, “[t]he relationship between the government and citizens in the 
Eastern Caribbean in the post-independence era is essentially one of clientelism” 
(1992: 128). This conclusion is shared by Sutton, who points out that “Caribbean 
politics established strong links between political leaders and their supporters, 
cemented by patronage networks that deliver jobs and benefits in return for 
votes” (1999: 74). The most elaborate analysis of the issue has however been 
published by Duncan and Woods, who perceive patronage to be an essential 
component of Anglophone Caribbean politics, that is also related to the small size 
of these countries. The authors especially highlight the redistributive effects of 






 Patronage and clientelism also emerge as key political factors in the 
literature on separate Eastern Caribbean microstates. In his account of elections 
in St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Ryan for example argues that “[t]he use of 
state resources to establish bases of patronage was an important means of 
securing votes” (2005: 2). In similar fashion, on the case of Antigua and Barbuda 
Phillips argues that “[t]he ALP40 has also made use of government funds as an 
electoral tactic; for example to repair roads, to embark on construction projects, 
and to provide jobs for supporters and would-be supporters” (2005: 2).41 On the 
case of Grenada, finally, Wendy Grenade explains how Hinds’ findings with 
regard to “a culture of party or racial patronage or clientelism” in the Eastern 
Caribbean are also applicable to this particular microstate (2004: 11). In 
summary, the case study-literature suggests that the Eastern Caribbean 
microstates confirm the political pattern of particularism that was suggested by 
some authors in the previous chapter. 
 In the case of the African microstate of São Tomé and Príncipe, patron-
client relations appear even more perennial and prevailing than in the Caribbean 
microstates. According to Seibert, “[i]n São Tomé and Príncipe patron-client 
relationships have been deeply entrenched in local society since the 16th 
century” (1999: 11). These linkages can possibly be attributed to the small size of 
this island state, since “[j]obs and resources are not distributed according to 
economic necessities and the professional capacities of the person in question, 
but to maintain clients, satisfy kinship obligations, or to do favors to lovers and 
friends” (1999: 151). As Seibert convincingly shows, the implementation of 
democratic institutions has not concomitantly resulted in a decline in 
particularism, since “[d]emocratic institutions have merged with the political 
attitudes and clientelist models of resource distribution which have 
characterized all previous regimes”, and “[p]arty competition has only resulted 
in new opportunities for creating and exploiting patron-client relationships that 
link individuals to politicians and parties” (1999: 244, 322). 
 Patronage and clientelism are also defining characteristics of Pacific 
politics, but since the distribution of favors by political leaders is a key 
component of traditional Pacific island cultures, it can be hard to disentangle 
particularism from custom and traditions in this region  (Larmour 2005: 4-5; 
                                                
40 Antigua Labour Party. 
41 In fact, in the literature Antigua and Barbuda is often mentioned as the most corrupt and 
patronage-ridden of the six Eastern Caribbean microstates, and Thorndyke notes that “Antigua 
has over two decades acquired the regrettable image of being the most corrupt society in the 





Duncan and Nakagawa 2006). As Taafaki and Oh for instance point out on 
corruption in Tuvalu; 
 
“The Tuvalu tradition of reciprocity can provide an effective measure of 
accountability. It is important for the political survival of leaders to provide 
employment opportunities for their constituents. This may take the form of 
contracts for government projects, appointments to the board of statutory bodies, 
or in some cases, influencing appointments to the civil service. In some countries, 
these actions may be considered as bordering on corruption. Tuvalu politicians, 
however, view these actions as a form of accountability to their electorate. It is a fact 
of Tuvaluan reciprocity, a custom that is still very strongly practised, and corruption 
is not seen as a significant problem in Tuvalu” (1995: 8). 
 
A comparable observation is made by Kun et al. on the case of Nauru, since they 
note that “[a]spects of traditional culture such as gift giving, privileges of elders, 
and the extensive relationships amongst many Nauruans have rendered 
investigations on corruption more difficult. It is common for the people of Nauru 
to go to their MPs to ask for money and other favors” (2004: 5).42  
 Although anticorruption and sunshine laws have been implemented in 
most Pacific islands, these are often in conflict with traditional culture and 
values. As Nancy Pollock shows, this is for example the case in the Marshall 
Islands: 
 
“Traditional values of gift-giving as a means of social cohesion and recognition of 
kin and wider social ties sit uneasily alongside formal rules against corruption. 
Nepotism in the civil service and gift-giving at election times may be considered as 
instances of corruption, but this interpretation is unclear in an indigenous setting” 
(2004: 11). 
 
In a publication on the Federated States of Micronesia, Edward Hill especially 
highlights the prevalence of nepotism and patronage in the public sector, 
revealing that “[w]ithin the public service, corruption occurs in the form of 
nepotism. Although the laws provide for the hiring of public servants on the basis 
of merit and require an examination of candidates, in fact personal managers and 
others have found ways to put relatives and friends ahead of more qualified 
applicants” (2004: 14). In Kiribati, “[c]orruption (…) occurs at all levels of 
society, though it is most notable in governmental circles with regards nepotism, 
petty bribery from public officials and possible instances of vote buying” 
(MacKenzie 2004: 4). 
                                                
42 In similar fashion, these authors later argue that “[v]oters usually see the receipt of gifts in 
return for votes as a legitimate part of the electoral process, as it may be the only thing they ever 
see coming out of the State. Nepotism continues to arise where elected leaders use their powers 






 The larger Pacific microstates are no less plagued by particularism. 
Tonga’s pro-democracy movement was initially also campaigning against abuses 
of power and corruption, but in the 2005 elections they were themselves accused 
of such actions (Campbell 2006: 56). Since the 1990s, Vanuatuan politics has 
been increasingly beleaguered by corruption and misconduct of politicians, with 
“Ministers and Members of Parliament from all parties being implicated in 
inappropriate and even criminal conduct” (Huffer and Molisa 1999: 102). The 
smallness of electoral districts also increases the likelihood of clientelism in 
Samoa, as “MP candidates will usually visit all the villages in their constituency to 
ask for support, and this includes bringing gifts for the villages” (So'o 2009: 206). 
In short, without exceptions the problems of corruption, lack of accountability, 
and particularism appear to dominate the politics of Pacific island states. 
  In accounting for citizen-politician linkages in small states, with the 
possible exception of the European cases particularism appears to play a role in 
all microstates. It is especially remarkable that other, more positive hypothesized 
effects of smallness, such as enhanced feelings of efficacy and awareness among 
citizens, and increased opportunities for communication and responsiveness do 
not surface as key political features in the case study-literature. Instead, on the 
basis of this literature the proximity between citizens and politicians actually 
appears to undermine the quality of political representation, seeing that 
clientelism and patronage are generally believed to result in political and social 
dependency (Benedict 1967b: 53-54). Since several publications also indicate 
that the political participation of microstate-citizens is limited to the casting of a 
ballot once in several years (Peters 1992: 133),43 in the next section attention 
will be paid to the characteristics of more conventional forms of participation in 
microstates. 
 
6. Inclusiveness in Microstates: The Characteristics of Participation 
In the literature on size and democracy, the positive effect of size on levels of 
citizen involvement and participation is listed as one of the key advantages of 
smallness, and higher levels of turnout in small states have been reported in 
several publications (Blais and Carty 1990; Franklin 2002; Gaarsted Frandsen 
2002). At the same time, Dahl and Tufte have concluded that “political 
participation and sense of effectiveness among citizens do not depend to any 
                                                
43 According to Peters, “[d]emocracy means to the Caribbean people the freedom to elect their 
leaders, but immediately after the elections their political participation ceases. They withdraw 







significant degree on the size of a country” (1973: 65). Since statistics on other 
conventional forms of participation such as party membership, participation in 
rallies and demonstrations, or the frequency of contact between voters and their 
representatives are either lacking or unavailable, turnout is the only form of 
participation on which enough data are available to enable cross-country 
comparisons. 
 A first remarkable characteristic about participation in the European 
microstates is the fact that women were until extraordinarily recently excluded 
from the franchise. Whereas female suffrage was introduced during the 
interbellum in most of Western Europe, women gained voting rights in San 
Marino in 1959, in Monaco in 1962, in Andorra in 1970, and in Liechtenstein only 
in 1984 (Eccardt 2005: 101). In this latter microstate, equal rights between the 
sexes was only realized in 1992 (Beattie 2004: 176), and according to Freedom 
House “Liechtenstein society remains conservative, and practice lags behind 
principle when it comes to female emancipation” (2012). Despite these 
downsides, turnout figures in the European microstates have been quite high, 
reaching on average 71.8% in Monaco, 73.9% in San Marino, 78.6% in Andorra, 
and even 86.5% in Liechtenstein.44 With the exception of Liechtenstein, these 
figures are however in line with European averages (Wattenberg 2000: 71-72), 
which indicates that size does not directly have an influence on turnout in the 
European microstates.  
 In publications of Peters and Sutton, levels of voter turnout in Eastern 
Caribbean microstates are reported to be high, especially in comparison to other 
developing countries (Peters 1992: 209; Sutton 1999: 70). The Eastern 
Caribbean microstates have rather comparable figures of voter turnout, and with 
the positive exception of Antigua and Barbuda (which has an average figure of 
71.6%), all microstates in this region have an average turnout level of between 
sixty and seventy percent. This is comparable to turnout figures of larger island 
states in region like Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, and Barbados, whereas it is 
much lower than voter turnout in the Bahamas (which is mostly above ninety 
percent). Furthermore, since voter turnout reaches on average about 65% in 
North America and 69% in Latin America (López Pintor et al. 2002: 77), the 
Eastern Caribbean microstates do not have exceptionally high levels of 
participation in comparison to the rest of the Americas. In general therefore, 
their smallness actually does not seem to generate higher turnout levels in the 
Eastern Caribbean microstates, and twenty years later, Peters’ conclusion that 
                                                
44 Own calculations, based on turnout data of the International IDEA database (International 





“voter participation is among the highest in the Third World” (1992: 209) can no 
longer be substantiated.  
Regarding other forms of participation, on which no data is available, the 
case study-literature offers a number of indications. According to Peters, 
“[p]olitical participation by the citizens of the Eastern Caribbean is centered 
around mass rallies in cities and towns”, yet “[m]ost leaders appear to welcome 
mass participation in the electoral process in order to get elected to government, 
but seem to discourage participation in the actual governing of the state” (1992: 
7, 113). In addition, Peters argues that “[d]emocracy means to the Caribbean 
people the freedom to elect their leaders, but immediately after the elections 
their political participation ceases. They withdraw from the political process 
completely and assume their status as subjects of the leaders” (1992: 133). 
Furthermore, as Hinds argues, in the Anglophone Caribbean “patronage 
undermines mass independent participation in the political process” (2008: 
393). On the basis of this literature, it appears that apart from election 
campaigns and the elections themselves, political inclusiveness in the Eastern 
Caribbean is quite limited. 
In São Tomé and Príncipe, the average turnout level in the five most 
recent parliamentary elections is 67.7%, which is just a little bit higher than 
Africa’s average of 64% (López Pintor et al. 2002: 77). In his book, Seibert argues 
that “[v]oter turnout in São Tomé and Príncipe has been high, both by African 
and international standards”, but this observation is hence not really 
corroborated by IDEA-figures. Again therefore, smallness seems to have at best a 
marginal impact on the level of participation, although “[t]he increasing venality 
of election campaigns, the changing election results, and the voting patterns 
within small communities and families both prove that voters in the creole 
society of São Tomé and Príncipe are not submitted to heavy social or group 
pressures, but enjoy a considerable individual freedom of political choice” 
(Seibert 1999: 326). Apart from these remarks, the literature offers little clues on 
the nature of alternative forms of political participation in the African microstate. 
 With an average of 79%, Oceania stands out as the world region with the 
highest voter turnout figures. Since over half of this region is composed of 
microstates, it seems plausible that at least part of this achievement is an effect 
of the smallness of the many Pacific island states. At the same time however, 
turnout statistics on many elections in microstates are lacking, as a consequence 
of which it hard to estimate average levels of electoral participation. Out of the 
five most recent Tuvaluan elections, for example, only one turnout figure is 





in 2007), Kiribati (67.5% in 2007), and the Federated States of Micronesia 
(52.6% in 2007). With the exception of Tuvalu, these figures are well below the 
Oceanian average, and this also holds true for the average figures of Tonga 
(59.0%), and Vanuatu (62.9%). As a result, only Nauruan (90.3%), Palauan 
(77.3%), and Samoan (82.3%) figures conform to the average level of the region, 
and as a matter of fact the largest countries in this region (Australia and New 
Zealand) have the highest turnout figures. In the Pacific, therefore, the notion 
that smallness fosters participation is forcefully rejected. 
In the case study-literature on Pacific microstates, the relatively negative 
observations with regard to voter turnout in the region are partially explained. 
On the case of Vanuatu, for example, Morgan notes that “[s]ince independence, 
voter turnout has declined steadily, indicating increasing voter disenchantment” 
(2008: 134). In similar fashion, on the case of Tonga Kerry James notes that 
“[l]ow turnout (49%) could indicate a passive resistance to the democratic 
rhetoric and perhaps to politics as a whole” (2002: 314). In general, the case 
study-literature indicates that the Pacific culture of respect and obedience to 
political leaders sometimes hampers the willingness of citizens to take part in 
politics. On the case of Nauru, Quanchi for instance points out that “[t]he 
predicted close and constant scrutiny by the public did not occur, as inordinate 
personal wealth and associated consumerism prevailed over political action. Clan 
loyalties to elected chiefs and leaders also overrode criticism” (2009: 125). In 
summary, in none of the four regions in which they are located do microstates 
significantly outperform larger countries with regard to participation, and Dahl 
and Tufte’s conclusions with regard to the absence of a relation between size and 
participation therefore appear to be accurate. 
As mentioned before, no data or statistics are available on the frequency 
of contacts between citizens and their representatives. However, in table 3.2 the 
ratios of citizens per Member of Parliament have been presented for all 
microstates, where it can be seen that in the smallest microstates each MP 
represents less than one thousand citizens. Even in St. Lucia, where the fewest 
number of MPs per citizen can be noted, individual MPs still represent less than 
10.000 citizens. If these figures are compared to countries like the Netherlands 
(111.538 citizens per MP), Germany (130.717), or the United States (721.488), it 
becomes clear that representation in microstates can be expected to occur on the 
basis of completely different dynamics than in larger states. In the analytical 
chapters of this dissertation, this hypothesis will be examined in four 





inclusiveness in microstates has been discussed, this literature will be contrasted 
with the theoretical literature of chapter 2 in the conclusion. 
 
Table 3.2: Citizen-MP Ratios in the Twenty-One Microstates45 
Microstate Citizens MPs Citizens per MP 
Nauru 9.322 18 518 
Tuvalu 10.544 15 703 
Palau 20.956 16 1.310 
Monaco 30.539 24 1.272 
San Marino 31.817 60 530 
Liechtenstein 35.236 25 1.409 
St. Kitts and Nevis 50.314 15 3.354 
Marshall Islands 67.182 33 2.036 
Dominica 72.969 32 2.280 
Andorra 84.825 28 3.029 
Antigua and Barbuda 87.884 19 4.625 
Seychelles 89.188 34 2.623 
Kiribati  100.743 46 2.190 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 103.869 21 4.946 
Tonga 105.916 30 3.531 
Federated States of Micronesia 106.836 14 7.631 
Grenada 108.419 15 7.228 
St. Lucia 161.557 17 9.503 
São Tomé and Príncipe 179.506 55 3.264 
Samoa 193.161 49 3.942 
Vanuatu 224.564 52 4.319 
 
7. Conclusion: Connecting the Theoretical and Case Study-Literatures on Size 
In the conclusion of the previous chapter, I pointed to a discrepancy between the 
theoretical literature on size and democracy and the more recent statistics that 
reveal a correlation between smallness and democracy. Whereas smallness was 
almost unequivocally cherished by philosophers and thinkers up to the 18th 
century, since that time a clear majority of the literature has emphasized the 
drawbacks rather than the advantages of a small population size. In fact, it can be 
seen that much of the recent optimism about the presumably democracy-
stimulating features of smallness are primarily based on statistics, and are 
actually not buttressed by convincing theoretical explanations. The examination 
of the case study-literature on microstates that was carried out in the present 
chapter in large part supports the more comparative literature on the 
shortcomings of smallness (especially those described in section 5 of the 
                                                
45 Based on own calculations. Data have been retrieved from the CIA World Factbook (2011), and the 
database of the Inter-Parliamentary Union (2011). In the case of bicameral legislatures, only the 





previous chapter). This suggests that the statistical link between size and 
democracy camouflages or misrepresents the true nature of politics in small 
states, which means that the quest for the explanation of this statistical link (cf. 
Anckar 2002b; Srebrnik 2004: 339) is actually doomed to fail. 
 If the main points of the two strands of literature that were examined in 
the previous and the current chapter are compared, two sorts of potential 
explanations for the supposed statistical link between size and democracy 
remain plausible. On the one hand, on the basis of the discussion in section 3 of 
this chapter, it could be hypothesized that this link is spurious in nature. As 
argued in this section, the explanation of microstate-democracy on the basis of 
religious factors or insularity is somewhat problematic in light of the abundance 
of non-Protestant microstates and non-democratic island nations. On the other 
hand, the location of microstates in democracy-enhancing regions of the world, 
their colonial legacies, and international political factors can all be supposed to 
stimulate democratic development, and can possibly explain the prevalence of 
democracy in microstates. In the case study-chapters of this dissertation, the 
relevance and applicability of these factors will be examined for each of the four 
microstates under investigation. 
 In addition to the possibility of a spurious correlation, I would like to 
propose an alternative explanation of microstate-democracy, which is based on 
the fact that most microstates can be regarded as third wave-democracies. As 
will be discussed extensively in chapter 4, scholars have encountered 
considerable difficulties in the classification of various ‘third wave’-countries (cf. 
Huntington 1991) that have not managed to complete the transition to 
democracy. In particular, O’Donnell has highlighted how these countries have 
implemented democratic institutions and structures, whereas democratic norms 
and traditions remain to be lacking (O'Donnell 1996). According to O’Donnell, 
the academic focus on formal democratic structures leads to the disregard of 
non-institutional factors such as personalistic politics or particularism. Although 
almost never studied as such, seventeen of the microstates can be classified as 
third wave-democracies, which means that O’Donnell’s line of argument can 
possibly be extended to these cases. 
 Due to the lack of more in-depth, substantive, qualitative analyses of 
microstate-democracy, the data of Freedom House are virtually the only 
information available on the political systems of these countries. As a large-N 
aggregate index of democracy, the Freedom in the World-survey is necessarily 
focused on formal, institutional indicators of democracy, and can only to a 





democracy in these countries. This statistical, quantitative focus has been 
adopted by many scholars who study democracy in microstates, whereas more 
qualitative, comprehensive analyses of microstate-politics have remained 
relatively scarce. It is at least partially the aim of this dissertation to fill this gap 
in the scholarly literature, by offering a comparative, in-depth analysis of politics 
and democracy in microstates. 
 The examination of the case-study literature on microstates has revealed 
that the politics of these countries are plagued by more or less similar features as 
those that emerge in the literature on third wave-countries. Personalistic politics, 
executive dominance, and particularism are all elements that characterize 
politics in larger third wave-countries as well, and in this sense the microstates 
do not appear to be markedly different from their larger counterparts. At the 
same time, publications on the individual microstates also suggest that size is at 
least to some extent at the basis of these political patterns, which might be 
reinforced as a consequence of smallness. The accuracy of this expectation will 
be further examined in the analytical chapters (# 5-8) of this dissertation. Now 
that the theoretical literature on size and the empirical literature on microstates 
have been discussed, and the implications of this literature for the present 
analysis have been outlined, in the next chapter attention will first be devoted to 

























Concepts, Methods, and Case Selection 
 
 
1. Introduction: the Need for a New Approach 
As described in chapter 2, in recent decades a variety of publications have 
highlighted the statistical association between size and democracy, and have 
endeavored to find an explanation for this correlation. Until now, this quest has 
however not resulted in a satisfactory or broadly endorsed theory, and in this 
sense academic thinking has not progressed much beyond the point of 
speculation. Since a large part of especially the sociological literature on size now 
perceives smallness to impede on democratic development, these theories 
cannot be referred to in explaining the statistical link between size and 
democracy. In similar fashion, as chapter 3 has demonstrated, whereas the case 
study-literature on the characteristics of politics in the individual microstates 
confirms that these countries do have democratic institutions and structures, 
their practical, informal, and more substantive political dynamics often diverge 
markedly from the democratic ideal. In this respect, the political systems of (non-
European) microstates in many ways resemble those of larger new democracies. 
 As discussed in the conclusion of the previous chapter, two alternative 
explanations of democracy in microstates can be conceived of that do not rely on 
the ‘classical’ literature on size and democracy. On the one hand, the variable of 
size can be deemed to overlap with other, democracy-stimulating factors such as 
religion, geography, colonial history, or international politics. On the other hand, 
it could be argued that the statistical link is exclusively based on formal 
indicators of democracy, and that microstates – like other third wave-countries – 
are characterized by a discrepancy between formally democratic structures on 
the one hand, and a more antidemocratic political environment on the other 
hand. If one thing is clear however, more statistical analyses on the relationship 
between size and democracy are not going to bring academic theorizing in this 
field any further, and will almost certainly not yield a convincing explanation of 
this link. As a consequence, the present study explicitly aims to address this 





 In the present chapter, the contours and substance of this new approach 
are outlined. Whereas chapters 2 and 3 have already explored a large part of the 
academic literature on this study’s key concepts of size and democracy, this 
chapter commences with a further conceptualization and operationalization of 
these terms. Subsequently, the theoretical model of this dissertation is sketched 
out and discussed, and the expectations that follow from the literature are once 
more presented. This is followed by a discussion of the qualitative and 
exploratory research method that this study employs, and the various 
components that it entails. After that, section five discusses the case study-
methodology of this study, and devotes further attention to the characteristics of 
both within-case and cross-case analyses. The subsequent sixth section deals 
with various issues that relate to the selection of cases for in-depth analyses, and 
explains and justifies the selection of four microstates for qualitative analysis in 
the chapters to come. The chapter ends with a conclusion, in which the main 
points are summarized, and the structure of the four case study-chapters is 
outlined. 
 
2. Concepts: Defining and Operationalizing Size 
Since at least the 1950s, an academic debate has emerged about the 
conceptualization of state size. The size of nations can be measured on the basis 
of multiple variables, among which population, territory, economic indicators, or 
military capacity. In addition to highlighting the existence of multiple ‘size’-
variables, this scholarly debate has also focused on the question of 
categorization; i.e. how a country should rank on these variables in order to be 
for example classified as a small state or microstate. As Charles Taylor points out 
in this respect, countries can score markedly dissimilar on the different size-
variables, which encumbers attempts to classify them according to their size 
(1969: 105).1 As a consequence of this problem, and the fact that no ‘natural’ 
break-off points in each of the three variables under investigation can be 
detected, Taylor proposes a statistical solution to his puzzle about the definition 
of a microstate (1969: 102).2 By integrating three size-variables, Taylor 
                                                
1 Taylor refers to the examples of Hong Kong, which is small in area but much larger in terms of 
population and GDP-size, and Namibia, which has a large territory but a very small population.  
2 In fact, two possible solutions are proposed in the article; the first is to use statistical thresholds 
such as medians, quartiles, and deciles as cut-off points (Taylor 1969: 102). For example, a 
researcher could decide that all countries that fall within the first quartile of the population 
distribution of all countries can be considered microstates (Taylor 1969: 105). A second option 
would be to “employ all three dimensions simultaneously” by standardizing the scores of the 
three variables (ibid.). In a resulting composite dimension, the effects of the three variables 





eventually creates an index in which a total number of 74 micro-territories can 
be separated from 107 non-micro-territories (Taylor 1969: 110-111).  
The integration of various size-variables to arrive at a composite measure 
or index of state size has been proposed by other authors as well (e.g. Downes 
1988; Crowards 2002). In contrast to Taylor’s observations, Andrew Downes and 
Tom Crowards argue that the three variables of population, territory, and gross 
domestic product are closely interrelated (Downes 1988: 87-88), and that 
natural break-off points in the ranking of countries on these variables can be 
identified (Crowards 2002: 145-149).3 In spite of their validity and suitability 
however, these proposed composite measures have not been widely adopted by 
other authors, who mostly stick to only one of the size-variables. In this light, 
population size has been by far the most often applied measure of size, and 
especially in analyses that seek to examine the influence of state size on politics. 
Whereas several authors are not really clear about their specific definition of size 
(Benedict 1967a; Dahl and Tufte 1973; Dommen and Hein 1985; Clarke and 
Payne 1987; Alesina and Spolaore 2005), and others use a combination of 
population and territorial size (Ott 2000; Congdon Fors 2007), at present 
population size unquestionably remains the most frequently used standard.   
 As Taylor argues, the choice about the variable according to which state 
size is defined should be primarily guided by the theoretical criteria of the 
researcher (1969: 116-117). As mentioned before, state size has not only been 
employed as an explanatory variable in relation to politics and democracy, but 
also to explain variations in other areas. For studies that aim to analyze the 
effects of size on economic success or international political behavior for 
instance, definitions of size according to respectively economic indicators and 
military capacity may be more appropriate. Since the primary goal of the present 
dissertation is to examine the influence of size on politics and democracy, the 
conceptualization of the state size-variable should be consistent with the 
theoretical assumptions that underpin this relationship. As the discussion of the 
literature in chapters 2 and 3 has revealed, most of the existing publications on 
the influence of smallness on politics and democracy depart from a definition of 
size according to population figures. In addition, the statistical link between size 
and democracy that was presented in the introduction, and that has been 
                                                
3 Just like Taylor, Downes proposes the solution of selecting a statistical divisor to classify 
countries according to size. Crowards suggests that a country may be defined as falling into a 
certain size-category when it is classified as such for at least two of three size-variables 
(Crowards 2002: 149). A subsequent cluster analysis confirms the existence of five ‘size’ 
categories of nations, and creates what Crowards argues to be a non-arbitrary classification of 





confirmed by various scholars in recent decades, is also based on population size. 
As a consequence of these facts and circumstances, in the present study state size 
will be conceptualized on the basis of population numbers. 
 
2.1. The Operationalization of Size 
As a result of the fact that the current study aims to investigate the effects of 
state size on politics and democracy, for the purpose of case selection a 
classification has to be made that separates microstates from other states. As 
already mentioned, such a classification is hampered by the fact that ‘natural’ 
cut-off points on the continuum of population size are hard to find, which 
renders a decision about any cut-off point inevitably random and therefore hard 
to defend. All countries in the world can be ranked on their population size, but 
seeing that there are no a priori reasons why a small increase of decrease in 
population size would result in different political dynamics, any boundary is 
arbitrary and capricious. That being said, this does of course not mean that there 
can be no arguments in support of a certain population threshold, and there are a 
number of motivations and justifications for locating the cut-off point at 250.000 
inhabitants, as the current study does. 
 Over the years, the population size that is referred to in defining a small 
state or microstate has been decreasing, due to an increase in the number of 
small states, and “a growing recognition that the economic characteristics of 
small size apply more comprehensively to a narrower range of very small 
countries” (Sutton and Payne 1993: 581-582; cf. Crowards 2002: 145). Whereas 
for example Kuznets defined small states as having less than ten million 
inhabitants (1960: 14), Ott looks at countries with populations less than 1.5 
million (2000: 18), and Clarke and Payne locate the threshold at one million 
people (1987: xvii). In addition to the category of small states, several scholars 
also pay attention to defining microstates, which generally have under a million 
inhabitants. Diamond and Tsalik (1999: 117-118) and Carsten Anckar (2008a: 
440), for example, define a microstate as having less than half a million 
inhabitants, whereas Hadenius (1992: 125), Ott (2000: 18) and Clague et al. 
(2001: 25) locate the cut-off point at a population size of 100.000. There is thus 
no consensus in the academic literature on an appropriate cut-off point to 
distinguish microstates from small states, and small states from large states. 
 In the process of selecting a practicable cut-off point in population size to 
identify the microstates, several factors can be taken into account. To begin with, 
it would be preferable to have enough cases included in the microstate-group to 





order to facilitate the generalization of the findings. In addition, the 
generalizability of the findings is also enhanced if the microstates differ on as 
many background variables as possible, since this entails that the effects of size 
can be more easily distinguished from those of other variables. Thus, a 
microstate-threshold of 25.000 inhabitants would not be feasible, since only 
three states would meet this criterion, which are all located in the same region of 
the world.4 By contrast, a threshold of 250.000 is clearly more practicable, since 
it results in a group of twenty-one microstates which are spread over four world 
regions. The statistics presented in the introduction of this dissertation 
moreover reveal that the association between smallness and democracy is also 
strongly significant at the boundary of 250.000 people (see table 1.1). As a third 
element that should be taken into account, several scholars have pointed to the 
existence of so-called ‘roof effects’, in the sense that smallness only has an 
influence on politics below a certain population figure. According to Hadenius, 
this ‘roof’ is located at 100.000 inhabitants, whereas Carsten Anckar believes it to 
exist at half a million inhabitants (Hadenius 1992: 125; Anckar 2008a: 440). 
Since a threshold of 250.000 is situated almost in between these two estimates, it 
can be deemed fruitful in this respect as well. Finally, it is also worth noting that 
this cut-off point also results in an analysis of exactly the countries that Lijphart 
has chosen to exclude (1999: 52).   
Now that a population threshold has been selected and motivated, it has 
to be decided what a ‘state’ is. Whereas earlier publications on size and politics 
have also analyzed non-independent territories and dependencies (Benedict 
1967a; Dommen and Hein 1985; Ott 2000), such a decision necessarily involves 
hard-to-defend distinctions between the territories that are analyzed and those 
that are not. Furthermore, at least part of the academic literature suggests that 
full sovereignty (including membership of international organizations) has a 
significant effect on the likelihood of democratic governance. As a consequence, 
the current study applies the scope condition of United Nations-membership to 
distinguish between independent and non-independent polities. It should be 
noted that this scope condition results in the exclusion of the Vatican, which is 
often seen as an independent country, but is at present the only permanent 
observer state of the United Nations. Since the Vatican has no native population, 
a completely unique and incomparable political structure, and can be seen as an 
absolute theocracy (cf. Murphy 1974), I however do not regard this exclusion as 
problematic.  
                                                






Table 4.1: List of Small Countries by Population, Area, and Regime Type5 
Country Inhabitants Area (in km2) Democracy? 
Nauru 9.322 21 Yes 
Tuvalu 10.544 26 Yes 
Palau 20.956 459 Yes 
Monaco 30.539 2 Yes 
San Marino 31.817 61 Yes 
Liechtenstein 35.236 160 Yes 
St. Kitts and Nevis 50.314 261 Yes 
Marshall Islands 67.182 181 Yes 
Dominica 72.969 751 Yes 
Andorra 84.825 468 Yes 
Antigua and Barbuda 87.884 443 Yes 
Seychelles 89.188 455 Yes 
Kiribati  100.743 811 Yes 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 103.869 389 Yes 
Tonga 105.916 747 No 
Federated States of Micronesia 106.836 702 Yes 
Grenada 108.419 344 Yes 
St. Lucia 161.557 616 Yes 
São Tomé and Príncipe 179.506 964 Yes 
Samoa 193.161 2.831 Yes 
Vanuatu 224.564 12.189 Yes 
Barbados 286.705 430 Yes 
Iceland 311.058 103.000 Yes 
Bahamas 313.312 13.880 Yes 
Belize 321.115 22.966 Yes 
Maldives 394.999 298 No 
Brunei 401.890 5.765 No 
Malta 408.333 316 Yes 
Suriname 491.989 163.820 Yes 
Luxembourg 503.302 2.586 Yes 
Cape Verde 516.100 4.033 Yes 
Solomon Islands 571.890 28.896 No 
Montenegro 661.807 13.812 Yes 
Equatorial Guinea 668.225 28.051 No 
Bhutan 708.427 38.394 No 
Guyana 744.768 241.969 Yes 
Djibouti 757.074 23.200 No 
Comoros 794.683 2.235 No 
Qatar 848.016 11.586 No 
Fiji 883.125 18.274 No 
 
                                                
5 Data on the number of inhabitants and territorial size have been retrieved from the CIA World 
Factbook (2011). The Freedom House-benchmark of ‘electoral democracy’ has been applied to 





The joined application of the size-threshold and the condition of UN-
membership results in a group of twenty-one microstates, which together with 
all other countries with less than one million inhabitants have been presented in 
table 4.1. The countries in the table have been subdivided into four groups of a 
roughly equal size, being countries with less than 100.000 inhabitants, countries 
with between 100.000 and 250.000 inhabitants, countries with between 250.000 
and half a million citizens, and countries with between half a million and one 
million citizens. In order to distinguish them from the group of microstates, 
countries belonging to one of the latter two categories have been presented in 
italics. From the table, it can be seen that the number and proportion of non-
democratic states grows as the population size increases; whereas no 
undemocratic states exist within the group of less than 100.000 people, among 
the countries with between half a million and one million people more than half 
are non-democracies. The table therefore provides an additional incentive for 
locating the cut-off point of population size at 250.000 inhabitants.  
 
3. Concepts: Defining and Operationalizing Democracy 
Democracy can literally be translated as ‘rule by the people’ (Held 2006: 21). A 
democracy can therefore be defined as a political system in which ‘the people’ 
are sovereign, in the sense that they rule themselves. Hence, it follows that 
governance in a democracy should be based on the preferences and interests of 
the people, and that a democratic system should therefore be “responsive to (…) 
its citizens” (Dahl 1971: 2). Since democracy has become the most fashionable 
and universally appreciated system of government however, almost all countries 
in the world now claim to have democratic governments.6 Yet, the extent to 
which different regimes around the world are considered to be democratic by 
scholars or by other countries differs markedly, and this undermines efforts to 
establish a universally acceptable definition of democracy (Held 2006: 2-3). 
Whereas democracy is by now almost universally recognized as the best form of 
government, and while the number of democracies continues to expand 
progressively, it has become increasingly difficult to formulate a consistent and 
broadly accepted definition of the concept.7 
                                                
6 The exceptions are Brunei, Myanmar, Saudi Arabia, and Vatican City. 
7 The concept of democracy is actually among the most hotly disputed ones in political science 
(cf. Schmitter and Karl 1991; Collier and Levitsky 1997). Since it has been questioned in how far 
the term of democracy is applicable to new, third wave-democracies, the accusation of conceptual 
stretching has figured prominently in this debate (Collier and Mahon 1993: 850-851; Collier and 





 In the last decades of the twentieth century, the number and proportion 
of countries in the world with authoritarian forms of rule diminished rapidly. 
This development, which is most eminently discussed in Samuel Huntington’s 
The Third Wave (1991), attracted widespread attention from both the academic 
community and politicians all over the world, and created a general sense of 
optimism with regard to the spread of democracy. As communism collapsed in 
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, the authoritarian governments of Latin 
America and Southern Europe suffered from legitimacy crises, and several 
autocratic East-Asian and sub-Sahara African nations entered phases of political 
liberalization, some scholars even argued that these events signaled the final 
triumph of the liberal democratic model of government over all its alternatives 
(Fukuyama 1992: 48). Whereas the concept of liberal democracy had originated 
in the Western world, and for long was believed to pertain to this part of the 
world almost exclusively,8 many authors asserted that the third wave of 
democratization demonstrated the fallaciousness of this assumption, as 
countries with decidedly non-Western cultural backgrounds now appeared to 
make the transition towards democratic government as well. Thus emerged what 
Thomas Carothers refers to as the ‘transition paradigm’ (2002); the teleological 
belief that the countries in which authoritarian governments subsided were ‘in 
transition’ from authoritarianism to full-fledged liberal democratic government. 
 At the dawn of the new millennium, it became apparent that the initial 
optimism associated with the transition paradigm was unwarranted (O'Donnell 
1994, 1996; Zakaria 1997; Diamond 2002; Levitsky and Way 2002). On the 
positive side, several third wave-countries, among which Costa Rica, Uruguay, 
Taiwan, and the Southern and Eastern European countries of Spain, Portugal, 
Greece, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia appeared to have successfully 
abandoned their authoritarian legacies and have made a definitive transition to 
democracy. For most of the Latin American, Asian, and African states however, 
this positive pattern did not materialize, and whereas some countries even slid 
back to outright authoritarianism (e.g. Russia, Nigeria, and Pakistan), most of 
them entered what Carothers calls ‘the gray zone’ between democracy and 
authoritarianism (Carothers 2002: 9).9 It appears to be the case, therefore, that 
                                                
8 Before the start of the third wave, Japan and India were commonly seen as among the major and 
only exceptions to this general rule (cf. Sartori 1995: 101) . 
9 The emergence and growth of the group of countries that are neither democratic nor 
authoritarian has posed scholars of democracy with the question of how these cases should be 
classified. This problem becomes readily apparent when the number and variety of labels that 
have been used to refer to these cases is examined; whereas Zakaria (1997) talks about ‘illiberal 
democracies’, O’Donnell (1994) labels them ‘delegative democracies’, Diamond (2002) calls them 





the third wave has at least partially ended in “the slow, bleeding death of a 
thousand subtractions” (Diamond 1999: 63).10  
 According to several authors (e.g. Linz 1997; Zakaria 1997), the 
fundamental problem with the institutionalization of democracy in non-Western 
settings can be found in the absence of a tradition of constitutionalism or a 
Rechtsstaat in these countries. These traditions were well-established and rooted 
in the countries of Western Europe already before the advent and introduction of 
democracy, and were never really distinguished from democratic procedures 
and institutions (Schmitter 1995: 16; Linz 1997: 118-119). In Latin American 
countries for example, such a spirit and tradition never really existed, which 
means that democratic institutions (in the form of free and fair elections) in 
these countries coexist with attitudes and practices that are more particular to 
this region of the world (and which according to many authors are not really 
democratic). Guillermo O’Donnell points to the coexistence of electoral practices 
with widespread particularism in the form of patron-client relationships in the 
Latin American political context (O'Donnell 1996: 40-41), and also highlights 
that, once elected, Latin American presidents are largely free to rule as they see 
fit and without constraints (so-called 'delegative democracy'; O'Donnell 1994).  
In summary therefore, the exportation of democratic procedures to new settings 
and contexts has not led to the paralleled exportation of a democratic ‘spirit’ or 
democratic norms of behavior to these places (Sartori 1995; Huber et al. 1997: 
330-331). 
 According to O’Donnell, the proliferation of new regime types not only 
raises questions with regard to classification, but also demonstrates flaws in the 
way political scientists are used to study democracies and other regimes 
(O'Donnell 1996: 40). Whereas scholars have usually been focused on the 
observation of “highly formalized and complex organizations”, according to 
O’Donnell the “extremely influential, informal, and sometimes concealed 
institution” of particularism remains obscured in this way (ibid.). In these new 
regimes, free and fair elections are continuously held largely due to “close 
international attention and wide reporting abroad of irregularities”, O’Donnell 
stipulates, whereas the rest of the political system can be characterized as a “sea 
                                                                                                                                 
and Carothers (2002) distinguishes between ‘feckless pluralism’ and ‘dominant-power polities’. 
In their seminal article Democracy with Adjectives (1997), David Collier and Steven Levitsky 
discuss the many (550) ‘diminished subtypes’ of the concept of democracy as they have been 
formulated over time, and examine the various strategies that can be pursued to deal with the 
‘new’ third wave-regimes. In the conclusion of their article, the authors argue that the “excessive 
proliferation of new terms and concepts” should be avoided (Collier and Levitsky 1997: 451). 
10 It should be mentioned, however, that not everyone endorses this view. In fact, some authors 





of particularism and blurred boundaries” (ibid.). In addition to clientelism, these 
hybrid regimes may also be characterized by an “uneven playing field between 
government and opposition”, in which the government assures electoral victories 
through manipulation, intimidation, and harassment of the opposition, 
journalists, or judges (Levitsky and Way 2002: 53). In such systems, the 
existence of free and fair elections “masks the reality of authoritarian 
domination” (Diamond 2002: 24).  
 Although they are almost never studied as such, the seventeen non-
European microstates that are examined in the present chapter are new 
democracies as well. As a result, it can be questioned whether the political 
features and characteristics that scholars have observed in larger new 
democracies also play a large role in these microstates. This question is 
particularly germane in relation to some of the theories that have been discussed 
in the previous chapter, which by contrast envisage a higher quality of 
democracy in small settings. As a result, the newly democratic microstates may 
not to the same extent be plagued by the democracy-undermining and 
obstructing political characteristics of larger third wave-countries. On the other 
hand, as discussed in the preceding chapter, other scholars have argued that 
smallness promotes the development of particularistic relationships, which 
would mean that the newly democratic microstates are at best equally, at worst 
to a larger extent beset by these kinds of linkages between citizens and 
politicians. The analysis of the four microstates that follows in chapters four 
through eight will shed more light on this question.  
 The proliferation of new and ambiguous types of third wave-regimes, and 
the question of how these regimes should be classified in terms of their 
democratic quality, have accentuated an already-existing divide in the 
democracy-studying academic community, which boils down to a discussion 
about the specific attributes (or, in Sartori’s words, intension (1970: 1041)) of 
the concept of democracy. In the academic, distinctions are often made between 
liberal versus procedural democracy, and between continuous versus 
dichotomous operationalizations of the concept. A long and influential tradition 
of academic literature assumes that democracy essentially entails the regular 
organization of free and fair elections. This conceptualization of democracy, 
which has been alluded to as the ‘electoral’, ‘minimalist’, or ‘procedural’ 
definition, does not envisage the protection of elementary freedoms, the 
availability of alternative sources of information, and the independence of the 
judiciary and media as defining characteristics of democracy, although these 





elections (Huntington 1991: 7; Przeworski 1999: 24).11 According to scholars 
who employ a procedural definition of democracy, the conditions and 
requirements that are part of more extensive and demanding conceptions of 
democracy are essentially irrelevant, either because they are side-effects or 
variations of the electoral aspect of democracy, or because they do not belong to 
the domain of democracy in the first place (cf. Di Palma 1990: 15-16; Gurr et al. 
1990: 83; Karl 1990: 2; Alvarez et al. 1996: 4; Przeworski et al. 1996).12 Over the 
years, procedural conceptualizations of democracy have had many followers, 
who have sometimes added a number of conditions that relate to the particular 
circumstances under which elections should take place (Collier and Levitsky 
1997: 434).13  
 Whereas the procedural definition of democracy has remained widely 
embraced, in recent decades attempts have been made to formulate a more 
demanding, compound definition of the concept, mostly referred to as liberal 
democracy. Until fairly recently, free and fair elections occurred almost 
exclusively in countries whose governments were also respectful of civil 
liberties, and the latter were accordingly mostly seen as a side-effect of the 
regular holding of elections (Zakaria 1997: 22-23). Over the last two decades 
however, it has become clear that many countries in Latin America, Africa, and 
Asia do continue to organize regular elections, but do not always (fully) respect 
                                                
11 The electoral definition has been employed in a number of seminal studies in the field of 
political science. In his seminal work Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, Joseph Schumpeter 
for instance famously asserts that democracy can be seen as “that institutional arrangement for 
arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a 
competitive struggle for the people’s vote” (Schumpeter 1943: 269). In similar fashion, Seymour 
Martin Lipset defines democracy as “a political system which supplies regular constitutional 
opportunities for changing the governing officials” (Lipset 1959: 71). For Anthony Downs, finally, 
democracy can be conceived of as a political system in which “two or more parties compete in 
periodic elections for control of the government apparatus” (Downs 1957: 137) 
12 Mike Alvarez and his colleagues, for example, argue that: “[p]erusing the innumerable 
definitions, one discovers that democracy has become an altar on which everyone hangs his or 
her favorite ex voto. Almost all normatively desirable aspects of political, and sometimes even of 
social and economical, life are credited as definitional features of democracy: representation, 
accountability, equality, participation, dignity, rationality, security, freedom – the list goes on. 
Indeed, the set of really existing democracies under many definitions is empty. And from an 
analytical view, lumping all good things together is of little use” (1996: 4). 
13 Samuel Huntington, for example, stresses the requirement that suffrage rights should be 
extended to include all adult citizens, as he “defines a twentieth-century political system as 
democratic to the extent that its most powerful collective decision makers are selected through 
fair, honest, and periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which 
virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote” (1991: 7). In similar fashion, Przeworksi and 
colleagues stress the presence of “an opposition that has some chance of winning office as a 
consequence of elections” as a precondition for democratic elections (1996: 49). Elklit and 
Svensson (1997), finally, focus on the specific meaning of the adjectives ‘free and fair’ when it 
comes to elections, and provide some benchmarks on the basis of which election observers can 






civil rights and liberties (O'Donnell 1993, 1994; Diamond 1999: 27-31). As a 
consequence, a distinction was created between so-called electoral or illiberal 
democracies, that only live up to the conditions of procedural definitions of 
democracy, and liberal or consolidated democracies, in which civil rights and 
liberties are respected as well (Ware 1992: 133; Collier and Mahon 1993: 848-
850; O'Donnell 1993: 1361; Bollen 1993: 1208-1209; Linz and Stepan 1996: 15; 
Diamond 1999: 10-13; Held 2006: 74-75). In the view of scholars who employ a 
liberal definition of democracy, the Schumpeterian, electoral notion of 
democracy places too much emphasis on the electoral element of democracy 
(which is referred to by Schmitter and Karl as the ‘fallacy of electoralism’), while 
it largely disregards other characteristics that they feel should belong to a 
democratic political system (Schmitter and Karl 1991: 78; Diamond 1999: 9). In 
particular, these scholars assert that electoral conceptions of democracy place 
too little emphasis on the safeguarding and preservation of political rights and 
liberties, which they see as another pivotal element of democracy (Diamond 
1999: 8-10).14 Although the liberal conceptualization of democracy is thus clearly 
distinguishable from the electoral or procedural one, in the literature a plethora 
of definitions of liberal democracy can be found. 
 There are good arguments in favor and against both procedural and 
liberal definitions of democracy. On the one hand, it appears that uniting many 
features into one concept of democracy is of little use. Not only would it be 
theoretically incorrect to equate democracy with all that is good in the world, but 
it must also be stressed that doing so decreases the analytical value of the 
concept, as Alvarez and his coauthors correctly point out (1996: 4; cf. Huntington 
1991: 11). If too many attributes are attached to the concept of democracy, there 
is a danger that research becomes tautological, since democracy cannot explain 
phenomena that are part of the concept itself. On the other hand, a minimalist 
definition of democracy also appears impracticable, because free and fair 
elections are meaningless if institutions like the judiciary or the media are 
politicized, or if real executive power is in the hands of a person or institution 
that cannot be held accountable. It should also be highlighted that the case study-
literature principally implies that the classification of microstates as democracies 
essentially depends on the definition of this concept, since whereas virtually all 
                                                
14 Additionally, as Schmitter and Karl argue, these academics believe that the participation of 
citizens in a democracy should not be confined to casting a vote once in every four or five years, 
but should also involve opportunities for expressing opinions or exerting influence on the 





microstates do organize free and fair elections, their adherence to the conditions 
of liberal democracy often appears questionable.  
Dahl’s concept of polyarchy can be seen as an intermediate alternative 
between liberal and procedural democracy. Although it is often regarded as a 
procedural version of the concept (Diamond 2002: 21-22), Dahl’s definition is 
definitely more extensive and demanding than the minimalist Schumpeterian 
notion that for example Przeworski and others have adopted, in the sense that a 
number of elementary freedoms are highlighted as attributes of the concept of 
polyarchy. For example, the first two of Dahl’s conditions refer to the freedom of 
expression and the freedom of assembly, whereas Dahl’s requirement of 
‘alternative sources of information’ can be translated into the existence of a free 
press. Finally, the condition of ‘institutions for making government policies 
depend on votes and other expressions of preference’ alludes not only to the 
electability and accountability of the executive, but also to the existence of checks 
and balances between other political institutions. 
In addition to the discussion about the definition (or conceptualization) of 
democracy, an extensive academic debate has emerged on the question of 
whether democracy should be seen as a dichotomous or as a continuous variable. 
This debate is somewhat related to the preceding discussion, in the sense that 
scholars who employ a procedural definition of democracy are usually more 
likely to divide the world in the two (dichotomous) categories of democracies 
and non-democracies, whereas academics who employ a liberal definition 
generally use more graded dimensions to classify their cases.15 Such a graded 
measure allows scholars to distinguish between liberal democracies and illiberal, 
flawed, or pseudo-democracies, which are usually seen as in-between categories 
(Levitsky and Way 2002; Diamond 2002; Carothers 2002). In addition however, 
many of these authors also argue that democracy necessarily has to be a 
continuous measure, since it is always present or absent to a certain degree 
(Bollen and Jackman 1989: 616-619; Bollen 1990: 13-14; Coppedge and Reinicke 
1990: 52; Elkins 2000: 299).16 
                                                
15 Samuel Huntington, for example, defends his choice for a procedural, dichotomous approach to 
democracy on the grounds that it “better serves the purpose of this study because our concern is 
with the transition from a nondemocratic regime to a democratic one” (1991: 11). Similar 
arguments in favor of a dichotomy can be retrieved in other studies that employ an electoral 
definition of democracy (Sartori 1987: 184; Alvarez et al. 1996: 4; Przeworski et al. 1996: 54; 
Doorenspleet 2001: 14-15). 
16 According to Kenneth Bollen, democracy must be thought of as a continuous variable since it is 
possible to rank groups of countries from democratic to non-democratic, which means that it is 
possible to distinguish between more and less democratic countries within both the groups of 





According to Giovanni Sartori, who is strongly in favor of a dichotomous 
approach to measure democracy, assessing levels of democracy on a continuous 
scale is a “stultifying” exercise in “degreeism”, which is analytically invalid 
because democracy and non-democracy are contradictories (Sartori 1987: 184). 
Collier and Adcock, on the other hand, extensively examine and discuss the 
various justifications and motivations that have been used to defend both 
dichotomous and continuous operationalizations of democracy, and argue that 
generic claims for both alternatives are incomplete (Collier and Adcock 1999: 
537).17 Instead, the authors propose and suggest that the choice between 
dichotomous or continuous measures of democracy should be based on “specific 
arguments about the goals and context of research” (Collier and Adcock 1999: 
561). In this light, Collier and Adcock argue, “research that is focused on 
democratization as a well-bounded event and on classical subtypes of democracy 
favors dichotomies” (Collier and Adcock 1999: 561-562). In light of these 
recommendations, such a measure will indeed be adopted in the current 
analysis, and Dahl’s definition of polyarchy also envisages a dichotomous 
measure of democracy. 
 
3.1. The Operationalization of Democracy 
On the basis of the considerations described above, in the present study I make 
use of Dahl’s conceptualization of democracy as outlined in his landmark work 
Polyarchy (1971).18 For a political system to be classified as a polyarchy, 
according to Dahl the following eight conditions have to be met (1971: 3): 
 
1) Freedom to form and join organizations 
2) Freedom of expression 
3) Right to vote 
4) Eligibility for public office 
5) Right of political leaders to compete for support and votes 
6) Alternative sources of information 
7) Free and fair elections 
8) Institutions for making government policies depend on votes and other 
expressions of preference 
 
                                                
17 According to the authors, a generic claim refers to the argument that “the concept of 
democracy inherently requires one approach or the other” (Collier and Adcock 1999: 546). 
18 Dahl prefers to reserve the term ‘democracy’ for the ideal-type polity in which a political 
system is completely responsive to its citizens’ needs. Since the existence of this kind of system is 
according to Dahl unknown, he prefers to use the term ‘polyarchy’ to refer to real-world 





Dahl’s eight conditions of polyarchy can broadly be transformed into two 
separate dimensions (Dahl 1971: 4; Doorenspleet 2001: 7-9; Coppedge et al. 
2008). On the one hand, the dimension of contestation (or competition) refers to 
the extent to which public offices are open to public and political competition, 
and therefore also to the opportunities for the existence of a political opposition. 
On the other hand, the dimension of inclusiveness stands for the proportion of 
citizens who are allowed to participate in the political process.19 In this regard, 
active and passive suffrage rights have generally been regarded as the most 
important indicator. In polyarchies, contestation of government is present and 
practically all adult citizens are granted the right to take part in political affairs 
(Dahl 1971: 8).20  
 For the purpose of the present analysis, and particularly in light of the 
specific hypothesized effects of size that were discussed in the two previous 
chapters, each of Dahl’s two dimensions can be subdivided into two sub-
dimensions. Whereas the dimension of contestation on the one hand refers to the 
presence of substantive political alternatives and a political opposition, in line 
with condition eight it can also be translated into the existence of political checks 
and balances between institutions.21 If institutional checks and balances are able 
to function as a restraint on executive power, the abuse of power and executive 
dominance are controlled for, and this generally means that the preferences of 
                                                
19 Several scholars have questioned the independence of Dahl’s two dimensions of inclusiveness 
and contestation, and have found democracy to be a one-dimensional concept (cf. Bollen and 
Grandjean 1981). Others, however, have confirmed the separate value of each of Dahl’s 
dimensions, even though some aspects of democracy such as the holding of free and fair elections 
correspond to both contestation and inclusiveness (Coppedge et al. 2008: 633). 
20 As Dahl himself readily acknowledges, the requirements of contestation and inclusiveness are 
somewhat problematic in the sense that in no country all public offices are open to contestation, 
and in no country all citizens are entitled to participate in the electoral process. In most countries 
judges are for example not elected, and in many countries (e.g. most parliamentarian systems) 
the head of state is not directly elected (Alvarez et al. 1996: 4-5). Furthermore, in some countries 
non-elected officials such as army officers or traditional leaders exert considerable influence on 
the daily conduct of politics (Gurr et al. 1990: 94-95; Valenzuela 1992; Whitehead 1992; 
O'Donnell 1993). In order to deal with these problems related to contestation, several scholars 
have emphasized that in a democracy at least the offices of the chief executive (mostly the head of 
government) and the legislature have to be contested (Bollen 1980: 376; Gurr et al. 1990: 80-82; 
Alvarez et al. 1996: 7-8). Regarding inclusiveness, Dahl points out that in a polyarchy practically 
all adult citizens should have the right to participate in the political process (Dahl 1971: 4). Thus, 
if democracy is rule by the people, ‘the people’ should be conceived of as everyone in the polity, 
except for children and specific, small groups of adults (such as foreigners or the mentally 
disabled). As Schmitter and Karl point out, suffrage rights were historically granted to only a 
small number of citizens (Schmitter and Karl 1991: 77). Thus, whereas the United States and 
Switzerland are generally regarded as among the most consolidated and high-quality 
democracies, the fact that African Americans were not allowed to vote in the US until 1965 and 
women did not obtain suffrage rights in some Swiss cantons until 1990 entails that these 
countries should be classified as competitive oligarchies before the extension of the franchise. 
21 In line with Montesquieu’s Trias Politica. In fact, later in his book Dahl also refers to the balance 





citizens are more closely reflected in the conduct of government. In light of the 
specific and often-mentioned effects of size on the relations between citizens and 
politicians, the dimension of inclusiveness can be split up into one sub-
dimension that refers to this aspect alone, whereas the second sub-dimension 
alludes to the more conventional forms of participation such as voter turnout 
and membership of political parties. In summary, this means that the 
characteristics and quality of democracy in microstates can be assessed on the 
basis of the following four sub-dimensions: 
 
1) Contestation I: the presence of political alternatives and a political opposition; 
2) Contestation II: the horizontal balance of power between institutions; 
3) Inclusiveness I: the relations between citizens and politicians; 
4) Inclusiveness II: the political participation of citizens. 
 
Now that the choice for a dichotomous measure of democracy based on 
Dahl’s conditions of polyarchy has been explained and motivated, the specific 
indicators of the four sub-dimensions of democracy that the present study 
employs should be described. In table 4.2, Dahl’s two dimensions of contestation 
and inclusiveness have been presented in the first column, followed by the four 
sub-dimensions of this particular study in the second column. The sub-
dimensions have been further subdivided into a total of fifteen indicators on the 
basis of which politics and democracy is studied in four selected microstates.  In 
addition, in the last column the specific means by which each indicator is 
measured has been listed. As a consequence of the lack of existing data on 
microstates and the qualitative, exploratory nature of this research in general, 
the scoring on these indicators does not occur on the basis of specifically 
demarcated categories or numbers, but instead is largely based on the 
conclusions that follow from my own assembled interview data. 
 With regard to the first sub-dimension, which examines the presence of 
political alternatives and a political opposition, the first indicator of free and fair 
elections can be seen as a first minimal requirement that has to be adhered to in 
order to classify as a democracy. The second and third indicators should be seen 
as attempts to measure the presence and relevance of the opposition, since they 
measure the number of available political alternatives (# 2) and the extent to 
which these alternatives have been able to realize their objectives by taking 
office in the executive. In order to examine the supposition that microstate-
politics is personality- instead of ideologically-oriented, the fourth indicator aims 
to investigate whether the available political alternatives also aim to realize 





also allows these alternatives to attract and mobilize supporters, the fourth 
indicator examines if citizens can freely support the opposition. With the 
exception of the third indicator, all indicators have emanated from the variables 
by means of which Dahl measures polyarchy (1971: Appendix A).  
 
Table 4.2: Dimensions, Sub-Dimensions, and Indicators of Democracy 
Dimensions Sub-Dimensions Indicators Operationalization 
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Regarding the second dimension, which measures the horizontal balance 
of power between institutions, four indicators have been listed that measure the 
autonomy and independence of the four institutions that can be expected to 
endure the consequences of executive dominance. Whereas the freedom of the 
press can be measured on the basis of an available index, the scoring on the other 
indicators will primarily occur on the basis of assembled interview data. On the 
basis of these indicators, it is also possible to examine the hypothesis that 
microstate-institutions tend to be ignored or circumvented by both politicians 
and citizens. The third dimension, which deals with the relations between 
citizens and politicians, can be measured on the basis of the frequency of contact 
and the accessibility of politicians for citizens, and nature and characteristics of 
citizen-politician contacts. On this basis, it can firstly be assessed whether the 
increased frequency of citizen-politician contacts that the literature suggests can 
be corroborated, and secondly it can be determined whether these contacts have 
a substantive political or a more particularistic nature.  
The dimension of political participation, finally, can firstly be measured 
on the basis of the minimalistic condition of universal suffrage. In addition, the 
most frequently used indicators of participation, which are voter turnout, party 
membership, and participation in political activities such as (campaign) rallies 
and demonstrations, can be analyzed. Whereas data and statistics on turnout are 
widely available, this is not the case for the other manifestations of political 
participation. With the exception of the indicators that are used to measure the 
third sub-dimension, virtually all indicators have been adopted from the ones 
that are used in Dahl’s original work. Now that the key concepts of this study 
have been operationalized, the theoretical model and expectations that follow 
from the academic literature are presented in the subsequent section. 
 
4. The Theoretical Model: Expectations 
A first impression that follows from both the empirical literature on microstates 
and the statistics that were presented in the introduction of this dissertation is 
that the overwhelming majority of microstates conform to the Freedom House-
standards of democracy. Although this conjecture is further examined in the case 
studies, where Dahl’s eight criteria of polyarchy are used as benchmarks of 
democracy, twenty of the twenty-one microstates are classified as electoral 
democracy by Freedom House (2012). However critical the empirical literature 
may be about the practical operation of politics and democracy in microstates, it 





institutions are in place. In this light, a distinction can be made between the 
group of authors who primarily focus on formal institutions and who accordingly 
have a positive idea about democracy in microstates (e.g. Diamond and Tsalik 
1999; Ott 2000; Anckar 2002b), and those who (also) examine the less formal 
aspects of politics, and have a more negative perspective (e.g. Peters 1992; 
Sutton 2007a; Gerring and Zarecki 2011).22 In large part, this distinction 
coincides with the division between minimalistic versus more substantive 
definitions of democracy. Although the formalist and anti-formalist perspectives 
diverge in terms of their appreciation of microstate-democracy (cf. Hinds 2008), 
it must be emphasized that even anti-formalist scholars highlight the fact that 
microstates have democratic institutional structures.  
 As formulated in the introductory chapter, the aim of the present study is 
to assess the influence and consequence of size on a political system, and more 
specifically, democracy and its sub-dimensions. In this regard, the question to 
what extent the formal democratic structures of microstates can be explained by 
their smallness is actually only a side issue, especially since the literature has 
shown that size can be hypothesized to affect many other facets of politics as 
well. In table six of the second chapter, the main expectations that follow from 
the theoretical literature on size were already summarized. If these points are 
contrasted with the main findings that follow from the case study-literature in 
chapter 3, the expectations that are not corroborated or even disconfirmed in the 
case study-literature on microstates can be deleted. When the remaining 
expectations are subsequently sorted out on the basis of the four sub-dimensions 
of democracy that this study employs, the theoretical model of this study 
emerges. In table 4.3, for each of the four sub-dimensions of democracy the 
primary expectations have been listed. With exception of the fourth sub-
dimension, the expectations clearly point in one direction, which is basically in 
line with the more pessimistic or skeptical part of the academic literature on the 
effect of size on the quality of democracy.  
The image that follows from the theoretical model is largely in line with 
the earlier-mentioned hypothesis that microstates are characterized by a 
divergence between formally democratic institutions and a markedly less 
democratic political reality, which is caused by the fact that institutional 
structures are expected to be recurrently disregarded. If this hypothesis can be 
                                                
22 To a certain degree, the distinction between ‘formalist’ and ‘anti-formalist’ studies appears to 
hinge on their relative definitions of democracy, since whereas formalist scholars primarily focus 
on the existence of free and fair elections, anti-formalist academics also examine more 





confirmed in the analysis that follows in the upcoming chapters, the question 
remains to what extent the microstates differ from other (new) democracies in 
which a similar pattern has been observed. On the one hand, since the analytical 
chapters specifically focus on the effects of size on politics, dissimilarities 
between microstates and other third wave-democracies that result from size 
may automatically surface in these chapters. On the other hand, it should be 
noted that one of the microstates that are studied, San Marino, is not a new 
democracy. By comparing the political system of this country with that of the 
other microstates, the effects of size can even be more clearly be distinguished 
from those that result from the status as a new democracy. 
 
Table 4.3: Theoretical Model: Expectations of this Study 
Sub-Dimension Expectations 
 






- Greater homogeneity of interests 
- Decreased number of factions and interests 
- Less political competition, weakened political opposition 







- Executive dominance in relation to other institutions 
(parliament, media, judiciary, and civil service) 
- Infrequent alternation of power 






- Increased accessibility of politicians 
- Increased direct contacts and communication between 
citizens and politicians 
- Conflicts of interest due to multiple-role relations 







- Increased opportunities for participation due to closeness 
- Equal or lower turnout levels in relation to larger states (on 
the basis of case study-literature) 
- Decreased political role for minorities and opposition 
 
5. Methodological Approach: Comparative, Small-N Research  
As discussed before, large-N statistical analyses have thus far neither yielded a 
convincing explanation of microstate-democracy, nor resulted in a persuasive 
and universally valid theory of the political effects of size. In addition to the lack 





it also deserves attention that these quantitative studies are almost exclusively 
based on Freedom House-data. Since other indices of democracy exclude 
microstates, the Freedom in the World-survey is the only reliable and well-
known aggregate index of democracy that provides information on microstates. 
This however means that any potential errors or biases in the Freedom House-
data will automatically appear in every quantitative-oriented publication on 
microstates as well, thereby making it impossible to cross-validate or triangulate 
these findings. Although the present study does rely on Freedom House-scores 
for the initial, preliminary scoring of microstates in order to facilitate case 
selection, during the in-depth analyses the presence and nature of Dahl’s 
conditions of polyarchy are examined on the basis of on-the-ground evidence.  
Instead of statistics, it therefore seems plausible that a qualitative and 
comparative analysis of a small number of microstate-systems represents a more 
fruitful research avenue. In comparison to the number of quantitative analyses of 
smallness and democracy however, the qualitative approach to studying 
microstates is significantly underdeveloped. A small number of qualitative, in-
depth case studies of individual or small groups of microstates does exist (and 
has been discussed in previous chapters), but Dana Ott’s (2000) study is to my 
best knowledge the only global qualitative investigation of the nature of politics 
and democracy in small states.23 In addition to a number of other shortcomings 
discussed in chapter one, Ott’s study employs a population threshold that is 
much more inclusive than the one of the present study, as a result of which the 
generalizability of Ott’s findings to the microstates that this study examines is 
questionable.24 It can therefore be asserted that the current study is a pioneering 
global, qualitative analysis of politics and democracy in the smallest countries of 
the world. As a consequence, in some ways this research assumes explorative 
character, and can be regarding as incorporating both theory-generation and 
theory-testing elements (cf. Mahoney and Goertz 2006: 230-232). 
The qualitative research in the chapters to come occurs along the lines of 
a small-N case study analysis, or what Evan Lieberman refers to as a model-
building small-N analysis (2005: 444-446). It must be noted that the use of case 
studies in social science research has often been criticized (cf. Lieberson 1991; 
King et al. 1994). According to Stanley Lieberson, the methodological 
assumptions that lie at the root of case study-analysis are “usually indefensible in 
                                                
23 In fact, Ott employs a mixed research design which consists of multiple quantitative statistical 
analyses and two in-depth case studies of the Gambia and Trinidad and Tobago. 
24 This is especially the case in light of the fact that both of the cases that are qualitatively studied 





social research” (1991: 318). Since qualitative research techniques cannot 
effectively deal with errors in measurement and the absence of interaction 
effects, the methods can according to Lieberson not be used to study causation 
on the basis of a small number of cases. Other authors however point out that 
case study research has a lot to offer, but that its value and usefulness depends 
on the goals of the analysis (cf. Gerring 2004; Mahoney and Goertz 2006; Levy 
2008). According to John Gerring, small N-case study research is very useful for 
exploratory research, of which the goal is to search for evidence of new theories. 
When it comes to exploratory research, “case studies enjoy a natural advantage” 
(Gerring 2004: 349). As Gerring points out however, exploratory research is 
significantly undervalued in social science, and it is also under-theorized (2004: 
350). Since the present study is at least partially exploratory in nature, on the 
basis of these recommendations and theories case study-research appears a very 
feasible method to conduct this analysis. 
As a consequence of the character of this research, the expectations that 
follow from the theoretical model are looser and less stringent than genuine, 
testable hypotheses. Since the study only examines microstates and makes no 
comparisons between small and large states, the testing of such potential 
hypotheses would also hardly be achievable. In this sense, the present study 
should really be seen as a first initial step in mapping the contours of microstate-
politics.  However, since large states are extensively covered in existing research 
and publications, the findings of the in-depth analyses of microstates can not 
only be mutually compared, but can also (implicitly if not explicitly) be 
contrasted with this existing literature on both larger consolidated democracies 
and larger third wave-countries. In this way, it can even more persuasively be 
demonstrated that their smallness is at the root of diverging political patterns in 
the microstates that are investigated.  
 
6. Within-Case Analysis, Cross-Case Analysis, and Case Selection 
Where quantitative research is generally more useful for studying causal effects, 
case studies are valuable when it comes to identifying causal mechanisms 
(Rogowski 1995; Gerring 2004: 349). In order to do so, case study research relies 
on both within-case and cross-case analyses. On the cross-case level, four 
microstate-cases are studied as part of the current project, which are compared 
in order to determine whether the expected political effects of size can be 
observed across the cases. In the second part of this section, the specific 





within-case level, in each of the microstates under scrutiny evidence for the 
expectations that are part of the theoretical model are searched, as well as 
possible indications of other political characteristics that are a result of size. 
Whereas the cross-case analysis is primarily focused on the observation of causal 
effects, the aim of the within-case analysis is to detect a causal mechanism 
(George and Bennett 2005: 206-207). 
 
6.1. Within-Case Analysis: Field Research and Semi-Structured Interviews 
The major aim of the within-case analysis is to acquire so-called causal-process 
observations, which offer indications of a link between different causes or causes 
and effects at the within-case level of one case (Collier et al. 2004: 252-253). In 
the present research, the main aim of the within-case analysis is to discover 
whether and how the political patterns that are observed can be attributed to the 
size of the microstates under scrutiny. Although most scholars would agree that 
causal mechanisms are ultimately unobservable, it is mostly possible to observe 
indications of the existence of a causal process (George and Bennett 2005: 137). 
The attainment of such observations can best be achieved by conducting a 
research strategy of process tracing or (historical) thick description. Using the 
method of process tracing, a researcher engages in a kind of ‘detective-work’ in 
which the different causes and their relevant relationships which are leading up 
to the outcome are carefully analyzed and described (Gerring 2007: 134). The 
observations that are collected as part of the process tracing can be subsumed 
under the various expectations and the indicators of democracy, so that they 
serve to support or weaken earlier formulated conjectures. On this basis, the 
results of this analysis should offer a general overview of the existing causal 
processes, and if similar causal processes can be found in other cases as well, the 
generalizability of the findings can be ascertained. 
 In the process of within-case analysis, different sources about the political 
system and specific political characteristics of the respective microstates can be 
consulted and used for data collection (Thies 2002: 355-356). Regarding the 
primary sources, official government documents, manuscripts, and reports can 
be analyzed to find out how the smallness of the analyzed microstates affects the 
political composition and dynamics of microstates. Secondary sources such as 
the academic literature about microstate-politics are consulted as well. The 
major component of the case study research however, consists of interviews 
with public officials, experts, and ordinary citizens. As a consequence of the 





the exploratory nature of this study, interviews are an excellent way to uncover 
information that cannot be obtained by analyzing written sources. 
 In order to conduct interviews with microstate-respondents and in order 
to access documents and reports that are only available in the microstates 
themselves, field research has been carried out in the four microstates that were 
selected for in-depth analysis. By spending three weeks to a month in every 
microstate, approximately fifteen interviews with various respondents were 
held, on the basis of which a comprehensive overview of the microstate-political 
system has been obtained. A list of the respondents that were interviewed in 
each of the four microstates can be found in Appendix A of this dissertation. 
Since microstate-politicians are relatively easily accessible, there are great 
opportunities for conducting interviews with even the highest public officials. In 
addition to politicians, other public officials such as civil servants, legal 
representatives, electoral commissioners and ombudsmen have been 
interviewed, as well as non-public figures such as journalists, academics, 
business leaders, and interest group-representatives. The criterion that 
representatives from as many societal and political backgrounds were included 
in the sample has guided the selection of interview respondents. Last but not 
least, although I have not formally interviewed them as respondents, discussions 
with ordinary citizens are valuable in providing insights on the consumer-side of 
the political system. 
Since this analysis is exploratory in nature, the specific questions that are 
posed during the interviews should retain an open character, and the interviews 
should be geared towards theory generation (Bogner and Menz 2009: 46-48).  
Under these circumstances, a semi-structured interview format with flexible 
questions and the possibility to raise new questions during the interviews is 
most suitable. Whereas the hypotheses and the theoretical model can serve as a 
framework on which to build the initial set of questions, it should also be 
possible to diverge from these questions and pose other ones instead. For the 
interviews that I conducted during four stages of field research, a basic shortlist 
of questions that address the core themes and hypotheses of this study has been 
established, and can be found in Appendix B of this book. The content of the 
specific interviews, however, is also based on 1) the country in which the 
analysis was conducted, 2) the job or specialization of the respondent, and 3) the 
issues that the respondent raised during the interview. 
 In addition to interviews that serve as the most important sources on 
which to construct the analysis, other sources such as government documents, 





intrinsic value of these sources for the analysis, they are also used for 
triangulation; i.e. as a check on whether the issues that have been raised by the 
participants to the interviews are substantiated (Thies 2002: 359). In addition, 
these sources can reduce or correct eventual biases that might arise during the 
interviews, and are used to reconstruct historical events or causal processes 
(Lustick 1996; Yin 2003: 85-89). As such, documentary and archival analysis 
primarily serve to supplement the data that is derived from the interviews. The 
evidence from the analysis is further strengthened by using and referring to 
existing case studies on the microstates.25 In contrast to the documentary and 
archival material, academic case studies are more likely to provide an inclusive 
overview of the entire microstate-system, and in that sense are used to validate 
the general conclusions that are drawn from the in-depth analysis. 
 
6.2. Cross-Case Analysis: the Method of Agreement 
Whereas the within-case analysis serves to expose the political effects that result 
from a small population size, a cross-case analysis is required to cancel out the 
notion that these political characteristics are caused by idiosyncratic 
characteristics of the individual cases, or by other background variables. Since it 
is however not possible to expansively study all twenty-one microstates, a 
selection of microstates has been made. Seeing that the goal of the small-N 
analysis is to acquire a universally valid and generalizable model of microstate-
politics, the cases that are selected for in-depth analysis should be typical or 
representative of the larger group of microstates (Seawright and Gerring 2008: 
296-299). In addition, the case selection should lead to a sample on the basis of 
which as many secondary background variables can be eliminated as 
explanatory factors, so that the explanatory value of the remaining variable(s) of 
size is maximized. In order to achieve this, Mill’s method of agreement provides 
the most fruitful research design (Lijphart 1971: 687-688). 
When it comes to small-N comparative research, two classical strategies 
for cross-case comparison have been introduced by John Stuart Mill: the method 
of agreement (or the most different systems design) and the method of 
difference (Mill 1843). Whereas the method of difference is employed to study 
variance on the dependent variable, the aim of the method of agreement is to 
explain a similar outcome in the cases that are studied. In order to be able to 
make strong causal inferences, the latter method departs from a selection of 
cases that are as different as possible on all potential explanatory variables, but 
                                                
25 Much of the case study-literature was already discussed in the previous chapter, but the case 





have one independent variable in common. Since the goal of this analysis is to 
examine the influence of a variable that all the cases share (which is their small 
population size) the selected cases would preferably differ on as many other 
background variables as possible (Seawright and Gerring 2008: 300-301).  
 Over the years, Mills methods have become the subject of rigorous 
criticism. According to Stanley Lieberson, Mills methods are based on a 
deterministic logic, and should therefore conform to a number of criteria26 that 
are normally unattainable in qualitative research (1991: 318). In addition, 
Lijphart, Lieberson, and King, Keohane and Verba all caution for an 
indeterminate research design, which comes about if the number of observed 
cases is lower than the number of independent variables (Lijphart 1971: 685; 
Lieberson 1991: 314; King et al. 1994: 118-122). In case of an indeterminate 
research design, it becomes impossible to assess the explanatory value of the 
separate independent variables. However, King, Keohane and Verba also 
emphasize that indeterminacy is only a problem if the goal of the analysis is to 
make causal inferences, and not in the case of exploratory or descriptive studies 
(King et al. 1994: 119).   
 It is clear that the present study has an indeterminate research design. In 
the first place, it can be posited that it is hard to analyze the effects of size on the 
quality of democracy if the cases under investigation are all microstates. In the 
second place, the number of cases that are analyzed can be perceived as limited 
in relation to the relatively large number of variables and indicators on which the 
cases are ranked. In reaction to these objections, it can be argued that the two 
dimensions and four sub-dimensions on the basis of which democracy in 
microstates is studied offer a robust and workable framework to analyze the 
quality of democracy, by means of which not only formal and institutional effects 
of size can be examined, but also the more practical and informal political 
dynamics that figure so prominently in the theoretical literature described in 
chapters 2 and 3. Whereas the shortcomings of this research design imply that 
no final conclusions can be drawn about political differences between large and 
small countries, by means of the cross-case comparisons it is however possible to 
acquire an accurate image of the nature of microstate-politics and –democracy.  
In this sense, it is likely that the research design does result in a number of 
political patterns that can be ascribed to the size of the cases under scrutiny.  
 
                                                
26 Specifically, according to Lieberson the research must have 1) a deterministic rather than a 
probabilistic logic, 2) no errors in measurement, 3) the existence of only one cause, and 4) the 






6.3. Case Selection: The Four Microstates 
In the literature on methodologies of case studies, extensive attention is paid to 
strategies of case selection (Geddes 1990; Collier and Mahoney 1996; Seawright 
and Gerring 2008). The primary recommendation that follows from this 
literature is to avoid the pitfall of selecting on the dependent variable. According 
to Barbara Geddes, the selection of cases with a similar outcome leads to a 
situation in which it can never be ascertained that the indentified causal variable 
really explains the outcome (1990: 132). This view is shared by Collier and 
Mahoney, who add that selection bias can lead to an underestimation of the 
effects of the main independent variable (1996: 62). In the view of other 
scholars, however, case selection in small-N research should not occur randomly, 
but cases should be carefully selected on the basis of the twin criteria of 
representativeness and useful variation on the variables of interest (Seawright 
and Gerring 2008: 296; Levy 2008: 9).  
These yardsticks for case selection are also adopted as leading strategies 
for case selection in the current study, which means that case primarily occurs 
on the independent variable that is central in this dissertation: size. The goal of 
the analysis is to discover the effects of this independent variable on a political 
system, and by ensuring as much variation as possible on other potential 
explanatory factors, any political features that the microstates share can with a 
greater degree of confidence be attributed to their small size. It is important to 
emphasize that this study only to a limited degree selects cases on the basis of 
their scoring on the dependent variable. Whereas the dependent variable of this 
study is ‘democracy’, the main question of this dissertation focuses not so much 
on the presence or absence of democracy, but rather on the quality of democracy - 
in terms of contestation and inclusiveness - that results from a small size. Since 
this outcome obviously remains unknown before the current analysis is 
conducted, in this regard no selection on the dependent variable has occurred. In 
fact, as will be explained below, the selection of one case that according to 
Freedom House is only partially free – which is the Republic of Seychelles – 
actually ensures at least some variation in outcomes on the dependent variable. 
If the political effects of size are also found to play a role in a political system that 
is regarded as only partially democratic, the explanatory value of the size-
variable arguably becomes even stronger.  
If it can be asserted that – in line with the method of agreement - the 
selected microstates are preferably as different as possible on potential 





scrutiny, the question arises which background variables to take into account in 
this respect. Firstly, since the method of agreement requires one shared 
explanatory variable, only cases that fall within the parameters of size that this 
study employs have to be selected. Secondly, geographical or regional bias can be 
avoided by selecting microstates from different regions in the world.27 Since the 
microstates are clustered in four world regions, a preliminary decision is to 
select one microstate from each region, which leads to the feasible number of 
four in-depth case studies. Thirdly, it would be sensible to select microstates that 
score differently on variables that have also been hypothesized to affect the 
microstate-political system, such as colonial history, religion, culture, ethno-
linguistic homogeneity, economic development, geographical factors, and 
political institutions. The ranking of these three criteria as they have just been 
described also determines which criterion prevails over the other(s) in the case 
that incompatibility between the criteria arises. 
On the basis of the three case selection-criteria, the microstates of San 
Marino, St. Kitts and Nevis, Seychelles, and Palau are selected for in-depth 
analysis and field research. In the following four paragraphs, the choice for each 
of these four microstates is motivated and defended. In table 4.4 at the end of 
this chapter, the twenty-one microstates have been ranked on background 
variables in order to further clarify the choices that have been made as part of 
this case selection. 
 
6.3.1.. The European Microstate: San Marino 
Being among the smallest of the four European microstates in terms of 
population size,28 the Republic of San Marino is in this sense a logical European 
case for in-depth analysis. Like the other three microstates in the region, San 
Marino has never been colonized, has a predominantly Catholic population, a 
high level of economic development, and a parliamentary system of government 
in which pre-modern institutions exist up to the present day. The main 
difference with Andorra, Liechtenstein, and Monaco is that San Marino is no 
principality but a republic, and in this sense the oldest one of its kind in the 
world.29 From the viewpoint of my study, San Marino is an appealing case to 
                                                
27 The twenty-one microstates are clustered in four different regions of the world (the Pacific, the 
Caribbean, Europe, and Africa), and the microstates in each region are largely similar to the other 
microstates in that region (in terms of economic development, colonial legacy, culture, religion, 
and so on), but very different from microstates in other regions. 
28 Monaco is the smallest of the European microstates, but since the difference with San Marino is 
only a little over 1.000 inhabitants (on a total of approximately 30.000), I consider this difference 
to be negligible. 





study because it has been known for centuries as a bastion of liberty and 
democracy.30 In contrast to European microstates such as Liechtenstein and 
Monaco, which both have politically powerful monarchies, San Marino therefore 
appears to be an exemplary case of microstate-democracy. Since virtually no 
publications on politics in San Marino have appeared in recent years, however, 
only its formal political institutions are superficially known, and little is known 
about the practical, informal conduct of politics in this microstate. 
 
6.3.2.  The Eastern Caribbean Microstate: St. Kitts and Nevis 
Out of the six microstates in the Eastern Caribbean region, the Federation of St. 
Kitts and Nevis is selected for field research. The microstates in this region are 
remarkably similar on their background characteristics, so the preference for the 
smallest state has been guiding in the selection. Aside of being the smallest of the 
Eastern Caribbean microstates, St. Kitts and Nevis shares its British colonial 
heritage, Westminster parliamentary institutions, medium level of economic 
development, and insular geographical nature with the other five microstates in 
this region. In contrast to these other states however, St. Kitts and Nevis 
constitutionally is a federation that consists of two separate states, coinciding 
with the two islands of the nation. Since the federal government suggests the 
existence of at least a geographical cleavage, St. Kitts and Nevis embodies an 
especially appealing political system to examine the assumption of (attitudinal) 
homogeneity in microstates. Attaining independence in 1983, St. Kitts and Nevis 
is (as of yet) the last of the former British colonies in the Eastern Caribbean 
region to acquire statehood.  
 
6.3.3. The African Microstate: Seychelles 
Given that only two of the microstates are located in Africa, it is impossible to 
pick a case that is ‘representative’ for the microstates in this region. As a 
consequence, again the benchmark of smallness has therefore guided case 
selection, and the Republic of Seychelles has been selected as the African case to 
be analyzed. Seychelles is different from the other African microstate, São Tomé 
and Príncipe, in almost all variables that can be thought of: it has a French-British 
instead of Portuguese colonial heritage, a moderate to high instead of a low level 
of development, and a presidential rather than a semi-presidential system. The 
two countries are similar, however, in the sense that they both have a 
predominantly Catholic population, both had a one-party socialist regime from 
                                                
30 The country refers to itself as the Antica Terra della Libertà, which translates into the “ancient 





the mid-1970s to the early 1990s, and both are island nations. Although 
Seychelles is classified as an electoral democracy in the Freedom House-survey, 
it has a score of ‘partly free’ on political rights as well as civil liberties (Freedom 
House 2012).31 Because of this, Seychelles can to some respects be seen as a 
deviant case, in which the more demanding requirements of liberal democracy 
have not all been attained (yet).  
 
6.3.4. The Pacific Microstate: Palau 
Out of the nine Pacific microstates, the Republic of Palau has been chosen for 
case-study research. Palau is the third smallest state in the Pacific, but the 
smaller island states of Nauru and Tuvalu are not selected because certain 
features make them less attractive cases to study. Like St. Kitts and Nevis and 
Seychelles, Tuvalu is a former British colony with (predominantly) Westminster 
institutions, and its inclusion would have led to a clear bias towards ex-British 
colonies. Palau, on the other hand, is a former US trust territory and has adopted 
the most important institutions of the American presidential system. Nauru has 
been left out because I consider it unrepresentative for the region; whereas the 
political systems of all other Pacific island nations are characterized by a 
significant influence of (councils of) traditional leaders, this is not the case in 
Nauru. According to the literature on the subject, Palau on the other hand does 
have a strong heritage of traditional leadership (cf. Shuster 1994). With regard to 
the variables of economic development, insularity, and democratic governance, 
Palau is also unmistakably representative of the Pacific region as a whole. The 
microstate acquired statehood and UN-membership only in 1994, rendering it 
the youngest independent microstate in the Pacific region.  
 
7. Conclusion: Summary Remarks and Structure of the Analytical Chapters 
The goal of this chapter was threefold. In the first place, its aim was to translate 
the two central concepts of this dissertation – size and democracy – into 
workable variables and indicators on the basis of which the analysis in 
subsequent chapters can be carried out. Secondly, attention has been paid to a 
description, explanation, and justification of the research method that this study 
employs. On the basis of the observation that quantitative research is unlikely to 
generate new findings, I have chosen for an exploratory, qualitative research 
design that is based on four in-depth case studies of microstates around the 
                                                
31 The only other microstate that does not rank as ‘free’ on these dimensions is the Kingdom of 





world. In each of these microstates field research is conducted, which focuses on 
semi-structured interviews with local respondents, and a supplementary 
analysis of available written sources and secondary literature. As a third 
objective, this chapter has sought to explain and motivate the selection of four 
microstates that serve as cases for in-depth analysis in the four analytical 
chapters that follow. On the basis of various arguments, the microstates of San 
Marino, St. Kitts and Nevis, Seychelles, and Palau were selected as cases. 
 The four analytical chapters that follow are organized on the basis of a 
similar structure. Each chapter commences with a brief introduction, followed by 
an overview of the political history of the particular microstate under scrutiny. 
Subsequently, one section in each chapter is devoted to the discussion of a 
number of factors that can explain the existence of democratic institutions, after 
which one section deals with an overview of the political-institutional 
framework of the microstate. After this, four analytical sections deal with an 
examination of the nature and characteristics of each of the four sub-dimensions 
of democracy that this study employs. Each chapter ends with a conclusion in 
which the main findings are summarized. The first case study, which follows in 
the next chapter, is focused on San Marino, whereas chapter six offers an analysis 
of St. Kitts and Nevis. Subsequently, in chapter seven the political system of 
Seychelles is analyzed, and as a final case study the characteristics of politics and 
democracy in Palau are examined in chapter eight. 
 As mentioned before, the largest part of the findings that are presented 
and reported in the analytical chapters are based on interview data. In the 
analytical narrative, fragments and quotations from these interviews are 
occasionally presented in order to substantiate the findings and as illustrations 
of the themes that are discussed. Because of the intimate social relations and the 
lack of personal anonymity in small states, and in light of the sensitivity of some 
of the statements, I have decided not to disclose the names and professions of the 
individuals by whom the specific interview excerpts were expressed. Only in 
cases in which the profession of the respondent gives an additional dimension to 
a quote, and in which the information that the excerpt contains is not overtly 
touchy, I have made it public. However, a complete list of the people I 





Table 4.4: Overview of Microstate-Scoring on Background Variables for Case Selection1 
 
                                                
1 Data retrieved from the 2011-indices of the CIA World Factbook, Freedom House, and the World Bank. Regarding religion, P stands for Protestant, and C for 
Catholic. On the issue of wealth, ‘Low’ indicates a GDP per capita figure up to US $10.000, Medium represents a GDP per capita figure between $10.000 and $20.000, 
and High signifies a GDP per capita figure of over $ 20.000. 
Microstate Population Region FH-Score Independence Colonizer Religion Pol. System Wealth 
Nauru 9.322 Pacific 2 (Free) 1968 Australia P/C Parliamentary Low 
Tuvalu 10.544 Pacific 2 (Free) 1978 UK P Parliamentary Low 
Palau 20.956 Pacific 2 (Free) 1994 USA C Presidential Low 
Monaco 30.539 Europe 3 (Free) (1297) - C Principality High 
San Marino 31.817 Europe 2 (Free) (301) - C Parliamentary High 
Liechtenstein 35.236 Europe 2 (Free) (1866) - C Principality High 
St. Kitts and Nevis 50.314 Caribbean 2 (Free) 1983 UK P Parliamentary Medium 
Marshall Islands 67.182 Pacific 2 (Free) 1986 USA P/C Hybrid Low 
Dominica 72.969 Caribbean 2 (Free) 1978 UK C Parliamentary Medium 
Andorra 84.825 Europe 2 (Free) (1278/1993) - C Principality High 
Antigua and Barbuda 87.884 Caribbean 4 (Free) 1981 UK P Parliamentary Medium 
Seychelles 89.188 Africa 6 (P. Free) 1976 UK C Presidential High 
Kiribati 100.743 Pacific 2 (Free) 1979 UK P/C Parliamentary Low 
St. Vincent - Grenadines 103.869 Caribbean 3 (Free) 1979 UK P Parliamentary Medium 
Tonga 105.916 Pacific 8 (P. Free) 1970 UK P Monarchy Low 
Fed. St. of Micronesia 106.836 Pacific 2 (Free) 1986 USA P/C Presidential Low 
Grenada 108.419 Caribbean 3 (Free) 1974 UK C Parliamentary Medium 
St. Lucia 161.557 Caribbean 2 (Free) 1979 UK C Parliamentary Medium 
São Tomé and Príncipe 179.506 Africa 4 (Free) 1975 Portugal C S-Presidential Low 
Samoa 193.161 Pacific 4 (Free) 1962 N. Zealand P Parliamentary Low 
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Figure 5.1: Location and Map of San Marino1 
   
 
1. Introduction: the Ancient Land of Freedom 
Entering the Most Serene Republic of San Marino2 from the main road that leads 
up from the Adriatic coast to the Monte Titano on which the microstate was 
founded, one cannot miss the border signals that welcome the visitor to the 
“Antica Terra della Libertà” – the ancient land of freedom. This nickname 
accurately summarizes the qualities that San Marino wishes to confer to its many 
day-trip visitors – that the place is antique, and that it has a tradition of 
safeguarding and promoting liberty. When it comes to age, San Marino claims to 
be the world’s most ancient republic, having been established in 301 AD 
according to the legend of its foundation. In terms of liberty, the country can 
rightfully claim to have frequently and at critical times functioned as a hiding 
place for political refugees. The hero of the Italian Risorgimento, Giuseppe 
Garibaldi, for example found refuge in San Marino during the summer of 1849 
                                                
1 Retrieved from the CIA World Factbook (2011). 
2 Translated from the country’s full name in Italian; “Serenissima Repubblica di San Marino”. 





when he was chased by Austrian troops. At the end of the Second World War, 
more than 100.000 Italian citizens fled to the Republic in order to escape the 
allied crossing of the Gothic Line and the ensuing Battle of Rimini.  
 In addition to functioning as a hiding place for political refugees, San 
Marino’s domestic political history provides a second justification for its 
reputation as a bastion of liberty. From its foundation up to the present day, the 
microstate has been known for its republican traditions and its respect for 
individual rights and freedoms. In addition to its historical respect for personal 
liberties, San Marino also has a longstanding tradition of participatory decision-
making, even though the microstate has also experienced periods of more 
autocratic rule. At present, with a territory of 61 square kilometers and 
approximately 30.000 inhabitants, the country is the second smallest state of 
Europe when it comes to population, and the third smallest in terms of territorial 
size.3 Like its Italian neighbor, the Sammarinese population speaks Italian (in the 
form of the Romagnolo-dialect) and is religiously almost entirely Roman Catholic, 
but with a GDP per capita-level of US $61.223 (the 9th highest in the world), the 
country is clearly more wealthy than its larger neighbor, as the Italian equivalent 
figure is at US $38.385 (World Bank 2011). A remarkable demographic 
characteristic is that one third of the Sammarinese nationals (between 12.000 
and 13.000 people) live outside their country, primarily in Italy, France, the 
United States, and Argentina (San Marino Statistics Office 2011). In addition, 
twelve percent of the people residing in San Marino (about 3.500 individuals) 
possess Italian nationality. 
In the present chapter, the influence of size on San Marino’s democracy is 
analyzed by examining the presence, manifestation, and characteristics of the 
two dimensions of polyarchy - contestation and inclusiveness (cf. Dahl 1971: 6). 
Before this analysis however, an overview is given of some of the pivotal 
moments in this microstate’s political history and its pathway to democracy. 
Subsequently, an attempt is made to explain the present-day democratic 
institutional structure of the microstate by pointing to a number of contributing 
factors, and San Marino’s contemporary political institutional structure is 
outlined. In four succeeding sections, the influence of size on contestation and 
inclusiveness is analyzed on the basis of the list of indicators that was formulated 
in the methodological chapter. In sequence, attention is paid to 1) the role of 
ideology, political parties, and the political opposition, 2) the horizontal balance 
                                                
3 The Vatican is smaller both in terms of population and territory, and Monaco is smaller in 






of power between institutions, 3) the relations between Sammarinese citizens 
and politicians, and 4) the characteristics of political participation. The chapter 
ends with a summary of the findings and an assessment of the influence of size 
on Sammarinese democracy. 
 The current analysis of San Marino’s political system is based on field 
research conducted in the country in November 2010. As part of this in-depth 
analysis, eighteen Sammarinese individuals were interviewed, among whom 
former heads of state, government ministers, parliamentarians affiliated with 
both the government and the opposition, (former) members of the Council of 
Twelve, journalists, leaders of unions and employers’ organizations, academics, 
business leaders, and the Sammarinese ambassador to the United States. In this 
light, one effect of smallness instantly surfaces; many of the respondents fulfill 
multiple roles in society, and often combine functions that would usually be 
separated in larger states. One of the journalists I interviewed was for example 
also active as an opposition MP, and one MP combined her job with being 
president of the state museum. In addition to combining functions, many 
interviewees have already been active in Sammarinese public life for decades, 
and also in varying functions. One minister told me that he had fulfilled all 
political-institutional roles in the country; that of Captain Regent, minister (four 
times), party group leader, and member of the Council of Twelve. A complete list 
of the people I interviewed can be found in Appendix A of this book.4  
 
2. Political History and Democratization of San Marino 
Wandering through the narrow streets of San Marino’s capital town that bears 
the same name as the country, one is struck by the sense of pride that the 
microstate derives from its political history. On the corner of almost every street, 
tribute is being paid to the well-documented Sammarinese history and its 
accompanying heroes. According to the legend,5 San Marino was founded on the 
3rd of September 301 by the stonecutter Marinus the Dalmatian, who was later 
canonized as Saint Marinus – San Marino in Italian (Duursma 1996: 216; 
Sundhaussen 2003: 274; Eccardt 2005: 278-279).6 On the slopes of Mount 
                                                
4 In the following discussion, I will occasionally present quotes from these interviews to illustrate 
some arguments. Some of my interviews were conducted in English and others in Italian. 
Whenever the interview was in Italian, I have translated the quote to English and presented it as 
such, with the original Italian citation in a footnote.  
5 It is not clear to what extent this legend must be taken for true, but historians and archeologists 
have found evidence of the existence of an autonomous society on the slopes of Mount Titano 
going back to at least the 9th century (Miller 1901: 635; Bacciocchi 1999: 27). 
6 Marinus originated from the island of Arbe (or Rab) in contemporary Croatia, but traveled to 





Titano, Marinus and a small number of his followers founded a community based 
on the freedom to practice their religion, and although Marinus died in the 
autumn of 301,7 his followers continued to preserve and defend the values of 
liberty on which the tiny society was built (Eccardt 2005: 278). 
 Although not much is known about the first ages that followed the 
foundation of the commune, writings from the early Middle Ages substantiate the 
existence of the Arengo (or Arringo), a council composed of all Sammarinese 
heads of family (the capifamiglia), which at the time constituted the most 
important decision-making institution of the polity (Miller 1901: 635; 
Sundhaussen 2003: 217). Attendance at Arengo-meetings was compulsory, and 
although only (male) heads of family could participate, for at least part of the 
Middle Ages San Marino thus had a system of popular and participatory decision 
making. Due to the growth of the population and ensuing logistical problems of 
organizing Arengo-meetings, the largest part of the Arengo’s powers were 
transferred to a representative body, the Council of Sixty, at the end of the 
fifteenth century (Giannini 1899: 31; Bacciocchi 1999: 28-29; Casali and 
Crescentini 2003: 57-58).8 Hence, the society transformed from a system of 
direct decision-making into a representative polity, even though the Arengo 
continued to exist and was still convoked on instances of extraordinary 
importance. 
 Already in the 13th century, the duumvirate (joint leadership) of the 
Captains Regent (Capitani Reggenti) constituted the political leadership of the 
Sammarinese polity (Sundhaussen 2003: 217; Casali and Crescentini 2003: 61). 
This institution, which originated in the Roman Republic (in the form of consuls) 
and was very common in medieval Italian republics, has been preserved up to 
the present day. In the year 1600, the first complete Statutes of San Marino were 
established and written down, thus forming one of the most ancient written 
constitutions in the world (Catudal 1975: 194; Bacciocchi 1999: 28).9 In its 
                                                                                                                                 
demolished by pirates. When the Roman Emperor Diocletian issued laws that called for the 
persecution of Christians (known as the Diocletianic Persecutions), Marinus supposedly fled 
inland and found a hiding place on Mount Titano, which nowadays is the location of San Marino’s 
capital. Another version of this history assumes that Marinus came to Mount Titano to find material 
(stones), and then remained to live there. 
7 This year is now viewed as the founding date of the Republic, and is used as the staring point in San 
Marino’s own calendar. As a consequence, the period between 1 September 2011 and 1 September 
2013 is seen as year 1712 d.F.R. (dalla Fondazione della Repubblica). 
8 The Arengo and the Council of Sixty (Consiglio dei Sessanta) exist up to the present day, but the 
former is only very rarely convoked, and the latter has been renamed as the Great and General 
Council (Consiglio Grande e Generale). 
9 In these Statutes, the legislative and constitutional competences of the Council of Sixty have 
been formulated, and also its task to nominate and appoint people to the main political positions 





external relations, the Republic maintained a policy of neutrality and abstinence 
from international affairs, and largely succeeded to remain independent by not 
arousing the attention of its neighbors (Sundhaussen 2003: 217).10 The Vatican 
recognized the sovereignty of San Marino in 1291 and again in 1627, but despite 
its clever diplomatic tactics the country was occupied for two brief periods; first 
in 1503 by the Italian former Cardinal Cesare Borgia, and in the years 1739 and 
1740 by Cardinal Giulio Alberoni, in an attempt to bring the Republic under the 
influence of the Vatican (Duursma 1996: 216).11 
 Over the course of the seventeenth century the democratic traditions of 
the Sammarinese Republic had declined significantly, as the Arengo was not 
convoked anymore and the Council of Sixty (which at times consisted of far less 
than sixty members) had become an oligarchic assembly of which the members 
were selected by hereditary cooptation (Bacciocchi 1999: 31-32). As a 
consequence, the political power of the Republic was in the hands of the few 
powerful families that controlled the Council of Sixty, and who became the 
aristocracy of San Marino.12 Due to its isolated location and its withdrawal from 
international political affairs, the Republic has mostly been severely 
underdeveloped economically and only very few people were literate, a situation 
which endured well into the 20th century.  
When Napoleon began his conquest of northern Italy in 1796, a treaty of 
friendship was signed between the French Empire and San Marino, in which 
Napoleon pledged to respect the autonomy of the tiny Republic (Duursma 1996: 
216). The Emperor even offered San Marino a significant increase of its territory, 
which the country’s leaders (under the leadership of the skillful Antonio Onofri) 
however refused. Napoleon was well aware of the exceptional history of the 
microstate, and had been particularly fond of its republican and democratic 
traditions (Casali and Crescentini 2003: 74). Additionally, the geo-strategic 
insignificance of San Marino and the positive propagandistic effects of refraining 
                                                                                                                                 
competences of the main jurisdictional and administrative organ of the Republic, the Council of 
Twelve (Casali and Crescentini 2003: 64). 
10 Sundhaussen calls this the “leave us alone”-attitude (2003: 217). In San Marino, the motto 
“known to us, unknown to others” (Cogniti Nobisque Incognti Aliis) was used as an expression of 
the Republic’s longstanding policy with regard to international relations. 
11 This Occupazione Alberoniana ended when Pope Clement XII, after receiving numerous pleas 
from the Sammarinese population, restored the independence of the Republic. 
12 In the beginning of the 19th century, it was decided that only a third of the Council should exist 
of nobles, whereas the other two thirds were to be occupied by the inhabitants of Sammarinese 





from an invasion of the Republic probably made Napoleon decide not to violate 
its autonomy.13 
 During the Risorgimento, San Marino offered a hiding place to numerous 
supporters of the unification movement, among whom Giuseppe Garibaldi and 
250 of his followers (Miller 1901: 646-647). Due to these events the leaders of 
the newly established Kingdom of Italy respected San Marino’s sovereignty, and 
in 1862 a treaty of friendship was signed between the two countries 
(Sundhaussen 2003: 215-216; Eccardt 2005: 100). Since then, San Marino has 
been able to retain its independence, and remained neutral during the two World 
Wars, with the exception of a short period in 1944 when the country was 
erroneously bombed by the British air force and later briefly occupied by the 
Allies (Bacciocchi 1999: 101).  
 On the eve of the 20th century, San Marino’s internal political organization 
was to experience a number of profound changes. For the past ages, the country 
had been controlled by the oligarchic Council of Sixty (a period now known as 
the Oligarchia).14 However, subsequent to similar developments in Italy, the first 
socialist and democratic movements emerged in the Republic and started the 
fight for democratization and representation (Bacciocchi 1999: 34-35). Under 
the leadership of well-educated and competent figures like Gino Giacomini and 
Pietro Franciosi, the socialists and democrats succeeded in attaining their goals. 
The struggle for democratization culminated in the 1906 convocation of the 
Arengo, for the first time in several hundred years (the last time it had been 
convoked was in 1571). In what has now come to be seen as a pivotal moment in 
Sammarinese history, the Arengo decided that the Council of Sixty – henceforth 
called the Great and General Council (Consiglio Grande e Generale) – should be 
elected by universal male suffrage (Bacciocchi 1999: 50-54; Casali and 
Crescentini 2003: 59). The introduction of universal male suffrage in San Marino 
thereby preceded the same development in Italy by a number of years.15  
 The newly established democracy in San Marino was however short lived. 
After the establishment of Mussolini’s fascist regime in Italy in 1922, the 
                                                
13 At the Congress of Vienna in 1815 San Marino’s autonomy was not discussed, which allowed 
the Vatican to proclaim that the territory of the Republic should become an indirect dominion of 
the Papal State (Duursma 1996: 217). Although this never happened, the relations between San 
Marino and the Vatican remained tense until the Italian unification in 1861. 
14 Despite the oligarchic nature of its politics and the limited opportunities for political 
involvement of citizens, San Marino in this period continued to be regarded as a shining example 
of liberty, democracy, and constitutional republicanism, and was cherished as such by among 
others Napoleon and Lincoln. As Doyle remarks, in the mid-19th century Republics were an 
endangered species, as only the war-torn United States, Switzerland, and San Marino upheld the 
republican ideal (Doyle 2011). 





Sammarinese Fascist Party (PFS16) was formed and finally took over power in 
the Republic in 1926. For San Marino, the fascist era marked a return to the pre-
1906 Oligarchia, which is demonstrated by the fact that the fascist rulers of San 
Marino (with Giuliano Gozi17 as the most prominent one) came from the same 
families that controlled the Great and General Council before 1906 (de Visser 
1941: 49-51; Pelliconi 1995: 86). Under the fascist regime other parties and their 
publications were forbidden, and the electoral law of 1906 was abolished. Apart 
from this however, the fascist regime of San Marino was less motivated by 
ideology than by the aspiration of several influential conservative families to 
restore the pre-1906 oligarchic system (Pelliconi 1995: 89). As a consequence, 
Sammarinese fascism had a much less totalitarian character than in Italy, and can 
by and large be categorized as a ‘regular’ authoritarian or oligarchic regime 
instead. On 20 September 1944 the fascists were decisively defeated, and 
democracy was restored.18 
 After the war, a coalition government of communists (PCS19) and 
socialists (PSS20) took over power in San Marino, and would remain in office for 
twelve years. As such, San Marino was the only country in Western Europe with a 
(democratically elected) government that included communists.21 During the 
twelve years of its existence, the left-wing government had a strained 
relationship with the government of Italy, resulting even in a blockade of San 
Marino’s borders in 1950 and 1951 that lasted for eighteen months. In 1957, the 
defection of five socialist MPs led to a perfect split in parliament (thirty 
government MPs versus thirty opposition MPs).22 When one of the communist 
MPs decided to withdraw his support as well, the government was faced with a 
minority of seats in the Council, upon which it decided to close parliament and 
call for new elections.23 The opposition did not accept this decision and instead 
                                                
16 Partito Fascista Sammarinese. 
17 Gozi was five times Captain Regent during the fascist regime, intermittently ruling the country 
as such for two and a half years. More importantly however, is that he was in charge of the most 
powerful ministry - that of foreign affairs - for twenty-six years between 1917 and 1943. 
18 Even though its sovereignty had been largely respected, the war had enormous consequences 
for San Marino, as the country’s (economic) infrastructure had been completely demolished. 
19 Partito Comunista Sammarinese. 
20 Partito Socialista Sammarinese. 
21 Unlike the Italian socialist party, the Sammarinese socialists initially chose to align themselves 
with the communist party instead of the Christian-democratic party (PDCS – Partito Democratico 
Cristiano Sammarinese), which has since the end of the war always been the largest party in San 
Marino (Bacciocchi 1999: 104). 
22 The defection of the socialist MPs was a consequence of international political developments: 
they no longer accepted the alliance of the Sammarinese government to the Soviet Union after the 
events in Hungary in 1956. 
23 It was a practice of the communist and socialist parties to enforce party discipline by having all 





formed a provisionary government in the industrial village of Rovereta, in the 
north of San Marino. This government was immediately recognized as legitimate 
by Italy, France, and the United States, and the Italian government decided to 
send 150 carabinieri (military policemen) to the Republic. Under this pressure, 
the left-wing government resigned, and Christian-democrats together with the 
new social-democratic party that was established by the dissenting socialist and 
communist MPs24 formed a new government, without organizing new elections 
(Catudal 1975: 194; Duursma 1996: 220-221; Bacciocchi 1999: 114-117; 
Sundhaussen 2003: 218; Bonelli 2010: 163-165). 
 























Year V% S V% S V% S V% S V% S V% S V% S V% S S 
1945 34.0 20 - - 66.0 40 - - - - - - - - - - 60 
1949 42.3 25 - - 57.7 35 - - - - - - - - - - 60 
1951 43.0 26 29.3 18 22.2 13 - - - - - - - - 5.6 3 60 
1955 38.3 23 31.6 19 25.5 16 4.7 2 - - - - - - - - 60 
1959 44.3 27 25.6 16 13.8 8 15.9 9 - - - - - - - - 60 
1964 46.8 29 24.1 14 10.7 6 16.2 10 - - - - - - 2.2 1 60 
1969 44.0 27 22.8 14 11.9 7 18.0 11 - - - - - - 3.4 1 60 
1974 39.6 25 23.6 15 13.9 8 15.4 9 - - - - - - 7.5 3 60 
1978 42.3 26 25.1 16 13.8 8 11.1 7 - - - - - - 7.7 3 60 
1983 42.1 26 24.4 15 14.8 9 13.9 8 - - - - - - 4.8 2 60 
1988 44.1 27 28.7 18 11.1 7 13.6 8 - - - - - - 2.5 - 60 
1993 41.4 26 - - 23.7 14 18.6 11 7.7 4 3.4 2 - - 5.2 3 60 
1998 40.9 25 - - 23.2 14 18.6 11 9.8 6 3.3 2 - - 4.2 2 60 
2001 41.9 25 - - 24.2 15 20.8 12 8.2 5 3.4 2 - - 1.5 1 60 
2006 32.9 21 - - - - 31.8 20 12.1 7 8.7 5 5.3 3 9.2 4 60 
2008 31.9 22 - - - - 32.0 18 11.5 7 8.6 5 6.3 4 9.7 4 60 
 
                                                                                                                                 
terms. Being confronted with a minority in parliament, the heads of these two parties handed in 
35 letters of resignation, including those of the MPs that had switched allegiance to the 
opposition. As a consequence, the quorum of 30 seats could no longer be met, and the incumbent 
Captains Regent scheduled new elections for the 3rd of November, 1957. Since the term of the 
incumbent Captains Regent would however transpire on October 1st, and no new ones could be 
elected (since the quorum could not be met), a constitutional crisis ensued. 
24 This party was called the Sammarinese Independent Democratic Socialist Party (PSDIS – 
Partito Socialista Democratico Indipendente Sammarinese).  
25 PDCS = Partito Democratico Cristiano Sammarinese (Christian-democratic party), PCS = Partito 
Comunista Sammarinese (communist party), PSS = Partito Socialista Sammarinese (socialist 
party), PSDIS – Partito Socialista Democratico Indipendente Sammarinese, PSU – Partito Socialista 
Unitario, PPDS – Partito Progressista Democratico Sammarinese, PD – Partito dei Democratici, 
PSD = Partito dei Socialisti e dei Democratici (social-democratic parties), AP = Alleanza Popolare 
(liberal centre party), RCS - Rifondazione Communista Sammarinese, SU = Sinistra Unita (new left 
parties), NPS = Nuovo Partito Socialista (social-democratic party). In 1945 and 1949, the PCS and 





The events of 1957 are currently known as the “Fatti di Rovereta”26, and 
Sammarinese people have since then been divided on the issue, with both sides 
accusing the other one of committing a coup d’état. Several decades later, 
documents from United States-archives demonstrated that the CIA and the U.S.-
government had close links with the Sammarinese Christian-democratic 
opposition, and actively endeavored to destabilize the left-wing government 
(Bacciocchi 1999: 117-118). Christian-democrats and socialists ruled the country 
in subsequent years, and succeeded in realizing an impressive economic growth 
and the development of a large financial sector in the country. Female suffrage 
was introduced in 1957, but due to a slow implementation of laws, women could 
only vote for the first time in 1964, and passive electoral rights were granted to 
women only in 1973 (Duursma 1996: 227; Bacciocchi 1999: 123-124).27 In 1978 
the communists returned in a coalition with the socialists and in 1986 the so-
called ‘historical compromise’ (Compromesso Storico) led to a coalition between 
the two traditional archrivals in Sammarinese politics, the communist and 
Christian-democratic parties.  
 
Table 5.2: Composition of Sammarinese Postwar-Governments 
1945 - 1957 PCS-PSS Communists and Socialists 
1957 - 1973 PDCS-PSDIS Christian-Democrats and Social-Democrats 
1973 - 1978 PDCS-PSS Christian-Democrats and Socialists 
1978 - 1986 PCS-PSS-PSU Communists, Socialists, and Social-Democrats 
1986 - 1992 PDCS-PCS Christian-Democrats and Communists 
1992 - 2000 PDCS-PSS Christian-Democrats and Socialists 
2000 - 2001 PDCS-PPDS Christian-Democrats and Social-Democrats 
2001 - 2002 PDCS-PSS Christian-Democrats and Socialists 
2002 - 2006 PDCS-AP-PSD Christian-Democrats, Liberals, and Social-Democrats 
2006 - 2008 PSD-AP-SU Social-Democrats, Liberals, and New Left 
2008 -  2012 PDCS-AP-NPS Christian-Democrats, Liberals, and Social-Democrats 
 
Just like in neighboring Italy, the fall of the Berlin wall and the collapse of 
communism marked the disintegration of the communist party of San Marino, 
out of which two new left-wing parties appeared (Bacciocchi 1999: 158). On the 
right side of the political spectrum new parties emerged as well, mainly as split-
offs from the Christian-democrats – most notably the liberal Alleanza Popolare. 
Thus, the Sammarinese party system which had always consisted of three or four 
stable parties fragmented, and governments became more unstable. At present, 
                                                
26 This can be translated to English as ‘the events of Rovereta’ or the ‘Rovereta affair’. 
27 Since it was assumed that women would be more inclined to vote for the Christian-democratic 
party, the left-wing coalition refused to allow female suffrage at an earlier stage. Their 
assumptions turned out to correct however, as the proportion of votes for the PDCS rose 





twelve parties are represented in the Consiglio Grande e Generale, and due to an 
electoral law that was introduced in 2006 and aimed at countering further 
fragmentation, parties now have to form pre-electoral alliances (just like in 
Italy). Although the Christian-democratic party can still be considered as the 
largest and most important party in the Republic, at elections it now obtains 
close to thirty instead of over forty percent of the votes. In table 5.1, the 
percentages of votes received by Sammarinese parties at parliamentary elections 
have been presented, and in table 5.2 the governments that have ruled the 
Republic since the Second World War. 
 At the dawn of the new millennium, an emerging worldwide combat 
against money laundering and fiscal evasion presented new difficulties for San 
Marino. With a large part of its economy based on finances and banking, the 
country has been recurrently accused of engaging in harmful tax practices. Even 
though the Republic managed to avoid being named on the ‘black list’ of the 
OECD, after 2008 the Italian government significantly increased its pressure on 
the microstate (IMF 2011: 11). Specifically, the Italian government announced a 
tax amnesty for Italians who repatriated their offshore assets, while concurrently 
announcing further legal action against those who maintained their bank 
accounts in San Marino. In addition, the Italian government discouraged Italian 
companies to do business with San Marino, and when a money-laundering 
scandal in San Marino’s largest bank (the Cassa di Risparmio della Repubblica di 
San Marino) became public and the executives of the bank were arrested, San 
Marino’s image as a malevolent fiscal paradise was complete (IMF 2011: 14).28 
Whereas the Sammarinese economy had been growing with over four percent 
annually during the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s, in 2008 this declined 
to two percent, and for 2009 a shrink of over twelve percent was noted.29 In the 
context of the severe crisis that is now plaguing the country, for the first time in 
history Sammarinese politicians are openly debating the option of EU-
membership.30  
                                                
28 Many of my respondents pointed to hypocrisy on the part of the Italians in this regard; whereas 
rich Italians used San Marino as a bank for decades, and eagerly exploited its flexible financial 
laws and low taxes, San Marino is now suddenly being treated as a malicious fiscal paradise. 
Furthermore, several politicians highlighted the fact that many Sammarinese banks are at least 
partially owned by Italians, implying that the root of the problem is for some part to be found in 
Italy itself, and that the Sammarinese government has a limited capacity to solve it. 
29 Statistics derived from the Sammarinese Chamber of Commerce (Camera di Commercio) 
website (www.cc.sm). 
30 A referendum on the issue was scheduled to be held on March 27th 2011, but several days in 
advance the government blocked the referendum on the grounds that it will set in motion the 





3. Explaining Democracy in San Marino 
Now that the historical process by means of which San Marino became a 
democracy has been outlined, a number of factors that can explain or have 
contributed to San Marino’s democratic institutional framework can be listed. 
The participatory Arengo-system by means of which political decision-making 
occurred in medieval San Marino can be seen as a pre-modern democratic 
system, in which participation was limited to a small number of citizens. Full 
democratization arrived with the realization of universal male suffrage in 1906, 
but the fascist regime constituted an eighteen year-long return to 
authoritarianism. Seeing that the appearance of pro-democratic forces was 
strongly influenced by the rise of similar movements in Italy, which were 
virtually mirrored by the Sammarinese ones, regional and diffusion effects can 
effectively explain San Marino’s (re-)democratization in the early 20th century. 
Regardless of whether it was a coup d’état, the 1957 Fatti di Rovereta 
demonstrate Italy’s readiness to intervene in case it perceives a threat to San 
Marino’s (capitalist) democracy. In this sense, San Marino’s location in the heart 
of a presently democratic country (which is located in a democratic continent), 
and its economic, military, and political dependence on its larger Italian neighbor 
can be deemed to have contributed to the development and sustainment of the 
Republic’s democracy after 1945. 
 Whereas San Marino for centuries maintained a policy of abstinence and 
isolation from international affairs, after the Second World War this policy 
shifted dramatically, and the country now maintains connections with many 
international actors. In 1988 the Republic became a member of the Council of 
Europe, and in 1992 it entered the United Nations. Interviews with Sammarinese 
political figures indicate that this reorientation in foreign policy was fueled by a 
desire to decrease the country’s dependence on Italy. Be that as it may, the 
relations with Italy remain of extreme importance to San Marino, especially in 
light of the far-reaching monetary, economic, postal, and customs agreements 
that have been signed between the two countries over the years (Duursma 1996: 
232-245).31 Although San Marino is formally and legally completely autonomous, 
                                                                                                                                 
stalled for now, but the public discussion continues. Especially the social-democrats (PSD) have 
been strongly advocating the entrance of San Marino into the EU. 
31 In 1862, the newly established Italian Kingdom by means of a treaty recognized San Marino’s 
sovereignty (Sundhaussen 2003: 215-216; Eccardt 2005: 100). The bilateral relations between 
the two countries were reconfirmed with new treaties in 1939 and 1971, in which the special 
relation between the countries is further emphasized. The treaties envisage extensive 
cooperation in judicial, economic, administrative, and commercial areas, in which Italy will 
support San Marino in exchange for loyalty to Italy’s foreign policy objectives (the so-called 





in practice the Republic is crucially dependent on its larger neighbor, and the 
relations between the countries are in this sense obviously extremely unequal.32 
In light of San Marino’s dependence on Italy, and due to the EU and OECD’s focus 
and emphasis on democracy and good governance in Europe, the international 
environment of San Marino offers formidable inducements for the persistence of 
democracy.  
In addition to the role played by international actors, virtually all the 
Sammarinese people I interviewed pointed to the increased political awareness, 
attachment to the public good, and involvement of the country’s citizenry as an 
explanatory factor of the country’s democracy. In the words of one of the 
politicians I interviewed: 
 
“Participation in politics is very important, and it is one of the reasons why the 
Republic of San Marino has remained independent, while being so small. This 
collective participation in public life has determined the success of the Sammarinese 
republican model after all these ages, and the success of the microstate.”33 
 
Apart from the influence of international factors on San Marino’s democracy, the 
Sammarinese historical tradition of republicanism and liberty should according 
to a majority of respondents not be discounted in explaining the country’s 
contemporary democracy. Other European microstates that are currently located 
in a similarly democracy-friendly environment as San Marino, like Monaco and 
Liechtenstein, continue to have powerful and occasionally controversial 
monarchs.34 Whereas these microstates originated as autocratic personal 
fiefdoms and to a significant extent remain to be governed as such, San Marino 
was actually created on the creed of (religious) liberty, and has traditionally 
steered away from the concentration of power in the hands of single 
individuals.35  
                                                
32 Several interviewees pointed out that the personal sympathies and beliefs of individual Italian 
ministers with regard to San Marino and its autonomy have a decisive effect on the bilateral 
relations, which further demonstrates the vulnerability and dependence of San Marino on its 
larger neighbor. 
33 “Questa participazione alla politica è molto importante, ed è una delle ragioni per cui la 
Repubblica di San Marino è rimasta indipendente così piccola. Questa participazione colletiva alla 
vita pubblica è stata la ragione che nei secoli ha determinato il successo del microstato.”  
34 These two countries are often criticized by European actors and organizations for the less 
democratic aspects of their political systems. The Council of Europe, the OECD, and the European 
Parliament for example strongly and vocally criticized the outcomes of the 2003 Liechtensteiner 
referendum, which according to their perceptions increased the power of Prince Hans-Adam II at 
the expense of democratically elected institutions in the country. 
35 This difference between the European microstates is most clearly visible in the organization of 
executive power. Whereas the Monegasque and Liechtensteiner monarchs assume an 
exceptionally powerful position in their respective political systems (especially in comparison to 





It is also clear, however, that the democratization movement of the early 
20th century was spearheaded by a handful of intellectuals, which means that the 
actions of several single individuals had a great impact on the establishment of 
democracy in 1906. The country was at this time economically underdeveloped 
and primarily consisted of a poor, uneducated, and illiterate peasantry 
(Sundhaussen 2003: 220), which according to Bacciocchi had lost all hopes of 
participating in public life (1999: 36-37). In combination with the enduring 
economic malaise, the expression of demands for popular representation by a 
small number of educated individuals like Giacomini and Franciosi, aided by 
Italian sister movements, eventually mobilized the Sammarinese people into 
opposing the oligarchy. Although trade unions and political parties did appear, 
the constraints of San Marino’s small size prevented the emergence of pro-
democratic mass movements that arose in larger countries, and democratization 
therefore appears to have primarily been a consequence of the actions of a few 
determined individuals, who largely copied Italy’s model of democratization. 
 
4. Political Institutions of San Marino 
In many ways, the present-day political-institutional structure of San Marino has 
the appearance of that of a medieval Italian city-state. Although the country has 
unmistakably made the transition to representative democracy, its pre-modern 
institutions have remained virtually intact. In this sense, Sammarinese political 
structures have been more resilient than those of many larger states in Western 
Europe, in which institutional renovation and transformation have intermittently 
occurred. In addition to the antiqueness of the microstate’s institutions, in many 
ways they also seem to be specifically devised and suitable for a small society. 
Many of the former Italian city-states (like Lucca, Venice, and Ferrara) which 
later were incorporated in the Italian Kingdom had the same type of councils, 
consuls, and tribunals that continue to exist in present-day San Marino.36 In this 
respect, the political institutions of the microstate can be seen as relics from the 
past, which have accidentally survived against all odds, and which can give some 
unique insights in the workings and structures of pre-modern Italian city-states.   
The contemporary political system of San Marino can be characterized as 
a parliamentary democracy, with a government (the State Congress - Congresso 
di Stato) that is accountable to parliament (the Great and General Council). San 
                                                                                                                                 
persons with an office term of only half a year, after which they cannot be appointed to the same 
position for the next three years. 
36 For example, many of these city-states (like Lucca and Venice) also had the adjective 
Serenissima in their names, and whereas Venice was ruled by a Doge and Lucca was governed by 





Marino’s heads of state and heads of government are the two Captains Regent, 
and together with Andorra (which has two Co-Princes) San Marino is the only 
country in the world with two heads of state.37 The Captains Regent reside in 
office for only half a year, which is the shortest of any head of state in the world, 
and they are elected by and from the members of the Great and General Council. 
Decision-making by the Captains Regent occurs on the basis of collegiality, 
meaning that any decision has to be approved by both officeholders. After having 
served as Captain Regent for half a year, it is by law forbidden to be elected to 
this position again for at least three years (Duursma 1996: 220; Eccardt 2005: 
287-288).38 The position of the Captains Regent is largely ceremonial, and even 
though they preside over the main institutions of the state (such as the Great and 
General Council, the State Congress, and the Council of Twelve) and represent 
their country in external contacts, they have little factual powers. Due to the tiny 
population and the rapid turnover in Captains Regent, practically every 
Sammarinese family has one or more members who have been the head of state 
of their country. 
San Marino’s legislative power is vested in the Great and General Council, 
which has sixty members who are elected every five years on the basis of 
proportional representation.39 With sixty MPs representing a population of 
approximately 30.000 people, the number of citizens per MP is about 500, which 
is the lowest number in the world.40 The Council has the competence to 
nominate and appoint people to important organs of the state such as the 
Reggenza and the judiciary, and in line with the parliamentary system the 
survival of the Sammarinese government depends on a parliamentary majority 
(Duursma 1996: 219-221). Whereas the relationship between the executive, 
                                                
37 In the literature, this is referred to as a diarchy or duumvirate (Sundhaussen 2003: 217).  
38 Together with the extremely short period in office, and the fact that there are two heads of 
state instead of one, this rule is said to be designed in order to prevent for the concentration of 
power in the hands of one person, which is evidently a risk in a small state with only a few people 
that are willing and able to assume political positions. 
39 Specifically, San Marino has a system of List-PR in which the entire country is treated as one 
constituency. Since 2008, an electoral threshold (between 0.4% and 3.5%, depending on the 
number of competing coalitions) has to be reached in order to gain representation in parliament. 
In order to curb the increasing fragmentation of the country’s party system, a ‘majority bonus’ or 
premio di stabilità (premium of stability) was introduced to bestow the winning coalition of 
parties with at least 35 of the 60 seats. However, this majority bonus is only awarded if the 
winning coalition gains at least 50% of the votes, which creates a strong incentive for parties to 
cluster in two opposing coalitions, as is now the case. If no coalition reaches 50% of the votes, a 
second round is organized in which only the top two coalitions of the first round can participate 
(Consiglio Grande e Generale 2011). Voters can choose between voting for a coalition or for one 
party in the coalition, and electoral coalitions are obliged to present their programs and the 
composition of their potential government before the polling day. 
40 Based on own calculations and data from the Inter-Parliamentary Union (Inter-Parliamentary 





legislative, and judicial powers in the Sammarinese system always used to be 
somewhat unclear (Duursma 1996: 223), in recent years a more strict separation 
between these powers has been established (Pelliconi 1995: 67).41 Out of the 
sixty members of the Great and General Council,42 twelve members are elected to 
form the Council of Twelve (Consiglio dei Dodici), a remarkable institution that 
used to have a number of significant judicial competences (as it was for example 
the administrative judge in third instance), but with the recent separation of 
powers has lost much of its duties, and is now primarily an administrative organ. 
However, the Council of Twelve does continue to decide on matters that involve 
the acquisition and possession of territory by foreigners, which is an important 
matter in a country with an area of only 61 square kilometers of land (Duursma 
1996: 226). 
The State Congress (Congresso di Stato) of San Marino is composed of ten 
secretaries of state, and exercises the executive power in the country. Every 
minister heads his or her own functionally specialized ministerial department, 
which each has its own public administration. The Captains Regent preside over 
the State Congress, but in the absence of a prime minister the Secretary of State 
for Foreign Affairs is generally considered to be the most authoritative minister 
within the Congress, and thus also the most important political figure in the 
country. Unlike the Captains Regent, for a long time there were no term limits for 
the function of secretary of state, and because the number of potential 
ministerial candidates is inherently small it was and is not uncommon for 
secretaries of state to be in office for many years, often also at different 
departments.43 Although they preside over the State Congress, the Captains 
Regent have no voting rights.  
In addition to the upper layer of national government, San Marino is 
subdivided in nine communes (the Castelli44), which each have their own local 
administration, the Giunta di Castello. Each Giunta has its own assembly, which is 
directly elected by the inhabitants of the commune, and is headed by a Capitano 
                                                
41 Other than before, members of government can now no longer be MPs at the same time. 
42 A number of typical (size-related) restrictions with regard to the membership of parliament 
have existed over time, such as the rule that husband and wife or father and son cannot be 
members at the same time. 
43 The most illustrious (yet somewhat dated) example is found in the person of Domenico Fattori, 
who in the 19th and 20th centuries was Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs for 48 years, twelve 
times Captain Regent, and also secretary of state for internal affairs, and for finances for a couple 
of years. More recently, the de facto leader of the Sammarinese fascists, Giuliano Gozi, was 
secretary of state for external affairs for 26 years (de Visser 1941: 50-51).  
44 These are Acquaviva, Borgo Maggiore, Chiesanuova, Città di San Marino, Domagnano, Faetano, 






di Castello (Duursma 1996: 221-222). The local administrations have the 
competence to deal with issues related to health, culture, and sport, and can also 
manage their own budget. Additionally, they have the right to initiate laws and to 
call for a referendum (ibid.). In order to preserve impartiality in a society where 
everybody knows each other, San Marino’s judges and policemen are mostly 
hired from Italy (Catudal 1975: 197; Duursma 1996: 223). The Great and General 
Council appoints judges for a four year period, which can be prolonged 
indefinitely. In 2002, a three-member constitutional court (Collegio Garante della 
Costituzionalità delle Norme) was set up, of which also only non-Sammarinese 
judges can be members.45 
In addition to the representative political institutions, San Marino also 
maintains a number of direct democracy-instruments. The historically most 
salient of these is the Arengo, which technically continues to exist but is only very 
rarely convoked. Instead, twice a year the so-called Istanze d’Arengo occur, in 
which citizens can present petitions and requests of public interest to the newly 
elected Captains Regent.46 The Captains Regent can choose to propose these 
requests to parliament, which can transfer them into law. In addition to the 
biannual Istanze d’Arengo, San Marino occasionally also organizes and holds 
referendums, which can be abrogative, confirmative, or proposing (in the form of 
a popular initiative). For a proposing referendum to be held, the signatures of 
sixty Sammarinese citizens and admission by the constitutional court are 
required, whereas an abrogative referendum requires the signatures of 1.5 
percent of the number of eligible votes. Referendums can also be initiated by at 
least five of the nine Giunte di Castello.   
 On the basis of both its history and its contemporary political-institutional 
structure, San Marino’s tradition of democracy and liberty stands out as a 
recurrent and defining characteristic of the microstate. In spite of its smallness, 
as such the Republic managed to catch the attention of many statesmen from 
larger countries, among whom Abraham Lincoln, who in 1861 became an 
honorary citizen of San Marino.47 In the academic community, the peculiarities 
                                                
45 In addition to regulating disputes between political institutions and controlling whether 
proposals of law are in line with the constitution, this constitutional court also functions as the 
so-called Sindacato. After the term of the Captains Regent has expired, citizens have three days to 
present claims or complaints to the Sindicato, which has the capacity to pursue legal action 
against former Captains Regent.  
46 As the term of new Captains Regent starts on April 1st and October 1st of every year, the Istanze 
d’Arengo occur on the first Sunday after these dates. 
47 Lincoln was impressed with the Sammarinese republican principles and practices, and wrote 
to the leadership of the Republic: “Although your dominion is small, your state is nevertheless 





and achievements of San Marino were at the basis of several publications in the 
late 19th century, such as those by Bent (1879), Tucker (1880), Giannini (1899), 
and Miller (1901). At present however, academic publications on Sammarinese 
politics are exceptionally rare, and many recent publications are only available in 
Italian and can only be retrieved in the country’s state library. In this sense, a 
secondary aim of this chapter is to (partially) fill this gap in scholarly attention to 
the Republic. As the political history and institutional structure of San Marino 
have now been outlined, the subsequent sections will pay attention to the 
characteristics of the two dimensions of democracy – contestation and 
inclusiveness – as they exist in San Marino, and to the way in which these are 
influenced by the country’s small size. 
 
5. Size and Democracy in San Marino 
According to Freedom House, which is the only aggregate democracy index that 
includes San Marino, the microstate is a full-fledged democracy, acquiring the 
most favorable scores on both political rights and civil liberties (Freedom House 
2012). The overwhelming majority of my respondents agreed and confirmed that 
elections in San Marino are free and fair, and in annual Freedom House-reports 
the freedom and fairness of elections is always underscored (Freedom House 
2012).48 It can therefore be ascertained that San Marino organizes free and fair 
elections for its national parliament and local assemblies, and the microstate 
additionally offers its citizens alternative channels of political involvement 
through the Istanze d’Arengo and occasional referendums. Active suffrage rights 
are awarded to every Sammarinese citizen who is at least eighteen years old, and 
passive rights (i.e. the right to be elected to the Great and General Council and 
therefore to the Council of Twelve and the Regency) are granted to those who 
have reached the age of twenty-five. In conclusion therefore, the formal 
institutional requirements for both contestation and inclusiveness are present in 
the Republic, which according to Dahl’s standards unquestionably qualifies as a 
polyarchy. In order to fully examine the influence of size on the characteristics of 
contestation and inclusiveness however, it is essential to look beyond the formal 
channels and institutions in San Marino. In the subsequent four sections, 
analyses of the influence of size on contestation (4.1. and 4.2.) and inclusiveness 
(4.3. and 4.4) in San Marino are offered. 
                                                                                                                                 
encouragement to the friends of humanity, that government founded on republican principles is 
capable of being so administered as to be secure and enduring” (Doyle 2011).  
48 Since it was included in the dataset in 1992, San Marino has always received a score of 1 on 
both Freedom House-dimensions, based on a 7-point scale in which 1 is most free and 7 is least 






5.1. Contestation: Ideology, Political Parties, and Opposition 
According to Dahl, contestation refers to “the extent of permissible opposition, 
public contestation, or political competition” (Dahl 1971: 4). In San Marino, 
contestation occurs in the form of elections for representative institutions and 
occasional plebiscites in which citizens can express their opinions on specific 
issues or policies. Elections for the Great and General Council are organized once 
in five years,49 and the members of this Council nominate and appoint people to 
the Council of Twelve, the judiciary and the Regency. Since the State Congress 
depends on a parliamentary majority, virtually all political offices are either 
directly or indirectly open to contestation. Passive electoral rights furthermore 
ensure that every Sammarinese citizen of at least twenty-five years old has the 
opportunity to take part in political competition for public office, and this 
inclusiveness provides the necessary conditions for contestation to occur in the 
first place.  
On a more substantive level, contestation also refers to the availability of 
alternatives, in the sense that citizens actually have a choice when they express 
their political preferences. In this respect, the degree to which parties articulate 
different political interests can be regarded as an important indicator. On the 
basis of a comparison of the election manifestos of the two electoral coalitions of 
parties in the 2008 elections, it appears that the parties do not really advance 
divergent substantive political platforms, as more or less similar issues are 
raised in these programs. Although Sammarinese parties do publish lengthy and 
wide-ranging manifestos, and therefore do appear to articulate political 
interests, seventeen out of eighteen respondents indicated that electoral 
programs are rather similar and do not really determine the dynamics of 
Sammarinese politics. Since virtually all interviewees hence shared my tentative 
conclusion that the political parties of San Marino do not really represent 
substantially different political orientations, the relative insignificance of 
political ideas and ideology appears to be a first fundamental characteristic of 
Sammarinese politics.  
Although the history of San Marino appears to be dominated by ideologies 
like communism, socialism, fascism, and Christian-democracy, on closer 
inspection these ideologies have always been fairly superficial and generally 
concealed the personal rivalries that undergirded the competition between them 
                                                
49 In practice this figure is much higher, due to the frequent government changes that have 





(cf. Bacciocchi 1999: 145, 147). As Pelliconi notes, Sammarinese fascism should 
be essentially understood as a reversion to the pre-1906 Oligarchia and the 
return to power of the old aristocratic families, and not as an ideologically 
motivated attempt to transform the country’s society along fascist lines (1995: 
86, 89).50 In similar fashion, the Sammarinese communists surely were in close 
contact with their Eastern European and Soviet counterparts, but never 
attempted to radically reorganize San Marino according to the Soviet model 
(Muccioli 2011: 5). Nevertheless, before the end of the Cold War ideologies at 
least to some extent determined Sammarinese domestic political competition. 
After the collapse of communism and the disintegration of the 
Sammarinese communist party (the PCS), the entire party system of the country 
fragmented, just as happened in neighboring Italy. According to Laakso and 
Taagepera’s measure the effective number of parties (ENP) in San Marino has 
risen from 1.80 in 1945 to on average around 3.0 in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, 
to over 4.0 in the two most recent elections (Laakso and Taagepera 1979).51 At 
present, no less than twelve parties are represented in parliament, albeit that the 
most recent electoral law has instigated the formation of two blocs of parties – 
the governing Patto per San Marino (Pact for San Marino) and the opposition that 
is united in the Riforme e Libertà (Reforms and Freedom) coalition. Although the 
number of competing factions has grown, it paradoxically appears to be the case 
that the diversity in terms of political ideas and substantial alternatives has 
diminished.  
With only one exception, all my respondents agreed that no significant 
substantive differences exist between the contemporary Sammarinese parties. 
When asked about the role of ideology in the Sammarinese political context, one 
of the politicians associated with the left for example answered: 
 
“Unfortunately, there are not many ideological differences. Take for example the 
differences that have arrived in the socialist field; we presently have three socialist 
parties, and they are not based on ideological motivations or on the question how to 
manage the state. They are probably due to personal relationships (…). Within a 
reality like ours, personal relationships affect politics a lot, and most of all also 
affect the composition of governments.”52 
 
                                                
50 This is also demonstrated by the fact that the Sammarinese fascists left the country’s 
institutional structure almost completely intact, but just abolished the organization of elections, 
banned other political parties, and repealed universal suffrage. 
51 Based on own calculations, using data from the Inter-Parliamentary Union (Inter-
Parliamentary Union (IPU) 2011). 
52 “Purtroppo, differenze ideologiche non ce ne sono molte. Penso, ad esempio alle divisioni nell’area 
socialista, al fatto che oggi siamo tre partiti di area socialista; e sono dovute ai rapporti personali. 
(...) All’interno di una realtà come la nostra, i rapporti personali incidono molto sulla politica, e 





Although discrepancies between the Sammarinese parties can be observed on 
certain specific issues, such as whether San Marino should accede to the EU or 
whether the country should open a casino, in terms of the broader political 
orientation of the microstate the parties express more or less similar viewpoints. 
The fact that parties from across the political spectrum have cooperated in 
coalitions further illustrates the insignificance of ideology. With regard to the 
indicator of alternation in office, table 2 already demonstrated that Sammarinese 
governments have traditionally consisted of various combinations of parties, and 
that it remarkably appears as if every combination between parties is possible, 
regardless of these parties’ respective ideological and programmatic 
orientations. Christian-democrats, communists, socialists, and liberals have at 
various times all cooperated with each other in coalition governments.53 One 
academic in this context said that: 
 
“The fact is that we now have a coalition in government that has the extreme right, 
Alleanza Nazionale, and also the socialists, NPS – the new socialist party, which is a 
little socialist formation, and they are in the same government. It’s transversal. 
Between the two coalitions, the programs are almost equal.” 
 
According to various respondents, the relative unimportance of ideology in San 
Marino is primarily a consequence of the intimate social relationships between 
citizens and politicians that result from the smallness of the country. Since 
virtually all citizens personally know one or more politicians, voting behavior 
appears to be essentially motivated by personal considerations, as a result of 
which the importance of programmatic ideas seems to diminish.54 One journalist 
explained this as follows: 
 
“You have to compare it to the difference between a city election and a national 
election in Italy. When you vote in a city election, you don’t look at left or right, you 
look at the people that are there. Here it is the same thing; you do not vote for a 
person because he is left or right, but because it’s him you want. You don’t worry if 
it’s Sinistra Unita or Democrazia Cristiana; it does not matter.”55 
                                                
53 In this regard the Compromesso Storico of 1986 can be seen as a watershed moment in 
Sammarinese political history, since it brought together the formal archrivals of Sammarinese 
politics (communists and Christian-democrats) in one government. A similar agreement was 
never achieved in the First Italian Republic. 
54 Volatility between elections might theoretically constitute a good indicator of personalistic 
voting behavior, in the sense that if people constantly vote for the same persons volatility can be 
expected to be low. Due to the fragmentation of the Sammarinese party system however, 
volatility remains around European averages (on average 11.6% (0.116) over the period 1949 - 
2008, compare Dalton et al. 2000: 41). 
55 In this sense, voting behavior in San Marino can perhaps be compared to voting behavior in 
other non-political elections with a very small number of voters, like for example university-
elections to form a student council. In this sort of elections people also tend to vote primarily on 






With one exception all interviewees argued that the differences between the 
parties are primarily personalistic in nature. Sammarinese politics therefore 
appears to revolve essentially around personalities, and the case study-literature 
indicates that since the Second World War, government coalitions have largely 
been constructed and terminated on the basis of interpersonal relationships. The 
three or four main traditional parties of San Marino have to a large extent 
disintegrated due to personal conflicts, and new parties have been established on 
the basis of political opportunism on the part of several individual politicians 
(Bacciocchi 1999: 97, 145, 147, 175).56 One politician for example pointed out 
that: 
 
“The micro-parties are evidently personalistic; they originate from personal 
contrasts within the larger parties. Then there are some parties which are only and 
exclusively formed out of political opportunism. I can see at least two of them. They 
will align themselves with anyone.”57 
 
Whereas contestation for political positions definitely occurs in the Republic, the 
political alternatives therefore appear to be much more defined in terms of 
personalities than in terms of policies.  
 In the introduction to this chapter, I pointed out that Sammarinese 
politicians often combine their political job with other societal functions or 
positions, and that many of them have been active in Sammarinese public life for 
a long time. In terms of contestation, this implies that the group of people who 
compete for political offices is inherently small, and that these individuals know 
each other really well. Due to the tiny population size, only a handful of people 
are willing and able to assume political positions and pursue a political career, 
and these people form the closely interlinked and well-connected political elite 
of San Marino. It is hardly surprising that in such an environment, political 
decisions are often not made on the basis of a cost-benefit analysis of different 
policy options, but on the basis of alliances and feuds between persons within 
                                                                                                                                 
certain policy-proposals, the differences between such ‘parties’ are mostly mainly personal 
instead of programmatic. 
56 The formation of coalitions has arguably served to enhance this opportunism. The current 
governing coalition, the Patto per San Marino, consists of seven parties among which a 
(supposedly) extreme-right party (the Alleanza Nazionale) and a social-democratic party (the 
Nuovo Partito Socialista). This latter party seems to have joined the right-wing coalition only for 
opportunistic reasons. The contemporary opposition, united in the Riforme e Libertà, consists of 
socialists, neo-communists, Christian-democrats, and liberals, and is therefore as ideologically 
incoherent as the governing coalition. 
57 “I micro-partiti, è evidente che sono partiti personalistici; provengono dei contrasti personali nei 
partiti più grandi. Poi ci sono alcuni partiti che si formano solo ed esclusivamente per opportunismo 





the elite instead. According to a historian I interviewed, this circumstance 
strongly impedes on the creation of continuity: 
 
“It is difficult when you do something positive in politics; a nice project or 
something positive for the country, then it’s difficult to have continuity, because 
when there is a change of government (…) the changer will break off the project 
started, without thinking about it on the theoretical level.” 
   
The absence of ideological divergence in the Sammarinese party system is 
matched by the absence of strong (ideological) cleavages in the country’s society. 
A majority of respondents asserted that the country’s population is categorically 
really homogeneous, and that the strong economic development from the 1960s 
onwards has created a high level of prosperity across the board. Although no 
data on income differences (such as the Gini-coefficient) are available for San 
Marino, in 2011 unemployment figures were for example at around 5%, which is 
half of Italy’s figure (San Marino Statistics Office 2011). Although San Marino 
receives a score of 0.29 in Alesina et al.’s fractionalization index (2003),58 this 
score is due to the Italians that compose about 12% of the microstate’s 
population, but these have no say in domestic Sammarinese politics. On account 
of the categorical homogeneity of the Sammarinese society, in conclusion no 
major socio-economical cleavages appear to exist between different segments of 
the country’s population.  
As a consequence of the absence of politicized cleavages and the absence of 
major socio-economic differences in the Sammarinese society, no major 
differences in political preferences appear to exist among the Sammarinese 
population; respondents asserted that the country’s extensive welfare provisions 
and facilities are undisputed, and that nobody would argue in favor of tax 
increases. Some respondents pointed to the likelihood that the current economic 
crisis leads to a political reconfiguration and economic restructuring, but this 
remains to be seen. In combination with the closeness and intimacy of San 
Marino’s small society, the absence of cleavages and the presence of categorical 
homogeneity thus can be assumed to create the basis for personalistic instead of 
programmatic contestation. 
 Virtually all of my respondents have described San Marino’s society as 
heavily politicized, in the sense that politics permeates all segments of the 
country’s public life. Since contestation is essentially personalistic in nature, and 
since the small population size implies that every Sammarinese family has one or 
                                                
58 This index measures ethnic, religious, and linguistic fractionalization, and ranges between 1 
and 0, with 0 indicating the absence of fractionalization, and 1 indicating a completely 





more members who are politically active, people are often judged or identified 
on the basis of their surname or place of residence. As various respondents 
indicated, the members of a family which has for example always supported the 
Christian-democratic party are unlikely to change their support; on the one hand 
because of the traditional allegiances of the family, and on the other hand 
because of the family members that continue to be active for the party. As one 
interest group-representative explained in this regard: 
 
“There is this political classification, because traditions within the family might 
entail a certain political orientation. We automatically know who people are, and it’s 
an old habit to classify people.”59 
 
These political classifications and branding also have their drawbacks however, 
because various individuals explained to me that they can impede on equal 
treatment and impartiality in for example schools and non-political offices. When 
it comes to the indicator of freedom to support the opposition, it can therefore be 
remarked that although no major constraints exist on supporting a particular 
political party, the smallness of San Marino entails that people are generally 
highly aware of each other’s political preferences, and that this may influence 
their behavior vis-à-vis one another. 
 
5.2. Contestation: the Balance of Power between Institutions 
In addition to the presence of competition for public office, contestation also 
alludes to the horizontal distribution of power between the various public offices 
that are contested, and between non-elected institutions that nevertheless play 
an important role in a democratic political system, like the judiciary, the media, 
and the civil service. Among Dahl’s eight criteria for polyarchy is the availability 
of alternative sources of information, which can be translated into the existence 
of an independent press. In similar fashion, political contestation is meaningless 
if the institution that is open to competition is actually powerless or controlled 
by a non-elected body. Number eight of Dahl’s criteria is the existence of 
“institutions for making government policies depend on votes and other 
expressions of preference” (Dahl 1971: 3), and this condition calls for the 
presence of certain checks and balances (or at least a reasonable horizontal 
distribution of power) between the various institutions for which contestation 
occurs.  
                                                
59 “C’è la catterizzazione politica perché tradizioni interne di una famiglia avevano un indirizzo 
politico di un certo tipo. Conosciamo automaticalmente le persone, e questa è una vecchia abitudine, 





Since the ministers in the Sammarinese government are for the main part 
powerful individuals that have been in politics for a relatively long time, and 
since they establish and sustain strong relations with people from all segments of 
society, a clear majority or interviewees argued that the Sammarinese 
government has an exceptionally powerful and dominant position in relation to 
other political or societal institutions. The Sammarinese parliament only consists 
of part-time politicians, who often exercise important societal functions in 
addition to their parliamentarian job, allowing them to accumulate a great 
amount of influence as well.60 This means that it can be hard for institutions that 
ought to function autonomously or as a check on the power of government and 
parliament, such as the judiciary and the media, to preserve their independent 
and neutral positions. The smallness of San Marino exacerbates this tendency, 
since respondents emphasize that it causes these other institutions to suffer 
from a lack of resources in terms of finances, qualified personnel, and therefore 
professionalism.  
 Since the Sammarinese parliament appoints people to many other state 
institutions, the Great and General Council has been described as an 
exceptionally strong legislature (Sundhaussen 2003: 219; Eccardt 2005: 287). 
Due to the fragmenting party system governments have become more unstable, 
which could have further enhanced the position of parliament. However, the 
1990s-reforms that were aimed at creating a more clear separation of power 
between the executive, legislative, and judicial powers arguably have 
strengthened the position of government vis-à-vis parliament. Since government 
ministers are no longer members of parliament, the legislators that I interviewed 
perceive their control over the actions of government to be diminishing rather 
than augmenting in recent years. Respondents affiliated with the opposition 
indicated that the parliamentary opposition is ignored by a much more powerful 
government and parliamentary majority, but interviewees associated with the 
government expressed an opposite opinion. Therefore it is hard to estimate the 
status of the Sammarinese legislature in relation to the country’s government. 
In addition to more common legislative functions, the Council also has a 
number of judicial powers, such as the competence to grant pardons, amnesty, 
and to repeal a criminal judgment (Duursma 1996: 219). The fact that judges are 
appointed by and responsible to the Council is a source of concern, and according 
to some of the politicians I interviewed frustrates the autonomy of the judiciary; 
                                                
60 On the website of the Great and General Council (www.consigliograndeegenerale.sm), it can be 







“The judiciary is not independent; the judges are nominated by the government. All 
systems, from health care to the judiciary, all of them, depend on the government. 
And this brings distortions, because there is no real freedom. I am not saying that 
there is a dictatorship because some things do not work. But judicial choices are 
never free; they are always influenced by politics, always.”61 
 
The opinion that the judiciary is not independent was definitely not shared by 
most of my other respondents, and especially journalists asserted that judges 
had often ruled in their favor, i.e. against politicians or the government. In 
addition, a wide majority of interviewees cherished the fact that most judges are 
Italians, which they perceived to enhance the impartial and independent status 
of the judiciary. Whereas virtually all respondents argued that the Sammarinese 
judiciary is free and fair, concerns about the disproportional influence that 
politicians have on the appointment of judges were also voiced by some of them. 
Without details, Freedom House simply concludes that the judiciary of San 
Marino “is independent” (Freedom House 2012).  
The Sammarinese media landscape consists of three daily newspapers,62 
one television and radio station (San Marino RTV) that is owned by the 
government, and a handful of weblogs and online newspapers.63 Whereas the 
television station has a big staff and according to all respondents receives ample 
state funding, the newspaper-journalists complained that they have a very small 
staff of mostly non-professional journalists, are for the predominant part owned 
by persons with extensive public and financial interests, and receive only very 
limited financial resources from the state. Since the potential public and hence 
also the sales revenues are inherently limited,64 the newspapers of San Marino 
find themselves in an unfortunate position to start with, which is further 
amplified by a lack of staff, lack of professionalism, and lack of financial support. 
Being financially dependent on others, the Sammarinese journalists I 
interviewed complain that they do not always feel free to publish their news 
reports, since these might run against the interests of some of their donors; 
 
                                                
61 “La giustizia non è indipendente; i giudici vengono nominati dal governo. Tutti i sistemi, dalla 
sanità alla giustizia, tutti, dipendono dallo stato condizionalmente. Questo porta distorzione, perché 
non c’è libertà vera. Non sto dicendo che c’è una dittatura perché qualcosa non funziona. Però le 
scelte giudizarie non sono mai libere, sono sempre comunque influenzate dalla politica, sempre.” 
62 La Tribuna Sammarinese, San Marino Oggi, and l’Informazione. The existence of (formally) non-
affiliated newspapers is rather novel, because until the 1990s only partisan newspapers existed 
in the Republic. 
63 Of which Libertas – Notizie San Marino (www.libertas.sm) and Giornale.sm are among the most 
prominent. 
64 Newspaper journalists told me that a Sammarinese newspaper typically sells a few hundred 





“We don’t know who is behind our journals, and for democracy this is not a good 
thing. It’s very difficult to be independent here, because the government gives some 
money to the journals, but very little. And so we have to take advertisements, and 
we give away our control. You always have a lot of pressure.”  
 
The fact that the ownership of the newspapers is in the hands of persons 
with public interests who occupy a central position in San Marino’s public life 
may well go at the cost of the quality or impartiality of the newspapers. Despite 
these limitations, in the Freedom of the Press-index San Marino receives a score 
of 17 on a 100-point scale in which 100 stands for ‘least free’, indicating that the 
press has ample freedom of expression (Freedom House 2012).65 In comparison 
to the written press, the only existing Sammarinese television station has much 
more resources, staff, and professionalism, but the fact that it is owned by the 
government and occupies a monopolistic position readily leads to questions 
about its autonomy. Interviews with newspaper journalists and politicians have 
revealed that there are indeed some concerns with regard to the position and 
independence of San Marino RTV;  
 
“This is a major limitation for San Marino. The only television, the state television, is 
monopolistic, which means that it is not possible to establish another. And this is 
really bad.”66  
 
Since Sammarinese political contestation focuses on persons and not on policies 
or ideas, it is no wonder that the bulk of news is also oriented towards individual 
persons and politicians. This is a source of great annoyance to the public officials 
I interviewed, and by accusing them of defamation, legal action against 
journalists occurs frequently. According to one politician; 
  
“Unfortunately, scandals or sensational things in politics are often more important 
than other issues. Here, there is not really any substantial attention on the part of 
the media for the true interests of San Marino. Often, stories get published that are 
incorrect or exaggerated.”67 
  
The Sammarinese journalists, on the other hand, perceive recurrent legal action 
as an attempt on the part of politicians to reduce their independence. In recent 
years the number of online newspapers and blogs has grown dramatically, and 
                                                
65 In its reports, Freedom House emphasizes that Sammarinese people have broad access to 
Italian print media, which obviously increases the number of alternative sources of information 
(Freedom House 2012). 
66 “Questo è un grande limite di San Marino. L’unica televisione, di stato, è monopolistica, cioè non è 
possibile farne un’altra. E questo è molto grave.” 
67 “Purtroppo, lo scandalo o la cosa eclatante in la politica diventa più importante delle altre cose. 
Per cui non c’è una attenzione da parte dei media veramente sugli interessi di San Marino. Spesso 





according to many respondents these can be a fruitful alternative form of 
journalism, since they are widely accessible and are not financially dependent. 
 In terms of contestation, two major effects of size on San Marino’s politics 
can be noted. Even though political competition does occur and a political 
opposition is free and active, contestation is essentially based on personalistic 
issues and interpersonal relations instead of ideologies, policies, or 
programmatic considerations. With regard to the balance of power between 
political institutions, it can be observed that the legislative and executive powers 
occupy a relatively dominant position vis-à-vis the judiciary and especially the 
media, although this does not appear to significantly harm the independence and 
autonomy of these institutions. In line with the academic literature on the 
politics of small states, governmental dominance appears to result from size in 
the sense that smallness puts constraints on the number of resources available to 
other institutions, as a result of which the government is the only really 
professionally organized institution in the country (Sutton 2007a). Both patterns 
are therefore a direct consequence of the small size of San Marino, which creates 
a closely connected, homogenous population that is ruled by a minute, cohesive, 
yet often quarrelling elite.  
Contrasting these findings with the theoretical literature, it can be seen 
that the predictions of Benedict (1967b) and Sutton (2007a) with regard to 
(exaggerated) personalism and governmental dominance are at least partially 
confirmed by the Sammarinese case. Additionally, the supposition of small-state 
homogeneity that follows from the work of Dahl and Tufte, and Anckar is 
corroborated by this analysis. However, whereas Anckar (1999: 30) 
hypothesized that homogeneity would create a spirit of “cooperativeness and 
accommodation”, the Sammarinese case demonstrates that the absence of 
cleavages does not automatically generate more consensus or less factionalism. 
Instead of ideological competition, contestation in San Marino occurs on the 
inter-personal level, and in this sense political parties appear to camouflage the 
personalistic competition that drives politics in the country. Personalistic 
competition can obviously be more ferocious than policy-based contestation, and 
smallness in the Sammarinese case therefore absolutely does not imply more 
unity or consensus. 
 
5.3. Inclusiveness: Relations between Citizens and Politicians 
According to Dahl, inclusiveness refers to “the proportion of people entitled to 
participate on a more or less equal plane in controlling and contesting the 





literature on size and democracy, from Plato to the present, emphasizes that 
citizens of small states are likely to display increased feelings of attachment to 
the public good, awareness, and efficacy, and are therefore more likely to 
participate. On the other hand, the absence of strong societal cleavages might 
also diminish participation rates, especially if this limits the number of available 
alternatives. The closeness between citizens and politicians is supposed to foster 
opportunities for direct communication, which according to Dahl and Tufte has 
the potential to create a higher quality of responsiveness and representation 
(1973: 87). As the present section will demonstrate, the effects of closeness and 
direct contacts on the quality of inclusiveness in the case of San Marino are not as 
encouraging as this literature suggests. 
 The smallness of San Marino creates an environment in which citizens are 
not only closely connected to each other, but also to their politicians. It is very 
common for citizens to meet politicians when going out for dinner, to the 
supermarket, or when having a drink in a bar. Additionally, all Sammarinese 
citizens know at least some politicians because they are family members, 
neighbors, friends, colleagues, or because they used to go to the same school. As 
the literature suggests, this creates a situation in which people know each other 
through multiple role-relationships (Benedict 1967a: 6-9; Ott 2000: 94-95). 
Under such circumstances, there evidently is a risk that personal interests enter 
the political domain, with conflicts of interest looming large. Since personal 
relations determine political competition, the interminglement of public and 
private issues in Sammarinese politics is further facilitated. All eighteen of my 
respondents pointed to the significance of this closeness for politics in San 
Marino, and almost all of them argued that closeness has both advantages and 
disadvantages.   
 On the positive side, many respondents stressed the benefits of direct 
access of citizens to politicians, and the opportunities for direct and face to face 
communication. Reciprocal communication means that Sammarinese politicians 
are generally more aware of the political preferences and opinions of their 
electorate, which also means that they have increased opportunities with regard 
to political responsiveness. As two of the country’s politicians said about direct 
contacts: 
 
“That could be positive according to some measures. Positive, because it gives a real, 
a constant measure of the problems and the items that the people, the citizens of 






“Here, politicians are questioned every day, because (…) there is direct contact with 
the people. So I think that the political commitment is stronger here in San Marino, 
and this is also the reason why politics here is more lively.” 
 
Other respondents argued that the smallness of San Marino also enhances 
feelings of political involvement among citizens, since political decisions can 
more clearly have a direct impact on their lives. Although no data are available to 
support it, on the basis of interview data it certainly appears to be the case that 
meetings between Sammarinese citizens and politicians occur much more often 
than in larger states, both inside and outside formal institutional settings. With 
regard to the indicator of awareness and efficacy, among the Sammarinese 
citizenry it certainly appears to be the case that these figures are very high.  
 Although these positive effects of San Marino’s size were mentioned by 
the majority of my interviewees, a larger part of them primarily highlighted the 
negative consequences of smallness. From the interviews, it can be extrapolated 
that the topics that are discussed during face-to-face contacts between citizens 
and politicians are mostly not matters of public interest, but private and 
individual interests instead. One of the former civil servants I interviewed 
pointed out that: 
 
“In this way citizens consider all that is possible. So you will go to a restaurant this 
evening, there is a minister there, and you can ask him what you want, about 
anything. And this is not completely correct, because in this way the citizens 
consider (…) that they can ask for everything. “I have a problem with my kid in 
school, would you be so kind to take a look at that school?”, or “I have been to the 
hospital but the queue was too long; can you do something about that?” And if the 
politician is a clever guy or clever girl, they could use it”. 
 
Along the same lines, from the opposite perspective one of the politicians argued 
that: 
 
“In San Marino everyone, even the most insignificant individual, can influence 
politics. And this is a great limit of small countries, a very great limit. Every citizen 
has access to political leaders; because they are friends, because they are related, or 
because they love each other. (…) And this closeness makes it difficult to respect the 
law; in this country it is very difficult to respect the law. Especially because of this 
reason, because everyone seeks a way to circumvent the law. (…) So the minister 
who one day of every week receives the public does not receive people who ask for 
respect of their rights, but he receives people who ask him to break the law in their 
interest.”68 
  
                                                
68 “A San Marino tutti, anche l’ultimo cittadino, può incidere sulla politica. E questa è un limite dei 
paesi piccoli, un limite molto grosso. Perché ogni cittadino ha accesso ai leader politici, e può farlo 
per amicizia, per parentela, o perché lo ama. (...) Questa vicinanza rende difficile il rispetto della 
legge; in questo paese è difficilissimo fare rispettare la legge. Proprio per questa ragione, perché 
tutti cercano delle strade alternative alla legge. (...) Quindi il Ministro che un giorno alla settimana 
riceve il pubblico, non riceve persone che chiedono il rispetto dei loro diritti, riceve persone che 





On the basis of a wide majority of the interviews, it appears that citizens often do 
not use their access to politicians to talk about politics and policies, but because 
they demand personal favors from politicians. Citizens thus appear inclined to 
mostly ignore or circumvent the official institutional channels for representation, 
and instead often directly pressure their politicians to bestow them with 
benefits. In this situation, multiple-role connections can obviously become a 
disadvantage, because personal, political, and public interests may become 
intertwined. According to three quarters of my respondents, clientelism and 
patronage are recurring phenomena in Sammarinese politics, and the smallness 
of the country increases the tendency to develop particularistic relationships.  
 Since clientelism is a covert and mostly unobservable practice, it is hard 
to gauge the extent to which it influences Sammarinese politics, and no data on 
this phenomenon are available. Several of my respondents attempted to 
downplay its significance, whereas others argued that it is a determining 
characteristic of politics. Due to the frequent contacts between citizens and 
politicians, the intimacy of San Marino’s society, and the existence of multiple 
role-relationships, it seems that there generally is a high awareness among 
citizens about the actions and behavior of their politicians, although 
unfortunately no data is available to prove this. As a consequence of awareness, 
the citizens of San Marino recognize that clientelism has an influence on their 
country’s politics, and the specific instances of politicians who have taken 
advantage of their position are generally well known. Paradoxically however, 
politicians are only seldom in any way penalized for their behavior, and continue 
to receive many votes despite their bad reputations. According to some of my 
respondents, clientelism is tolerated because everybody at some point benefits 
or has benefitted from it. Furthermore, clientelism leads to a situation in which 
many citizens are (financially) dependent on their government, which according 
to some respondents also discourages them to undertake any action against their 
politicians.  
Although the prevalence of particularism is also common in larger 
countries, and San Marino’s larger neighbor has a reputation for clientelism, it 
can be ascertained that the size of San Marino creates additional incentives to 
develop particularistic relationships. As discussed before, citizens often 
approach politicians with demands for favors, and due to multiple-role relations 
the pressures on politicians to comply with these demands can be formidable. 
Due to smallness, citizens therefore have stronger capacities to induce their 
politicians to deliver on them. On the other hand, as a result of the smallness of 





the difference between winning and losing an election, Sammarinese politicians 
can have a strong enticement to attract these voters by offering rewards in 
return. On the sides of both citizens and politicians, smallness thus reinforces the 
profits that clientelistic bonds can entail. 
In addition to clientelism, a majority of respondents alluded to patronage in 
the civil service as one of the major problems of the country, and one of the 
major effects of San Marino’s small size. About a quarter of the Sammarinese 
workforce is hired by the state, which means that more than 5.000 people are 
working in the public sector (San Marino Statistics Office 2011). On the one hand, 
the oversized Sammarinese bureaucracy can be explained by the fact that being a 
small yet independent country, the government of San Marino has to execute all 
the duties and services of a larger state. On the other hand however, over half of 
my respondents believe that jobs in the public administration are often 
distributed by politicians to voters in exchange for political support, as the 
following business leaders mentions; 
 
“Everybody wants to go into the public administration, because you will have 
money and certain work for the rest of your life. So everybody will do everything to 
get into the public administration; even giving their votes in exchange for work. And 
this thing happens everywhere, but in a small country you feel it stronger.” 
 
According to respondents, salaries of Sammarinese civil servants are relatively 
high, jobs in the public sector are comparatively undemanding, and working 
conditions are excellent. As a consequence, jobs in the public sector are much 
more popular than in the private sector. In addition to the costs of running an 
oversized bureaucracy, various interviewees highlighted that patronage also 
impedes on the impartiality of the administration. 
 The large size of the bureaucracy also has consequences for San Marino’s 
private sector. Firstly, since many parliamentarians are active in or even run 
some of the country’s larger companies, conflicting private and public interests 
repeatedly emerge. The boundary between these two sectors often gets blurred, 
which makes it especially hard to implement economic reforms.69 Secondly, since 
public sector-jobs are generally preferred over those in the private sector, the 
Sammarinese companies are left with less qualified employees. Whereas hiring 
Italians or other foreigners could be a solution to this problem, private sector-
                                                
69 In the context of the recent economic crisis and Italy’s determinacy to bring an end to fiscal 
evasion and the preferential tax regime of San Marino, it is clear that an economic reorientation is 
necessary and that new and stringent rules will have to be introduced in the financial sector. 
However, with so many politicians directly involved in Sammarinese banks, until now this has 





spokespersons point out that San Marino has stringent laws that force 
businesses to hire Sammarinese personnel; 
 
“Because the government wants to preserve the occupation in San Marino, if a 
company needs a person for itself, the office of government will check if there is a 
person in San Marino who has the same skills as the person you ask for in Italy. And 
so companies have a lot of problems, because they would like to take highly skilled 
persons, but there is the government that would like companies to take persons 
with no skills.” 
 
In this way, the smallness and closeness of San Marino not only create a civil 
service that is oversized and prone to partiality, but also undermine the 
efficiency and competitiveness of the country’s private sector. 
 In addition to clientelism and patronage, several scholars have argued 
that small states are particularly prone to cronyism (particularistic relations 
with friends) and nepotism (particularistic relations with relatives). A large 
majority of my respondents however indicated that these two forms of 
favoritism are not very common in San Marino, in large part due to the extensive 
social control that prohibits such behavior. At the moment of my field research a 
large scandal had just erupted about a secretary of state who had allegedly 
changed the law to create a job for his son, and this instance of nepotism was 
very well-known and broadly condemned not only by my interviewees, but also 
among other Sammarinese citizens with whom I had conversations about 
politics.  
 
5.4. Inclusiveness: Participation of Citizens 
On the basis of the closeness and face-to-face contacts described in the previous 
paragraph, scholars have repeatedly assumed that levels of participation in small 
states are higher than in larger states. Inclusiveness first and foremost refers to 
the extent to which citizens participate in politics, and therefore take part in 
political contestation. As table 5.3 demonstrates, the participation of 
Sammarinese citizens at general elections has not been very high in comparison 
to the Western European average, but on closer inspection this is primarily a 
result of low turnout figures among emigrant voters. Domestically, voter turnout 
has usually reached levels of above 90 percent, and this is comparable to Italian 
figures, but whereas voting in Italy is compulsory this is not the case in San 
Marino. The table also reveals the declining significance of emigrant voters, who 
constituted almost half of the votes in 1959, but in 2008 only represented one 





proportion of the external electorate, as well as strongly decreasing turnout 
levels among this group of voters. 
In addition to general elections, voter turnout figures for the six most 
recent referendums have been presented in table 5.4. In this table, it can be seen 
that turnout varies strongly between different referendums, and no pattern can 
be detected here. Although separate figures for domestic and external turnout 
are only available for the two most recent referendums, the strong differences 
between these two measures are again clearly visible. Whereas data and 
statistics for voter turnout – which according to many scholars is the principal 
manifestation of participation – are available, unfortunately no data exist on 
membership of political parties and interest groups or participation at 
demonstrations, rallies, Giunta-elections, or Istanze d’Arengo. The turnout 
statistics reveal that political participation in San Marino is perhaps not as high 
as a part of the literature on size suggests, with domestic turnout at 
parliamentary elections as the major exception. For this figure, the smallness of 
San Marino indeed seems at the root of higher rates of political participation. 
Since interest in public matters and substantial political issues however appears 
to be generally low, an alternative explanation for high domestic turnout figures 
has to be found. 
 
Table 5.3: Voter Turnout at Sammarinese Parliamentary Elections70 
Turnout  








1945 57.5% 100 57.5% - - 
1949 67.5% 100 67.5% - - 
1951 62.5% 100 62.5% - - 
1955 70.1% 100 70.1% - - 
1959 85.7% 52.3 99.1% 47.7 74.7% 
1964 84.0% 60.4 97.3% 39.6 69.5% 
1969 80.1% 65.8 94.0% 34.2 61.2% 
1974 79.7% 70.8 94.2% 29.2 58.0% 
1978 79.0% 75.2 93.1% 24.8 53.3% 
1983 79.7% 76.2 93.4% 23.8 54.3% 
1988 81.1% 73.8 94.9% 26.2 57.6% 
1993 80.3% 73.7 94.9% 26.3 56.1% 
1998 75.3% n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2001 73.8% n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2006 71.8% n.a. 90.8% n.a. 33.3% 
2008 68.5% 88.6 89.8% 11.4 24.0% 
 
                                                
70 Source: www.elezioni.sm. For several elections and referendums, no separate data and 
statistics for domestic and external votes have been published or reported. 





Table 5.4: Voter Turnout at Sammarinese Referendums55 
Year Total Turnout Domestic 
Turnout 
External Turnout 
1997 46.4% n.a. n.a. 
1999 56.2% n.a. n.a. 
2003 35.1% n.a. n.a. 
2005 21.7% n.a. n.a. 
2008 35.4% 49.8% 5.6% 
2011 40.4% 59.1% 4.7% 
 
When it comes to the more informal characteristics of participation in San 
Marino, personalism and particularism are again the defining terms. The notion 
of Montesquieu and Rousseau that small state-citizens display higher levels of 
interest in public matters must be disconfirmed for the Sammarinese case. 
According to a wide majority of the persons I talked with, many citizens of San 
Marino are primarily politically interested and active because of the direct effects 
of politics on their personal well-being, and not because of a genuine interest in 
the well-being of the country. As one of the MPs I interviewed explained:  
 
“We are really close but also really far away from each other, because the 
population is generally apolitical or disinterested. They have not participated much 
in order to be involved.”72 
 
Since political contestation principally revolves around personalities instead of 
policies, it can be no surprise that political participation in San Marino is also 
primarily oriented towards individuals and personal benefits. According to a 
large majority of respondents, electoral clientelism occurs regularly and is a 
major problem for the country. Clientelism however also partially seems to be an 
explanation of high (domestic) turnout rates at national elections, since this is 
the primary instance in which voters demonstrate political loyalty and support 
to their political patrons.  
Clientelism during elections can for a large part be attributed to San 
Marino’s small electorate, as a consequence of which the significance of a single 
or a few votes rises markedly (Riker and Ordeshook 1968). Due to face-to-face 
contacts and the intimacy of the country’s society, politicians can relatively 
accurately estimate the number of (preferential) votes they need in order to be 
elected. The Sammarinese electoral law invites voters to cast three preference 
votes on their ballot, which gives Sammarinese elections a strongly personal 
dimension. This voting rule according to many respondents further encourages 
                                                
72 “Siamo molto vicini ma molto distanti, perché la popolazione è tendenzialmente apolitica o 





clientelism, and election results demonstrate that several of the ‘dinosaurs’ in 
Sammarinese politics gather an impressive number of preferential votes, 
especially in comparison to the total number of votes that their party receives. In 
table 5.5, which lists the ten politicians with the highest number of preferential 
votes in the 2008 parliamentarian elections, it can be seen that a small number of 
politicians collect the wide majority of preferential votes of their party, and that 
many of these politicians have been politically active for multiple decades. The 
table hence accurately illustrates the personal nature of Sammarinese politics.  
 
Table 5.5: Candidates with Highest Number of Preferential Votes in 2008 Election73 
Name Party Preference Votes 








Giancarlo Venturini PDCS 1.225 (18.3 %) 6.692 15 
Antonella Mularoni AP 1.174 (48.6 %) 2.415 19 
Pasquale Valentini PDCS 1.118 (16.7 %) 6.692 24 
Gabriele Gatti PDCS 1.107 (16.5 %) 6.692 38 
Paride Andreoli PSD 881 (13.1 %) 6.702 40 
Fiorenzo Stolfi PSD 762 (11.4 %) 6.702 34 
Fabio Berardi PDCS 700 (10.5 %) 6.692 34 
Silvia Cecchetti PSD 607 (9.1 %) 6.702 - 
Claudio Podeschi PDCS 569 (8.6 %) 6.629 24 
Marino Riccardi PSD 566 (8.4 %) 6.702 40 
 
According to my interviewees, clientelism has been especially poignant 
with regard to the votes of expatriate Sammarinese citizens. Table 5.3 
demonstrates that the vote share of emigrants is quite significant, although it is 
steadily decreasing. At times of poverty and economic and financial hardship, 
many Sammarinese citizens have emigrated, primarily to Italy, the United States, 
France, and Argentina. In total, over 12.000 Sammarinese nationals now live 
abroad, which represents approximately one third of the population (San Marino 
Statistics Office 2011). After the Second World War, a protracted political 
discussion evolved over the question of emigrant voting rights, especially 
because it was believed that their votes would benefit the Christian-democratic 
party at the expense of the socialists and communists. Since correspondence 
voting was abolished in 1966, citizens living abroad have to come to San Marino 
to cast their vote, and the travels of those wanting to do so were paid by the state 
                                                
73 Source: www.elezioni.sm. Since the order of candidates on the party list is alphabetically 






until 1996 (Bacciocchi 1999: 143). Many people think that individual politicians 
or parties are now paying the emigrants to come to San Marino to vote: 
 
“A large part of our population lives outside of San Marino. There was a great 
scandal here in San Marino, because politicians went to Argentina or the United 
States to really buy the votes of emigrant people. This vote is very important, 
because it can really decide who governs and who not. Someone made a video of 
Argentineans who came to hotels in Rimini, and who were paid to come here and 
vote.” 
 
Since the rewards of clientelism are so direct and obvious, and since at least 
some politicians appear to win elections primarily due to their particularistic 
networks, not engaging in clientelism is likely to result in a defeat at the polls. 
This provides additional incentives for politicians to establish and develop such 
networks, and makes it very hard to counter this trend. 
If the findings of this section are contrasted with the theoretical literature 
on inclusiveness and participation in small states, it becomes clear that the non-
substantively politically interested populations that have been found to exist in 
Eastern Caribbean, (Peters 1992; Duncan and Woods 2007), African (Seibert 
1999), and Pacific (Larmour 1994; Powell 2007) microstates for a large part can 
be identified in San Marino as well. This finding is remarkable in light of the fact 
that San Marino is neither a new democracy nor located in a lesser developed 
region of the world, which all the non-European microstates both are. It appears 
to be the case, however, that the arguments of Benedict, Lowenthal, and Sutton 
with regard to the effect of size on participation can be substantiated; in the case 
of San Marino smallness indeed leads to personalistic and particularistic forms of 
participation, and high turnout rates can be explained on the basis of 
particularistic rather than programmatic reasons. In summary, my research has 
revealed that although the positive elements of closeness and face-to-face 
contacts are present in San Marino, these are largely overshadowed by the more 
ominous effects of favoritism and personalism. 
 
6. Discussion and Conclusion 
On the basis of both its political history and contemporary political institutions, 
the political system of San Marino by all means appears highly democratic. All 
eight of Dahl’s criteria for polyarchy are met, political contestation for the most 
important political institutions takes place, and all adult Sammarinese citizens 
have the right to participate in their country’s political system. With the 
exception of a number of idiosyncratic institutions like the Council of Twelve and 
the Captains Regent, the impact of smallness on San Marino’s institutional 





that are comparable to those of other, larger democracies in the region. From a 
formal institutional perspective, San Marino thus in many ways appears to be a 
rather typical Western European democracy.  
 
Table 5.6: San Marino’s Scoring on the Indicators of Contestation and Inclusiveness 
Dimension Section Indicator Classification of San Marino 
Free and Fair 
Elections 
Present 








Does occur in manifestoes 
but voting behavior and 












Opposition Freedom to 
Support the 
Opposition 
Present, but political 
branding is common 
Freedom of the 
Press 
Press free (FotP-score 17), 
but weak and unprofessional 
Status of the 
Legislature 
Not really clear; different 
opinions among respondents 
Status of the 
Judiciary 
Impartial, but concerns about 
appointment procedures of 






















Status of the 
Bureaucracy 
Oversized and influenced by 
government due to patronage 
Contact With and 
Access to 
Representatives 
Continuous contact and 
access 













feelings of Efficacy 
of Citizens 
High 




(Very) high at elections, 
mixed at referendums 















No data, but according to 





The present in-depth analysis of the practical and informal aspects of 
Sammarinese politics however reveals that size actually has a strong impact on 
the conduct of politics in the microstate. If the findings of this case study are 
matched with the theoretical discussion on the effects of size in chapters 2 and 3, 
it can be seen that the arguments of more skeptical scholars like Benedict, 
Lowenthal, Sutton, Peters, and Baker turn out to be more valid than those of the 
academics who are optimistic about smallness. In the case of San Marino, 
homogeneity leads to the absence of cleavages, the prevalence of personalistic 
over programmatic contestation, and personalistic voting behavior. The 
closeness between citizens and politicians induces multiple-role relations, 
conflicts of interest, and perhaps most disturbingly, the incidence of various 
forms of particularism and favoritism. In the absence of resources and 
professionalism, and due to politicization and multiple-role relations, the 
autonomy and capacity of the judiciary, media and the civil service vis-à-vis 
government and parliament are sometimes challenged, as a consequence of 
which these latter institutions assume a considerably more powerful position.  
On the basis of its classification on the indicators of contestation and 
inclusiveness that were formulated in the methodological chapter, table 5.6 
provides a summarized overview of the influence of size on the Sammarinese 
political system. The table adequately demonstrates that whereas the advantages 
of smallness (i.e. closeness and contacts between citizens and politicians, higher 
forms of participation, efficacy, and awareness) to a large degree do materialize, 
with regard to contestation size appears to induce personalistic rather than 
programmatic contestation, and with regard to inclusiveness it principally seems 
generate more particularistic-oriented forms of participation. On the basis of 
these results, the question can be posed whether the imitation or adoption of 
institutional structures that in large part originated in larger states (in this case 
primarily Italy) is a fruitful or practical way to organize the political system of 
such a small society. Sammarinese politics is based on the premise of competing 
political parties, but voting behavior seems essentially person-oriented and 
mostly unrelated to the political programs and platforms of these parties. In 
similar fashion, it should be questioned whether, as a result of the country’s 
smallness, the Sammarinese electoral system and state organization harm rather 
than advance the quality of politics, as they primarily appear to stimulate 
clientelism and patronage. In this sense, more direct forms of participation and 
inclusiveness (such as the Arengo) might be more feasible to organize politics in 





In the wake of the global economic crisis and the recently emerging 
combat against preferential tax regimes, San Marino’s economic and political 
structures have recently come under severe pressure. Whereas clientelism and 
patronage were much less controversial in the preceding decades of strong 
economic growth, in the last two years this is unmistakably changing. The option 
of EU-accession is now seriously debated, and the need for reform is broadly 
heard. However, without wanting to be overtly deterministic, with regard to 
particularism San Marino seems to find itself embroiled in a catch-22 situation 
that is not easily adjusted. In large part, particularism can be explained by the 
country’s small size, which provides strong incentives on the part of both 
politicians and citizens to develop patron-client networks. Without pressure or 
help from external actors like the EU, it seems to be very hard to counter this 
political pattern. Recent debates in San Marino focus on the potential influence of 
the mafia in the country’s politics and financial institutions.74 An often-heard 
complaint is that whereas San Marino used to be a country of high morals and a 
safe-haven for the oppressed and persecuted, it now has become a corrupted 
safe-haven for shady people with too much money. 
The suggestion that follows from the findings of this chapter is that any 
academic examination of microstate-politics should proceed beyond the level of 
statistics and formal political institutions. Precisely because of their smallness, 
the informal level of microstate-politics reveals much more about the political 
consequences of size than the formal, institutional level does (cf. Hinds 2008). 
This finding opens up the possibility that despite all their differences on the 
formal, institutional level, the informal political characteristics of St. Kitts and 
Nevis, Seychelles, and Palau are relatively similar to those of San Marino. Since 
the informal political features of San Marino are in large part determined by size, 
a similar pattern can be expected for the other three cases. 
                                                
74 This belief is actually quite widespread, and all major newspapers have reported about it. 
Attention has focused on links between several politicians with the Calabrian mafia group 
‘Ndrangheta. Although no legal steps have yet been taken, concerned Sammarinese citizens have 
established online communities and now often organize rallies and demonstrations, for example 








Politics or Politricks? 
 
The Federation of St. Kitts and Nevis 
 
 
Figure 6.1: Location and Map of St. Kitts and Nevis1 
  
 
1. Introduction: the Eastern Caribbean Political Context 
On the 10th of August, 1998, 61.7 percent of Nevisian citizens cast a vote in favor 
of secession of their island from the federation of St. Kitts and Nevis.2 Although 
the referendum just failed to reach the two-thirds majority in favor of 
independence that the constitution requires for this to succeed, the result of the 
referendum reflected the strong dissatisfaction among Nevisian citizens with the 
existing federal union with their larger sister island. As the referendum failed to 
result in the dissolution of the federation, as of yet the Eastern Caribbean island 
state of St. Kitts and Nevis remains the smallest federation in the world, and the 
smallest UN-member state in the Western hemisphere. The federation has a total 
population size of about 50.000 people, of whom approximately 35.000 live on 
the island (and federal state) of St. Kitts, and the remaining 15.000 people on the 
island (and federal state) of Nevis. Attaining independence and UN-membership 
                                                
1 Retrieved from the CIA World Factbook (CIA World Factbook 2011) 
2 Officially, the name of the country is Saint Christopher and Nevis. According to the Constitution, 
both denotations are permissible (Constitution of Saint Christopher and Nevis 1983: Art. 1.1). In 





only in 1983, St. Kitts and Nevis is the youngest independent Caribbean state, 
and as of yet the last former British West Indian colony to acquire statehood.3 
 In terms of demographics, the population of St. Kitts and Nevis is for over 
90 percent composed of blacks whose ancestors were brought to the islands as 
slaves, with small groups of mulattoes, Indians, and whites making up the 
remainder of the population. English is the only official language on the islands 
and is spoken by everyone, and in terms of religion virtually the entire 
population is Christian, and consists of Anglicans, Evangelicals, and Catholics 
(CIA World Factbook 2011). According to World Bank figures, in 2010 St. Kitts 
and Nevis had a GDP-per capita figure of US $12.500, which is comparable to that 
of the other Eastern Caribbean island states, and makes the federation a middle-
income country (World Bank 2011).4 Although no data such as the Gini-
coefficient are available, in terms of the distribution of welfare secondary 
sources suggest that no major income differences exist in the country, and that 
the population as a whole has become more affluent in recent years (Griffin 
1994: 238). Due to migration to mainly the United Kingdom and the United 
States, about 32.000 Kittitians and Nevisians live in a foreign country. 
 In the academic literature, St. Kitts and Nevis is usually analyzed as part of 
the wider Anglophone Caribbean region.5 According to scholars who study this 
region, the political systems of the Anglophone Caribbean are characterized by 1) 
the preservation and maintenance of political democracy, 2) the predominance 
of Westminster-Whitehall political institutions, and 3) a distinct Caribbean 
political culture, which has a number of authoritarian features (Peters 1992: 20-
21; Payne 1993a: 58; Thorndyke 1993: 151-154; Sutton 1999; Duncan and 
Woods 2007; Hinds 2008). Unlike larger, non-Anglophone countries in the 
region such as Cuba, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic,6 the formerly British 
West Indian islands have for the overwhelming part experienced only 
                                                
3 Whereas most of the former British island colonies in the Caribbean are now independent 
countries, Anguilla, the Cayman Islands, Montserrat, the Turks and Caicos Islands, and the British 
Virgin Islands continue to be British Overseas Territories. 
4 In 2011, the federation furthermore had a Human Development Index of 0.735, and as such 
ranks 72nd in the world in terms of human development (World Bank 2011). 
5 Several other names for this region are sometimes used, such as the West Indies, the Eastern 
Caribbean, the Commonwealth Caribbean, the Lesser Antilles, or the Windward and Leeward 
islands. These names cover different groups of islands, but St. Kitts and Nevis forms part of all of 
them.  
6 In fact, larger Caribbean states have seen some of the most authoritarian and repressive 
governments in history, such as Fidel Castro’s communist regime in Cuba, the governments of 






democratic rule since their independence.7 In fact, the prevalence of democracy 
in the Anglophone Caribbean has raised the attention of several scholars, and has 
resulted in what the distinguished Caribbean scholar Jorge Domínguez calls ‘the 
Caribbean question’ (Domínguez 1993: 3).8 Since attaining independence in 
1983, St. Kitts and Nevis is one of the West Indian island states that have 
commonly and consistently been ranked as a democracy. 
 Whereas many scholars have cherished and applauded the Anglophone 
Caribbean islands for the preservation of democratic political institutions, others 
have expressed more mixed views on the democratic nature of the region. 
According to David Hinds, a scholarly divide can be observed between academics 
who primarily examine formal democratic institutions and who are generally 
positive about the level of democracy in the region (which is what Hinds calls the 
‘formalist’ perspective), and those who emphasize informal political aspects, 
political culture, and the more substantial quality of democracy (the 'anti-
formalist' perspective; Hinds 2008: 393-394). The latter group of scholars 
highlight that Westminster institutions are unsuitable for the Caribbean political 
context, as they primarily generate extreme partisan polarization, top-down 
authoritarian leadership, and the exploitation of state resources to finance 
clientelism and patronage (Peters 1992: 21; Duncan and Woods 2007: 211-213). 
On the basis of these considerations, it can be hypothesized that the formal, 
democratic institutional structure camouflages the more authoritarian political 
features of the Caribbean (Emmanuel 1993: 2-4).9  
 Against this theoretical background, the present chapter will offer an 
overview of the influence of size on the political system and context of St. Kitts 
and Nevis. The analysis is based on field research conducted in the federation in 
                                                
7 The Marxist New Jewel Movement (NJM) that ruled Grenada between 1979 and 1983 
constitutes the sole and major exception. Larger former British colonies in the Caribbean such as 
Jamaica, the Bahamas, and Barbados have also maintained democracy since their independence. 
Guyana, which is located on the Southern American continent but is often perceived to be part of 
the Caribbean in terms of (political) culture, witnessed authoritarian rule between 1964 and 
1985 under the rule of Forbes Burnham. It is now commonly seen as a democracy. 
8 The specific quotes of Domínguez in this context are: “no other region in what has been called 
the Third World has had, for so long, so many liberal democratic polities. (…) The Caribbean’s 
capacity to sustain liberal democratic politics is impressive. Since independence (…) ten of twelve 
(…) Anglophone Caribbean countries have consistently held fair elections and have been free 
from unconstitutional transfers of power” (Domínguez 1993: 2-3). 
9 In the words of Donald Peters; “[i]n spite of the existence of open, regular elections, opposition 
parties, and other institutional aspects of a modern democracy, the governmental system of the 
Eastern Caribbean does not function like a democracy” (Peters 1992: 2). In similar fashion, 
Anthony Payne argues that “[t]he political order of the Commonwealth Caribbean (…) is unique – 
a mixture of First World theory with Third World practice, British form with Caribbean vitality. It 






January 2011. As part of the research, semi-structured interviews were held with 
thirteen Kittitian and Nevisian respondents, among whom the Governor-General, 
government ministers, members of parliament affiliated with the government 
and the opposition, journalists, the ombudsman, academics, and the executive 
officer of the chamber of commerce.10 The chapter starts off with an overview of 
the political history of the federation, after which two sections are devoted to 
outlining the microstate’s democratic institutions and explaining their continued 
existence. Subsequently, the influence of size on the politics of St. Kitts and Nevis 
is examined by analyzing the nature and quality of contestation and 
inclusiveness. In four successive paragraphs, I assess the characteristics of 
political competition, the relations between political and societal institutions, the 
effects of closeness and direct contacts, and the political participation of citizens. 
The chapter ends with a summary and evaluation of the main findings. 
 
2. Political History and Democratization of St. Kitts and Nevis 
Like the other islands of the Eastern Caribbean, the indigenous Carib and Arawak 
populations of St. Kitts and Nevis were virtually annihilated by the European 
colonizers.11 The Europeans imported slaves from the African continent to work 
on sugar plantations, and the contemporary population of the federation is 
therefore in large majority composed of descendants of these slaves. The islands 
of Saint Christopher and Nevis were discovered by Christopher Columbus in 
1493, but in subsequent centuries control over the islands changed frequently 
between the Spanish, French, and British colonial administrations.12  In the 
beginning of the 17th century, the first British and French colonies in the 
Caribbean were established on St. Kitts (hence called the “mother colony” of the 
Caribbean), and the island was divided into British and French zones.13 The first 
African slaves were imported to the island to work on newly established sugar 
                                                
10 A complete list of the people I interviewed can be found in the appendix. Throughout the 
chapter, I occasionally use interview quotes to underline or illustrate my findings and the 
analytical narrative. Due to the strong interpersonal relations and the smallness of St. Kitts and 
Nevis’s society, I have decided not to disclose the names and professions of the people to whom 
the specific interview excerpts belong.  
11 In 1626, the British and French settlers on St. Kitts massacred large numbers of Caribs in a 
place that is now known as Bloody Point. These events have now been documented as the 
Kalinago Genocide.  
12 Saint Christopher (San Cristóbal) was named after the patron saint of travel, whereas Nevis 
was named after Nuestra Señora de las Nieves, a reference to a 4th century miracle in ancient 
Rome. 
13 Over the course of the 17th century, the French and British used St. Kitts as a base from which 





cane plantations in this period as well (Simmonds 1985: 58; Harris 2008: 1-3). 
After 1713, both St. Kitts and Nevis finally came entirely under British control. 
 In 1660, what is now known as the ‘old representative system’ was 
established on the British part of St. Kitts (Harris 2008: 2). This system of 
colonial government strongly resembled the Westminster political model, with a 
Governor representing the British monarch on the island, and a legislative 
assembly in which members of the plantocracy and a number of merchants were 
represented. Despite formally being a British colony, the old representative 
system thus largely enabled the settlers of St. Kitts and Nevis to rule their islands 
as they desired. Although the system was designed for the exploitation and 
control of slave workers who formed the backbone of the islands’ economies, 
conflicts between the assembly and the Governor time and again resulted in 
political deadlock (Simmonds 1987: 278-279). As a solution, the British 
government took over control and the islands became a British crown colony in 
1867. Under crown colony rule, the powers and prerogatives of the Lieutenant-
Governor were overwhelming and virtually unchecked (Peters 1992: 59; Inniss 
2005: 29).14 
 From the 17th to the 20th century, the British experimented with various 
federations and unions between their West Indian island colonies, but in 1882 
the three-island unit of St. Kitts, Nevis, and Anguilla was formed, with the 
Governor and central authority residing on St. Kitts, which was the largest of 
these islands (Midgett 2004: 45). Although London later decided to integrate 
these islands into larger units,15 in 1962 St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla again became a 
separate British colony (Lewis 2002: 12-14). From the beginning of the union 
onwards, strong antagonisms characterized the relations between St. Kitts and 
Nevis and St. Kitts and Anguilla, as the two smaller islands opposed and 
challenged the dominant position of St. Kitts in the union. In particular, the 
peoples of Nevis and Anguilla felt that the interests and autonomy of their 
islands were neglected by the central government on St. Kitts (Inniss 1983: 1; 
Midgett 2004: 45-46; Dee 2001: 14).16 On the other hand, people on the 
wealthier island of St. Kitts had the idea that they were forced to carry the 
                                                
14 Although the plantation owners were reluctant to transfer their powers to the British 
government, they were aware of the increased physical security that this would bring.  
15 First the Leeward Islands Federation (between 1871 and 1956) and later the West Indies 
Federation (between 1958 and 1962).  
16 In the discourse on all three islands, Nevis and Anguilla were perceived to be colonies of St. 
Kitts. Inniss (1983: 9-10, 68) for example asserts that St. Kitts was in the paradoxical position of 
being both a colony and a colonizer, and that Britain had forced her to carry the burden of the 
two other islands. Nevisians on the other hand, felt that they were a colony of a colony, and were 





financial burden of the two lesser developed islands (Inniss 2005: 5). Whereas a 
highly profitable sugar industry was established on St. Kitts in the 17th and 18th 
century, the Nevisian and Anguillan economies were much less successful.17 On 
Nevis a small peasantry emerged and the first tourism facilities of the Caribbean 
were set up, whereas Anguilla’s economy was mainly based on fisheries (Inniss 
1983: 2). 
 After the abolishment of slavery in 1834 and the emergence of new and 
more competitive sugar industries in Brazil and India, the sugar plantations on 
the Caribbean islands in general witnessed a period of decline. As the richest and 
most successful sugar colony in the Eastern Caribbean, St. Kitts was initially less 
affected by these developments than other islands in the region, but the 
economic situation on the island nevertheless deteriorated in the first decades of 
the 20th century (Inniss 2005: 45). Whereas Britain for a long time profited from 
its Caribbean colonies, at the end of the 19th century its control over these islands 
gradually turned into a financial burden. Several violent riots by the sugar 
workers occurred when their living conditions became more and more dismal, 
and in 1932 the Workers League was established, which vied for the 
representation of workers in the legislative council of the island (Inniss 1983: 
102). Since Nevis and Anguilla did not have sugar plantations, no equivalent 
movements emerged here. 
After ongoing riots and violence throughout the Eastern Caribbean, the 
British government appointed a special royal commission under the leadership 
of Lord Moyne to review and examine the social and political situation in their 
West Indian colonies. Although the Moyne-commission did not suggest 
immediate independence for the islands, it did recommend a host of social and 
political reform measures (Peters 1992: 62-64). In reaction, the British 
government decided to abolish crown colony rule and reintroduce elections on 
the islands, even though the franchise remained extremely restricted (Inniss 
1983: 62).18 In 1940, the Workers League was transformed into the St. Kitts-
Nevis-Anguilla Trades and Labour Union, out of which the Labour Party emerged 
as a political arm. This party was led by the young plantation worker Robert L. 
                                                
17 On Nevis a sugar industry was launched as well, but it was far less successful than on its 
neighboring island because the geological characteristics of Nevis were less appropriate for the 
cultivation of sugar cane (Dee 2001: 15; Midgett 2004: 46-47). 
18 The franchise established under the 1936 Constitution was based on the following property 
and income qualifications: 1) ownership of real property of the value of 100 pounds or payment 
of rent of 12 pounds per annum on real property, 2) payment of direct taxes of 15s. per annum in 
respect of the district in which the voter resides, 3) salary or income of 30 pounds per annum 
(Inniss 1983: 62). These requirements effectively excluded the overwhelming majority of the 





Bradshaw, who became its first leader in 1946, and was elected into the 
legislative council that same year. 
 Only in 1952, the first elections under universal suffrage were held in the 
colony. In all eight constituencies, also those in Nevis (2) and Anguilla (1), 
candidates from the Labour Party were elected, and Bradshaw became the 
colony’s first Premier. Whereas the party and its leader were extremely popular 
on St. Kitts, their support on Nevis and Anguilla declined rapidly. In the 1957 
elections, three independent MPs were elected on these two islands, who 
opposed the authorities on St. Kitts and especially the leadership of the Labour 
Party.19 In expressing their opposition to the Labour Party, the peoples of Nevis 
and Anguilla conveyed their feeling that the government only represented 
Kittitian interests (Simmonds 1987: 282-283; Griffin 1994: 235; Dee 2001: 20-
21). In 1965, the People’s Action Movement (PAM) party was established and 
succeeded in forming the first realistic opposition to the Labour Party, winning 
two seats on Nevis and Anguilla in the 1966 elections (Midgett 2004: 52). 
Nevertheless, between 1952 and 1980 politics in the colony remained strongly 
dominated by the Labour Party, and especially by Bradshaw. 
 After a short militant rebellion (called the ‘Anguillan Revolution’), 
Anguilla seceded from the union in 1967.20 Nevis had expressed its wish for 
secession already many times before, but both the British and the Bradshaw-
governments were reluctant to allow this to happen.21 In 1970, the Nevis 
Reformation Party (NRP) was formed with the primary aim of achieving 
complete autonomy for the island.22 Winning one seat in the elections of 1971, 
and six of the nine seats in Nevisian local elections that same year, the NRP 
rapidly became the largest party on Nevis, thereby overtaking the position of the 
PAM (Dee 2001: 23-26). The rise of the NRP signaled the ultimate separation of 
                                                
19 Since this party however managed to win all five constituencies in St. Kitts, it could manage to 
stay in power. When he was informed about the rejection of his party on Nevis and Anguilla, 
Bradshaw angrily declared to put “pepper in their soup and bones in their rice” (Midgett 2004: 
43). He also stated that he would “not rest until I have reduced that place to a desert” and that 
Anguillans would have to “suck each other’s bones” (Griffin 1994: 237). 
20 After this rebellion Anguilla became a separate British overseas territory, which it has 
remained until today. The PAM was accused of stimulating the Anguillan secession, and its 
leaders on St. Kitts were imprisoned (Simmonds 1987: 283). 
21 In fact, Nevis already opposed the creation of the union in 1882, and Nevisians commonly 
believe that the prosperity of their island has started to decline from the creation of a union 
onwards. In 1904, one of the two representatives from Nevis in the legislative assembly made the 
first plea for secession (Dee 2001: 16). 
22 The establishment of the NRP was a direct reaction to the sinking of the Christena-ferry and the 
ensuing death of 227 mainly Nevisian passengers that same year, for which the people on Nevis 





Kittitian and Nevisian partisan politics, as both Labour and PAM eventually 
decided not to contest elections on Nevis any longer. 
 In the meantime, the once unshakable position of the Labour Party on St. 
Kitts began to erode, as people from the evolving middle-class started to support 
the more business-oriented PAM (Griffin 1994: 238). Real change arrived with 
the death of Bradshaw in 1978, and of his successor and co-founder of the 
Labour Party Paul Southwell one year later. In the pivotal 1980 elections, the 
PAM won three out of seven Kittitian seats, and together with the two Nevisian 
seats of the NRP it was able to form a coalition government under the leadership 
of Dr. Kennedy Simmonds (Griffin 1994: 239; Harris 2008: 14).23 Shortly after 
the new government was formed, the two parties which paradoxically both had 
campaigned on anti-independence platforms started negotiations that in 1983 
led to independence for St. Kitts and Nevis (Midgett 2004: 57).24 Whereas the 
two islands thus jointly formed a new state, it was also decided that the new 
country was to become a federation, with a separate parliament and government 
for Nevis (the Nevis Island Assembly and Nevis Island Administration). By 
contrast, St. Kitts did not acquire its own legislative and executive institutions.25 
Furthermore, in the new Constitution a clause (no. 113) was added that provides 
for the possibility of unilateral secession of Nevis (Constitution of Saint 
Christopher and Nevis 1983: Art. 113; Inniss 1983: 76; Dee 2001: 33-37; Griffiths 
2005: 3-4). 
 In subsequent elections until 1995, the PAM-government managed to 
remain in office, and after 1984 without the support of the NRP. On Nevis the 
monopolistic position of the NRP ended because many Nevisians were 
dissatisfied with the party’s more moderate stance towards the secession issue 
since it had entered the coalition government. Accordingly, the Concerned 
Citizens’ Movement (CCM) was formed, which won one of three seats in the 
Nevisian local elections of 1987, and has consistently occupied two of the three 
Nevisian seats in the federal parliament since 1993 (Midgett 2004: 58). The 
                                                
23 The defeat of Labour was also a result of some rather extreme and seemingly undemocratic 
statements by its new party leader Lee Moore, who at one point suggested that the country 
should become a one-party state under the leadership of Labour (Griffin 1994: 239). 
24 By coincidence, independence came exactly one hundred years after the British had forced the 
two islands into one union. After having been denied a legislature in 1882, Nevisians felt that 
they now finally regained (some) control over their own island (Dee 2001: 31). 
25 As a result, both Kittitians and Nevisians claim that the country is not a real federation, but 
rather a ‘pseudo’ or ‘semi’-federation. Kittitians frequently complain that this is unfair, because 
whereas Nevisians do have a say in Kittitian matters (through the federal institutions), the 
reverse is not the case (Griffiths 2005: 3). Nevisians, on the other hand, point to the fact that a 
large majority of parliamentary seats in the federal assembly are reserved for Kittitian MPs, as a 
result of which one party from St. Kitts can often form a government on its own, without a 





federal elections of 1993 resulted in a stalemate and constitutional crisis when 
Labour and PAM both managed to win four of the eight Kittitian seats, CCM won 
two Nevisian seats, and NRP one. The PAM-government thereby lost its majority, 
but since CCM-leader Vance Amory upheld his campaign promise not to 
cooperate with any Kittitian party, no government could be formed. 
Consequently, the Governor-General swore in a minority government of PAM 
and NRP, which immediately led to protests and riots on the part of Labour-
supporters. In the end, under the auspices of a number of societal institutions 
such as the chamber of commerce and the churches, the four political parties 
negotiated a joint declaration (the so-called Four Seasons Accord) calling for 
fresh elections to be organized in the next year (Dee 2001: 43-46). 
  
Table 6.1: Vote Percentage and Seats of Kittian-Nevisian Parties at Elections26 
 Labour UNM PAM NRP CCM Other, Ind. Total 
Year V% S V% S V% S V% S V% S V% S S 
1952 84.7 8 - - - - - - - - 15.3 - 8 
1957 53.6 5 - - - - - - - - 46.4 3 8 
1961 64.5 7 7.3 2 - - - - - - 28.2 1 10 
1966 44.3 7 5.9 1 35.0 2 - - - - 14.8 - 10 
1971 50.8 7 4.4 - 37.0 1 7.7 1 - - - - 9 
1975 60.2 7 - - 23.4 - 16.2 2 - - 0.2 - 9 
1980 50.0 4 - - 33.9 3 16.0 2 - - - - 9 
1984 41.3 2 - - 47.6 6 10.1 3 - - 1.0 - 11 
1989 37.3 2 - - 45.4 6 10.9 2 6.4 1 0.1 - 11 
1993 43.8 4 - - 33.6 4 8.5 1 10.9 2 3.1 - 11 
1995 49.2 7 - - 34.7 1 7.0 1 8.2 2 0.3 - 11 
2000 53.6 8 - - 29.6 - 7.8 1 8.7 2 - - 11 
2004 50.6 7 - - 31.7 1 7.5 1 8.8 2 1.2 - 11 
2010 47.0 6 - - 32.2 2 9.8 1 11.0 2 0.1 - 11 
 
The 1995 general elections resulted in a landslide victory for the Labour 
Party of Dr. Denzil Douglas, who managed to win seven out of eight Kittitian 
seats. The Labour Party and Dr. Douglas went on to win the elections of 2000, 
2004, and 2010, and have since then always secured comfortable majorities that 
did not call for the support of a secondary (Nevisian) coalition partner. Due to 
the fact that Nevis was no longer represented in the federal government, and due 
to the historical antipathy of Nevisians towards the Labour Party, in 1997 (CCM-) 
Premier Amory of Nevis decided to invoke clause 113 of the constitution, thereby 
                                                
26 Labour = St. Kitts and Nevis Labour Party (St. Kitts-based socialist party), UNM = United 
National Movement (Nevisian regional party), PAM = People’s Action Movement (St. Kitts-based 
centre-right party), NRP = Nevis Reformation party (Nevis-based regional party), CCM = 





initiating the process of secession (Dee 2001: 47-48; Midgett 2004: 61-62; 
Nisbett 2004: 11; Griffiths 2005: 5). Whereas the entire Nevis Island Assembly 
endorsed the proposal for secession, the 1998 referendum narrowly fell short of 
producing the two-thirds majority in favor of secession that the constitution 
requires. Although no further attempts at secession have been made since 1998, 
the secession issue continues to cast its shadow over the future of the 
federations. In tables 6.1 and 6.2, the results of federal elections and the 
composition of federal governments have been presented. 
 
Table 6.2: Composition of Federal Governments of St. Kitts and Nevis since 1952 
Time Span Government Party Head of Government 
1952 - 1980 Labour Party Robert Bradshaw, Paul Southwell, Lee 
Moore 
1980 - 1995 PAM & NRP Kennedy Simmonds 
1995 - Labour Party Denzil Douglas 
  
3. Explaining Democracy in St. Kitts and Nevis 
Now that the political history and pathway to democracy in St. Kitts and Nevis 
have been outlined, in the present section a number of factors that have 
contributed to the maintenance of democratic institutions in the federation will 
be listed. Having been a colony of the United Kingdom until 1983, 
democratization in St. Kitts and Nevis was essentially orchestrated and 
implemented by this colonial power. Already at the outset of colonialism, the 
settlers imported the British Westminster system of government to St. Kitts and 
Nevis, and a Governor became the King’s representative. For the subsequent 
three hundred years, the small white and European elite of the islands used the 
Westminster institutions to dominate, exploit, and oppress the black working 
class. Although this system basically excluded the plantation workers from 
political participation and inclusion, it is supposed to have had a large impact on 
this group in terms of political socialization (Peters 1992: 25-26).27 In contrast to 
many African and Asian colonies that were colonized for a much shorter period 
of time, Caribbean populations have ages of experience with Westminster 
institutions, to the point that they have apparently come to regard the system as 
autochthonous (Sutton 1999: 69). 
 Academics frequently ascribe the survival of democracy in the Caribbean 
to the prevalence of the Westminster system (Peters 1992: 7, 206; Payne 1993a: 
                                                
27 As Douglas Payne remarks about the Eastern Caribbean microstates: “socialized by over three 
hundred years of British colonialism, the emergent Commonwealth Caribbean elite could scarcely 
have become anything else other than liberal democracies” (Payne 1993b: 9; cf. Duncan and 





58-59; Domínguez 1993: 15-17).28 Although Westminster institutions have been 
maintained after independence and have been cherished for bringing about 
political stability in the region, many scholars have also asserted that 1) the 
Westminster system is inapplicable to the (small-sized) Caribbean political 
context, or that 2) the people of the Eastern Caribbean region only experienced 
the potentially oppressive and authoritarian features of Westminster 
institutions, which they have now mastered themselves (Peters 1992: 25-26). 
According to these academics, the Westminster system has helped to create a 
political system that is characterized by democratic institutions, but is also 
marked by polarization, top-down government, victimization, and oppression, 
and therefore hardly deserves a democratic label. In combination with the size 
and political culture of Eastern Caribbean states, Ryan (1999: 317) for example 
argues that Westminster institutions lead to a sharp polarization along political-
tribal lines, and that they confer vast powers on the winning party, and little or 
no power on the losing party.29 Colonial experience in the Eastern Caribbean can 
therefore not only account for the persistence of representative democratic 
institutions, but also for the perseverance of a political reality that clearly 
diverges from democratic ideals. Nevertheless, there is broad scholarly 
consensus about the socialization and colonization effects on the maintenance of 
formally democratic political structures in the Anglophone Caribbean. 
 Although this argument of political socialization in Westminster 
traditions helps to explain the origins and preservation of democracy in St. Kitts 
and Nevis, the international political context should be taken into consideration 
as well. Over the course of the 19th and 20th centuries, the historical supremacy 
of the United Kingdom in the Caribbean basin was overtaken by the United 
States, which came to regard the Caribbean as its political backyard (Muñiz and 
Beruff 1994: 113). Becoming one of the key areas of Cold War rivalry, the 
strategic interests of the US in the Caribbean further increased after the Second 
World War, and the 1983 invasion in Grenada demonstrated the American 
determination not to tolerate the establishment of any Soviet-aligned regime in 
the region in addition to Cuba. In many ways, the Eastern Caribbean microstates 
                                                
28 The argument that microstates have witnessed more intense and protracted periods of colonial 
rule and are therefore more likely to have democratic political systems is repeatedly expressed in 
the academic literature (Baldacchino 1993: 31; Srebrnik 2004: 333). In addition, several authors 
have emphasized the tendency of microstates to stick to the political institutions they inherited 
from their former colonizers (Anckar 2004b: 215-217; Sutton 2007a: 202-203).  
29 According to Ryan, “[t]he unfortunate aspect of the Westminster model of governance is that it 
has encouraged a ‘to the victors the spoils’ mentality. It has ensured that at any time almost half 
of the population of any given Caribbean society is marginalized and alienated from participation 





became international clients of the United States, which financially and militarily 
supported these countries in exchange for political compliance (Lewis 1993: 
112).30 Since the end of the Cold War, the United States have been increasingly 
advocating the protection of human rights and democracy in the world, and have 
turned these into conditions for the provision of development aid. Being heavily 
dependent on foreign investments, this provides additional incentives for the 
Eastern Caribbean microstates to preserve their democratic structures. 
 The location of the Eastern Caribbean microstates in the proximity of a 
democratic superpower has indeed been suggested as an explanation for their 
democratic systems of government (Masala 2004: 252-254). Interviews with 
Kittitian and Nevisian respondents provide further evidence for this notion: 
 
“I think that by and large by their comments, foreign governments can have a 
disciplining effect on democracy and how it is practiced in countries that are small.” 
 
“We sit under the big nose of the United States; we are in the United States’ sphere 
of influence. We have to listen to what the United States says to us.” 
 
According to several interviewees, the maintenance of democratic practices is a 
deliberate strategic attempt to appease the United States, and is actually a façade 
that serves to camouflage a less democratic reality: 
 
“Of course yes, there is a façade. (…) When Maurice Bishop on Grenada affiliated 
himself with Castro on Cuba, the United States government said “there will not be 
another Cuba in the Caribbean”. So what happened to Grenada? (…) Therefore, the 
need for the façade of democracy is always there.”31 
 
In addition to the United States, the role of regional international platforms 
like the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) and the Caribbean 
Community (CARICOM) as additional protectors of democratic government in 
the region should also not be underestimated, since these organizations have 
historically taken verbal or physical action when democracy was perceived to be 
under threat in one of its member states. Most of my respondents however 
                                                
30 For a discussion about the application of the patron-client model to international relations, see 
Carney (1989) and Sutton and Payne (1993). In somewhat comparable fashion, Levitsky and Way 
have argued that international social, geographical, economic, and political linkages can foster 
democratization (2005: 22-23). Being so small and vulnerable, the Eastern Caribbean microstates 
almost by definition maintain many of such linkages with the United States and the United 
Kingdom. In addition, Taiwan and Venezuela have emerged as new major investors in the region 
in recent years, and in terms of international patron-client relations St. Kitts and Nevis therefore 
is a client state to multiple patrons. Like it does with many other microstates, Taiwan supports St. 
Kitts and Nevis in exchange for recognition and support of Taiwan’s positions in the United 
Nations. 
31 In this regard, Peters argues that, “domestic politics are closely monitored by Britain and the 
US, and any policy that they believe may threaten the political stability of the region is quickly 





asserted that democracy in St. Kitts and Nevis also follows from a strong 
yearning for freedom and independence among the population, which is argued 
to be the result of ages of suppression. This idea is buttressed by several 
manifestations of the intolerance of Eastern Caribbean populations for leaders 
who became too authoritarian and were eventually ousted, such as Eric Gairy in 
Grenada and Patrick John in Dominica (both in 1979). In St. Kitts and Nevis, the 
defeat of Labour Party leader Lee Moore in the 1980 elections has been 
explained on the basis of his radical and sometimes antidemocratic positions and 
statements. In short, present-day democracy in St. Kitts and Nevis can be 
explained from historical, international, and socio-cultural perspectives. 
 
4. Political Institutions of St. Kitts and Nevis 
Like the other former British colonies in the Eastern Caribbean, the political 
institutions of St. Kitts and Nevis are strongly modeled after the Westminster 
parliamentary example. The government of the federation is responsible and 
accountable to the National Assembly, and is as a rule supported by a 
parliamentary majority. The country is a constitutional monarchy in which the 
monarch of the United Kingdom is officially the head of state, but an appointed 
Governor-General performs His or Her duties as a viceroy. Although the country 
is constitutionally labeled as a federation, a system of devolution that is rather 
similar to that of the United Kingdom has been adopted, in which the largest 
constituent state (St. Kitts) has no separate political institutions.32 The public 
administration of the country is also based on the Westminster example, with 
functionally specialized departments that are headed by a minister (Simmonds 
1985).  
 According to the Constitution, the Governor-General of St. Kitts and Nevis 
is appointed by the monarch of the United Kingdom (1983: Art. 21). On His or 
Her behalf, the Governor-General has among other things the competence to 
appoint a Deputy Governor-General on Nevis, to appoint senators in the National 
Assembly, to appoint the Supervisor of elections and members of the electoral 
commission, to sign proposals of law, to dissolve parliament, and to appoint 
ministers and the Prime Minister. For many of these duties, the constitution 
prescribes that the Governor-General shall ‘act in accordance with the Prime 
Minister’, which means that the space for political maneuvering of the Governor-
                                                
32 After the victory of Labour in the 1997 UK elections, Northern Ireland, Scotland, and Wales 
each acquired separate assemblies and executives, and several powers and competences were 
devolved to these sub-national institutions. As the largest country in the United Kingdom, 





General is rather circumscribed. Since the British monarch appoints a Governor-
General on the advice of the Prime Minister, new Governor-Generals have been 
customarily appointed after an electoral victory of the opposition.33 It is 
therefore hardly surprising that the Governor-General is often perceived to be 
acting primarily in the interests of the government (and Prime Minister) of the 
day. 
 Elections in St. Kitts and Nevis are conducted under the rules of the first-
past-the-post plurality system, with eight single-member electoral districts being 
contested on St. Kitts and three on Nevis in federal elections.34 Elections are held 
once in five years, and governments usually fulfill their term in office. In addition 
to the eleven MPs that are elected in constituencies, the parliament of St. Kitts 
and Nevis consists of three non-elected senators who are appointed by the 
Governor-General,35 and the Attorney-General who is an ex-officio member of 
parliament. This means that the federal parliament of St. Kitts and Nevis consists 
of only fifteen MPs,36 who each represent on average 2.500 citizens. In line with 
the Westminster system government ministers are also members of parliament, 
but since the number of government posts usually exceeds the number of 
parliamentary seats for the ruling party or parties, all ruling party MPs are 
usually also cabinet ministers. This means that there are no government party-
backbenchers in the National Assembly. Government ministers in the federal 
government are appointed by the Governor-General from among the members of 
parliament on the advice of the Prime Minister (Constitution of Saint Christopher 
and Nevis 1983: Art. 52: 4).37 The contemporary federal government consists of 
nine ministers, who each head their own governmental department. 
 Since independence in 1983, the state of Nevis has its own parliament 
(the Nevis Island Assembly) and its own executive (the Nevis Island 
Administration). The Assembly consists of five elected members and three 
                                                
33 After the PAM-NRP government came to power in 1980, Governor Inniss was replaced by 
Governor-General Arrindell, and after Labour regained office in 1995, Arrindell was swiftly 
replaced by the current Governor-General, Sir Cuthbert Montraville Sebastian. All of these 
Governors have been commonly seen as an extension of the incumbent government. 
34 In elections for the Nevis Island Assembly, five electoral districts on Nevis are contested under 
similar electoral rules. 
35 Two of these senators are appointed on the advice of the Prime Minister, and one on the advice 
of the parliamentary opposition leader (Constitution of Saint Christopher and Nevis 1983: Art. 
30, 35). 
36 Together with the parliaments of the Federated States of Micronesia (14), Tuvalu (15), and 
Grenada (15), the parliament of St. Kitts and Nevis has the smallest membership size in the 
world. 
37 The Prime Minister himself is appointed from among the elected MPs by the Governor-General, 
who has a constitutional duty to select someone who is likely to command the support of the 
majority of the representatives. In practice this would normally mean the leader of the majority 





appointed senators, and the party that controls the majority of seats in the 
Assembly has the right to form the Administration, which is headed by the 
Premier of Nevis.38 According to the constitution, the Nevis Island Assembly has 
the authority to invoke a secession clause, and two-thirds of the members of the 
Assembly and two-thirds of Nevisian voters must be in favor of secession in 
order to accomplish full independence of the island (Constitution of Saint 
Christopher and Nevis 1983: Art. 113). The constitution further determines that 
the Nevis Island Administration can rule on issues relating to infrastructure, 
education, health, fisheries, and labor, and also has its own budget. Regarding 
other issues (such as foreign affairs and defense), the federal government has the 
final say (Constitution of Saint Christopher and Nevis 1983: Art. 106-111; Dee 
2001: 35-37).  
 Judicial authority in St. Kitts and Nevis is exercised by the Eastern 
Caribbean Supreme Court (ECSC), which is the primary judicial organ of the 
Organization of Eastern Caribbean States39 and has its headquarters on St. Lucia 
(Gilmore 1985: 314; Lewis 1993: 101). The ECSC-judges in St. Kitts and Nevis are 
no citizens of the federation, but are nationals of another member state of the 
OECS; currently both high court judges in the federation originate from St. 
Vincent and the Grenadines. Cases of appeal used to be transferred to the Privy 
Council in London, but the establishment of the Trinidad-based Caribbean Court 
of Justice (CCJ) by the member states of the CARICOM in 2001 has created a 
second court of appeal, which might possibly replace the Privy Council in the 
future (cf. Bryan 1998). Smaller criminal and civil cases are dealt with by local 
magistrates’ courts, of which magistrates are appointed by the Governor-General 
in accordance with the public service commission (Constitution of Saint 
Christopher and Nevis 1983: Art. 83). According to Freedom House, the judiciary 
of the federation is “largely independent and legal provisions for a fair and 
speedy trial are generally observed” (Freedom House 2012). 
 Together with six other small island states in the Eastern Caribbean, St. 
Kitts and Nevis in 1981 founded the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States 
(OECS).40 Over the years, cooperation within the OECS has led to the 
                                                
38 Since only two parties contest elections on Nevis, the Administration usually takes the form of 
a single-party government. At present there are seven ministers in the Nevis Island 
Administration, some of whom are also members of the Nevis Island Assembly. In 2012, the Nevis 
Reformation Party (NRP) won three of the five seats in the Assembly, as a result of which it 
gained a new term in office. 
39 In addition to the seven OECS members, the ECSC also is the main judicial organ of the British 
overseas territories of Anguilla and the British Virgin Islands. 
40 The OECS was established in 1981 with the Treaty of Basseterre, which was signed in the 





establishment of an economic and monetary union, relatively far-reaching 
judicial and security agreements, and the establishment of institutions like the 
ECSC, the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank, and the Regional Security System 
(Lewis 1993: 106-111, 115-117; Thorndyke 1993: 171-174; Alexis 1997: 138-
139).41 The OECS-organs thus exercise a number of judicial, economic, financial, 
and defense competences that usually belong to the domain of national 
governments, as a result of which these institutions to some extent assume a 
supranational character. Talks about further political and economic integration 
are ongoing, and the benefits of this are underlined by almost all my 
interviewees.  
The present overview of the institutional political structure of St. Kitts 
and Nevis suggests that the country operates as a full democracy, which is also 
how the country has been classified in annual Freedom House-surveys.42 
Whereas the academic literature on wider Anglophone Caribbean politics implies 
that the political reality of the region also inhibits several less democratic or even 
authoritarian elements, the handful of somewhat recent publications on St. Kitts 
and Nevis alone do not really reveal to what extent this literature is applicable to 
this specific microstate as well. In the following analysis of the influence of size 
on various aspects of contestation and inclusiveness in St. Kitts and Nevis it 
becomes clear that the country is no exception from the rest of the region, 
although the federal arrangement creates a number of specific political dynamics 
that the other Eastern Caribbean microstates presumably do not experience, as 
the remainder of the chapter will demonstrate. 
 
5. The Influence of Size on Democracy in St. Kitts and Nevis 
In terms of Dahl’s dimensions of contestation and inclusiveness, as its Freedom 
House-rankings suggests St. Kitts and Nevis can indeed be classified as a 
democracy or polyarchy. Acquiring the most positive rankings on both political 
rights and civil liberties, Freedom House consistently groups the microstate into 
                                                                                                                                 
independent (UN-member) states of Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines, and Grenada are members of the OECS, as well as the British overseas territory of 
Montserrat. 
41 All OECS-member states and Anguilla use the Eastern Caribbean dollar as their currency, and 
all members and Barbados are member of the Regional Security System (RSS). This latter 
organization is a collective security arrangement that played a major role in 1983-Operation 
Urgent Fury on Grenada and in the restoration of order after the 1990 coup attempt on Trinidad 
and Tobago (Linton 1993: 240-242). During the unrest on St. Kitts and Nevis in the aftermath of 
the 1993-elections, the RSS was briefly deployed to maintain order in the federation.  






the cluster of most democratic countries in the world (Freedom House 2012).43 
With federal parliamentary elections being organized every five years under 
conditions of freedom and fairness, and the government of St. Kitts and Nevis 
being responsible and accountable to parliament, political contestation for the 
main offices of the state is definitely present. Active electoral rights are granted 
to every Kittitian-Nevisian citizen of at least eighteen years old, and every citizen 
who is at least twenty-one years of age has the right to be elected to the National 
Assembly. For Nevisian citizens, similar provisions apply with regard to voting 
rights for the Nevis Island Assembly.  
Although many of my respondents complained about electoral ‘tricks’ 
such as the registration of voters in districts where they do not live, or the 
importation of expatriate supporters by the political parties, in line with the 
assessments of Freedom House the overwhelming majority of interviewees 
agreed that the process of voting itself and the counting of the votes occurs in 
conditions of fairness (cf. Hillebrands and Schwehm 2005b: 569). In order to 
fully comprehend the influence of size on politics and democracy in St. Kitts and 
Nevis, however, an analysis of the specific nature and quality of contestation and 
inclusiveness in the federation is offered in subsequent sections. The analysis 
will start off with two sections on contestation; one on the nature and contents of 
political competition (4.1.), and one on the balance of power between the various 
institutions of the state (4.2.). Subsequently, two sections are devoted to the 
effects of closeness and direct contact between citizens and politicians on 
inclusiveness (4.3.) and the characteristics of political participation and elections 
in the federation (4.4.). The findings are summarized and evaluated in the 
conclusion of the chapter.  
 
5.1. Contestation: Personalism, Polarization, and Victimization 
In the federation of St. Kitts and Nevis, political contestation occurs in the form of 
direct elections for legislative organs that are organized once every five years. 
Since the composition and authority of the government is dependent on 
parliament and continuing parliamentary support, contestation for the executive 
branch of government is indirectly present. In turn, the government (and 
especially the Prime Minister) has the competence to make appointments to a 
host of public institutions, and commonly has a decisive influence in the 
                                                
43 The Freedom House-scale ranks from 1 to 7, with 1 indicating most ‘free’ and 7 indicating 
completely ‘not free’. Since independence in 1983, St. Kitts and Nevis mostly acquired a score of 1 
on political rights, and a score of 2 on political liberties. Since 2006, this latter score has however 





appointment of the Governor-General, who has the competence to appoint other 
public officials and to sign and thereby ratify proposals of legislation. As the 
elections results presented in table 6.1 (on page 9) demonstrate, political 
competition in St. Kitts and Nevis occurs primarily on the basis of political 
parties, and in the last two decades federal elections have been contested by four 
parties. In each of the two islands (and federal states) two parties contest 
elections, which means that de facto two separated spaces of competition exist, 
with actually no political party vying for nationwide support. 
 In terms of the indicators of contestation that were outlined in the 
methodological chapter, on the basis of table 6.2 it can firstly be noted that 
alternation in office through the ballot box does occur in the federation, although 
it does not happen very often. The Labour-government that ruled the country 
from the introduction of universal suffrage until 1980 was removed from office 
by means of a peaceful transition of power that resulted from a defeat at the 
polls, and a similar alteration occurred in 1995, when Labour took over power 
from the PAM-NRP government. Regarding party system-fragmentation and the 
presence of an opposition, it can be seen in table 1 that the number of parties 
that are represented in parliament has grown from two to four over the past 
couple of decades, and the effective number of parties (ENP) has grown from 
below 2.0 over the 1960s and 1970s to mostly over 2.0 from the 1970s onward.44 
Despite the lopsided proportion of seats in relation to vote-percentages that 
results from the majoritarian electoral system, there has always been a 
parliamentary opposition in the National Assembly. 
  When it comes to the substantial and programmatic differences between 
the four parties and the degree to which they represent political alternatives in 
contesting political offices, a major political cleavage can evidently be observed 
between the parties that are based on St. Kitts and those based on Nevis. In 
addition to primarily representing and addressing the demands of constituents 
on their particular island, this cleavage brings along a programmatic difference 
between the parties with regard to the issue of (increased) autonomy for Nevis. 
Whereas the NRP and especially the CCM strongly oppose the union of their 
island with St. Kitts, Labour and PAM have at various times assumed either an 
                                                
44 As a result of the distorted election outcomes under the plurality rules, the ENP-figure can 
differ markedly between elections even if the respective proportion of votes for political parties 
has not shifted much. Whereas PAM in the 2000-elections managed to obtain almost 30% of the 
votes, this was not translated in a single parliamentary seat, thus leading to a historically low 





ambiguous or outright negative stance towards more autonomy for Nevis.45 Due 
to the fact that the two parties of each island however do not express markedly 
different viewpoints about this issue, this programmatic difference is much less 
salient at elections than it is in the federal parliament or in the public debate. 
Furthermore, as Midgett argues, the desire of secession among Nevisians 
originates primarily from their historical antagonism towards St. Kitts, and is not 
fueled by a distinct Nevisian identity or sense of community (2004: 44).46 This 
means that this cleavage cannot be identified on the basis of ethnicity or religion, 
but that it can instead be classified as a centre-periphery cleavage, in which 
Nevisian parties can be seen as regionalist, nationalist, and secessionist parties 
that oppose the central authorities on St. Kitts.47 
 With exception of the Nevis secession-issue, substantial differences 
between the political parties actually appear to be marginal (cf. Griffin 1994: 
231, 235). In terms of the indicator of the articulation of political interests by 
political parties, it therefore seems to be the case that this hardly occurs in St. 
Kitts and Nevis. On the basis of a review of the most recent political programs of 
the four parties, I found that election manifestos hardly contain any policy goals 
or proposals, and that parties primarily use them to denounce the opposition and 
emphasize how they do things better. Whereas the Sammarinese political parties 
did outline policy proposals in their manifestos, this cannot be said of the 
Kittitian-Nevisian parties. Furthermore, in the context of personalistic 
contestation, election manifestos appear to be hardly relevant, as one of the 
academics I interviewed points out; 
 
“The manifestos that are put out are hardly read; people collect them as memento. 
(…) Election campaigns are typically eighteen to twenty-one days; the manifestos 
come out maybe only ten days before the election. And we don’t have debates 
between the candidates and between the parties to discuss the policies (…). We 
don’t have that, so the policies to me only play a second role to personalities and 
party.” 
 
                                                
45 The impression that I obtained from my field research is that Kittitians are not so much 
opposed to increased autonomy for Nevis, but primarily dislike the contemporary set-up of the 
federation, in which Nevis has its own political institutions whereas St. Kitts does not. 
46 Specifically, Midgett points out that “Nevisians are not imagining “community” leading to some 
nationalist impetus, but rather imagine a release from something they do not want to be, but 
without a necessary conception of what they might become” (2004: 44).  
47 Again, a comparison can be drawn here between St. Kitts and Nevis and its former colonizer, 
the UK. The position of the NRP and CCM in many ways appears to be somewhat similar to that of 
the Scottish National Party (SNP) or Plaid Cymru in Wales, which also primarily advocate 
nationalist and regionalist sentiments, and vie for more autonomy of Scotland and Wales. 
Whereas these parties however also adopt a certain (left-wing) position on for example socio-





Whereas the names, symbols, and rhetoric of the parties on St. Kitts are based on 
a class cleavage, with Labour claiming to represent working class-interests and 
PAM supposedly representing the middle-class and business owners, all thirteen 
of my respondents (and even politicians) agreed that the parties are more or less 
similar with regard to their political orientation, as the following politician 
argues: 
 
“The difference now between the parties is individual, personalities. If you look at 
both parties, what is now the PAM party actually operates under the principles of 
the old Labour Party.” 
 
According to Griffin, the Labour Party traditionally primarily claimed to 
represent workers’ interests in order to stigmatize and criticize the opposition, 
thereby more or less artificially cultivating the notion of a class cleavage (1994: 
235).48 Instead of ideology, the differences between Labour and PAM now appear 
to be primarily personal, and both parties primarily appear to serve as platforms 
to support individual politicians. On the question whether it would make a 
difference if PAM would be in government now, one of the journalists 
illustratively asserted that: 
 
“All that would happen is that you would have a different set of persons benefiting. 
But basically their ideology is the same. I don’t know one thing that is different.” 
 
Whereas the Kittitian parties however still uphold the image of representing 
different interests, the Nevisian parties cannot even be distinguished in this 
sense.49 Respondents were unable to say whether one of the Nevisian parties is 
more right-wing or left-wing than the other, or more progressive or 
conservative. The absence of ideological demarcations between the parties in the 
federation can in large part be attributed to the homogeneity of the population 
and the lack of major socio-economic or ethno-linguistic cleavages (Griffin 1994: 
233, 235, 242).50 In combination with smallness, which creates more intimate 
and direct linkages between citizens and politicians, homogeneity in St. Kitts and 
                                                
48 Griffin states that “the Labour Party defined the political battle along class lines (…). The task of 
the opposition, consequently, was quite formidable – erasing the stigma of being elitist in a 
society that was overwhelmingly rural and working class” (1994: 235). 
49 The only potential difference between the NRP and the CCM is that the NRP has historically 
been slightly more open to cooperation with the parties on St. Kitts (for example during the 
coalition government), whereas the CCM has always principally rejected this. 
50 In Alesina et al.’s fractionalization index, which measures ethnic, religious, and linguistic 
fractionalization, St. Kitts and Nevis receives a score of 0.18 (Alesina et al. 2003). Since the index 
ranges between 1 and 0, with 0 indicating the absence of fractionalization and 1 indicating a 
completely fractionalized society, this score is rather low. Whereas 90 percent of the population 
has African ancestry, the remaining 10 percent has a mixed African and European ethnic 





Nevis appears to create an environment of contestation that focuses primarily on 
personalities instead of policies. This is not only the case with regard to the 
aspects of inter-party competition, but according to almost all respondents also 
applies to voting behavior among the Kittitian-Nevisian electorate, as the 
following politician points out; 
 
“In St. Kitts and Nevis you find that people are largely homogenous. Yes, you have 
people who are more affluent than others, but there is not a huge distinction; the 
lawyer or the politician or the doctor’s kids go to the same school as the farmer or 
the fisherman’s kids. And so the divisions we see are largely along family lines. (…) 
People vote NRP because it’s a traditional NRP family, and it happens like that.” 
 
 Whereas several scholars have supposed that homogeneity and the 
absence of cleavages that follow from a small size generate less polarization and 
a spirit of consensus (Anckar 1999: 30), the case of St. Kitts and Nevis 
demonstrates that the opposite is true. On both islands, virtually all respondents 
confirmed that partisan competition is marked by a rather extreme degree of 
polarization, to the extent that people refer to it as political tribalism. As one 
senior public official points out; 
 
“The politics is very divisive; sometimes we refer to it as tribal politics. Each 
political party becomes so obsessed with the righteousness of its own cause that the 
only thing it sees that the other side should be or should do is to be destroyed. What 
we see happening now in St. Kitts –Nevis is that both of the major political parties 
practice the same divide and rule.” 
 
As Peters argues, Eastern Caribbean governments have taken the concept of 
partisan politics “to its zenith”, since “when a party is elected to power, it 
virtually eliminates the opposition” (Peters 1992: 9). My various interviewees 
pointed out that marriages and friendships between supporters of the different 
parties are uncommon, and that the partisan divide reverberates throughout 
society and has a profound impact on social relationships of any kind. Since 
people also commonly display their partisan affiliation by wearing symbols and 
colors of the party that they vote for, partisan loyalty appears in many ways 
comparable to support for a sports team.   
 In such a polarized environment, supporters of the opposition are 
recurrently harassed and bullied by the party that is in power. Indeed, political 
victimization of opposition leaders and supporters is another characteristic 
feature of Eastern Caribbean politics (Peters 1992: 178; Sutton 1999: 75-76), 
and according to virtually all respondents St. Kitts and Nevis is no exception in 






“You have a tremendous amount of victimization. If a politician feels that you don’t 
support him, and you have a business, they victimize you. They ensure that you 
don’t get any of the government services, and you don’t get any chance to get any of 
the government work.” 
 
With regard to victimization, the small-scale environment and intimate social 
relationships certainly facilitate the identification of supporters and opponents. 
As one prominent politician of the Labour party explained: 
 
“In St. Kitts, we know who is Labour, and we know who is PAM. And we know the 
families who are Labour and the families who are PAM; most of them. And the same 
thing in Nevis.” 
 
Political victimization creates a climate of anger and fear that further stimulates 
polarization and partisan loyalties. In addition, victimization and polarization 
strongly determine the actions and attitude of the government vis-à-vis 
individual citizens, as one of the scholars I talked to highlighted; 
 
“If someone goes to a minister and says: “minister, I would like to buy a piece of 
land to build a house or to do some farming”, what will happen (…) is that the 
minister will find out who that person who wants the land is related to. What is 
their political affiliation? How many people in the family or in that genealogical 
stream are members of my party or the other party?”51 
 
In terms of the indicator of the freedom to support the opposition, it can 
therefore be concluded that in the polarized and victimization-prone 
environment of St. Kitts and Nevis, actively supporting the opposition can and 
will have negative consequences. Paradoxically however, victimization does not 
appear to limit people’s eagerness to display their partisan affiliation, and this 
goes as much for government as for opposition supporters. Based on my own 
observations, Kittitians and Nevisians commonly and continuously wear clothes 
and accessories that express their partisan affiliations, and therefore also 
explicitly support the opposition. 
Due to the size of the country and the limited number of people who are 
qualified to assume political positions, the political elite of St. Kitts and Nevis is 
inherently small. Both my interviews and political developments in the 
federation however reveal that victimization, antagonism, and feuds also 
determine intra-elite relations, and opposition politicians claimed to be ignored 
or pestered by the government. Various interviewees confirmed that policy 
proposals of the opposition are mostly ignored or immediately rejected without 
                                                
51 During my field research, when asked about instances of victimization several citizens 
mentioned that the government had recently shut off electricity in a district in which many 





considering their quality or value, as the parliamentary leader of the opposition 
remarked; 
 
“It is incredibly debilitating, I will tell you that candidly. Because our politics is not 
about ideas; it is about personalities. (…) And so there is no evaluation of ideas; they 
start thinking “who did the idea come from; who do they support, and what is their 
agenda? (…) The victimization is rampant.” 
 
According to the MPs I was able to talk with, parliamentary debates are also 
characterized by the prevalence of ad hominem attacks, just like the public 
debate in the media. 
 Just like in San Marino, the presence of partisan competition in St. Kitts 
and Nevis obscures the fact that contestation is essentially personalistic rather 
than programmatic. With exception of the Nevis secession-issue no major 
substantial points of contestation exist between the four parties, even though the 
labels and rhetoric of the Kittitian parties may suggest otherwise. To a greater 
extent than in San Marino however, personalistic competition in the federation 
leads to political polarization and the victimization of opponents. This generates 
a political environment characterized by fear that has the potential to impede on 
the freedom of expression or the freedom to form and join organizations (cf. Dahl 
1971: 3). In combination with the absence of major politicized cleavages and the 
interconnectedness of the microstate’s society that results in personality-
oriented voting behavior, contestation in St. Kitts and Nevis is thus in conclusion 
characterized by personalism, polarization, and the victimization of opponents. 
 
5.2. Contestation: The Balance of Power Between Institutions 
In the tremendously polarized political environment of St. Kitts and Nevis, 
politically independent, neutral, and impartial institutions are hard to find. In 
terms of political contestation, this means that there are only a very limited 
number of checks on the power of elected politicians, and that non-elected 
political institutions assume a subordinate position vis-à-vis the politically 
contested bodies. In addition, in a small and close-knit society where people are 
generally well aware of each other’s political affiliation, maintaining the image of 
neutrality and impartiality is often even harder than actually being and acting as 
such, as an academic mentioned; 
 
“At times our democracy then becomes a fight between a government view and an 
opposition view, and no views in between. I think if you had more views or more 
people and groups with different views, then you wouldn’t be so polarized and you 






Regardless of whether it is accurate or not, institutions like the judiciary, the 
media, the civil service, the ombudsman, and the electoral commission are easily 
and frequently branded as being politically biased, and according to a majority of 
respondents this impedes on their authority and performance. 
 Like in the rest of the Eastern Caribbean, in the St. Kitts-Nevis political 
system the Prime Minister wields an extraordinary amount of power. Various 
persons I interviewed called the Prime Minister “the king”, “el supremo”, “a 
powerhouse”, “a little Caesar” and “an elected dictator”.52 One of the scholars I 
talked to told me that: 
 
“Our politics, our political democracy has been personalized. The Prime Ministers 
want to get their hands on every single thing in the Caribbean, so they have 
awesome powers. And because they have such awesome powers, it often dilutes the 
true picture of democracy.” 
 
In the absence of term limits Prime Ministers often remain in office for a very 
long period of time, which enables them to establish and expand their power 
base.53 The omnipotent position of the Prime Minister is legally fixed in the 
constitution, which explicitly confers powers to him or her individually, and not 
to the government or the party that controls a majority of parliamentary seats.54  
 With the constitution bestowing such vast powers on the Prime Minister, 
the other ministers in the government are in a subordinate position to their head 
of government. The Prime Minister can virtually alone appoint and dismiss 
ministers,55 which creates political dependency and inequality within the 
cabinet. As one former minister argues; 
 
“In our electoral process, a number of people get elected to office who are not 
people of independent means. So that when they get elected or nominated to office, 
they are also dependent on the Prime Minister who already has so much 
constitutional power (…). And he has these people almost in a state of subservience 
to him.” 
 
                                                
52 According to Peters, “[t]he constitutions of the independent Windward and Leeward islands 
(…) cover all the symbolic apparatus of a democracy, but concentrate power in the hands of one 
individual – the Prime Minister.” (1992: 89). 
53 In St. Kitts and Nevis, Prime Ministers Bradshaw (1952 – 1978), Simmonds (1980-1995), and 
Douglas (1995 until the present) all remained in office for at least fifteen years. 
54 According to some of my interviewees, the constitutionally supreme position of the Prime 
Minister in is no coincidence: “[w]e believe that it was by design. The British did not want to 
totally and absolutely give up these territories. They could not take on the hassle of politically 
and administratively running these islands, so they gave political independence. But this 
constitution would give you [the political leaders, WV] vast and unhindered powers, knowing 
that you will abuse the power.” 
55 According to article 52 of the Constitution, “[a]ppointments to the office of Minister, other than 
the office of Prime Minister, shall be made by the Governor-General, acting in accordance with 
the advice of the Prime Minister, from among the members of the National Assembly” 





Several of my respondents asserted that the Prime Minister occasionally 
interferes in the departments of his ministers, and that real executive power is 
only to be found in the Prime Minister’s office, whereas the other government 
departments are largely empty vessels.56 With regard to contestation, this 
presents an additional dimension to the personalized nature of Kittitian-Nevisian 
politics, as political parties appear to be primarily used as vehicles to develop 
and sustain the power base of individual politicians (cf. Peters 1992: 38-39, 90, 
109-111).  
 The power and influence of the Prime Minister is also visible in his 
relation with the Governor-General. Although the constitution grants the 
Governor-General a large number of competences, the Prime Minister has a large 
influence on these because 1) he has a decisive say in the appointment of the 
Governor-General, and 2) many of the Governor-General’s decisions 
constitutionally need to occur ‘in accordance’ with the Prime Minister. Almost all 
my respondents agreed that in practice, the Governor-General can be seen as an 
extension of the government of the day, and as someone who always acts in line 
with the Prime Minister’s interests.57 As one senior legal official emphasized;  
  
“Each party is going to appoint a Governor-General who is going to do what it 
wants. And the Prime Minister can dismiss him; he has that power. (…) They are a 
rubber-stamp, they just rubber-stamp the bills.” 
 
In similar fashion as the Governor-General, almost all interviewees alluded 
to the parliament in terms of a rubber-stamp legislature. Due to the fact that 
every MP from the governing party is also a government minister, in parliament 
no group of critical backbench-parliamentarians exists. In terms of the effects of 
size on executive-legislative relations and the indicator that refers to the status 
of the legislature, it can therefore be noted that the smallness of the federation’s 
parliament severely weakens its autonomy and authority in relation to the 
government. One journalist I interviewed illustrated how the absence of a 
backbench generates executive dominance: 
 
“Because you don’t have a big parliament, the government or executive is always in 
control of parliament. In small countries you don’t have a backbench, so every 
elected member is a member of cabinet. And so there is not any buffer there, there 
is no call to account, because every elected member is looking after his own 
interests. So the government is really secured.” 
 
                                                
56 In this regard, Peters points out that “the other members of the party executive perform a mere 
symbolic and clerical role” (1992: 108). 
57 The current Governor-General, who is an active member of the Labour Party, mentioned to me 





Since ministers are highly unlikely to reject their own policy proposals or bring 
down their own government, and since the speaker of parliament is also 
perceived to be acting in the Prime Minister’s interests, with one exception my 
respondents agreed that government controls and dominates parliament. As one 
of the academics I interviewed asserted: 
 
“The truth is that the government controls parliament at the end of the day. The 
speaker, who is the person who is in charge of parliament, ultimately cannot be 
elected speaker without the support of the members of the government benches, 
and invariably is someone who the government has sort of hand-picked. And so the 
government has a disproportionate amount of influence; I have in my own 
experience never seen a bill brought by the government which has been defeated.” 
 
This obviously also has an impact on the role and functioning of the political 
opposition, as virtually all my respondents agreed that its role in the Kittitian-
Nevisian system is marginal. One of the journalists pointed out that: 
 
“The opposition can make noise and kick up whoever they want, but they have 
basically no input in terms of changing any laws or anything. They sit there and 
make noise and wait until hopefully their time comes.” 
 
And this view was shared by politicians affiliated with the opposition; 
 
“In some countries the opposition might not be very powerful, but at least it has 
influence, it has a voice. When the government is as powerful as it is here (…) then 
whatever the opposition says can be totally ignored.”  
 
Since the current opposition consists of three parties that do not exactly 
maintain cordial relations, it is divided and therefore further weakened.58 The 
powerless and docile position of parliament and especially the opposition in 
relation to government was confirmed to me by supporters of both the 
government and the opposition parties. 
 As one of the few institutions, most of my interviewees asserted that the 
judiciary of St. Kitts and Nevis is free from government influence, even though it 
is sometimes under formidable pressure. Since high court judges are foreigners 
who are appointed by the executive organs of the ECSC, both in terms of 
perception and with concern to their actual court rulings they have increased 
opportunities to be impartial and free from political interference.59 Magistrate-
court judges are appointed by the public service commission, which in turn is 
                                                
58 Whereas the Kittitian opposition party can at least hope to be able to form a government after 
the next elections, the Nevisian parties know that they can only be a junior coalition partner (and 
that there will therefore never be a Nevisian Prime Minister) and that their only chance to govern 
arises if no Kittitian party acquires a majority in parliament (Nisbett 2004: 11). 
59 However, according to one of my respondents the Prime Ministers of the OECS-member states 
have a strong say in the appointment of ECSC-judges, and will generally not appoint a judge 





appointed by the Governor-General, who does so “in accordance with the Prime 
Minister” (Constitution of Saint Christopher and Nevis 1983: Art. 77, 83). This 
can obviously lead to problems with regard to (the perception of) their 
neutrality, according to one of the journalists I interviewed: 
 
“There are problems in terms of perception, because of course if one party 
nominates somebody to be a magistrate, then the perception is that because this 
party nominated this individual, that person favors this party.” 
 
Regardless of these problems, and despite the pressures that the judiciary may 
experience on the part of politicians, most of my respondents argued that the 
judiciary is actually one of the very few politically impartial institutions in the 
country. This is confirmed by Freedom House, which asserts that “[t]he judiciary 
is largely independent” (Freedom House 2012). In light of the pervasiveness of 
government vis-à-vis other institutions that other scholars have observed in 
small states (cf. Sutton 2007a: 210), the hiring of foreign judges appears to 
contribute significantly to the autonomy and independence of the judiciary.  
 Since the ombudsman, the electoral commission, and civil servants are all 
either directly appointed by the Governor-General or appointed by the public 
service commission, all these appointments are in the end open to pressure and 
influence from the Prime Minister. In the politically polarized and charged 
society of St. Kitts and Nevis, this inevitably creates accusations of partiality. 
Furthermore, interviews revealed that a free and impartial media landscape also 
does not really exist in the federation. Whereas St. Kitts and Nevis acquires a 
Freedom of the Press-score of 20 on a 100-point scale in which 100 stands for 
‘least free’ (Freedom House 2012), my interview data and other secondary 
sources point to a somewhat different conclusion. The only television station of 
the country, ZIZ National Broadcasting Corporation, is government-owned and is 
broadly believed to be exclusively articulating government views (cf. Griffin 
1994: 240). According to members of the opposition; 
 
“The government is the owner of the television station, ZIZ. And you find that 
nobody in the opposition can get any airtime on the station. ZIZ is basically a 
mouthpiece for the government and the governing party.” 
 
The limited access of the opposition to ZIZ is confirmed by both Commonwealth 
election reports and Freedom House, which, referring to ZIZ, argues that “[t]here 
are some restrictions on opposition access to the medium” (Freedom House 
2012). However, Freedom House also asserts that “foreign media are available”, 






In addition to ZIZ, several private radio stations like Winn FM, Kiss FM, and 
Voice of Nevis (VON-) Radio are broadcasting in the federation, but these have to 
apply for a broadcasting license from the government, which can be withdrawn. 
Four newspapers constitute the written press of the federation, of which two 
operate on St. Kitts and two on Nevis, and each of these is associated with one of 
the four political parties.60 Finally, several internet-based weblogs and 
newspapers are available, among which SKNVibes.com and SKNList.com. 
Whether correctly so or not, due to the polarized environment that results from 
the small size of the federation, all these media sources are routinely branded as 
being supportive of a certain party or certain politicians, and journalists 
complained that this puts pressures on their capacity to deliver the news 
objectively and impartially. 
 When discussing the effectiveness and neutrality of the media in the 
federation, the journalists that I interviewed referred to media financing as a 
major obstacle to objective reporting. Due to the population size and ensuing 
limited revenues from publishing a newspaper, newspapers are largely 
dependent on sponsors and other donors. As a consequence, newspapers will be 
very cautious not to publish stories that might offend their financers, which 
mostly are private sector organizations (which in turn are often managed by 
people with extensive political connections). These restrictions can impede on 
journalistic freedom: 
 
“We have an independent media, but this is such a small community that media 
houses are even reluctant to critique the financial records of major companies, 
because they don’t want to lose the corporate sponsorship for the radio 
programming. So media houses here operate with some degree of apprehension 
with regard to possible consequences from the government or from some bigger 
private sector organizations.” 
 
Another problem with the media of St. Kitts and Nevis, which is also related to 
smallness, is that newspapers and radio stations lack journalistic professionalism 
and quality. This problem is amplified by the lack of resources, which means that 
newspapers cannot afford to hire competent journalists. Just like in San Marino, 
it primarily leads to frustration on the part of politicians; 
 
“I find the media here very irresponsible if you ask me. (…) I think the media is not 
mature and not professional; that is my personal view. The media have to play a 
                                                
60 The Labour Spokesman is openly affiliated with the Labour Party, the Democrat is aligned to 
PAM, the Leeward Times is mostly seen as supportive of the NRP, and the Saint Kitts and Nevis 
Observer is usually seen as leaning towards the CCM. There are no figures on the reach of 
newspapers, but both respondents and my own observations indicate that almost all citizens 





better role in terms of information; I think the media is really biased (…) and could 
do a much better job.” 
 
Since the government of St. Kitts and Nevis is thus able to dominate or overrule 
institutions that are supposed to function as a check on its power, a scholar that I 
interviewed pointed to a lack of transparency with regard to the actions of the 
executive: 
 
“What is lacking in St. Kitts and Nevis is transparency and accountability. (…) There 
are no sunshine laws to keep the politicians’ fingers to the fire. And so what you find 
is that people are in the dark in terms of how government is really functioning.” 
 
In terms of the effect of size on the balance between both elected and non-
elected institutions in St. Kitts and Nevis, it can be concluded that the position of 
neutral, independent institutions that ought to function as a check on 
governmental power is undermined by the smallness of the country. Due to a 
lack of professionalism and resources that follow from size, especially the role of 
the media is undermined. Now that the characteristics of political competition 
and the balance between institutions for the case of St. Kitts and Nevis have been 
analyzed, the following sections will pay attention to the nature and degree of 
inclusiveness in the federation. 
 
5.3. Inclusiveness: The Consequences of Closeness and Direct Contact 
Like in San Marino, the relations between citizens and politicians of St. Kitts and 
Nevis are marked by proximity, direct contact, and multiple-role relationships. 
Politicians and citizens can and do communicate directly with each other, and 
they continuously meet each other in bars and restaurants, the supermarket, on 
the beach, or in a sports club. In addition, they know each other through multiple 
societal roles, since it is common for politicians to be active in various 
organizations in addition to their political office, and because the proximity 
increases the chances that there are politicians in people’s families, friend 
groups, or neighborhood. According to many people I discussed the matter with, 
this closeness between citizens and politicians is a positive characteristic of the 
country’s politics, because it is much easier for citizens to express their demands 
and concerns to their political representatives. As one journalist explains;  
 
“It [closeness, WV] makes you feel that you could reach your representative. You 
know you could touch them; you could call them on the phone. In most cases we 
have their cell number. The home numbers are listed in the phone book, so we are 
able to call and reach them.” 
 
As a consequence of direct contact and communication, politicians are deemed to 





them enhanced opportunities for political responsiveness. Politicians in St. Kitts 
and Nevis claimed to spend a great deal of time on relationships with their 
supporters, which means that they basically know every individual in their 
district; 
 
“When I was campaigning and representing a constituency here, I went into just 
about every home in my district, many times over. And everybody knew me 
personally.” 
 
Whereas the frequent contact between citizens and politicians may obviously 
benefit democratic representation and responsiveness, it also means that 
politicians have less time to actually govern and run the country. According to 
one of the politicians in the federation; 
 
“The country is a small country, but it’s nonetheless a country which has to be run 
and has all the important issues of crime, health, education, and the economy, that 
bigger countries have. And so it can be difficult at times when so much time is 
consumed by having to continually interact on a one-on-one basis.”61 
 
In addition to this drawback, to an even greater extent than in San Marino 
politics in St. Kitts and Nevis appears to be characterized by the prevalence of 
patron-client relationships. Although no data on voter attitudes are available, the 
primacy of personalistic competition over programmatic contestation seems to 
entail that Kittitian-Nevisian voters are generally not very interested in policies 
or the public good, but primarily support politicians because they can provide 
them with personal favors. Because of the small size, particularistic relations 
between citizens and politicians can become very intense, as one politician 
clarifies: 
 
“People feel that as their representative you become their friend, you become in 
many respects a figure that they can turn to if they have difficulties, and it’s not 
always money. Oftentimes if they are having a problem of some kind, you become 
the priest, you become the doctor, you become the lawyer, you become the brother, 
you become the confidant, you become someone in the community that people look 
to. And that obviously can be difficult, because it creates immense pressure.” 
 
Since, as Donald Peters accurately summarizes (1992: 9), the goal of a party in 
office is to 1) reward its own supporters and 2) demolish and victimize the 
opposition, clientelism in St. Kitts and Nevis essentially entails boosting one’s 
own political tribe at the expense of the other(s). Since respondents assert that 
voters expect their party leaders to provide them with benefits, and would most 
likely cease voting for them if they stopped doing this, politicians can only 
                                                
61 In this respect Peters says that, “[p]olitical leaders normally spend such a disproportionate 
amount of their time campaigning and improving their image that they neglect major national 





survive politically if they abide by these expectations. Even though the citizens I 
talked to were extraordinarily cynical about the intentions of their political 
leaders, and incessantly accused them of corruption, self-enrichment, and other 
forms of misbehavior,62 conversations with ordinary voters reveal that their own 
political demands are also basically individualistic, as they demand and expect 
politicians to circumvent the law and the institutions in their favor. 
 In St. Kitts and Nevis and the Eastern Caribbean in general, clientelism is 
also broadly seen as a redistributive mechanism of social welfare (Duncan and 
Woods 2007: 211). This means that many citizens are economically and 
financially dependent on government, and that a change in office can also bring 
about dramatic personal consequences. In terms of inclusiveness, one former 
politician emphasizes that this dependence on government also impedes on the 
ability of people to freely and consciously express themselves;63 
 
“What is different between St. Kitts and a number of other countries is that 
government controls the majority of the resources. (…) So people tend to toe the 
line when it comes to criticism of government; very few people can criticize and be 
able to withstand the backlash of being too critical of government.”  
 
This dependency on government can also explain why people, despite all the 
criticism of their politicians, continue to vote for the same parties and their 
leaders. Due to the fact that parties in power primarily transfer resources to their 
own supporters and constituents, and due to the fact that governments are 
mostly formed by one of the Kittitian parties, the Nevisian perception that 
federal governments tend to disregard their island financially is further 
strengthened by particularism. 
 In addition to clientelism, a wide majority of my interviewees asserted 
that political patronage in the public sector of the federation is rampant. 
According to an interest-group representative, this has major negative 
consequences for the functioning of the civil service: 
 
“The civil service has really become an extension of whichever party is there. It is 
routine that people are transferred and humiliated; it is customary that the 
government would take people who are supporters and fit them into positions for 
which they don’t qualify. (…) It’s all patronage, it’s all an attempt to farm out and say 
“well, you supported me so here is a job”, which means a few thousand dollars every 
month, even though you don’t have anything to do.” 
 
                                                
62 People in the federation commonly refer to this as ‘politricks’ – hence the title of this chapter. 
63 One of the academics I interviewed claimed that this dependence on government was also 
harmful for democracy in the country; “[t]his sense of entanglement in government (…) muzzles 
people’s willingness to express themselves. In other words: it impinges on the freedom of speech, 
and as you and I very well know, once you impinge on the freedom of speech, you actually 





 Government is by far the largest employer in St. Kitts and Nevis, and jobs in the 
civil service are commonly distributed to reward supporters.64 After elections 
bring a new party to power, the civil service is usually completely turned over, 
which means that the institutional memory and experience is drained (cf. Baker 
1992: 14, 18; Sutton 2007b: 220). Furthermore, as a consequence of patronage 
the civil service cannot function impartially, and also does not aspire to do so. As 
one private sector-spokesperson declared; 
 
“Many of the activists of both parties are well-known civil servants, and it is a badge 
of honor in their view. It is a badge of honor for them to be known to be supporting 
this party because of course the party will reward them.” 
 
In addition to diminishing the quality, efficiency, and neutrality of the public 
administration, patronage also leads to an oversized and therefore highly costly 
public sector. Since both clientelism and patronage are primarily financed with 
state resources, St. Kitts and Nevis has an immense national debt of three billion 
US dollars, which equals to 198% of its gross domestic product.65 Seeing that the 
country is largely dependent on foreign investments, external actors are 
indirectly financing domestic particularism in the federation. 
 The size and influence of the public sector of St. Kitts and Nevis has a 
number of consequences for the country’s private sector. As in San Marino, the 
separation between the sectors is often somewhat fuzzy, since part-time public 
officials often are concurrently active in a company or business, as a result of 
which conflicts of interest can and do arise.66 In addition, the independence of 
the private sector is compromised by the fact that patronage and clientelism also 
play their part here. Because of the authority and control of government, the 
success of Kittitian and Nevisian businesses largely depends on their relationship 
with the politicians and party in power. As one representative from the private 
sector emphasizes; 
 
“A number of businesses, they get concessions from government, from various 
taxes. For example for investment, when they try to invest in a property, 
government may give them a special incentive (…), duty-free concessions. So even 
the private sector has to sort of have a harmonious relationship with government, 
for them to also benefit.” 
 
                                                
64 According to World Bank statistics, 41.6 percent of the labour force in the federation works in 
the public sector (Carrizosa 2007: 4). However, according to Sir Probyn Inniss, in the beginning 
of the 1980s at least ninety percent of jobs in the country are either directly or indirectly 
controlled by government (1983: 80).  
65 After Japan, St. Kitts and Nevis has the highest public dept as percentage of the Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) in the world (CIA World Factbook  2011). 
66 Most of the MPs in the National Assembly have secondary professions, and among the MPs are 





Whereas clientelism and patronage are common features of politics in 
larger Caribbean states as well, the smallness of St. Kitts and Nevis 
unquestionably increases the likelihood of particularistic relations, and also 
provides these with specific dynamics. In the small-scale Kittitian-Nevisian 
society where everyone knows each other and each other’s political affiliations, 
particularistic relations are established on a one-on-one basis, and augment the 
personalistic nature of politics (Griffin 1994: 233). Furthermore, Griffin points 
out that particularism and personalism in St. Kitts and Nevis lead to the 
undermining of formal structures.67 Since elected officials are able to assemble 
detailed information on all their constituents, their control on the fulfillment of 
obligations that follow from the clientelistic bonds is enhanced. Correspondingly, 
because of the availability of direct contact, voters have increased opportunities 
to pressure their representatives to present them with favors of all kind. On both 
sides of the particularistic linkage, the smallness of St. Kitts and Nevis therefore 
creates a greater inducement to establish patron-client relationships. 
  
5.4. Inclusiveness: Participation of Citizens 
Whereas the academic literature lists increased political participation of citizens 
as one of the major advantages of smallness, in St. Kitts and Nevis and the 
Eastern Caribbean island states in general, political participation is essentially 
limited to expressing a vote once in four or five years. According to Peters 
“[d]emocracy means to the Eastern Caribbean people the freedom to elect their 
leaders, but immediately after the elections their political participation ceases. 
They withdraw from the political process completely and assume their status as 
subjects of the leaders” (Peters 1992: 133). In terms of inclusiveness, the 
opportunities for citizens to participate in Kititian-Nevisian politics appear to be 
rather restricted, but my own observations demonstrate that both politicians 
and citizens seem to be satisfied with this situation. Since there are no data on 
indicators like party membership or participation in demonstrations and rallies 
in the federation, this conclusion is primarily derived from my interviews and 
the secondary literature. 
 Apart from ubiquitous face-to-face contacts between citizens and 
politicians, political participation in St. Kitts and Nevis seems largely confined to 
the electoral process. When it comes to election campaigns, the involvement of 
                                                
67 Griffin argues that “[t]he intrinsic relationship between structure and function that is clearly 
discernible in larger, more developed, majoritarian systems, however, is not as clear-cut in small, 
developing countries. While the political structures do exist, personality often preponderates 
over structure, and, consequently, function devolves more from personal loyalty and patronage 





citizens is overwhelming; all parties organize mass rallies in which their leaders 
hold strident and vociferous speeches, and famous Caribbean musicians are 
invited to energize the crowds.68 Virtually the entire electorate seems to eagerly 
participate in the carnival-like election campaigns. Whereas citizens are keen to 
display their partisan affiliation and political preferences during campaigns, their 
willingness and capacity to actually have an influence on politics appears very 
much restricted. Since election manifestos are shallow and voting behavior is 
essentially personalistic, by casting their ballot voters also do not really have the 
opportunity to voice their substantial political attitudes. In the absence of 
ideological representation, most respondents I interviewed explained that 
citizens typically vote for a person they know personally, or for the candidate 
who they expect to provide them with the most personal benefits.  
 Elections in St. Kitts and Nevis are held under the rules of the first-past-
the-post plurality system, with the country being carved up in eleven single-
member constituencies. Since the entire electorate consists of around 35.000 
people, this means that there are on average around 3.000 voters per 
constituency, although this number varies strongly between districts. Since 
turnout however generally reaches between sixty and eighty percent, in each 
district between 2.000 and 3.500 votes are normally expressed. Because the 
electoral commission also publishes the expressed votes per polling station, and 
each district consists of between six and thirteen polling stations, politicians can 
to a large extent estimate who voted for them and who did not, and therefore 
also which voters or families kept their promise and fulfilled their clientelistic 
obligations. The size of electoral districts therefore enables politicians to directly 
sense the benefits of patron-client links, and stimulates them to create such 
relations. 
 Since most politicians try to visit all voters in their electoral district in 
advance to the election, they can with a great degree of accuracy estimate and 
calculate the size of their support, and hence how many votes they need to win 
their district. This leads to a number of electoral ‘tricks’ that parties use to 
increase their chances, such as the registration of voters in districts where they 
should not legally be voting, as one of the academics I talked to pointed out; 
 
“There is what we call “constituency-shopping”. So for example in the Prime 
Minister’s constituency he wins with enormous margins. When a voter turns 
eighteen, they don’t let him register there where he is supposed to be, but they took 
him to an area where the margins are smaller.” 
 
                                                
68 In the 2010-elections, the Labour Party for example succeeded in attracting Haitian superstar 





As can be seen in table 6.3, in the most recent election the support of the Labour 
Party in three districts (Basseterre West, Newton Ground - Harris, and Belle Vue 
– Ottley’s) was so overwhelming that the party could indeed encourage its 
supporters here to vote in a different district. On Nevis, this was in one district 
the case for the CCM. 
 
Table 6.3: Vote Differences between Parties on the District Level in 2010 Elections 
District St. Kitts Labour Party PAM Difference 
# 1 (Basseterre East) 1.777 1.536 241 (7.2 %) 
# 2 (Basseterre Central) 1.907 1.476 431 (12.7%) 
# 3 (Basseterre West) 1.306 545 761 (41.2%) 
# 4 (Challengers – Half Way Tree) 1.185 1.156 29 (1.2%) 
# 5 (St. Anne Parish) 985 1.128 143 (6.8%) 
# 6 (Newton Ground - Harris) 1.905 179 1.728 (82.8%) 
# 7 (Belle Vue - Ottley’s) 1.635 570 1.065 (48.1%) 
# 8 (Ottley’s - St. Peter’s) 1.527 1.803 276 (8.2%) 
Total St. Kitts 12.686 8.607 4.079 (19.2%) 
    
District Nevis NRP CCM Difference 
# 9 (St. John’s and St. Paul’s) 1.335 1.481 146 (5.2%) 
# 10 (St. George’s) 225 665 440 (49.4%) 
# 11 (St. Thomas’s and St. James’s) 979 714 265 (15.6%) 
Total Nevis 2.805 3.128 323 (5.4%) 
 
In addition to constituency-shopping, just like in San Marino political parties try 
to use the votes of expatriate citizens to win elections, and several scandals 
about the importation of emigrant voters from the UK and the US have surfaced. 
Since over 30.000 Kittitians and Nevisians live abroad, the potential electoral 
influence of this group of voters is highly significant, and as one academic 
argued; 
 
“One year ago on Election Day, the Labour Party brought in roughly five thousand 
people to vote by plane. The party paid the plane, they got a free ticket. And they 
were housed at hotels and left the next day. They were from England, North 
America, and the Virgin Islands, you name it. Some of them came in the morning, 
voted, and left the same day.”69 
 
Although it is hard to say to what extent these practices occur and have an 
influence, many ordinary Kittitian and Nevisian citizens at least believe that they 
do, which already challenges the legitimacy of the election results. Since 
                                                
69 Since the Labour Party is now in office, it may appear that this party to a larger extent engages 
in particularism and the domination of other institutions than the PAM, but most of my 






expatriate voters are however not separately registered, in contrast to San 
Marino the size and influence of emigrant votes in the federation cannot be 
estimated. In the 2004 Commonwealth election report, a number of irregularities 
at elections are repeatedly noticed, among which the fact that 1) a number of 
eligible voters are not on the electoral roll, 2) a number of overseas voters return 
to the federation to vote, 3) more than one person votes under the same name, 
and 4) a number persons vote in districts were they are legally not allowed to 
vote (Commonwealth Expert Team 2004).70 The report on the most recent 
elections however notes improvements in this respect, even though it continues 
to emphasize the differences in media access between the ruling party and the 
opposition (Commonwealth Expert Team 2010). Despite these shortcomings, the 
reports conclude that elections are generally fair, and reflect the will of the 
people.  
 
Table 6.4: Voter Turnout in Kittitian-Nevisian Federal Elections71 
Election Year Voter 
Turnout 
















In terms of the participation rates, voter turnout in St. Kitts and Nevis 
varies strongly (between sixty and ninety percent), but the average of 73.7 
percent is in line with Eastern Caribbean standards and is relatively high among 
the developing-world (International IDEA 2011). In table 6.4, the turnout rates of 
elections since the introduction of universal suffrage have been presented. It can 
be seen that there is not really a detectable pattern in turnout figures, and that 
                                                
70 Although the Commonwealth election team treats these irregularities as (minor) incidents, it 
must be emphasized that due to the smallness of electoral districts, a very small number of votes 
can alter the election result. 





turnout in the most recent elections has been markedly higher than in the five 
preceding ones. This is probably the result of new and stricter registration rules, 
as a consequence of which the number of registered voters has decreased by 
more than fifteen percent in relation to the 2004-elections.72 In table 6.5, turnout 
levels and averages of the independent OECS-countries have been presented, and 
it can be seen that turnout figures in St. Kitts and Nevis are comparable to the 
rest of the region.  
 
Table 6.5: Voter Turnout in the OECS-Countries: the Five Most Recent Elections73 
 1 2 3 4 5 Average 
Antigua and Barbuda 60.7% 62.3% 63.6% 91.2% 80.3% 71.6% 
Dominica 66.6% 65.2% 60.1% 59.1% 54.9% 61.2% 
Grenada 68.4% 61.8% 56.7% 57.4% 80.3% 64.9% 
St. Kitts and Nevis 66.4% 68.4% 64.2% 59.0% 83.5% 68.3% 
St. Lucia 60.7% 62.8% 66.1% 53.7% 58.5% 60.4% 
St. Vincent - Grenadines 65.6% 67.4% 69.2% 63.7% 62.3% 65.6% 
 
With regard to the fairness of elections, both the election reports and my 
interviews point to concerns about the appointment and composition of the 
electoral commission. According to the constitution, this commission is 
appointed by the Governor-General and consists of three members, of whom two 
however can be expected to side with the governing party.74 Therefore; 
 
“We have always had a contention that it is the persons or the political party who 
controls the electoral office, will control who will win elections.” 
 
In addition to the electoral office there is a Supervisor of elections, who is 
appointed by the Governor-General and commonly is a high-ranking public 
official; since 2004 it is a pastor who has become rather controversial, and the 
opposition parties have recurrently demanded his resignation. The two most 
recent Commonwealth election reports have pointed to changes in the 
appointment of the Supervisor and the electoral commission as primary 
                                                
72 In 2004, 22.922 out of 38.865 registered voters cast a ballot, whereas in 2010, 27.364 out of 32.766 
registered voters did so (International IDEA 2011). Among the names that were removed from the list 
of registered voters were probably a lot of deceased people or people who had been registered twice. 
73 Source: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) website (2011).  
74 The constitution stipulates that the electoral commission “shall exist of: a) a chairperson 
appointed by the Governor-General, acting in his own deliberate judgment, b) one member 
appointed by the Governor-General, acting in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister, 
and c) one member appointed by the Governor-General, acting in accordance with the advice of 
the Leader of the Opposition.” Since “any decision of the commission shall require the 
concurrence of a majority of all its members”, no unanimity is required and the opposition-
aligned member can therefore be ignored by the other two members (Constitution of Saint 






recommendations to improve the conduct of elections. As a consequence of the 
fact that the incumbent party controls state resources and can influence a 
number of these institutions (and also to a large extent controls the news media), 
incumbency is a major and perhaps excessive political advantage at the polls 
(Peters 1992: 112). When it comes to estimating the influence of size on political 
participation and elections in St. Kitts and Nevis, it can be concluded that the 
absence of programmatic contestation leads to voting on the basis of 
individualistic and personalistic concerns, and that the smallness of electoral 
districts leads to a number of specific particularism-related electoral dynamics 
and problems. 
 
6. Discussion and Conclusion 
In terms of the nature and quality of contestation and inclusiveness in St. Kitts 
and Nevis, this chapter has revealed a disparity between formal institutional 
structures and informal political practices. In this sense, the chapter confirms the 
observation of Hinds, Peters, and other scholars who have noted that Caribbean 
politics is a mixture between democratic institutions and a more top-down and 
sometimes authoritarian political reality. Whereas institutionally-oriented 
scholars and organizations like Freedom House continue to classify St. Kitts and 
Nevis as a full-fledged democracy because all the necessary conditions for 
political contestation and inclusiveness are present, the political reality of the 
federation offers an entirely different impression.  
As a general conclusion, in line with the academic literature it can be 
remarked that the Westminster system seems unsuitable to the polarized, 
personalized, and particularistic socio-political environment of the federation, as 
it appears to exacerbate its centrifugal tendencies. Due to the absence of 
cleavages and the prevalence of personality-driven politics that results from size, 
in St. Kitts and Nevis the likelihood of personalistic conflicts and interpersonal 
polarization is higher than in larger states. Furthermore, as this chapter also 
underlines, due to smallness microstate-governments control the majority of 
their countries’ available resources, which goes at the cost of the autonomy and 
impartiality of other societal and political institutions. If the winner-takes-all 
elements of the Westminster system are applied to such a political environment, 
the functioning of these institutions and the political opposition are further 
undermined, and the negative consequences of smallness are further enhanced 
(Ryan 1999; Hinds 2008).  
In table 6.6, a summarized overview of the scoring of St. Kitts and Nevis 





of these scores, a number of general conclusions about the effects of size on 
contestation and inclusiveness can be drawn. First of all, political contestation in 
this microstate revolves primarily around personalities, and parties are 
primarily used as vehicles to support individual politicians. Secondly, despite the 
absence of ideologies and programmatic contestation the Kittitian-Nevisian 
society is heavily polarized, both between and within the two islands of the 
federation. Thirdly, in relation to other institutions, the government and 
especially the Prime Minister of St. Kitts and Nevis occupy a supremely powerful 
position. With regard to inclusiveness, the closeness and direct contact between 
citizens create various forms of particularism and dependency on government, 
as a result of which political participation occurs due to individualistic rather 
than public or programmatic considerations.  
 These findings are in line with some of the major publications on the 
relation between size and democracy, whereas they contradict others. In 
particular, the notions that increased homogeneity leads to a culture of 
consensus (Anckar 1999; Congdon Fors 2007: 3-4) and the idea that citizens of 
small polities are more aware, interested, and willing to participate in politics 
(Ott 2000: 202-203; Anckar 2002b: 386-387; Srebrnik 2004: 331-332) cannot be 
confirmed. By contrast, studies that have emphasized the preponderance of 
personalistic over ideological contestation (Dahl and Tufte 1973: 92-93; Sutton 
2007a: 203-204), the omnipotence of government (Sutton 1987: 12-14; Gerring 
and Zarecki 2011: 9), and the prevalence of particularistic relations (Srebrnik 
2004: 334) in microstates are confirmed by the current analysis. With regard to 
the hypothesized advantages of smallness in part of the academic literature, 
Peters accurately notes that there is “potential for positive results”, which 
however essentially does not materialize in practice (1992: 185). 
Although there are a number of obvious differences, the similarities 
between the political systems of San Marino and St. Kitts and Nevis are quite 
striking. In light of their entirely different political histories and contemporary 
political institutions, these similarities can largely be explained by the diminutive 
size of the countries. In both microstates, partisan competition obscures 
personality-driven politics, and in both countries non-elected political and 
societal institutions are only to a limited extent able to function as a check on 
governmental power. In similar fashion, in both cases closeness and direct 
contact between citizens and politicians lead to particularistic forms of 
representation, which in both countries is fostered by the smallness of the 





between San Marino and St. Kitts and Nevis, however, is the discrepancy 
between formal institutional structures and the every-day political reality.
 
Table 6.6: St. Kitts-Nevis’  Scores on the Indicators of Contestation and Inclusiveness 
Dimension Section Indicator Classification of St. Kitts 
and Nevis 
Free and Fair 
Elections 
Present, with minor 
limitations 
Party System Two-party system on each 








Barely; parties primarily 











Opposition Freedom to 
Support the 
Opposition 
Has major negative 
consequences; victimization 
Freedom of the 
Press 
Press free (FotP-score 20), 
but weak, polarized, and 
unprofessional 
Status of the 
Legislature 
Largely ineffective, not 
autonomous from 
government 
Status of the 
Judiciary 























Status of the 
Bureaucracy 
Oversized, ineffective, and 
influence by government due 
to patronage 
Contact with and 
Access to 
Representatives 













Feelings of Efficacy 
of Citizens 
No data, but appears to be 
high 




Mixed (between 60 and 80%) 
























En Nouvo Sesel? 
 
The Republic of Seychelles 
 
 
Figure 7.1: Location and Map of Seychelles1 
  
 
1. Introduction: Lingering Vestiges of Authoritarianism in a Tourist Paradise 
The opening of Seychelles International Airport in March 1972 signaled a 
revolutionary change for the population of the tiny country. Whereas the 
archipelago of Seychelles was previously only accessible by boat, the 
construction of the airport initiated a rapidly growing influx of tourists, and in 
due course the country became known among wealthier European travelers as a 
tourist paradise. This did not change when, within one year after the attainment 
of independence in 1976, a coup d’état installed a socialist one-party regime on 
the islands. The tourism industry has turned Seychelles into one of the wealthiest 
countries of Africa, and more than seventy percent of the country’s gross 
national income now derives from tourism (Campling and Rosalie 2006: 116).2 
Although the microstate is mostly categorized as part of the African continent, in 
terms of its culture and society it is an amalgam of multiple world regions and 
civilizations. This is most clearly visible in Seychelles’ demographic structure, 
                                                
1 Retrieved from the CIA World Factbook (CIA World Factbook 2011). 
2 In 2011 Seychelles has a GDP-per capita figure of US$ 24.700, which is the highest in Africa (CIA 





since the population consists of a diverse mix between European, African, Indian, 
Chinese, and Arab ethnic groups. Although Roman Catholicism is clearly the 
dominant religion, significant Protestant, Muslim, and Hindu communities exist 
in the microstate as well.3  
 In comparison to other African countries, the Republic of Seychelles is the 
smallest state according to both population and territorial size. The country 
consists of 115 islands that are scattered over a vast maritime territory in the 
Indian Ocean, located to the north of Madagascar and to the east of Somalia, 
Kenya, and Tanzania. Although about twelve islands are inhabited, more than 
ninety-eight percent of the approximately 90.000 Seychellois citizens live on the 
islands of Mahé (80.000), Praslin (6.500), and La Digue (2.000).4 Seychelles has a 
landmass of only 451 square kilometers, but its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) is 
1.336.559 square kilometers, which is more than twice the size of metropolitan 
France (CIA World Factbook 2011). Attaining independence from the United 
Kingdom in 1976, the microstate is one of the youngest independent states of 
Africa. Although it is mostly classified as part of this continent, historically and 
culturally Seychelles shares a lot of features with Caribbean island states, of 
which the population was also for the largest part brought to the islands as 
slaves from mainland Africa. 
 Whereas multiparty-democracy was officially reinstalled on the islands 
after the end of the Cold War, in Freedom House-rankings Seychelles continues 
to acquire ‘partly free’-scores on both political rights and civil liberties (Freedom 
House 2012).5 Although the archipelago is classified by Freedom House as an 
electoral democracy and therefore attains a more positive score than most 
African mainland states, in comparison to African island states like Cape Verde, 
São Tomé and Príncipe, and Mauritius, Seychelles lags behind when it comes to 
                                                
3 According to the World Factbook, over 82 percent of the Seychellois population is Roman-
Catholic, 7,5 percent is Protestant (mostly Anglican and Evangelical), 2.1 percent is Hindu, and 
1.1 percent is Muslim (CIA World Factbook 2011). In addition to ethnic and religious pluralism, 
virtually the entire population of the country speaks the languages of Seychellois Creole (Kreol), 
English, and French. 
4 The islands of Seychelles are generally clustered into the Inner Islands Group (which consists of 
the granitic islands where most of the Seychellois population lives), and the Outer Islands Group 
(Zil Elwannyen Sesel in Creole), consisting of the coralline island groups of the Amirante Group, 
the Alphonse Group, the Aldabra Group, the Farquhar Group, and the Southern Coral Group. In 
addition to the inhabited islands, a number of Seychellois islands are either privately owned or 
only have private resorts that are primarily advertised as honeymoon destinations (Franda 1982: 
2). 
5 In the last ten years, Seychelles has consistently acquired a score of 3 (on a 7-point scale with 7 
being ‘least free’) for both political rights and civil liberties (Freedom House 2012). Freedom 





democratic development.6 According to Freedom House reports, the governing 
party of Seychelles continues to maintain an all-powerful position in Seychellois 
politics and society, with the opposition party and other political and societal 
institutions playing a subordinate role (Freedom House 2012). This assessment 
is broadly confirmed by the scarce academic literature on Seychellois politics, in 
which especially the fusion of the microstate’s government and its ruling party is 
repeatedly cited as a major obstacle to further democratization (Hatchard 1993; 
Ellis 1996; Scarr 2000; Van Nieuwkerk and Bell 2007; Baker 2008; Yoon 2011).  
 In the current chapter, the influence of size on politics and democracy in 
the Republic of Seychelles is analyzed and evaluated. The findings of the chapter 
are for the main part based on field research that was conducted in the 
archipelago in February and March 2011, during which thirteen semi-structured 
interviews were held with Seychellois government ministers, members of 
parliament, party leaders, journalists, academics, legal officials, and the 
ombudsman.7 The chapter commences with an overview of the political history 
of Seychelles, and a synopsis of the country’s pathway to democratization and 
the re-establishment of multiparty-democracy in 1993. After this, one section is 
devoted to explaining democracy in contemporary Seychelles by pointing to a 
number of potential contributing factors, which is followed by a paragraph in 
which the political structure of the country is outlined. Subsequently, in four 
sections the influence of size on politics and democracy in Seychelles is examined 
along the lines of Dahl’s dimensions of contestation and inclusiveness. In 
sequence, attention is paid to the role of cleavages and political parties, the 
balance of power between institutions, the effects of closeness and direct contact, 
and the characteristics of political participation and elections. The chapter ends 
with a summary and discussion of the findings. 
  
2. Political History and Democratization of Seychelles 
The islands of Seychelles geologically form part of the Mascarene plateau that 
originated when the Indian plate broke away from Madagascar approximately 
ninety million years ago. The Seychelles islands thus actually constitute a 
continental fragment or ‘micro-continent’ on their own, and due to their isolated 
                                                
6 In fact, among the five small African island states only Comoros has a less democratic Freedom-
House score than Seychelles. 
7 A complete list of the people I interviewed can be found in the Appendix. Throughout the 
chapter I occasionally use interview quotes to underline or illustrate my findings and the 
analytical narrative. Due to the strong interpersonal relations and the smallness of the 
Seychellois society, I have decided not to disclose the names and professions of the persons to 





location a completely unique flora and fauna has developed on the islands of the 
archipelago (Franda 1982: 2). Although Arab and Indian merchants and 
navigators were aware of their existence, the islands of Seychelles were never 
colonized or even settled until 1770 (Scarr 2000: 5-7). After several Portuguese 
and British discoverers and navigators had already visited Seychelles in the 16th 
and 17th centuries, the French navigator Lazare Picault was the first to 
extensively explore the archipelago and map its main islands between 1742 and 
1744.8 The exploration of Seychelles was organized by the French Governor of 
the nearby island of Île de France (contemporary Mauritius), which together 
with Île de Bourbon (contemporary La Réunion) had been occupied by France in 
1715 (Franda 1982: 9). In 1754 the archipelago was given the name of Séchelles, 
in honor of the contemporary French minister of finance, Viscount Jean Moreau 
de Séchelles.9  
 On 12 August 1770, fifteen French colonists, seven slaves, five Indians, 
and one black woman established a small settlement on the island of Ste. Anne, 
and thereby finally ended the uninhabited status of the islands (Franda 1982: 5-
6; Scarr 2000: 5-7). After the outbreak of the French Revolution in 1789, these 
settlers decided to establish their own Colonial Assembly, write their own 
constitution, and run the colony themselves. As a consequence Seychelles 
acquired de facto independence, and many of the policies of post-revolutionary 
France (such as the abolition of slavery) were not recognized on the islands 
(Scarr 2000: 14-16). In 1794 Chevalier Jean-Baptiste Quéau de Quinssy took over 
power in the colony, and through skillful diplomacy was able to preserve the 
autonomy of the islands (Franda 1982: 11-12). During the Napoleonic wars 
Seychelles hosted a group of French privateers,10 but the British discovered this 
and forced De Quinssy to surrender. Since the British themselves however 
deemed occupation of the archipelago a waste of resources, the Seychellois 
colonists managed to retain their autonomy by remaining officially neutral, while 
supplying both French and British ships that passed by with goods (Scarr 2000: 
19-20). Not only was this a successful strategy in diplomatic terms, but it also 
resulted in a period of increased economic activity and prosperity on the islands. 
                                                
8 On his voyage to India, Vasco da Gama sighted the Seychelles islands in 1502. In 1608, the 
English East India Company-vessel Ascension got lost in a storm and reportedly anchored on a 
paradisiacal island with “land turtles of such bigness which men would think incredible”. In the 
rest of the 17th century, the Seychelles islands were primarily used as a hiding place for pirates 
from different origins. 
9 The spelling was changed to Seychelles in 1814, after the British had gained control of the 
colony. 






 In 1811 Seychelles finally came under control of the United Kingdom, and 
after a major political struggle slavery was abolished in 1835.11 Seychelles was 
united under colonial rule with the island of Mauritius, where the central 
administration of the colony was based, but the British largely allowed the white 
settlers (the so-called Grand Blancs) to preserve their French heritage and 
traditions. Although the colonial authorities were British and reported to London 
and Mauritius, the islands were largely ruled according to French customs and 
traditions, and (creolized) French remained the colony’s common language 
(Scarr 2000: 54-55).12 After decades of pressure and pleas, Seychelles finally was 
separated from Mauritius to become a Crown Colony on its own in 1903 (Franda 
1982: 14; Van Nieuwkerk and Bell 2007: 142). Like the French, the British saw 
the islands as a useful place to exile political prisoners, and over the years such 
prisoners arrived from British colonies around the world. In addition to the 
Grand Blancs and the former slaves that had been imported from East-Africa, the 
British also imported indentured laborers from India, China, the Arabian 
Peninsula, and other British colonies to Seychelles, as a consequence of which in 
light of their size, the islands acquired their remarkably heterogeneous 
population (Franda 1982: 18-19).  
 After the end of the First World War, which not only had dramatic 
economic consequences for Seychelles but also led to the outbreak of diseases 
and rising crime levels, the Grand Blancs established the Planters’ Association,  
which vied for greater representation of the plantocracy in governmental affairs 
(Scarr 2000: 113). In similar fashion, plantation workers in 1937 founded the 
League for the Advancement of Colored People, which primarily emphasized the 
need for minimum wages and better working conditions (Scarr 2000: 122-123). 
The first competitive elections in Seychelles were organized in 1948, when four 
of the twelve members of the legislative council could be elected by an electorate 
that was limited by property and literacy conditions (Franda 1982: 14; Campling 
et al. 2011: 14).13 Since these restrictions implied that only the plantocracy could 
vote, the Seychelles Taxpayers’ and Producers’ Association (STPA), which had 
been established by Grand Blancs in 1939, easily won all four seats.  
 Despite restrictions on the franchise, in 1963 two political parties 
emerged in Seychelles. On the one hand, the socialist Seychelles People’s United 
Party (SPUP) was established by France-Albert René, and this party vied for 
                                                
11 British control over the islands was formalized during the Treaty of Paris in 1814.  
12 In an attempt to appease the settlers, the British appointed Quéau de Quinssy (now De Quincy) 
as juge de paix, which he remained until his death in 1827. 






complete independence from the United Kingdom and international alignment 
with the Soviet block (Van Nieuwkerk and Bell 2007: 142).14 Its counterpart, the 
Seychelles Democratic Party (SDP) was founded by James Mancham, represented 
the business-oriented Seychellois middle-class, and desired closer political 
integration with the United Kingdom (Scarr 2000: 171-173; Campling et al. 2011: 
14-15). Despite their differences, both parties called for the introduction of a 
Westminster political system and universal suffrage, which were finally realized 
in 1967. Elections that same year were won by the SDP, which together with an 
allied independent MP managed to secure a majority of five out of eight 
parliamentary seats (Franda 1982: 14; Campling et al. 2011: 15-16). In 
subsequent elections in 1970 and 1974 the SDP and Mancham managed to stay 
in power by marginal majorities, and the ideological divide between this party 
and René’s SPUP rapidly became more profound.15 
 Since not only the public opinion of the Seychellois population, but also 
the attitude of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the British 
government became increasingly anti-imperialistic and pro-independence, 
Mancham realized that he would have to change his position on this issue in 
order to remain in power (Scarr 2000: 184-188). During the Constitutional 
Convention in London in 1975, the British (Labour-) government insisted on the 
formation of a coalition government between SDP and SPUP as a precondition for 
independence of Seychelles. After such a government was formed, and Mancham 
became President and René Prime Minister, Seychelles became an independent 
republic on 29 June 1976.16 Although rumors of a potential coup d’état by the 
SPUP circulated and also reached Mancham, the President did not appear to take 
these very seriously (Scarr 2000: 193). 
Within one year after independence, on 4 June 1977, Prime Minister René 
seized power in a bloodless coup while Mancham was on an overseas trip 
(Hatchard 1993: 601; Ellis 1996: 167). Aided by Tanzania, Libya, and other 
Soviet-aligned African states, René embarked on a socialist political program, 
                                                
14 The SPUP was to some extent related to and aided by contemporary African liberation 
movements and socialist regimes, and was itself categorized as a liberation movement by the 
Organization for African Unity (OAU) in 1973. In addition, at least in the 1960s and 1970s René 
was supported by the French socialists and the British Labour Party, which both supported his 
anti-colonialist ideals (Campling et al. 2011: 14-15). 
15 The Mancham-governments successfully established a tourism industry in Seychelles, as a 
consequence of which the country rapidly became more prosperous. The SPUP however believed 
that foreign capitalists gained too much influence in the country’s economy, and that the 
revenues from tourism were not equally distributed among the population (Campling et al. 2011: 
18). 
16 Under the new constitution, Seychelles acquired a republican political system which included 





suspended the constitution, and established a one-party state (Baker 2008: 297). 
With regard to international politics, Mancham’s staunchly pro-Western position 
was substituted with a policy that aimed at closer cooperation with the African 
socialist states and the Soviet Union. Due to its strategic location in one of the 
main areas of Cold War-interest and due to its small size and vulnerability, 
Seychelles has always been exceptionally susceptible to foreign pressures, and 
even though the country’s government was officially socialist, René skillfully 
maintained relatively harmonious relations with former colonizers Britain and 
France (Ellis 1996: 168).  
 












Year V% S V% S V% S V% S V% S S 
1967 45.5 3 51.5 4 - - - - 3.0 1 8 
1970 44.1 5 52.8 10 - - - - 3.1 - 15 
1974 47.6 2 52.4 13 - - - - - - 15 
1979 98.0 23 - - - - - - 2.0 - 23 
1983 100 23 - - - - - - - - 23 
1987 100 23 - - - - - - - - 23 
1992 58.4 14 33.7 8 - - - - 7.9 - 22 
1993 57.5 27 32.8 5 9.7 1 - - - - 32 
1998 61.7 30 12.1 1 26.1 3 - - 0.1 - 34 
2002 54.3 23 3.1 - 42.6 11 - - - - 34 
2007 56.2 23 - - 43.8 11 - - - - 34 
2011 88.6 31 - - - - 10.9 1 0.5 - 32 
 
Within Seychelles itself, the ruling SPUP, which in 1978 adopted the new 
name of Seychelles People’s Progressive Front (SPPF), dominated political life. 
Opposition parties were banned, criticism of government was not tolerated, 
there was very little room for political freedom, and human rights abuses were 
commonplace (Van Nieuwkerk and Bell 2007: 148; Baker 2008: 280). Political 
patronage and nepotism were the main instruments of political control, but even 
though corruption flourished, tourism continued to generate vast economic 
development on the islands, and Seychelles became one of the most prosperous 
states of Africa (Campling and Rosalie 2006: 119-121; Yoon 2011: 101). In 
                                                
17 SPUP = Seychelles People’s United Party - SPPF = Seychelles People’s Progressive Front - Parti 
Lepep = People’s Party (socialist party), SDP = Seychelles Democratic Party (centre-right party), 
SNP = Seychelles National Party (liberal, democratic party), PDM = Popular Democratic 
Movement (former SNP-members). Data for 1979, 1983, and 1987 are presented in italics 
because these elections were conducted under the one-party regime. In 2011 the SNP decided to 





November 1985, one of the most prominent Seychellois opposition leaders in 
exile, Gérard Hoareau, was murdered in London by foreign assassins with 
numerous indications of links with the Seychellois regime (Baker 2008: 280).  
 
















Year V% V% V% V% V% V% 
1979 98.0 - - - - - 
1984 92.6 - - - - - 
1989 96.1 - - - - - 
1993 59.5 - 36.7 3.8 - - 
1998 66.7 - 13.8 - 19.5 - 
2001 54.2 - - 0.9 44.9 - 
2006 - 53.7 - 0.6 45.7 - 
2011 - 55.5 - 1.7 41.4 1.4 
 
The fall of the Berlin Wall, the end of the Cold War, and the Harare 
Declaration of 199119 proved to be watershed moments for Seychellois politics. 
Many of the country’s socialist allies and their vital investments in Seychelles 
disappeared abruptly, and increasing diplomatic pressure from France, Britain, 
and the United States eventually resulted in the return of multiparty-democracy 
in 1993, when free and democratic elections were organized (Van Nieuwkerk 
and Bell 2007: 143; Baker 2008: 280; Campling et al. 2011: 32). Domestically, the 
influential Catholic and Anglican churches played a major role in advancing the 
democratization process, and clearly sided with the political opposition 
(Hatchard 1993: 606). Former President James Mancham returned from exile 
and reinvigorated the Seychelles Democratic Party, but suffered defeats in both 
the 1993 presidential and parliamentary contests, as a consequence of which 
René and the SPPF could remain in power.  
As election results presented in tables 7.1 and 7.2 demonstrate, since the 
return of multiparty-democracy the SPPF has won all parliamentary and 
presidential elections and is presently ruling the country for thirty-five years. 
Having been defeated in the pivotal 1993 elections, the position of Mancham’s 
                                                
18 NDP = New Democratic Party (part of former SDP). Data for 1979, 1984, and 1989 are presented in 
italics because these elections were conducted under the one-party regime. René never obtained 100% 
of votes because the electorate could only cast a ballot ‘for’ or ‘against’ him; the percentage of the 
electorate that voted ‘for’ is presented here. 
19 The Harare Declaration of 1991 was a joint declaration of the member-states of the Commonwealth, 
in which (among others) the need for democratic and accountable government was being emphasized. 





SDP as the main opposition party has been overtaken by the Seychelles National 
Party (SNP) of the former Anglican priest Wavel Ramkalawan. In 2004, France-
Albert René resigned as President after having been in power for over twenty-
five years, and handed over power to his former Vice-President James Michel, 
who currently still is the nation’s President and changed the name of his party 
into Parti Lepep (People’s Party in Creole). With the same party and people 
remaining in power, critics assert that very little has changed in post-1993 
Seychelles except for some institutional and cosmetic changes (e.g. Baker 2008: 
280-281). Especially with regard to the freedom of expression and judicial 
neutrality the reputation of the regime has not been very favorable, and there is 
a perception that the distinction between the ruling party and the government 
remains hard to determine (Yoon 2011: 101). The 2011 parliamentary elections 
were boycotted by the SNP because of the government’s refusal to revise existing 
laws on campaign financing, and out of frustration with the supposedly faltering 
democratization process in general. In table 7.3, the composition of Seychellois 
governments since 1970 has been presented. 
 
Table 7.3: Composition of Seychellois Governments since 1970 
Time Span Government Party President 
1970 - 1975 SDP James Mancham 
1975 - 1977 SDP & SPUP James Mancham  
(& France-Albert René as Prime Minister) 
1977 – 2004 SPPF France-Albert René 
2004 - SPPF – Parti Lepep James Michel 
 
3. Explaining Democracy in Seychelles 
On the basis of the political history and other characteristics of the country, a 
number of factors that contributed to the present-day electoral democracy in the 
Republic of Seychelles can be listed. As opposed to St. Kitts and Nevis, Seychelles 
actually experienced two transitions to democracy; one with the introduction of 
universal suffrage in 1967, and one with the reinstallation of multiparty 
democracy in 1993. In many ways, the first Seychellois transition to democracy is 
comparable to that of the Eastern Caribbean microstates, in the sense that it was 
gradual and characterized by the interplay between the three groups of the 
British colonial authorities, the white local plantocracy, and the colored mass of 
(former) plantation workers. In contrast to St. Kitts and Nevis however, the 
influence and grip of the British administration on political developments in 
Seychelles was markedly less significant, as the colonial authorities often felt 





descendants of the French settler families (the Grand Blancs) were to a large 
extent able to rule the colony as they desired. With regard to the influence of 
colonialism on democratization, the three-hundred years of socialization in the 
Westminster system that the population of St. Kitts and Nevis experienced is not 
matched by an analogous process in Seychelles. In comparison, colonialism in the 
latter microstate was shorter, less intensive, and consisted of the interplay 
between French, British, and Grand Blanc-political cultures. 
 Whereas St. Kitts and Nevis upon independence undisputedly retained 
both its Westminster-modeled democratic institutions and its pro-Western 
foreign policy orientation, Seychelles acquired a political system that 
incorporated both French and British elements, and faced a great divide between 
its two main political parties with respect to economics and the country’s 
position in the Cold War-conflict. While the survival of (capitalist) democracy in 
the Caribbean was furthermore not only closely monitored by the United States, 
but also by other countries in the generally democracy-friendly region (cf. 
Domínguez 1993),20 Seychelles is located in one of the most undemocratic parts 
of the world, and not in the proximity of any major democratic power. As a 
matter of fact, nearby regimes like the Nyerere-government of Tanzania actually 
supported and contributed to the downfall of the democratically elected 
government in Seychelles (Van Nieuwkerk and Bell 2007: 143). In light of these 
contextual factors, the initial survival of democracy in Seychelles was uncertain 
from the start, and the 1977-coup d’état was hence maybe not an improbable 
development. 
 Both my own interviews and the secondary academic literature on 
Seychelles explain the country’s return to democracy in 1993 largely on the basis 
of international factors. Not only in Seychelles, but on the entire African 
continent, the collapse of communism and the end of the Cold War generated the 
demise of Soviet-aligned one-party regimes, and instigated a shift to 
democracy.21 Authoritarian socialist regimes in other small African island states 
like Cape Verde and São Tomé and Príncipe crumbled in the first years of the 
1990s as well, and in these countries a successful transition to democracy 
                                                
20 In the previous chapter, it was described how various far-reaching judicial, monetary, security, 
and economic cooperation agreements have been established between the small island states in 
the Eastern Caribbean. The Organization of Eastern Caribbean States of which St. Kitts and Nevis 
is a member has for example played a significant role in the preservation of democracy among its 
members. Seychelles, by contrast, is only a member of the Indian Ocean Commission (together 
with France, Mauritius, Comoros, and Madagascar), which is a much less formalized and less 
active organization. 
21 Together with Latin American, Asian, and Southern and Eastern European states, these African 





subsequently unfolded. Since the financial and economic support from the Soviet 
Union and its allies suddenly subsided, and in light of the international economic 
dependence of small states in general, the attainment of aid from Western 
donors at once became a crucial factor for these African microstates. 22 With 
regard to Seychelles, multiple publications assert that French, British, and 
American diplomats in 1991 pressured the regime to organize free and fair 
elections, and threatened to suspend their provision of aid to the country (Van 
Nieuwkerk and Bell 2007: 143; Baker 2008: 280).23 Being crucially dependent on 
foreign investments and especially tourist inflows, it appears that the 1993-
return to multiparty elections in Seychelles was primarily a result of 
international developments (Hatchard 1993: 602).  
 Just like St. Kitts and Nevis and most other microstates in the developing 
world, the foreign policy of Seychelles can by and large be identified according to 
the international patron-client model (cf. Carney 1989). Already in the early 19th-
century De Quinssy-era, Seychellois leaders proficiently and advantageously 
played out Britain and France against each other, and in the 1970s and 1980s the 
René-regime played the same game with the two Cold War-superpowers (Ellis 
1996: 166-168; Van Nieuwkerk and Bell 2007: 152). In the past two decades, 
Seychelles has acted as a client state of among others the United States, the 
United Kingdom, France, South Africa, India, China, and most recently the United 
Arab Emirates.24 Since it is not located in the sphere of influence of a major 
international power, Seychelles arguably has a greater degree of freedom in the 
formulation of its foreign policy than for example the Caribbean and Pacific 
microstates. Seeing that Seychelles’ most important international partners are 
                                                
22 Hatchard specifically points out that “René acknowledged the increasing linkage of aid to 
democratic change by Western donors” (1993: 602). 
23 Specifically, Baker asserts that President René “was confronted with the resident ambassadors 
of Britain, France and USA who handed him a letter giving him until 5 December 1991 to 
announce the restoration of the multiparty system or else they would denounce him in public in 
Seychelles itself. Under political pressure, therefore, from the Commonwealth, exiles and 
domestic critics, and with the economy in trouble, President René announced a return to 
multiparty government at the Extraordinary Congress of the SPPF in December 1991” (Baker 
2008: 280). 
24 The UAE have become an important trading partner of Seychelles, especially with regard to oil 
and gas, and their national airline company (Emirates) has become the second most significant 
airline serving Seychelles. Most significant, however, is the recent construction of a colossal six-
storey palace on the site of a former US satellite tracking station on Mahé, which was built as a 
secondary residence for the President of the Emirates and the Emir of Abu Dhabi, Sheikh Khalifa. 
Not only are the dimensions of the palace and the surrounding land gigantic in proportion to the 
size of Mahé itself, but the behavior and influence of Sheikh Khalifa have caused a lot of 
antagonism among the Seychellois population. Many people I talked to fear that the Emiratis will 
attempt to impose Islamic rules and traditions on Seychellois society, and opposition parties and 






however Western democracies, especially since these deliver the wide majority 
of tourists, these countries now function as major promoters of democratic 
government in the microstate. 
 Whatever the reasons for the 1993-return to democracy and the current 
status of Seychelles as an electoral democracy may be, various scholars point to a 
number of considerable deficiencies in the archipelago’s democratic system. First 
of all, the ruling party of Seychelles (the Parti Lepep) is now in office for thirty-
five years, and a political change through the ballot box has as of yet never 
occurred in the country. As Van Nieuwkerk and Bell argue, this means that “the 
ghost of Seychelles’s one-party past lingers on” (2007: 146), primarily because 
the ruling party continues to dominate the opposition and various elected and 
non-elected institutions. According to Yoon, the Parti Lepep uses state resources 
to finance its election campaigns and distributes government jobs as part of 
political patronage, which provides the party with excessive advantages at the 
polls (2011: 101). In addition, restrictions on the freedom of the press and the 
freedom of assembly are believed to impinge on political rights in the microstate 
(Baker 2008: 288). Last but not least, Baker asserts that electoral district 
administrators are commonly confusing their role with support for the 
governing party, the Seychellois army plays an excessively dominant role in the 
country’s public life, and “judicial abuse now arguably constitutes the single most 
serious governance issue requiring reform” (2008: 282). In short, on the basis of 
secondary sources the political system of Seychelles appears rather distant from 
democratic ideals.  
 
4. Political Institutions of Seychelles 
The mixed French-British colonial heritage of Seychelles is clearly visible in the 
country’s present-day political-institutional structure. The country had a 
Westminster-modeled parliamentary system during the decade that is now 
known as the ‘First Republic’ (1967-1977), but upon independence this was 
changed to a semi-presidential system that aimed at power-sharing between the 
SDP and SPUP (Campling et al. 2011: 17). During the so-called Second Republic 
(1977-1993) power gradually became more and more concentrated in the hands 
of René, who in addition to President also became Prime Minister and Minister of 
Finance, and headed a cabinet of only five members. The new constitution of the 
Third Republic (1993 until the present) that was adopted after the return to 
multipartyism turned Seychelles into a presidential republic, with a directly and 





Campling et al. 2011: 32). As in other presidential systems, Seychellois 
government ministers are appointed by the president, who is both head of state 
and head of government of the country (Constitution of Seychelles 1993: Art. 50).  
 According to the Constitution, presidential elections are organized once 
every five years, and the same person cannot be President for more than three 
subsequent terms (1993: Art. 52).  In 1996, a constitutional amendment 
established the office of Vice-President, and prospective Vice-Presidential 
candidates have to be announced by presidential candidates (as ‘running mates’) 
in advance to the presidential election (1993: Art. 66A). The additional ministers 
in the executive are appointed by the President, and have to be approved by a 
majority of the members of the National Assembly.25 Ministers are accountable 
to the President, and can also be removed by the President (Constitution of 
Seychelles 1993: Art. 71, 73). In addition to the ministers, the President has the 
duty to appoint the Attorney-General, the Auditor-General, the electoral 
commission, judges of the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court, and the 
ombudsman of Seychelles.26 According to the Constitution, the President 
furthermore has the competence to dissolve the Seychellois legislature and to 
declare the state of emergency (1993: Art. 41, 110; Van Nieuwkerk and Bell 
2007: 144). 
 Presidential elections in Seychelles are organized under the rules of the 
two-round runoff system that is also used in France, but as table 2 demonstrates 
so far no second rounds in presidential elections have been necessary, since 
SPPF-Parti Lepep-candidates have always obtained an absolute majority of votes 
in the first round. For legislative elections a mixed electoral system is being 
employed, in which the country is divided in at least twenty-two single-member 
constituencies, in which the first-past-the-post plurality system is used.27 In 
addition, political parties that acquire at least ten percent of the nationwide 
votes have the right to nominate one additional member of parliament for every 
                                                
25 In addition to the President and the Vice-President, there are currently eleven ministers in the 
Seychellois government (source: www.gov.sc).  
26 Most of these appointments are based on candidates proposed by the Constitutional 
Appointments Authority (CAA), which consists of 1) one member appointed by the President, 2) 
one member appointed by the leader of the opposition, and 3) one member (and chairman) 
appointed on the basis of consensus between the other two members. If the two members 
however disagree on this last appointment, they have to propose a list of potential candidates to 
the President, who then can appoint the chairman (Constitution of Seychelles 1993: Art. 143: 3). 
Until 2007, the chairman of the CAA was also a member of the executive committee of the ruling 
party. 
27 In the four most recent parliamentary elections (since 1998), the country was carved up in 
twenty-five constituencies that each delivered one MP. Of these constituencies twenty-two are 
located on Mahé, two on Praslin, and one remaining district for the Inner Islands (among which 





ten percent of the votes that they obtained (Constitution of Seychelles 1993: 
Schedule 4; Yoon 2011: 100).28  In practice this has mostly lead to a total number 
of nine ‘proportionally elected’ MPs, but due to the opposition’s boycott of the 
last election, only seven additional MPs were appointed. Whereas the Seychellois 
National Assembly thus used to consist of thirty-four members, after the 2011 
elections it has only thirty-two MPs. This means that each MP on average 
represents nearly 3.000 Seychellois citizens. 
 The legislature of Seychelles, the National Assembly,29 is a unicameral 
parliament that is directly elected once in every five years. Under the rules of the 
presidential system with its strict separation of powers, MPs can since 2007 not 
be simultaneously members of the executive branch, and vice versa. The National 
Assembly selects a Speaker and a Deputy-Speaker from amongst its members, 
and the MPs who are not member of the party that nominated the President have 
the right to select the leader of the opposition. Subsequent to a referendum on 
the issue,30 the approval of two-thirds of the members of the National Assembly 
is necessary for constitutional amendments. Since 1993, all Speakers have been 
members of the SPPF-Parti Lepep, and this party has always managed to obtain 
more than two-thirds of parliamentary seats at elections. Furthermore, since all 
presidential and all parliamentary elections since the return of multiparty 
democracy have been won by the SPPF-Parti Lepep, the executive and legislative 
branches of government have always been dominated by the same party, and a 
situation of divided government has so far never occurred. 
 In addition to the national layer of government, Seychelles consists of 
twenty-five local administrative divisions, which also function as electoral 
districts. Since the 1990s local governments have progressively gained more 
power, and they have generally been a-political (Commonwealth Secretariat 
2010: 178). Since 1991, each district has obtained its own elected council, but 
from 1999 onwards the members of these assemblies are appointed by the 
Minister of Local Government (ibid.). The judicial branch of the Seychellois 
government consists of the Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court, and several 
                                                
28 Although various academic publications and reports discuss these appointments as if it were a 
separate election under PR-rules, they are actually post hoc-appointments by political parties, 
especially since the candidates for these appointments are unknown in advance to the elections. 
29 Lasanble Nasyonal Sesel in Creole. 
30 According to the Constitution, a referendum in which a constitutional amendment is proposed 
needs to result in approval of at least sixty percent of the votes cast (1993: Art. 91). Since the 






subordinate courts,31 of which the magistrates are all appointed by the President 
upon the advice of the Constitutional Appointments Authority (CAA). Many of the 
Seychellois judges are foreign nationals, and in contrast to Seychellois judges 
they are appointed for a specific term, which can be prolonged by the President 
(Constitution of Seychelles 1993: Art. 131: 134).32  
 When looking at the constitutional arrangement of Seychelles, and the 
structure and institutions of its presidential republican system, no 
antidemocratic elements can be observed. This however contrasts markedly with 
reports from organizations like Freedom House and the Commonwealth as well 
as with the academic literature on the political system of the country, in which 
quite a few reservations about the democratic nature of the Seychellois system 
are being expressed (Van Nieuwkerk and Bell 2007; Baker 2008; Yoon 2011). In 
previous chapters on San Marino and St. Kitts and Nevis, it was demonstrated 
how the size of these microstates creates certain political dynamics that are hard 
to notice if the institutional structure of the country alone is taken into 
consideration. For the political system of Seychelles, however, it is the question 
whether the non-democratic features that have been observed in the scholarly 
literature are a consequence of the small size of the country, or whether they are 
a legacy of the one-party era instead, and are therefore also similar to less 
democratic characteristics of larger states. In the analysis in following 
paragraphs, an attempt will be made to find answers to this question. 
 
5. The Influence of Size on Democracy in Seychelles 
When the political system of Seychelles is measured up to Dahl’s conditions for 
polyarchy, it can firstly be remarked that Freedom House’s classification of the 
microstate as an electoral democracy can be considered justifiable. Presidential 
and parliamentary elections are organized and held at regular points in time, and 
according to Commonwealth-reports elections are “credible” (Commonwealth 
Expert Team 2006), “well organized and peaceful” (Commonwealth Expert Team 
2011) and are “generally viewed as having met basic international norms” 
(Freedom House 2012). Despite these positive qualifications, none of these 
reports uses the labels of ‘free’ or ‘fair’, and all of them express major concerns 
and list quite a number of recommendations for future elections. According to 
                                                
31 Five magistrate courts that deal with lesser criminal and civil cases exist, of which four are 
based in the country’s capital Victoria on Mahé, and one on Praslin. 
32 Freedom House-reports stipulate that “the impartiality of the non-Seychellois magistrates can 
be compromised by the fact that they are subject to contract renewal” (Freedom House 2012). At 
present, the President of the Seychellois Court of Appeal is a Mauritian citizen, whereas the Chief 





the Constitution however, all registered Seychellois citizens of at least eighteen 
years old who reside in Seychelles have active voting rights (1993: Art. 113, 
114), and similar conditions apply to passive suffrage rights (1993: Art. 80). This 
means that the inclusiveness of Seychellois citizens is at least legally 
safeguarded. 
 In the following sections, an in-depth analysis of the influence of size on 
the nature and quality of contestation and inclusiveness in the Republic of 
Seychelles will be offered. First, attention is paid to the role of socio-political 
cleavages, ideology, and political parties in the archipelago. Subsequently, the 
balance of power between different political and societal institutions will be 
highlighted, which is followed by an analysis of the effects of closeness and face-
to-face contacts on the characteristics and quality of political inclusiveness. The 
final section is devoted to an assessment of elections and the degree and nature 
of participation of citizens in Seychellois politics. On the basis of these four 
paragraphs, in a concluding section the main findings are summarized and an 
assessment of the influence of size on Seychellois politics is provided. In addition, 
the conclusion briefly draws a comparison between Seychelles and the two 
microstates that were analyzed in earlier chapters. 
 
5.1. Contestation: Cleavages, Ideologies, and Political Parties  
Political contestation in Seychelles occurs in the form of parliamentary and 
presidential elections that are organized once in every five years. Since the 
elected President has the constitutional duty to form his own cabinet and 
appoint government ministers, the presidential election can actually be regarded 
as a vote for the entire executive branch of government. Furthermore, since 
public officials in the most important non-elected bodies of the Seychellois 
political system are also appointed by the President and some of them by the 
leader of the parliamentary opposition, political contestation for these 
institutions is indirectly present as well. Active and passive suffrage rights for 
Seychellois adults furthermore ensure that every eligible citizen can take part in 
contestation, either by influencing the outcome of political competition (by 
casting a ballot) or by entering the competition itself. Whereas all the conditions 
for political contestation are therefore constitutionally upheld, it is necessary to 
also examine the nature and content of political competition in order to fully 
comprehend the influence of size on political contestation in Seychelles. 
 As Dahl argues, contestation first and foremost refers to the “extent of 
permissible opposition” (Dahl 1971: 4). In this respect, it can be noted that 





this was thirty-five years ago and happened by means of a military coup. Since 
the same power is now in office for thirty-five years, political change through the 
ballot box has yet to occur for the first time. With regard to the presence of a 
parliamentary opposition, it can be noted that, since re-democratization in 1993, 
on average about one third of MPs in parliament has been affiliated with the 
opposition. The 2011-boycott of the parliamentary elections has however altered 
this balance, since at present the parliamentary opposition consists of only one 
out of thirty-two MPs. Whereas the effective number of parties (ENP; cf. Laakso 
and Taagepera 1979) since 1993 has always been around 1.80, after the 2011-
election it has become 1.06.33 This means that the extent of opposition in 
parliament has declined significantly since the last election, and it remains to be 
seen whether this will change after future elections. 
 As several of my respondents have emphasized, the Seychellois political 
system is characterized by the absence of major socio-political cleavages. 
Although the country’s population is both ethnically and religiously rather 
heterogeneous,34 ethnic and religious cleavages have remarkably never been 
politicized by any of the main Seychellois political parties. In this respect, Scarr’s 
observation that “Seychelles never had a color question” (2000: 4) is accurate, 
and is remarkable especially in light of the historical tensions between the white 
plantocracy and the colored plantation workers. At present, Seychellois citizens 
and politicians I talked to proudly refer to their ‘melting pot’-society, and 
although no data on this issue are available, people I talked to pointed out that 
interracial relationships and marriages are for instance relatively common.  
 As tables 1 and 2 demonstrate, political contestation in Seychelles 
commonly occurs on the basis of competing political parties. With exception of 
the one-party era in which no political parties other than the ruling party were 
allowed to compete for votes, in the First and Third Republics two parties have 
been represented in parliament most of the time, and at elections over ninety 
percent of the votes have usually been divided between only two parties.35 In 
                                                
33 Based on own calculation using data of the Inter-Parliamentary Union (Inter-Parliamentary 
Union (IPU) 2011). 
34 Seychelles has a rather low score of 0.20 in Alesina et al.’s fractionalization index, which 
measures ethnic, religious, and linguistic fractionalization, and ranges between 1 and 0 - with 0 
indicating the absence of fractionalization and 1 indicating a completely fractionalized society 
(Alesina et al. 2003). Since ‘Creoles’ are however treated as one group here (constituting almost 
90% of the population), in my opinion this index fails to recognize the significant differences 
between the various segments of the Creole population (i.e. Creoles from mixed African, Arab, 
Indian, Chinese, or European descent).  
35 Although small parties and independents (such as the NDP or the independent Presidential 
candidate Philippe Boullé) have contested elections, this has never led to actual representation in 





this two-party system, the left side of the political spectrum has always been 
occupied by what is now the Parti Lepep, but used to be the SPUP (1963 - 1977) 
or SPPF (1977 – 2006). Founded as a pro-Soviet socialist party, the Parti Lepep 
ruled Seychelles during the one-party regime and has continued to win elections 
after the restoration of multipartyism in 1993. At present the party continues to 
present itself as a spokesperson for the common people, and emphasizes socio-
economic equality and the redistribution of welfare in its election manifestos. In 
addition, in the 2011 elections the party claimed to be the party for the ‘true 
Seychellois’, and thereby tried to portray the opposition as outsiders.36   
 Even though the party changed its name twice and transformed from an 
authoritarian, antidemocratic, and pro-Soviet grouping into an allegedly pro-
democratic and ideologically more pragmatic party, key functions in the Parti 
Lepep- apparatus are still occupied by the people who headed the one-party 
regime (Yoon 2011: 102). Former President René still is the chairman of the 
party, and in this role continues to exercise a great degree of influence within not 
only the Parti Lepep but also the Seychellois government (Baker 2008: 290). In 
addition, the current President also had a prominent role in both the 1977-coup 
and the subsequent authoritarian regime, as one of the officials I talked with 
aptly points out; 
 
“The Parti Lepep has been in power for over thirty years. (…) And even though they 
have changed from SPUP to SPPF and now to Parti Lepep, it’s the same leopard, the 
same people. James Michel, the current President, took part in the coup d’état; there 
are pictures of him with his Kalashnikov.” 
 
While the leadership and internal organizational structure of the Parti Lepep 
have in several ways remained similar, the party has experienced a major 
transformation in terms of its ideology and economic orientation. Originally 
founded as a socialist party with a Soviet-style economic program, the party is 
now persistently advocating and acting upon free-market principles, and has 
therefore become as capitalistic as the opposition (Campling et al. 2011: 33-34). 
According to an academic I interviewed; 
 
“I must say that the main differences have slowly merged, in the sense that we have 
seen the ruling party moving from being a communist party to adopting a Western-
style economy.” 
 
                                                
36 The slogan of the Parti Lepep in the 2011-elections was ‘En Nouvo Sesel’, which translates into 
“a new Seychelles”, and is also the title of this chapter. Members of the opposition and the general 
public with whom I discussed it pointed to the irony of this slogan, as they did not expect the 






Whereas the party historically opposed the influence of foreign companies and 
governments in the Seychellois economy, the present government actively 
supports this, and Chinese companies and workers have for example executed 
momentous land reclamation projects that were deemed necessary due to urban 
sprawl.37 In terms of the indicator of interest articulation by political parties, it 
can therefore be noted that the Parti Lepep has moved from a staunchly left-wing 
ideological position to a much more pragmatic and capitalist party. 
The right wing of Seychellois politics used to be occupied by James 
Mancham’s Seychelles Democratic Party (SDP), which initially was opposed to 
independence from the United Kingdom, advocated business interests, foreign 
investments, and the development of tourism to the country, and promoted a 
pro-Western foreign policy orientation. After disappointing election results in 
the early 1990s, the party was however surpassed by the newly established 
Seychelles National Party (SNP) as the leading political opposition group, and 
this latter party has since 1998 been the main opposition party of Seychelles.38 In 
contrast to the center-right SDP, the SNP is generally considered to be a center-
left liberal party that primarily advocates greater transparency and 
accountability in politics, and opposes the alleged abuses of power and 
exploitation of state resources by the Parti Lepep (Campling et al. 2011: 32-33).39 
Instead of emphasizing and advocating a specific socio-economic platform, the 
party can therefore primarily be perceived as a pro-democracy or anti-Parti 
Lepep grouping, as one of its supporters mentions; 
 
“The current main opposition party came about primarily in 1993, with the return 
of multiparty-democracy, and they were designed primarily in my opinion to 
basically deal with all the thing the government was not doing right. So there is not 
really an ideological aspect to it, it is more pragmatic.” 
 
Rather than advocating a substantially different policy-orientation than the 
ruling party, the SNP therefore primarily emphasizes more meta-political issues 
about the functioning and legitimacy of the political system.40  
                                                
37 In the last decade the new islands of Île Aurore, Île du Port, and Île Perseverance were in the 
process of being  reclaimed from the sea, and two Chinese construction companies constructed a 
new National Assembly-building and new houses on Île Perseverance. 
38 Even though the party boycotted the 2011-parliamentary elections, the presidential election 
that same year demonstrates the continuing electoral appeal of the party and its leader Wavel 
Ramkalawan. 
39 The SNP also has formal links to the British Liberal Democrats (Campling et al. 2011: 32). 
40 In countries that are in transition to democracy, it is common to find that the opposition is 
primarily vying for liberalization and democratization, and that its position on more substantive 
(socio-economical) political issues is either undefined or of lesser importance. If the transition to 





Although the two Seychellois parties thus formally or rhetorically advocate 
and articulate different policies and claim to represent different socio-economic 
interests, according to all respondents whom I asked the question, the 
substantial political differences between them have decreased significantly over 
time. On the basis of a survey of their election manifestos for the 2011-election, 
the differences between the Parti Lepep and the SNP indeed appear to center on 
the organization of politics and the country’s institutional-political structure, 
whereas no major differences can be noted with regard to other issues. At 
present, twelve of the thirteen respondents argued that no clear programmatic 
differences between the parties exist, and as the following academic points out; 
 
“One party was based on a socialist ideology, the Parti Lepep, whereas the SNP 
tended to follow the liberal-capitalist kind of ideology. But at the end of the day it 
seems that both of them are merging. It is pretty much blurred now, the only 
difference being that one bears the green color and the other one bears the red 
color.” 
 
Just like in San Marino and St. Kitts and Nevis, the absence of ideological 
demarcations between the parties of Seychelles seems to induce a personality-
focused form of contestation. Like in the other two microstates, the 
preponderance of personalistic over programmatic politics seems to primarily be 
a causal effect of the country’s population size. As a consequence of the small size 
of Seychelles, people know their politicians personally, which means that style 
and personality become key aspects of politics, as one of the journalists points 
out; 
 
“I don’t think there are great differences between parties, but everything is in how 
you behave, you see? It’s the personal touch.” 
 
In the absence of ideology, personalistic intra-elite relationships in Seychelles 
also determine the conduct of politics. This sometimes obstructs a rational 
political debate about problems and potential solutions, and an example is 
offered by one the country’s senior political officials: 
 
“In the political arena here, if I come and talk about climate change, nobody will 
come and debate carbon emissions. Instead they will attack my personal life, which 
is totally not the way we should do it.” 
 
As the following minister argues, the fact that people within the Seychellois elite 
also know each other through multiple roles has significant consequences for the 
conduct of politics; 
 
                                                                                                                                 
political platforms (Huntington 1991: 122-124). The current situation in Seychelles to a certain 





“Because people know each other personally, the politicians that are your 
adversaries – you went to school with them. You know a lot of funny stories about 
them. So the politics can be more personal sometimes than it needs to be.” 
 
Although some scholars who study the effect of size on democracy have 
suggested otherwise, the small size of Seychelles and the absence of ideological 
demarcations does not bring about a more consensus-oriented or harmonious 
conduct of politics. Due to the intimacy and interconnectedness of Seychelles 
society, and the prevalence of multiple-role relationships, people are generally 
well aware of each other’s political adherence, as one of the journalists I 
interviewed explained to me; 
 
“With such a small population, it’s the case that everybody knows everybody. So if 
somebody has political affiliations then that person will basically be known for 
being supportive of such and such party. So as opposed to bigger countries where 
you would not easily know where ones interests or loyalty lies, here you do.” 
 
Since eleven out of thirteen respondents pointed to either personal connections 
or (family-) traditions in explaining party loyalties, Seychellois society appears to 
be by and large divided in two groups that support the two main political parties. 
As in St. Kitts and Nevis, a quite extensive degree of polarization appears to exist 
between these two groups. In such an environment, people are also recurrently 
branded as belonging to one of the two sides, which means that a neutral 
position in politics is hard to maintain. As one public official asserts; 
 
“People are cast as supporting one party or the other. In the eyes of normal people 
(…) you are either this or that. You know, you are automatically classified as one or 
the other. (…) Remaining independent is almost a new concept here. What is 
independence? We are all political. And when you say you are political, you are 
either or.”  
 
The smallness of Seychelles facilitates the broad public awareness about people’s 
individual political preferences, which means that political privacy and 
anonymity are much less easily maintained, as a result of which political 
branding and the treatment of people on the basis of their partisan affiliation 
becomes more common. In fact, because of these reasons most respondents 
stressed that Seychellois politics is highly divisive and polarized, especially 
because personal conflicts can be a lot more emotional and bitter than 
substantive political ones. Furthermore, just like in St. Kitts and Nevis strong and 
personality-based polarization sometimes leads to the victimization and 
pestering of political opponents, as an opposition supporter told me; 
 
“You see, if you are being told – maybe not directly but indirectly – that if you want a 
scholarship you need to be careful, that is a form of victimization, a form of 





again there is pressure. If you are in the private sector and apply for a license or 
want to diversify your business, again you have to be careful. So there are many 
subtle ways in which people are checked in order to ensure that they are toeing the 
party line.” 
 
 Although many political similarities can thus be observed between St. 
Kitts and Nevis and Seychelles, a major difference can be observed with regard to 
the freedom to support the opposition. Whereas Kittitian-Nevisian opposition 
supporters might be victimized for their political preferences, I observed that 
these people nonetheless (proudly) display their partisan affiliation and also 
participate in opposition rallies and meetings. In addition, due to the intermittent 
alternation of power, these people were convinced that a change in their 
situation would arrive somewhere in the future. In Seychelles, the freedom to 
publicly support the opposition seemed markedly less present, and the 
opposition supporters I talked to generally appeared fearful or at least hesitant 
to express their support for the SNP. As the 2011-Commonwealth election report 
notes, the only party that organizes campaign rallies is the Parti Lepep, as the 
SNP-campaign appears more focused on one-on-one campaigning and 
canvassing (Commonwealth Expert Team 2011: 16). In conclusion, the political 
climate of Seychelles, to a greater extent than its Caribbean counterpart, appears 
to be characterized by fear and the unequal position between the parties.41 
In conclusion, the Seychellois case demonstrates that the predominance 
of personalistic contestation over ideological and programmatic competition 
leads to a rather divisive political environment. In effect, this is essentially 
caused by the small size of the country, and the close and direct interpersonal 
(political) and multiple-role relationships and that evolve from it. Although 
Seychellois politics in this sense shares many features with St. Kitts and Nevis, a 
major difference is that whereas Kittitian and Nevisian parties have at various 
points in time alternated in government, and therefore more clearly assume a 
somewhat equal position with regard to their chances of gaining office at 
elections, the Seychellois parties have been unequal in this sense, as alternation 
of power has so far never occurred by means of free and fair elections, and the 
opposition is as of 2011 only marginally represented in parliament. 
 
 
                                                
41 Since it is publicly known who supports the opposition, it might seem illogical that opposition 
supporters are hesitant to openly support the SNP, especially in comparison to the vocal and 
visible PAM-supporters in St. Kitts. This can however possibly be explained as a legacy of the 
authoritarian period, in which a climate of fear existed due to human rights abuses and torture. 
Baker argues that this climate of fear has not ceased to exist after the return to multipartyism 





5.2. Contestation: The Balance of Power between Institutions 
In light of Dahl’s condition of ‘institutions for making government policies 
depend on votes and other expressions of preference’, the present section will 
discuss the horizontal balance of power between both elected and non-elected 
political and societal institutions in the Seychellois system. In the previous two 
chapters, it was shown that the theoretical expectations with regard to the 
supreme position of government in small states and the absence of institutions 
that can effectively function as a check on governmental power were largely 
corroborated for the cases of San Marino and St. Kitts and Nevis. As the 
preceding section has illustrated, the Seychellois socio-political environment is 
characterized by a great degree of polarization between supporters of the two 
main political parties in the system. In combination with the effects of the small 
size of the archipelago, this characteristic means that Seychelles is no exception 
when it comes to the supreme position of government in the microstate’s 
political structure, and the shortage of neutral and autonomous institutions that 
can effectively restrain the power of the executive. 
 According to the Constitution, the President of Seychelles is the head of 
state, head of government, and commander in chief of the defense forces 
(Constitution of Seychelles 1993: Art. 50). In addition however, the President has 
the constitutional prerogative to appoint the members of the executive, and to 
make appointments to a host of other positions. Although some of these 
appointments require the consent of the CAA, as described before, the President 
has a decisive vote in the composition of this institution itself. As a consequence, 
the President of Seychelles occupies a supremely powerful position in the 
country’s political system, and his powers are only to a very limited degree 
controlled or counterbalanced by other institutions or players in the country 
(Hatchard 1993: 607). Furthermore, because of their political dependence on the 
President, the other ministers appear to be mostly in a subordinate position to 
their head of government. As one minister illustratively explains: 
 
“I think the President is clearly the authority. As a minister I am conscious that the 
President is elected by the people; he chose me to be in his cabinet, and he can fire 
me. And basically that’s it; you have to follow his guidance, try to understand where 
he wants to go, and try to align yourself with a direction that he has set as the 
leader, as the President.” 
 
Whereas the preeminence of the President vis-à-vis other members of the 
executive is a common feature of presidential systems, the one-party legacy and 
in many ways still uncompleted transition to democracy of Seychelles means that 





according to some scholars are disproportionate for a democracy (Van 
Nieuwkerk and Bell 2007: 146; Baker 2008: 280-281). In some ways, the size of 
Seychelles exacerbates the pervasiveness of government, in the sense that the 
resulting weakness of other institutions enables the Parti Lepep’s continuing 
domination of Seychellois society.  
 According to both academic case studies on Seychelles and country 
reports of international organizations, the primary legacy from the one-party era 
in the country is the persistently blurred boundary between the ruling party and 
the government. The synthesis between the Parti Lepep and the state primarily 
manifests itself in the functioning of institutions that are controlled by the state, 
such as the Seychellois army, the police force, the civil service, local 
governments, and the state broadcasting channel, which all are perceived to 
operate primarily in the interests of the Parti Lepep (Yoon 2011: 101-102). Just 
like in St. Kitts and Nevis, the perception of partiality of these institutions is 
further exacerbated by the previously discussed personalization, polarization 
and divisiveness of the Seychellois society, as a consequence of which 
institutions and persons are rapidly and constantly branded as supporting one 
side or the other. Other than its Eastern Caribbean counterpart, however, the 
partiality of Seychellois institutions is broadly seen as persistently favoring the 
same party, and this partiality is also confirmed by multiple sources outside of 
Seychellois society (Van Nieuwkerk and Bell 2007: 149-150; Commonwealth 
Expert Team 2011). 
 Primarily as a result of the fact that the Parti Lepep currently controls the 
government and parliament of Seychelles for over thirty-five years, the National 
Assembly of Seychelles is broadly seen as obedient and compliant with the 
agenda of the government (Baker 2008: 284). The Speaker of parliament 
remains a very active and prominent party member, and does not take the 
required distance from the party in order to be perceived as somewhat neutral, 
as one of the opposition members asserts: 
 
“The Speaker is an active member of the governing party, who is out campaigning 
against the member of the opposition sitting in parliament. He attends all the party 
caucuses, so basically he is also the coach of the members of the ruling party. He is 
both the coach and the referee.” 
 
In addition to the alleged partiality of the Speaker, both interviewees and 
secondary sources assert that parliamentary committees exist more in name 
than in function, and that MPs have a very limited amount of time to research 
and evaluate bills before they are put to a vote (Baker 2008: 284). During the 





government in executive-legislative relations, as the following public official 
mentions; 
 
“I think the executive is much stronger than the legislature. Often the legislative 
branch of government is just an extension of the executive. If the executive wants 
something to become law, parliament usually just passes it through.” 
 
This finding is remarkably also supported by members of the ruling party itself;  
 
“Obviously in the history of Seychelles our party has traditionally always had a 
majority in parliament, so there has been a tendency to see that the executive can 
push things through the parliament.” 
 
Whereas MPs until 2007 were also allowed to occupy positions in government, a 
modification of the law has introduced more dualism in this respect (Yoon 2011: 
101). Nevertheless, many MPs of the governing party continue to exercise many 
other societal functions, which contributes to multiple-role relations and 
potentially generates conflicts of interest. In summary, it can be concluded that 
the National Assembly is largely ineffective in controlling the actions of 
government. 
 Although the previous paragraph has determined that a political 
opposition does exist in Seychelles, as Yoon argues “the opposition cannot 
compete with the ruling party on a level-playing field” (2011: 101). This is not 
only a result of the fact that the government controls a large proportion of the 
country’s resources and labor market, which will be discussed in further detail in 
the following section, but also because the opposition does not have access to 
state media, and cannot effectively exercise its parliamentary role in controlling 
the actions of government. This is of course especially true for the situation in 
the aftermath of the 2011 elections, which were boycotted by the SNP, as a result 
of which the Parti Lepep now controls 31 of the 32 parliamentary seats. 
However, also when a significant proportion of parliamentary seats were still 
occupied by the SNP, the opposition was mostly ignored by the ruling party, and 
the former opposition leader told me that their proposals were almost by 
definition voted down instantaneously: 
 
“Basically the assembly is a rubber stamp; whatever government wants is not 
questioned, it just goes through. What we have also realized is that when the 
opposition brings a motion to the House, their [the Parti Lepep MPs, WV] first 
reaction is to throw it out. But then a couple of years down the road, they will come 
back with those same proposals and accept them.” 
  
Although the 1993-return to multipartyism allows for the existence of a 





the ensuing inferior position of the legislature versus the government 
undermines its position as an effective counterbalance to the government. 
 The unequal position between government and opposition is primarily 
reflected in their uneven access to the media. The only television and radio 
station of the country, the Seychelles Broadcasting Corporation (SBC), is 
controlled by the government, and multiple sources confirm that the opposition 
has only very limited access to it (Baker 2008: 287; Yoon 2011: 101; 
Commonwealth Expert Team 2011: 17). In addition to the SBC, the government’s 
newspaper (the Seychelles Nation) also reports primarily in favor of the 
government. This tendency was denied by respondent who are affiliated to the 
Parti Lepep, but was confirmed by the other respondents: 
 
“The state media, the Seychelles Broadcasting Corporation, is basically run by the 
ruling party. (…) Local news is dominated by the President, so it’s very much a 
publicity tool for the ruling party. But in any democracy the state-sponsored media 
should be covering news and giving all opinions the possibility of being heard.” 
 
In addition to the government media, the main political parties of Seychelles 
publish their own newspapers; The People for the Parti Lepep, Regar for the SNP, 
and Le Nouveau Seychelles Weekly for the SDP and later NDP. Opposition 
newspapers (and especially Regar) have repeatedly been sued for libel, and have 
been intimidated in various ways as a result of which Regar eventually ceased to 
be printed (Baker 2008: 287; Freedom House 2012). Due to these pressures and 
in order to protect themselves, Seychellois journalists often maintain some 
degree of self-censorship, as one journalist explained to me: 
 
“Maybe the journalists need to stop self-censoring themselves, which happens a lot 
here. (…) There are things you just don’t put in; you don’t know who will be 
offended and what the consequences may be, so you just decide to leave it out.”  
 
In considering the shortcomings of media freedom in Seychelles, the country 
acquires a score of 56 (or ‘partly free’) in the Freedom of the Press-index 
(Freedom House 2012). 42  
 In addition to the problems that were mentioned before, the freedom of 
the press in Seychelles is further undermined by the regulation that radio 
stations need a government license in order to be able to broadcast 
(Commonwealth Expert Team 2011: 17). The cost of such a license is US $80.000, 
which is exorbitantly high in light of the small revenues that an inexorably small 
audience could ever bring about (Yoon 2011: 101-102).43 As a result, no other 
radio station than the SBC have so far acquired television or radio broadcasting 
                                                
42 Based on a scale ranging from 1 (completely free) to 100 (completely not free). 





rights in the archipelago, which limits the availability of alternative sources of 
information. In 2010 a Seychelles Media Commission was established with the 
aim to preserve media freedom and a high quality of journalism in the country. 
All eight members of this commission are however appointed by the President44, 
which has led to a great degree of skepticism about its neutrality among the 
opposition (Commonwealth Expert Team 2011: 17). In similar fashion as in the 
other microstates, the strength and quality of Seychellois newspapers is 
undermined by the country’s smallness, in the sense that most journalists are not 
professionals (but mostly politicians instead), and therefore profess journalism 
only as a hobby or secondary line of work. 
 The position of the judiciary in the Seychellois system is also a source of 
concern. Whereas interviews revealed that the Sammarinese and Kittitian-
Nevisian judiciaries are broadly believed to be impartial and neutral, this is not 
the case for the Seychellois judiciary. More than half of my respondents asserted 
that government interference in the judiciary does occur, and this idea is 
confirmed by secondary sources (Baker 2008: 282-283; Freedom House 2012). 
According to Baker, “certainly the pattern of judgments that have flowed from 
the judges suggests that they do what is expected of them” (ibid.). As one of the 
legal officials I interviewed explains; 
 
“Sometimes you will see a letter from a politician to the judiciary, saying something 
like how disappointed they are about how this case turned out, or politicians 
actually looking into the affairs of that case. And it happens a lot that the court’s 
case file is then transferred to the executive branch of government for the executive 
to have a look at the proceedings, but it’s really not in their place to look at these 
things.” 
 
Like in the other two microstates, due to size and ensuing interconnectedness, 
Seychelles primarily hires judges from other countries, primarily in Africa. 
Although this has the potential to augment (the perception of) their impartiality, 
various publications and interviewees argue that the principal motivation of this 
feature is that the government has a greater degree of control on the actions of 
foreign judges. This is primarily a consequence of the rule that the tenure of 
foreign judges subject to contract renewal by the government, whereas a 
Seychellois judge is appointed for life (Baker 2008: 282). According to a 
politician affiliated with the opposition; 
 
                                                
44 The Commission consists of one chairperson and seven members, of which two are appointed 
directly by the President, and one each on the advice of the National Assembly, the Department 
for Information, the Seychelles Media Association, the Liaison Unit for Non-Governmental 





“If according to the Constitution you appoint a Seychellois as Chief Justice, you 
appoint him for life, and he cannot be removed. And the danger with appointing this 
guy for life is that he might not toe the presidential line; he might assume his 
independence. And if you look at it carefully, since the reintroduction of multiparty 
democracy we have not had a Seychellois. It’s just a shenanigan, the way things are 
being run here.” 
 
On the basis of this evidence, it can be confirmed that the judiciary of Seychelles 
not always acts free from government interference. In addition to the media and 
the judiciary, multiple sources confirm that local governments are dominated by 
the ruling party, which is a consequence of the fact that local assemblies are 
appointed by the government (Commonwealth Secretariat 2010: 178). According 
to one of the opposition supporters: 
 
“When you look at the local government, basically it is an organization which even 
though it is part of the civil service, is there to protect the ruling party. District 
administrators are chosen on their party affiliation, and they go out campaigning 
with the ruling party-candidate.” 
 
 According to respondents from the judicial, journalistic, and public 
sectors, the autonomy and professionalism of the media, bureaucracy, and the 
judiciary of Seychelles is especially undermined by the lack of finances that these 
institutions have at their disposal. Due to the size of the country and the 
relatively small number of people that buy newspapers, the sales revenues of 
journals are inherently limited. Since the Nation however receives state funding, 
this ruling party-dominated newspaper has an unequal advantage in comparison 
with other newspapers. With regard to institutions like the judiciary, the 
ombudsman, and the police, of which the performance is dependent on state 
funding, both respondents and secondary sources assert that the professionalism 
of these institutions is severely weakened by the shortage of finances that they 
receive from the government (Baker 2008: 288). As one of the interviewees from 
the judicial sector points out: 
 
“I think the judiciary and police in this country have been neglected for years. I 
think that if the government would put more resources into the police and the 
judiciary, this would help them to function much more professionally.” 
 
 The present assessment of the balance of power between institutions 
reveals that the Seychellois government, but especially the Parti Lepep and the 
President, assume an all-powerful position in the country’s political system. This 
not only comes at the expense of the influence of the political opposition, but also 
of the autonomous and neutral functioning of parliament, the media, and the 
judiciary. The findings of my field research demonstrate that the presence of 





questioned, and the same goes for the existence of an impartial judiciary. When it 
comes to the question in how far this balance of power between institutions is a 
consequence of the size of Seychelles’s population, it appears that the effects of 
smallness of the country (as they were also observed in the other microstates) in 
some ways facilitate the enduring control of the Parti Lepep. In light of the 
limited resources that are available to these institutions as a consequence of 
smallness, they are arguably more dependent on state financing than their 
counterparts in larger states, which gives the Parti Lepep additional instruments 
to influence their actions and diminish their power. 
 
5.3. Inclusiveness: The Consequences of Closeness and Direct Contact 
Although the population size of Seychelles is with 90.000 inhabitants somewhat 
larger than that of San Marino (30.000) and St. Kitts and Nevis (50.000), 
comparable phenomena characterize the contacts and relations between citizens 
and politicians. Because both the physical and psychological distance between 
voters and their representatives is small, direct and reciprocal communication 
between citizens and politicians is common and occurs constantly. Many 
Seychellois people have politicians in their families, as their friends and 
acquaintances, or as neighbors. Furthermore, because political jobs are mostly 
part-time, many politicians have secondary jobs in for example the private 
sector, as a result of which people may also know them as colleagues. This means 
that Seychellois politicians are continuously exposed to questions, demands, and 
pressure from citizens, as one minister explains: 
 
“Citizens stop me in the street, and they have my mobile number. As soon as one 
person has my mobile number, everyone has it. So I get calls in the weekend and in 
the evenings, I get calls all the time. I go to the beach and have somebody who is 
coming to talk to me. It’s difficult because sometimes you can feel that you are 
always working.” 
 
Although several politicians indeed expressed reservations with regard to the 
desirability of these face-to-face contacts, with two exceptions all respondents 
emphasized the advantages it entails with regard to the quality of representation 
and Seychellois democracy as a whole, as one minister argues: 
 
“It [smallness, WV] puts government very close to the people. The public has very 
good access to the highest ranking officials in the government, and here I am talking 
about the President, Vice-President, and the ministers. We are in contact with our 
people and are connected very closely with our people.” 
 
In similar fashion, smallness offers increased opportunities with regard to the 






“I think the positive aspect of it [smallness, WV] is that you gain access. (…) You are 
very much aware of what is having a positive or a negative impact on the population 
in terms of the policies that you are implementing in your respective ministry.” 
 
As this quote demonstrates, direct contact and face-to-face relations between 
citizens and politicians definitely generate enhanced opportunities for politicians 
to estimate and be aware of the political demands of their constituents. Although 
no data are available to support it, all respondents furthermore argue that as an 
effect of multiple-role relations and the close contacts between voters and their 
representatives, Seychellois people are generally very much politically involved. 
 That being said, in light of the absence of programmatic contestation and 
the personalistic orientation of Seychellois politics it should come as no surprise 
that the political demands and preferences of citizens are generally personal and 
particularistic rather than policy-related. In that sense, the closeness between 
citizens and politicians as it evolves from the size of Seychelles can be asserted to 
stimulate the development of particularistic relationships. About three quarters 
of respondents underlined the particularistic nature of citizen-politician 
relations, and as one senior public official pointed out; 
 
“I think the average person sees politicians really as a means by which they can get 
something of a personal benefit, although you might hear debates about human 
rights and economy, and so and so. I think that the average person is more 
concerned with what immediate benefits they can derive, rather than whether 
someone they don’t know is being treated well in prison.” 
 
When it comes to the issue of particularism in Seychelles, the situation in this 
microstate bears a number of resemblances to the state of affairs in San Marino 
and St. Kitts and Nevis. The smallness of the country increases the proximity 
between politicians and their constituents, but this primarily appears to entice 
the Seychellois electorate to pressure their politicians and to demand personal 
favors from them: 
 
“Social relations might affect your work; friends and family members may put 
pressure on you. Sometimes, politicians or other officials do not have the capacity to 
resist to these pressures. People sometimes want to dictate: “if you do not give me 
this favor I will go to the President!” They just try, even though they know it’s a 
hopeless mission.” 
 
Different than in the other two microstates, clientelism in Seychelles seems to 
occur primarily between supporters and politicians of the Parti Lepep, because 
the opposition lacks the resources by means of which to attract potential 
supporters (Yoon 2011: 101). It is broadly believed throughout Seychelles that 





it major advantages at the polls.45 Since only very few people whom I talked with 
believed in the possibility of an election victory of the opposition, clientelistic 
demands of citizens are evidently primarily directed towards the ruling party, 
and are also addressed to this party by people who actually support the 
opposition.46  
 In addition to clientelism, government patronage in Seychelles appears to 
be ubiquitous. According to many sources, the ruling party distributes civil 
service-jobs as a means to reward supporters, and to attract new ones (Baker 
2008: 289; Yoon 2011: 101). Since the government employs more than twenty 
percent of the Seychellois workforce, and indirectly controls close to seventy 
percent of the economy, this also means that many citizens are economically and 
financially dependent on government (Van Nieuwkerk and Bell 2007: 146). As 
Baker points out (2008: 289), potential new employees in the civil service are 
screened on their political allegiance, and the existence of this process is 
confirmed by respondents from the opposition: 
 
“If a young person finishing his studies applies for a job in government, he goes for 
the interview and he might be successful. But that does not mean he gets the job. 
Having been found to be suitable for the post, his name is then sent to the State 
House, where they have a process of security clearance. And security clearance is 
not based on your academic ability or your ability to perform the job, but it is based 
on whether your parents supported the party, and whether you take part in party 
activities.” 
 
Since the civil service appears to be primarily recruited on the basis of allegiance 
to the ruling party, respondents who are not related to the ruling party 
expressed concerns about the partiality and independence of the Seychellois 
bureaucracy. In addition, since people are employed on the basis of party loyalty 
rather than expertise or capability, patronage can also be supposed to lead to a 
less competent and less effective administration. Finally, like in the other 
microstates patronage in Seychelles has led to an oversized public sector, which 
according to even government ministers whom I interviewed functions as a 
drain on state resources. 
 Another aspect of citizen-politician relations in Seychelles that follows 
from my interviews is that because of the proximity, citizens tend to ignore of 
circumvent official institutional channels, and directly contact the politicians 
                                                
45 As a matter of fact, the absence of restrictions on campaign spending led the main opposition 
party to boycott the 2011-parliamentary elections. 
46 I gathered this information by talking to Seychellois students and other citizens, who privately 
told me that they supported the opposition, but actually invited me to come to a Parti Lepep-rally. 
These people told me that their primary goal of attending this rally was to demonstrate their 
presence to the MP from their district, in order to raise the chances of acquiring some money to 





they know, or directly write a letter to the President. According to the Seychellois 
ombudsman; 
 
“There is direct access to the President and the VP. People do not always consult the 
ombudsman when they should, but sometimes directly call or write to the President 
to complain about their situation. They do not always use the proper channels as 
established in the constitution”. 
 
Although face-to-face relations between voters and their representatives can be 
applauded from the perspective of the involvement of citizens in politics, 
according to respondents working for public institutions the propensity of voters 
to contact the President instead of these institutions undermines their 
functioning. 
Patronage and clientelism are recurrent features in many African states, 
and in this light Seychelles is no exception from the rest of the continent (cf. 
Kopecký 2011). Nevertheless, it can be assumed that the size of this microstate 
contributes to the development of such relationships. First, it has been described 
before how the absence of political cleavages leads to a personalized and 
polarized political environment, in which interpersonal relationships determine 
the conduct of politics. The direct access of citizens to their representatives 
enables voters to directly demand personal benefits from politicians. As a 
consequence of the smallness of the electorate and the increased weight and 
potential decisiveness of a single vote, the incentives of politicians to construct 
particularistic relationships are also enhanced. Whereas a large part of the 
academic literature emphasizes the positive effects of close contacts between 
citizens and politicians, the Seychellois political dynamics reveal that these 
contacts can also obstruct the functioning of democracy. 
 
5.4. Inclusiveness: Participation of Citizens and Elections 
When it comes to the participation of citizens in Seychellois politics, all thirteen 
of my respondents confirm that levels of political interest, awareness, and 
efficacy in the microstate are very high, and many of them ascribe this to the 
country’s size. Because of the presence and directly visible influence of politics in 
most of the citizens’ daily lives, there is a very clear perception among citizens 
that politics matters, and although no data is available to support it, I gained the 
impression that levels of detachment or apathy with politics in Seychelles are 
lower than in larger states. It should come as no surprise that high levels of 
awareness, interest, and efficacy also result in high levels of political 







 “People are more eager to participate than in larger states, primarily because 
politics affects people individually and directly. People are also generally more 
interested in politics than for example in the UK, also because every vote may count, 
so people are very concerned about election outcomes.” 
 
As the previous section has revealed, the fact that every vote may count can be 
imagined to stimulate clientelism and patronage, but it may also lead to higher 
participation levels through more conventional and institutionalized channels of 
participation. Like in San Marino and St. Kitts and Nevis, no data exist on 
membership of Seychellois political parties, attendance rates at demonstrations 
or rallies, and other indicators of participation, which means that election 
turnout data are the only available evidence. Nevertheless, my own impression 
and that of most of the people I interviewed is that participation rates at rallies 
and political meetings is high, although this appears to originate more from 
particularistic motivations than from an interest in substantial political issues. 
 
Table 7.4: Voter Turnout in Seychellois Parliamentary and Presidential Elections47 
Parliamentary Elections Presidential Elections 
Election Year Voter Turnout Election Year Voter Turnout 
1967 72-77% - - 
1970 82% - - 
1974 84% - - 
1979 n.a. - - 
1983 59.3% 1979 96.4% 
1987 66.0% 1984 95.9% 
1992 85.3% 1989 91.5% 
1993 86.5% 1993 86.5% 
1998 86.7% 1998 86.7% 
2002 84.5% 2001 93.3% 
2007 85.9% 2006 88.7% 
2011 74.3% 2011 85.3% 
Average 83.9%  88.1% 
 
In table 7.4, voter turnout levels at parliamentary and presidential 
elections have been presented, and an average figure has been calculated and 
presented in the bottom row. The table reveals that, with the exception of 
parliamentary elections in the one-party era, turnout in Seychelles generally 
reaches above eighty percent, which is especially high in comparison to African 
standards (Blais and Dobrzynska 1998: 243, 247, 250). Voter turnout in the 2011 
                                                
47 The turnout figure for 1967 is disputed (Campling et al. 2011: 16). Figures for elections that 
were held under the one-party regime have been presented in italics. Averages have been 





parliamentary election was markedly lower than in previous elections, and this 
is most likely a result of the SNP’s boycott of the election. On average, it can also 
be seen that turnout at presidential elections has been higher than at 
parliamentary elections (reaching almost ninety percent), and that turnout levels 
have been rather stable throughout the 1990s and 2000s. In terms of political 
participation, the size of Seychelles therefore definitely appears to contribute to 
high voter turnout rates. It is important to mention here that in contrast to San 
Marino and St. Kitts and Nevis, expatriate Seychellois have no voting rights in the 
country (Hatchard 1993: 603).48 
 Although the election results presented in tables 7.1 and 7.2 suggest that 
the gap between the Parti Lepep and the SNP was declining, in the 2011-
presidential elections this difference increased somewhat again. According to 
people from the opposition whom I interviewed, elections in Seychelles are not 
free and fair, and in various subtle ways the ruling party increases its chances at 
the polls. Whereas Commonwealth-election observers highlight a number of 
relatively minor irregularities, one opposition spokesperson argued that these 
observers miss the most blatant forms of electoral fraud because they arrive too 
late to be able to monitor the entire campaign; 
 
“It’s what happens before the elections, and this is where too often election 
observers just miss their target because they come during the election campaign, 
when in fact they should have been here before the campaign to see what 
government is actually doing. How government is abusing the media, the state-
funded media, how government is just basically abusing its power.” 
 
In fact, the election observers do highlight a number of circumstances that 
could potentially damage the freedom and fairness of the elections, such as the 
fact that “each party was distributing materials and money to voters as 
inducements”, “a climate of fear existed within society, particularly among civil 
servants”, and “there were allegations by political parties of unfair treatment in 
respect of coverage of their events and prejudicial portrayal of their views” 
(Commonwealth Expert Team 2006: 9-10). In the 2011-report, the role of 
especially the electoral commission, the state-owned media, and the lack of rules 
with regard to campaign financing are emphasized as problematic 
(Commonwealth Expert Team 2011: 30-31). The absence of campaign spending 
                                                
48 This issue was one of the key points of contention at the drafting of the new constitution in 
1992. Since many SDP-supporters had left the country after the coup d’état (primarily to 
London), the opposition was strongly in favor of granting suffrage rights to expatriate citizens. 
Because approximately 13.000 Seychellois live outside their country, the potential electoral 
influence of this group is highly significant. This is also the main reason that the SPPF opposed 
the proposition, and as a consequence of the fact that this party won the 1992 and 1993 elections, 





laws made the SNP decide not to contest the 2011 parliamentary election, and 
this issue was named as one of the primary faults in the system by members of 
the opposition: 
 
“The ruling party has the entire machination its hands; they are using the 
government institutions to win elections. You see, there is no control on the amount 
of money that any political party can use in a campaign. And this in itself puts the 
smaller parties with less funds or no funds at a great disadvantage.” 
 
According to Van Nieuwkerk and Bell, the party machinery of the Parti Lepep on 
the district level and its control and influence on district authorities represents a 
major additional advantage to this party (2007: 145).  
 











Anse aux Pins 1.489 1.096 35 65 393 (14.6%) 
Anse Boileau 1.552 1.077 46 48 475 (17.4%) 
Anse Étoile 1.695 1.506 57 53 189 (5.7%) 
Anse Royale 1.549 1.030 47 29 519 (19.5%) 
Au Cap 1.386 1.302 54 30 84 (3.0%) 
Baie Lazare 1.229 893 47 32 336 (15.3%) 
Baie Ste. Anne 1.864 859 27 14 1005 (36.4%) 
Beau Vallon 1.236 1.267 71 55 31 (1.2%) 
Bel Air 1.105 864 36 25 241 (11.9%) 
Bel Ombre 1.313 1.149 59 40 164 (6.4%) 
Cascade 1.461 785 34 45 676 (29.1%) 
English River 1.262 912 49 30 350 (15.5%) 
Glacis 1.315 1.169 50 41 146 (5.7%) 
Grande Anse Mahé 1.115 721 43 34 394 (20.6%) 
Grande Anse Praslin 1.216 883 17 25 333 (15.6%) 
Inner Islands 1.116 509 12 10 607 (36.9%) 
Les Mamelles 1.018 897 34 30 121 (6.1%) 
Mont Buxton 1.287 1.124 27 30 163 (6.6%) 
Mont Fleuri 1.142 995 40 46 147 (6.6%) 
Plaisance 1.416 1.133 50 44 283 (10.7%) 
Pointe Larue 1.233 672 22 16 561 (28.9%) 
Port Glaud 882 614 30 27 268 (17.3%) 
Roche Caiman 1.019 527 20 21 492 (31.0%) 
Saint Louis  965 1.146 28 19 181 (8.4%) 
Takamaka 1.101 748 21 24 353 (18.6%) 
Total 31.966 23.878 956 833 8.088 (14.0%) 
 
In table 7.5, the results of the 2011-Presidential election on the district 
level have been presented. In the last column, the difference between the top-two 





proportional difference as part of the total number of votes has been outlined. 
The table demonstrates that Ramkalawan only won in two districts (Beau Vallon 
and Saint Louis), which are located in the northeast of Mahé. By contrast, in 
especially the districts that are not located on Mahé (Baie Ste. Anne, Grande Anse 
Praslin, and Inner Islands) Michel wins by wide margins, as well as in districts 
like Cascade, Pointe Larue, and Roche Caiman. The table also shows that the 
electoral districts of Seychelles are of a relatively similar size, and that between 
1.500 and 3.000 people voted in each district. As described before, this smallness 
allows citizens to directly access their representatives, and also allows 
representatives to have information on the preferences and demands of their 
constituents.  
Although no data on voter attitudes are available, as a result of the relative 
insignificance of substantial political issues, the personalistic dynamics of 
Seychellois politics, and the prevalence of particularistic linkages between 
citizens and politicians, voting behavior in Seychelles appears to be primarily 
based on family traditions and particularistic motivations. Political affiliation in 
Seychelles is in large part determined along the lines of big families, and as one 
politician explains: 
 
“We [politicians, WV] know everybody, and for example in my constituency 
probably five or six groups compose the constituency, and they are all families. 
There are five big families which comprise the whole composition of the 
constituency.” 
 
When asked about explanations for voting behavior, one respondent from the 
legal sector illustratively answered as follows: 
 
“I think it all depends on (…) what they [voters, WV] can gain personally from 
whoever might be in power. I think when going to the voting stands in a few 
months, that will be the main thing that voters will be thinking of; “what can we 
gain personally from whoever gets in power?” (…) The other thing would be that 
one might have personal grievances against the people inside the parties; “it could 
be Johnson who was behind the move not to get a planning permission to get my 
house, so I don’t like Johnson. Johnson is with that political party, so I am voting 
against that party.” 
 
Perhaps most tellingly, none of my respondents named programmatic or 
substantive political issues as a basis for explaining voting behavior. 
Like in St. Kitts and Nevis, Seychellois election campaigns occur in the 
sphere of a national festival, albeit that the ruling party has more resources to 
finance its rallies than the opposition. Many of my respondents and ordinary 





elections, gifts and services are commonly distributed to attract voters. 
According to one journalist: 
 
“It’s a common thing to see before elections that lots of gifts start coming out, 
people get lots of things. Right now there is a housing scheme that opens or starts 
operations just before elections. This housing thing comes up every five years, just 
before elections. And it’s the biggest tactic that the government can use to get 
people on their side.” 
 
The allocation of these gifts obfuscates the motivations behind political 
participation in Seychelles, because it is unclear whether high levels of 
participation can be explained by reasons related to size, or whether they are a 
consequence of the individual benefits that people can obtain by participating.  
The present discussion reveals that in terms of inclusiveness, the 
smallness of Seychelles offers increased chances for citizens to participate in 
their political system, and that citizens also make use of these opportunities. 
Turnout at elections in Seychelles is high, and the same appears to be true for 
other manifestations of participation. However, non-conventional or non-
institutionalized forms of participation like clientelism and patronage not only 
appear to be widespread, but in many ways also seem to fuel high levels of 
conventional participation. High levels of voter turnout, for example, are likely to 
be at least partially generated by the individual returns that citizens acquire in 
exchange for their vote. The findings described here are in line with much of the 
literature on politics and democracy in small states, in which the prevalence of 
particularistic relationships in small settings is emphasized as well (Parsons 
1951: 508; Benedict 1967b: 7-8; Lowenthal 1987: 39; Srebrnik 2004: 334).  
 
6. Discussion and Conclusion 
Different from the two microstates that were discussed in previous chapters, the 
political system of Seychelles does not appear to fulfill all of Dahl’s conditions of 
polyarchy. In several ways, the stipulations of alternative sources of information 
and free and fair elections are not fully adhered to, and this makes it hard to 
disagree with Freedom House’s categorization of the microstate as only ‘partly 
free’. This however makes Seychelles a deviant case in relation to the other three 
microstates that are analyzed in this study, and also makes it somewhat 
complicated to assess the influence of size on Seychellois democracy. Many of the 
features that have been described in this chapter are comparable to the 
observations that were made in the chapters on San Marino and St. Kitts and 
Nevis, but are also in line with characteristics of larger illiberal, semi-, or pseudo-





Table 7.6: Seychelles’ Scoring on the Indicators of Contestation and Inclusiveness 
Dimension Section Indicator Classification of Seychelles 
Free and Fair 
Elections 
Disputed; governing party 
has significant advantage 
Party System Two-party system (ENP < 2); 









Does occur to some extent in 

















Has major negative 
consequences; victimization 
and climate of fear hinders 
supporters of the opposition. 
Freedom of the 
Press 
Press partially free (FotP-
score 56), weak and 
unprofessional 
Status of the 
Legislature 
Largely ineffective, not 
autonomous from 
government 
Status of the 
Judiciary 
Not impartial, often 





















Status of the 
Bureaucracy 
Oversized and influenced by 
government due to patronage 
Contact with and 
Access to 
Representatives 
Continuous contact and 
access 













feelings of Efficacy 
of Citizens 
Appears to be high 




(Very) high at elections 















No data, but appears to be 







In table 7.6, the main findings of this chapter are summarized on the basis 
of Seychelles’ scoring on the indicators of contestation and inclusiveness. Like in 
San Marino and St. Kitts and Nevis, Seychellois politics appears marked by the 
prevalence of personalism, polarization, and particularism. Although the two 
main Seychellois parties used to advocate entirely divergent ideological and 
programmatic standpoints, these differences now have all but disappeared, and 
the parties can primarily be distinguished on the basis of the different persons 
that lead them. Like in the Eastern Caribbean, the personalistic nature of politics 
leads to political polarization between the two Seychellois parties. Both because 
of the enduring dominance of the Parti Lepep and due to polarization and 
smallness, institutions that are supposed to function as a check on the power of 
the executive are either weak or to a significant extent controlled or neutered by 
the government. With regard to inclusiveness, higher figures of political 
participation can be observed in Seychelles, but participation appears to be to an 
extensive degree fueled by particularistic incentives.  
At present, out of twenty-one microstates with less than 250.000 
inhabitants, Seychelles is one of only two countries that are not classified as ‘free’ 
by Freedom House (the other one is the Kingdom of Tonga). As long as the Parti 
Lepep is not voted out of office this situation is unlikely to change, but perhaps it 
is telling that at least five respondents did not believe that the ruling party would 
ever accept such a peaceful transition of power. Whereas President Michel in his 
2011-reelection campaign promised to work on ‘En Nouvo Sesel’ (a new 
Seychelles), thus far the changes and reforms that his party has implemented 
have mostly been cosmetic rather than substantial. Although the analysis has 
revealed that Seychellois political dynamics are as a result of size in many 
respects comparable to those of the other two microstates, the country’s 
authoritarian past and its enduring political legacy clearly set Seychelles apart 


















The Republic of Palau 
 
 




1. Introduction: The Pacific, an Ocean of Democracy 
On 14 November 1993, in the eighth referendum that was held on the issue, 
68.4% of Palauan voters cast a ballot in favor of the proposed Compact of Free 
Association (COFA) of their country with the United States. As a consequence of 
this result, on the first of October 1994 the Republic of Palau became an 
independent state, and the last trusteeship in the world finally ceased to exist 
(Leibowitz 1996: 199). In the preceding fifteen years, the procedure of approval 
of the COFA had spawned seven referendums, numerous lawsuits, at least two 
political murders, and the complete polarization of Palauan society (Wilson 
1995: 34). Traditional leaders, women’s councils, and international 
environmental organizations spearheaded the opposition to the Compact, which 
was in conflict with the antinuclear provisions of the Palauan Constitution and 
therefore required the approval of 75% of Palauan voters (Gerston 1990: 180). 
Only after the United States-government decided to repeal and modify some of 
the nuclear stipulations in the COFA as a result of which the approval of an 
                                                





absolute majority of Palauans became sufficient to ratify the agreement, 
independence could finally be attained. Palau is as of yet the last Pacific island 
nation to acquire statehood, and as such is one of the youngest sovereign states 
in the world. 
 With a total population size of around 20.000 people, the Republic of 
Palau2 is the third smallest member-state of the United Nations in terms of 
population size.3 Located directly to the east of the Philippine island of Mindanao 
and to the north of the Indonesian part of New Guinea, Palau is the westernmost 
island nation of Oceania, and of the Oceanian sub-region of Micronesia.4 Whereas 
the country consists of more than 250 islands scattered over an exclusive 
economic zone (EEZ) of 629.000 square kilometers,5 Palau’s landmass covers a 
mere 488 square kilometers, and only about ten of its islands are inhabited 
(Davis and Hart 2002: 6-10). The largest island by far is Babeldaob, which 
occupies more than seventy percent of the country’s landmass (331 square 
kilometers), but houses less than thirty percent of the population (approximately 
6.000 people). The predominant part of the Palauan population lives in the 
village of Koror, which is spread out over the three islands of Koror, Malakal, and 
Ngerekebesang, and has about 13.000 inhabitants. Other inhabited islands are 
Peleliu (700 inhabitants), Angaur (300 inhabitants), Kayangel (190 inhabitants), 
and the remote southern islets of Sonsorol (100 inhabitants) and Hatohobei (or 
Tobi; 40 inhabitants).  
 Out of the total population of approximately 20.000 people, about seventy 
percent (or 14.000) are ethnically Palauan, whereas the remainder of the 
population consists of Asian (primarily Filipino) and other Micronesian 
immigrants and guest workers (CIA World Factbook 2011). The overwhelming 
majority of Palauans is Christian, but the number and share of denominations is 
quite extensive.6 Almost all Palauans are bilingual and master both English and 
                                                
2 Palau was formerly known under the name of ‘Pelew’, and in academic publications the country 
is occasionally alluded to as ‘Belau’, which is the name of the country in Palauan language. Since 
Palau is the archipelago’s official English name, the country will be referred to as such in this 
chapter. 
3 The two smallest member states are Tuvalu and Nauru, which both have approximately 10.000 
inhabitants (CIA World Factbook 2011). 
4 The islands of Oceania are commonly subdivided into the three geographically and culturally 
distinct sub-regions of Polynesia, Melanesia, and Micronesia (cf. Levine 2009: 10). Together with 
the various island groups that now constitute the independent nations of Nauru, Kiribati, the 
Marshall Islands, and the Federated States of Micronesia, as well as the US-controlled islands of 
Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, Palau is usually grouped in the 
region of Micronesia. 
5 This is comparable to the size of the U.S. state of Texas. 
6 According to the CIA World Factbook, 41.6% of the population is Roman Catholic, 23.3% is 





Palauan language, and the islands of Angaur, Sonsorol, and Hatohobei each have 
their own languages. Economically, Palau has been more successful than its 
Micronesian neighbors, and standards of living are well above the Pacific or 
Micronesian average.7 Because of overpopulation that is a consequence of 
increasing migration from other islands to Koror, and out of concerns about the 
dominance of this town in the country, in October 2006 the Palauan government 
decided to move the capital from Koror to the village of Ngerulmud (in Melekeok 
State on Babeldaob Island; Davis and Hart 2002: 8). 
 Together with the overwhelming majority of the other Pacific island 
nations, Palau is ranked as ‘free’ by Freedom House (2012). Out of the eleven 
independent island states in this region, eight are categorized as ‘free’, as a 
consequence of which some scholars refer to the region as an ‘ocean of 
democracy’ (cf. Reilly 2002: 355-357).8 Together with the (Eastern) 
Caribbean, which also predominantly consists of democratic microstates, the 
Pacific thereby stands out as the most successful region in the developing world 
when it comes to democratic governance, and according to several academics 
this observation provides evidence for the hypothesized connection between 
smallness and democracy (Diamond and Tsalik 1999; Srebrnik 2004; Anckar 
2008a). Whereas small Pacific island states have indeed scored remarkably well 
in Freedom House-ratings, the scholarly literature on Pacific democracy 
indicates that the political systems of these islands are also marked by a 
continuing struggle between traditional forms of leadership and modern 
democratic institutions (Ghai 1988; Larmour 1994; White and Lindstrom 1997; 
Levine and Roberts 2005; Duncan and Nakagawa 2006).  
 In the present chapter, the influence of size on politics and democracy in 
the Republic of Palau is examined along the lines of Dahl’s dimensions of 
contestation and inclusiveness (1971: 3-4). The analysis is based on field 
research that was conducted in Palau in July 2011, as part of which semi-
structured interviews were held with fifteen Palauan politicians, journalists, 
academics, traditional leaders, and legal officials.9 The chapter commences with 
an outline of Palau’s political history and democratization process, which is 
                                                                                                                                 
Mormons, and Latter-Day Saints (CIA World Factbook 2011). Less than ten percent of the 
population professes Modekngei, which is the indigenous Palauan animistic religion (Mita 2009: 
112). 
7 The country has a GDP per capita figure of US $8.100, which is much higher than both small and 
larger countries in the region (CIA World Factbook 2011: ; cf. footnote #26). 
8 Whereas all states in this region are comparatively small, it should be noted that the two most 
populated ones – Fiji and the Solomon Islands – are among the “partly free” countries, together 
with the Kingdom of Tonga which is a traditional hereditary monarchy. 





followed by a section in which the presence of democracy in contemporary Palau 
is explained by pointing to a number of contributing factors. Subsequently, an 
overview is given of Palau’s political-institutional structure. After this, four 
sections are devoted to an in-depth analysis of the effects of size on contestation 
and inclusiveness in Palau, and in sequence attention is paid to the role of 
cleavages, ideology, and political parties, the horizontal distribution of power 
between institutions, the relationship between Palauan citizens and politicians, 
and the characteristics of political participation. The chapter ends with a 
summary and discussion of the findings. 
 
2. Political History and Democratization of Palau 
The Republic of Palau shares the predominant part of its colonial history with 
the other islands of Micronesia. Like other islands in the region, a complex and 
well-developed culture and societal structure existed on the islands before the 
arrival of European navigators (Hassall 2009: 170). This social structure is 
primarily based on hierarchical relations between rivaling clans and extended 
families, and has to a significant extent remained intact throughout colonization 
(Gerston 1990: 178). At the heart of the traditional Palauan social system is the 
village, which was governed by a council of chiefs (the klobak). Each Palauan 
village was divided in two halves, which each were governed by half of the 
village-chiefs. Villages existed of between seven and eleven clans, which were 
ranked in hierarchy of importance, and of which membership was matrilineally 
determined (Wilson 1995: 4-5; Davis and Hart 2002: 40).10 Relationships 
between the clans in the village were marked by competition and the formation 
of (shifting) alliances, as a result of which the hierarchy between clans was 
continuously challenged and called in question.  
 Due to the fact that some clans formed alliances with clans from other 
villages, as a consequence of which inter-village warfare started to occur, 
eventually two federations (or ‘Kingdoms’) emerged in Palau. One of these is the 
‘Kingdom of the West’, which is headed by the Ibedul or High Chief of Koror, and 
the other one is the ‘Kingdom of the East’, which is led by the Reklai or High Chief 
of Melekeok (Leibowitz 1996: 9; Davis and Hart 2002: 39-41). The two Kingdoms 
and chiefs used to wage war with each other for domination of the islands, but 
neither succeeded in completely subordinating the other. In the traditional 
Palauan system village-chiefs are elected by councils of female elders (the 
ourrot), and decision-making is based on protracted discussions and the 
                                                
10 Which means that membership of the clan was passed down from one generation to the next 





attainment of consensus between the chiefs in the village bai er a rubak 
(discussion house). From their hierarchically fixed seats in the bai, the chiefs 
whispered their opinions to messengers who transferred them to other chiefs, in 
a style that is known in Palau as the kelulau or ‘way of whispers’.11   
 Although various ships from different European powers passed by the 
Palauan islands since at least the sixteenth century, the crew members of the 
British Antelope were the first Europeans to make contact with the Palauan 
population, after their vessel shipwrecked in Koror in 1783 (Leibowitz 1996: 
10). The Antelope’s captain Henry Wilson established cordial relations with the 
Ibedul of Koror,12 and the employment of British firearms against the forces of 
the Reklai altered the balance of power on Palau for good, as Koror became the 
dominant and most powerful village in the country. The Spanish and the 
Germans were however the first to actually claim and occupy the islands, and the 
Pope officially declared Palau to be Spanish territory in 1885 (Davis and Hart 
2002: 47). In subsequent years, Palau and the other Micronesian island groups of 
the Carolinas and the Marianas were (to varying degrees) administered by 
Spanish authorities on the Philippines,13 until the Spanish-American war of 1898. 
The Spanish colonizers did little to develop the islands economically, as they 
were primarily interested in converting the indigenous population to Catholicism 
(Wilson 1995: 21; Davis and Hart 2002: 44; Mita 2009: 79-80). The efforts of 
Spanish missionaries paid off, and up to the present day Catholicism is by far the 
most popular religion in Micronesia. 
 After the Spanish-American war, which was decisively won by the United 
States, many Spanish colonies14 came under American influence, whereas the 
Carolinas, Marianas, Marshalls, and Palau were purchased from Spain by 
Germany in 1899, and became part of German New Guinea (Deutsch 
Neuguinea).15 German interests in the islands centered principally on their 
natural resources, of which phosphate, bauxite, and copra were the most 
profitable ones (Quimby and Iyechad 1983: 107; Mita 2009: 80). During their 
                                                
11 As a matter of fact, the name of Palau’s present-day Congress is Olbiil Era Kelulau, which 
translates into “House of Whispered Decisions”. 
12 The relations between Captain Wilson and the Ibedul were so friendly that the Ibedul’s son 
Lebuu (Lee Boo) was subsequently brought to London by the Captain, where he learned English 
and eventually died as a consequence of smallpox (Davis and Hart 2002: 44). Wilson also gave 
the archipelago the name of “Pelew Islands”, but the origins of this name are unknown. 
13 The name of this colony was the Spanish East Indies (Indias Orientales Españolas), and the 
Philippines had already come under Spanish control in the 16th century.  
14 Among these were the Philippines and Guam in the Asia-Pacific region, and Cuba and Puerto 
Rico in the Caribbean.  
15 In addition to the Micronesian islands, the German colony of Deutsch Neuguinea consisted of 
the northeastern part of New Guinea (Kaiser Wilhelmsland), the Bismarck Archipelago (which 





relatively short administration of the islands, the Germans established a 
phosphate-industry on the Palauan island of Angaur, and the indigenous 
Micronesian population was deployed here to mine and transport phosphate. In 
addition, the Germans introduced a monetary system on the islands, in which 
money replaced the Palauan traditional currency of shells and corals (Davis and 
Hart 2002: 45). 
Following German defeat in the First World War and the 1919 Treaty of 
Versailles, Germany’s colonial possessions were reallocated to the various allied 
forces, and the separate parts of German New Guinea were distributed to 
Australia (Kaiser Wilhelmsland, the Bismarck Archipelago, and Nauru) and Japan 
(the Caroline, Mariana, Marshall, and Palau islands).16 The Japanese turned out to 
have different interests in Micronesia than the European colonizers, as they used 
the islands as strategic geopolitical locations from which the emergent Japanese 
Empire in Southeast Asia was expanded. Palau’s capital village of Koror became 
the administrative center and most important naval base of Japan in the Pacific,17 
and the Japanese swiftly modernized the islands by providing for education, 
hospitals, and infrastructure (Wilson 1995: 23-24; Leibowitz 1996: 14; Davis and 
Hart 2002: 45-47). Whereas the Japanese became notorious for their ruthless 
oppression of people in many other parts of Asia, Japan’s island possessions 
were regarded as an integral part of the Empire, and the Japanese government 
aggressively promoted migration to Micronesia. As a consequence, at the dawn of 
the Second World War the Palauans were a small minority in their own islands, 
where many Japanese and Koreans had settled in the preceding decades. 
Although Japan controlled the Micronesian islands for thirty years, the 
Second World War eventually terminated Japanese rule, when the islands were 
occupied by the American army in 1944. The battles for the Micronesian islands 
were particularly fierce and brutal, and since the headquarters of the Japanese 
navy in the Pacific were located in Palau, warfare reached its zenith here. From 
September to November 1944, Japanese and American forces fought over the 
southern Palauan islands of Peleliu and Angaur, which resulted in over 10.000 
Japanese casualties and approximately 2.000 American losses (Leibowitz 1996: 
19-22). The remaining native population of only 500 Palauans had fled into the 
                                                
16 Although the Treaty of Versailles of 1919 formally granted the control of German New Guinea 
to Australia and Japan, these countries had already occupied the German Pacific territories in 
1914, at the start of the First World War. After having been ruled by Spain and Germany, the 
Micronesian island groups (among which Palau), thus acquired their third colonial master within 
a few decades. 






rainforests of Babeldaob, and suffered from famine and starvation. The 
Americans were to become the fourth and ultimate colonial power of the islands, 
and succeeded in bringing them firmly under their sphere of influence. In table 
8.1, the four colonial administrations that ruled Palau have been presented. 
 
Table 8.1: The History of Palau; Four Colonial Administrations 
Colonial Power Time Span 
Spain 1885 - 1899 
Germany 1899 - 1914 
Japan 1914 - 1944 
United States 1944 - 1994 
 
In 1947, the United Nations established the Trust Territory of the Pacific 
Islands (TTPI) on the Micronesian islands, of which the administration was 
granted to the United States (Hinck 1990: 920; Hassall 2009: 171). The TTPI 
differed from other trust territories in the sense that it was explicitly a strategic 
trust territory, implying that the United States could use the territory for 
strategic goals and that the UN Security Council (instead of the General 
Assembly) was given the competence to formally terminate the trusteeship 
(Davis and Hart 2002: 50).18 Managing the islands mainly from a perspective of 
strategic military interest and using them as sites for nuclear testing,19 the 
United States initially did little to promote economic development on the islands. 
Only after mounting criticism from the United Nations and other international 
organizations in the early 1960s, Washington sharply increased its investments 
on the islands of the TTPI (Wilson 1995: 27-28). 
 In the 1950s Palau acquired its own municipal and national assemblies 
(the Olbiil Era Kelulau), of which decisions however had to be approved by the 
TTPI-administration (Davis and Hart 2002: 50-51). In accordance with the 
American determination to unify the Micronesian islands, the bicameral 
Congress of Micronesia was established in 1965, and throughout the TTPI 
elections were held that same year (Rosenberg 1996: 16). In advance to the 
elections the American administrators tried to establish political parties on 
Palau, but these were artificially imposed and therefore disintegrated within a 
                                                
18 The TTPI-authorities were until 1951 based on Guam, but after that year moved to Saipan on 
the Northern Marianas. 
19 US nuclear testing in Micronesia centered on the Marshall Islands, where the atolls of Bikini, 
Rongelap, Utrik, and Enewetak were used as test sites. The heaviest detonation took place on 
March 1, 1954, when Castle Bravo exploded on Bikini atoll, of which nuclear radiation fallout 
poisoned the indigenous island population of nearby atolls for decades to follow. The Marshallese 
population still suffers from extreme cancer rates in comparison with the rest of the world, as 





decade.20 Under the leadership of Palau’s most prominent politician, Roman 
Tmetuchl, a large part of the Palauan population opposed the establishment of 
the unified, federal Micronesia that was advocated by the Johnson and Nixon 
administrations (Leibowitz 1996: 27; Davis and Hart 2002: 56).21 Already in 
1972 the Northern Marianas decided not to seek independence but to forge 
closer relations with Washington instead, and these islands chose to become a 
commonwealth in political union with the United States. After fourteen years of 
negotiations and independence talks between the Congress of Micronesia and 
the US government an agreement for the Compact of Free Association (COFA) 
and Constitution of Micronesia was attained in 1978, but in referendums on the 
Marshall Islands and Palau this Constitution was rejected.22 
After the referendum had gained approval in the Caroline island groups of 
Yap, Chuuk, Pohnpei, and Kosrae, these islands united to form the Federated 
States of Micronesia (Hanlon and Eperiam 1983: 88-89; Burdick 1988: 256-258; 
Petersen 2009: 46-47). Palau and the Marshalls, by contrast, entered separate 
stages of negotiations to establish their own Compacts with the United States.23 
As a consequence of the negative referendum outcome Palauans started drafting 
their own Constitution, of which the outcome was a definite blow to US-strategic 
interests. The draft Constitution prohibited the lease of lands to another power 
for military purposes and ruled out nuclear testing or the stalling of nuclear 
weapons on Palauan soil without the approval of three quarters of the Palauan 
people (Constitution of Palau 1981: Art. II: 3; Wilson 1995: 31-32; Leibowitz 
1996: 30-34). The United States immediately declared its opposition to the 
Constitution, and threatened to cancel all of its funding to Palau. Nevertheless, in 
a referendum the proposed Constitution was approved by 92 percent of the 
                                                
20 In 1963, the contemporary American district administrator in Palau, Manuel Godinez urged for 
the creation of two political parties, named the Liberal and Progressive Party. The parties had 
their own candidates in the Congress of Micronesia, but could not be distinguished on the basis of 
different ideas or ideologies, even though this is suggested by their names. After the TTPI 
fragmented into four different polities, the Palauan parties disappeared from the political scene 
(Davis and Hart 2002: 118). 
21 The people on the various Micronesian islands speak different languages and have completely 
different cultures and traditions (Leibowitz 1996: 27). Therefore, the American policy of 
‘Micronization’ (cf. Gerston 1990: 177) was artificial and doomed to fail from the beginning 
onward. 
22 In Palau Tmetuchl led the separatist group to victory, and the Constitution was defeated by 55 
to 45 percent.  
23 Although nationalist sentiments evidently played a role in the negative referendum outcome in 
Palau and the Marshalls, there was an economical reason to it as well. The United States planned 
to continue using its strategic military bases on Palau and the Marshall Islands, and had no such 
bases in Yap, Chuuk, Pohnpei, and Kosrae. The populations and politicians of Palau and the 
Marshalls were unwilling to lose or share the financial compensations that followed from the 





Palauan people, and in 1980 Haruo Remeliik was elected as the first President of 
Palau.24  
 Following ratification of the Constitution, difficult and protracted 
negotiations on a COFA began with the United States. Whereas Palau’s most 
prominent politicians (Remeliik, Tmetuchl, and Salii) and the majority of citizens 
eventually declared their support for the proposed COFA, in seven referendums 
over a period of fifteen years it never managed to obtain approval of 75 percent 
of the Palauan electorate (Gerston 1990; Leibowitz 1996). Political tensions in 
Palau mounted, and various lawsuits accompanied by strikes, violence, and the 
division of the entire Palauan society ensued. President Remeliik was 
assassinated in 1985, and his successor, Lazarus Salii, committed suicide in 1988 
after corruption allegations and mounting pressure and failure to gain approval 
for the COFA (Davis and Hart 2002: 73-75).25 Whereas the Republic of the 
Marshall Islands (RMI) and the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) obtained 
independence in 1986 subsequent to the approval of their respective COFA’s 
with the United States, Palau remained the sole UN-trust territory in the world. 
 In 1993 the newly elected Clinton-administration in the United States 
repealed and modified some of the nuclear stipulations in the COFA, as a 
consequence of which only a simple majority was needed for its ratification. On 
November 14, 1993, a majority of over 68 percent of Palauan voters endorsed 
the Compact, after which the Republic of Palau became an independent nation 
and a UN-member on 1 October 1994 (Leibowitz 1996: 216; Davis and Hart 
2002: 75-76; Hassall 2009: 170-171). Since then, Palauan politics have become 
more tranquil, although factionalism, polarization, and intrigues continue to 
characterize politics in the archipelago (Shuster 1994: 197-198). After having 
observed some of the errors that politicians in the nearby FSM and RMI made 
with regard to their COFA-funds, Palauan politicians have used their resources 
more shrewdly, as a result of which Palau is now economically much more 
successful than its neighbors (Mita 2009: 161).26  
In recent years Palau has vied to establish a lucrative tourist industry, and 
the number of visitors to the islands rose sharply in the 1990s and 2000s. After 
brief negotiations, in 2010 the Palauan government agreed with a prolongation 
                                                
24 Whereas Tmetuchl was still the country’s most popular and prominent leader, various clans 
and interest groups opposed his dominant position, and supported the less sophisticated but 
more nationalistic Haruo Remeliik for President (Leibowitz 1996: 29, 36). 
25 In addition, 1982 an assassination attempt was made on Roman Bedor, a prominent Palauan 
lawyer and opponent of the COFA, that instead of him killed his father Bedor Bins. 
26 Whereas Palau has a GDP per capita-level of US $8.100, the figure for RMI is $2.500 and that for 
FSM $2.200. Palau’s GDP per capita-figures are also much higher than those of larger neighboring 





of the COFA with the United States, which envisages the assignment of US $250 
million in economic assistance up to 2024. The country briefly made it to world 
headlines in June 2009, when President Toribiong agreed to ‘temporary resettle’ 
seventeen former Uyghur detainees of Guantánamo Bay detention camp on 
Palau, whom the United States refused to repatriate to China. Since Palau has 
diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan and not with 
the People’s Republic, resettling the Uyghurs on Palau provided a very practical 
solution to the US-government. In table 8.2, an overview is provided of Palauan 
presidential elections since 1980, in which votes and vote percentages of the 
winner and runner-up of each presidential election are presented. 
 
Table 8.2: Presidential Election Results in Palau27 
Year Winner Votes Runner-Up Votes 
1980 Haruo Remeliik 1.955 (31.2%) Roman Tmetuchl 1.608 (25.7%) 
1984 Haruo Remeliik 4.050 (50.9%) Roman Tmetuchl 2.482 (31.2%) 
1985 Lazarus Salii 4.077 (53.9%) Alfonso Oiterong 3.484 (46.1%) 
1988 Ngiratkel Etpison 2.392 (26.3%) Roman Tmetuchl 2.361 (26.0%) 
1992 Kuniwo Nakamura 4.841 (50.7%) Johnson Toribiong 4.707 (49.3%) 
1996 Kuniwo Nakamura 6.052 (64.3%) Yutaka Gibbons 3.356 (35.7%) 
2000 Tommy Remengesau 5.596 (53.2%) Peter Sugiyama 4.922 (47.8%) 
2004 Tommy Remengesau 3.443 (63.6%) Polycarp Basilius 1.960 (36.4%) 
2008 Johnson Toribiong 4.942 (51.1%) Elias Chin 4.726 (48.9%) 
 
3. Explaining Democracy in Palau 
Now that the most momentous events in Palauan political history have been 
outlined, in this section an attempt is made to list a number of factors that 
contribute to or explain Palauan democracy. Similar to St. Kitts and Nevis and 
Seychelles, democracy was brought to Palau by Western colonial 
administrations; in this case the United States. As the eminent Pacific scholar 
Peter Larmour points out (1994), in this sense democracy in the Pacific region 
was imported as a ‘foreign flower’, that had to root in the soil of Pacific island 
states. Whereas pre-colonial systems of rule in the Pacific often allowed for a 
significant degree of participation of citizens, these systems were predominantly 
based on the authority of traditional leaders, mostly called ‘chiefs’ in the Pacific 
context (White and Lindstrom 1997: 1-5). The Palauan pre-colonial political 
system was democratic to the extent that decision-making was based on 
consensus and discussions between various chiefs, which means that minimum 
degrees of contestation and inclusiveness were present. Political participation 
                                                
27 Data retrieved from the website of International IDEA (International IDEA 2011). A second 
round between the top-two candidates was introduced in 1992, as a result of which one 





was however limited to traditional leaders, whose chiefly titles were hereditarily 
passed on. This means that most of the people (the commoners) were excluded 
from participation. 
 Whereas St. Kitts and Nevis has been ruled by one colonial power and 
Seychelles by two, in approximately one hundred years Palau witnessed four 
colonial administrations. At least two of these colonial authorities were markedly 
non-democratic themselves (Germany and Japan), which means that the 
Americans were the ones who eventually carried democracy to the islands. The 
United States initiated and supervised the establishment of the Congress of 
Micronesia in 1965, which was the first democratically elected institution on the 
islands. However controversial the subsequent process of decolonization may 
have been, the establishment of a democratic political system based on the 
American model was never in question, and was also strongly encouraged by the 
United States (Wilson 1995: ix-x, 7). This is also strongly reflected in the extent 
to which the current Palauan political system resembles that of the United States, 
as will be demonstrated in the following section. 
 According to the academic literature, the process of decolonization in the 
Pacific took place on the basis of different logics and mechanisms than 
decolonization in Africa and Asia, which is primarily a result of differences in size 
(Baldacchino 1993: 31). In contrast to larger ex-colonies, Pacific island states had 
relatively weak independence movements, and the attainment of independence 
was more often a wish of the colonial power than of the people in the colony 
itself (Mita 2009: 188-189). As a consequence, the process of decolonization in 
the Pacific was much less confrontational, chaotic, and violent than elsewhere, 
and this has been advanced as a major factor in explaining the prevalence of 
democracy in the region (Baldacchino 1993: 30-34). In light of the problematic 
and often dramatic process of decolonization in Palau, this argument however 
appears to bear less relevance to this microstate.  
 Several scholars have sought to explain the prevalence of democracy in 
small states on the basis of their geographical proximity and linkages with larger 
democratic powers (Sutton and Payne 1993: 589; Masala 2004; Levitsky and 
Way 2005). Both because of its colonial history and the country’s continuing 
strategic-military significance to the United States, democracy in Palau appears 
to be largely guaranteed by the scope of its economic and political relations with 
the US (Wilson 1995: 30).28 In the academic literature, the autonomy of Palau 
                                                
28 In fact, Wilson believes that the United States deliberately vies to ensure that Palau remains 





(and the FSM and RMI) is sometimes even questioned, because of the limits to 
sovereignty that follow from these countries’ COFA’s with the United States (Mita 
2009: 98).29 Under the rules of the Compact, the United States is the only nation 
that can have military access to Palau’s territory and maritime zone, Palau has to 
consult with the United States about the conduct of its foreign affairs, and the 
country maintains the US dollar as its currency (Palau Compact of Free 
Association 1986: Sections 123, 251, 311, and 321). Because of these reasons, 
both the academic literature and respondents assert that Palau is financially, 
economically, politically, and in terms of security almost completely dependent 
on the United States, which means that the American influence on domestic 
Palauan politics is at least potentially quite significant. 
Whereas military coups d’état or uprisings have in recent decades 
occurred in larger Pacific island states such as the Solomon Islands and Fiji (both 
in 2000), both Australia and the United States have declared their readiness to 
intervene should something similar happen in a smaller Pacific island state 
(Kabutaulaka 2005; Connell 2006b). Multiple Palauan respondents indeed 
asserted that the United States would indeed never accept the establishment of 
an authoritarian regime on Palau, especially because instability in Palau would 
imperil US strategic interests in the region.30 Due to the stipulations and 
regulations of the COFA, the disciplining influence of the United States on 
Palauan democracy appears to be even greater than in St. Kitts and Nevis and 
Seychelles.  
Like that of other microstates, the foreign policy of Palau can principally 
be understood according to the logics of the international patron-client model 
(cf. Carney 1989). The United States unmistakably functions as the main 
international patron of Palau, and by means of the COFA continues to support the 
microstate both economically and militarily. All my respondents and secondary 
sources confirm that in exchange for this support, Palau not only allows the US 
army and navy to use its territory, but also streamlines its foreign policy with 
                                                                                                                                 
implement policies that create economic dependency in order to ensure the United States’ 
permanent access to the islands for military purposes” (1995: 29). 
29 According to Mita, “[i]t is controversial whether Palau is a full sovereign state or not. This is 
because Palau does not possess defense and security rights, which are crucial and fundamental 
elements of a modern sovereign state” (2009: 100). In fact, paradoxically in 1960 the UN General 
Assembly adopted a resolution (no. 1541 XV) in which the political status of ‘freely associated 
state’ is not considered to be full independence. Nevertheless, upon ratification of their Compacts 
Palau, the FSM and the RMI were accepted as UN-member states. 
30 As one chief I discussed the matter with remarked, “[t]he politicians say that we are 
independent, but they are in the government. But the regular people and the chiefs don’t feel that 
we are independent; we are still at the mercy of the United States. (…) They [the United States, 





that of the Americans. This is most clearly the case in the UN General Assembly, 
where Palau is in 2011 with over 96 percent of congruence the UN-member state 
whose voting behavior matches most closely with that of the United States.31 In 
addition to the United States, the establishment of diplomatic relations with 
Taiwan in 1999 has resulted in significant investments to Palau from this 
country, and also Japan has made noteworthy financial contributions to the 
development of the microstate.32 
Even though democratic institutions have now been employed in Palau 
for a couple of decades, tensions continue to persist between democratically 
elected leaders and traditional leaders with hereditary titles (Shuster 1994: 202; 
Rosenberg 1996: 17; Mita 2009: 139-140). According to Erica Rosenberg, this 
actually means that democratic institutions are “not fully embraced by or 
assimilated into Palauan society” (1996: 17). This opinion is shared by Lynn 
Wilson, who asserts that the introduction of Western democratic institutions 
brought confusion to Palau, because there are now two sets of leaders who also 
derive their legitimacy from different sources (1995: 7). According to many 
sources, clan relations, traditional titles, and customs and rituals continue to 
determine the course of Palauan politics, and there is little evidence that the 
importance or relevance of these factors is declining as an effect of the 
introduction of democratic institutions. If this is indeed the case, the persistence 
of Western-style democracy appears to be primarily an effect of the continuing 
American influence and control on Palauan politics. 
 
4. Political Institutions of Palau 
Analogous to the extent to which the Westminster system of St. Kitts and Nevis 
resembles that of its former colonizer, Palauan political institutions are almost 
completely modeled on the American example. The microstate is a presidential 
republic, with a directly elected President as both head of state and head of 
government. Presidents can serve for maximally two terms of four years, and 
                                                
31 According to Palau’s Ambassador to the United Nations, in 2011 Palau in this regard overtook 
Israel, as 96.5 percent of Palau’s votes were in line with the Americans against 91.8 percent of 
Israel’s votes. 
32 Like other microstates among which St. Kitts and Nevis, Palau endorses Taiwan’s bid to 
become a UN-member state, and the country receives ample financial and economical aid in 
exchange for doing so. In this sense, Palau is playing what Stringer calls ‘the two-China game’, as 
part of which it plays out the two Chinas against each other by occasionally threatening to switch 
its support for either of them (Shuster 2000: 219; Stringer 2006). Partly as an apology for the 
past and partly in exchange for political support for issues such as whale-hunting, Japan’s 
government has also been very generous to Palau since the microstate’s independence. The main 
example in this light is the fact that Japan paid and constructed a new bridge that links Koror to 





presidential elections are traditionally held on exactly the same day as in the 
United States (Constitution of Palau 1981: Art. VIII: 4). Unlike the United States, 
with the exception of the most recent presidential election (in 2008) separate 
elections are held in Palau to elect a Vice-President (Hassall 2009: 173).33 
Presidential and Vice-Presidential elections are held under the two-round runoff 
system, with the two candidates receiving most votes in the first round 
progressing to the second round.34  
 As in other presidential systems, the ministers in the government of Palau 
are appointed by the President upon the advice and consent of the Senate 
(Constitution of Palau 1981: Art. VIII: 5). Ministers cannot combine their function 
with membership of one of the two Houses of parliament, and according to the 
Constitution they “shall serve at the will of the President” (ibid.). In addition to 
appointing ministers, the President has the constitutional authority to appoint 
judges, ambassadors, and the Public Auditor, to declare the state of emergency, 
to propose the annual budget, to sign and ratify laws, and to establish 
agreements with other nations (Constitution of Palau 1981: Art. VIII: 7). In 
contrast to Seychelles, the Palauan President however does not have the 
competence to dissolve the legislature, and has less influence in the appointment 
of the commissions that nominates people to important posts.35 
 The Palauan legislature (the National Congress or Olbiil Era Kelulau (OEK) 
in Palauan) is bicameral, and consists of a thirteen-member Senate and a sixteen-
member House of Delegates (Davis and Hart 2002: 167-168; Hassall 2009: 170). 
In contrast to the United States the Palauan House of Delegates is devised for the 
representation of states, and each of Palau’s sixteen states is represented by one 
delegate in the House, elected under the rules of the first-past-the-post plurality 
system in single-member constituencies (Constitution of Palau 1981: Art. IX: 3; 
Levine and Roberts 2005: 280-281). The thirteen senators, by contrast, are 
elected in one nation-wide constituency under the block vote (plurality-at-large) 
system. Palauan presidents, senators, and delegates all serve four year-terms, 
and presidential and parliamentary elections are held simultaneously. Each 
                                                
33 During the Second Constitutional Convention of 2005, the regulation that provided for separate 
Vice-Presidential elections was modified, and it was decided that candidates should run on a joint 
ticket. The elections of 2008 occurred under this new rule, but since many people were 
unsatisfied with it, the modification was repelled immediately after the elections. 
34 Until the 1992 elections Palau employed the first-past-the-post plurality system to elect its 
President, but in advance to this election the two-round system was introduced in order to 
ensure that one candidate obtains at least a majority of the expressed votes. 
35 The Judicial Nominating Commission, which has the task to nominate judges, consists for 
example of seven members, of which only three are appointed by the President, and the others 





House of parliament elects a presiding officer (or Speaker) from amongst its 
members, and there are no fixed rules on the division of tasks and competences 
between the two Houses. If the combined number of MPs from both Houses is 
taken, twenty-nine MPs represent Palau’s population of 20.000 people, which 
translates into a ratio of less than 700 people per Member of Parliament.36  
 Similar to several other countries in Micronesia and the Pacific, no 
political parties exist in Palau (cf. Anckar and Anckar 2000; Rich et al. 2006).37 
Whereas political groupings have existed in the past, these were enforced by the 
American administrators, organized primarily along clan lines, and disintegrated 
already before the attainment of independence (Davis and Hart 2002: 118-119). 
At present Palauan politicians all run and serve as independents, which means 
that there are no formalized government and opposition groupings in the 
Palauan legislature. Whereas this situation could be hypothesized to generate 
political instability, informal coalitions between MPs exist in the Senate and the 
House of Delegates, and these allegiances are primarily based on clan and family 
relationships (Shuster 1994: 197-198). In the subsequent section more attention 
will be paid to the role of cleavages and ideology in Palauan politics, and also to 
these informal political alliances. 
 The judicial sector of Palau also strongly resembles that of the United 
States, with a Supreme Court that is headed by a Chief Justice, and a number of 
‘inferior courts of limited jurisdiction’ (Constitution of Palau 1981: Art. X: 1; 
Davis and Hart 2002: 183-184). In addition, the Palauan Constitution calls for the 
establishment of a National Court, but this has proven not to be needed and has 
therefore never become part of the country’s judiciary. Palauan judges are 
appointed for life by the President upon the advice of the Judicial Nominating 
Commission, and just like in the three previously examined microstates they 
have often been nationals of another country, most commonly the United States 
(Hassall 2009: 172). Since the ratification of the Constitution in 1981, Palau’s 
Chief Justices have however been Palauans, who both received their education at 
American universities.  
                                                
36 In most of such calculations for bicameral systems however, only the MPs from the lower 
House of parliament are taken in consideration. If the Palauan Senate can be seen as the lower 
House (since the House of Delegates provides for the representation of states), the number of 
citizens per each of the thirteen MPs would rise to a little over 1.500. 
37 In addition to Palau, the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, and 
Tuvalu have no political parties, whereas loose groupings of parliamentarians that hardly 
deserve the label of political party exist in Kiribati, Samoa, and Tonga. The absence of parties in 
these democratic microstates disproves Schattschneider’s thesis that “modern democracy is 





In addition to the three branches of government that have been adopted 
from the American presidential system, Palau has a fourth branch of government, 
which consists of the sixteen-member Council of Chiefs (Constitution of Palau 
1981: Art. VIII:  6; Davis and Hart 2002: 159; Hassall 2009: 174-175).38 Although 
this Council is often perceived to be a remnant of the pre-modern Palauan 
system, it was actually created by the American administrators. In the Council, 
which is jointly presided over by High Chief Ibedul and High Chief Reklai, the 
highest chief from each of Palau’s sixteen states is represented. According to the 
Constitution, the Council of Chiefs has the competence to advise the President on 
matters of tradition and custom. In addition, High Chiefs Ibedul and Reklai 
typically accompany the President during official meetings and ceremonies, and 
are occasionally referred to as Palau’s ‘royalty’ (e.g. Gerston 1990: 178). Whereas 
the constitutional role of the Council of Chiefs is restricted to advising the 
President on matters of custom and tradition (Constitution of Palau 1981: Art. 
VIII: 6), in practice the Council also often meets with senators, delegates, and 
ministers, either on the instigation of the Council itself, or on the initiative of 
elected politicians (Shuster 1994: 193; Hassall 2009: 175). The Council of Chiefs 
convenes at least once a month in sessions that are closed to the general public. 
In addition to the national layer of government, in line with the American 
model Palau is subdivided into sixteen states, which have a fairly extensive 
degree of autonomy (Davis and Hart 2002: 199-200; Mita 2009: 135).39 Every 
state maintains its own Governor, executive branch, state legislature, traditional 
leaders, state treasury, and bureaucracy, and as can be seen in table 8.3 the 
composition of state governments differs from state to state. In general however, 
it can be said that traditional leaders exercise much more power on the state 
level than on the national level, and in several states chiefs are clearly more 
powerful than elected officials (Shuster 1994; Rosenberg 1996: 16; Davis and 
Hart 2002: 202-204).40 The fact that every state maintains its own set of 
institutions is often regarded as inefficient, since most states have less than five 
hundred inhabitants (Mita 2009: 135). An extreme example is the state of 
Hatohobei, which has a population of only around forty souls, but maintains a 
nine-member legislature, a Governor, a Lieutenant-Governor, traditional leaders, 
                                                
38 This Council is called Rubekul Belau in Palauan. 
39 The Constitution determines that state legislatures have the power to impose taxes and to 
borrow money to finance public programs (Constitution of Palau 1981: Art. XI: 3-4). In addition, 
the national government may constitutionally delegate powers to the state government. In 
comparison to US states the powers of Palauan states vis-à-vis the national governments are 
rather restricted, as will be explained in more detail in section 4.2 of this chapter. 
40 The most obvious example is the state of Ngatpang, in which the legislature is entirely and 





a legislative clerk, a treasurer, a Hatohobei Island projects supervisor, and two 
officials in charge of Hatohobei Island maintenance. 
 
 Table 8.3: The Sixteen States of Palau and their Governments 
 
As the present overview of Palau’s political-institutional framework 
reveals, the country’s (modern) democratic system is in coexistence with a 
centuries-old traditional system of government. Although the Constitution 
clearly establishes the supremacy of democratically elected institutions over 
traditional ones, both secondary sources and all my interviewees point to the 
continuing influence and authority of traditions and traditional leadership 
(Shuster 1994: 193; Hassall 2009: 174). In addition, academic publications about 
politics and democracy in the broader Pacific region highlight a number of 
political features and practices that can potentially harm democratic 
development, such as the prevalence of clientelism (Duncan and Nakagawa 
2006), the lingering authority of non-elected traditional leadership (Haglelgam 
                                                
41 According to the 2000 Palauan census (Davis and Hart 2002: 202-203). 
State Area Population41 Elected MPs Traditional Leaders 
Aimeliik 52 km2 270 9 Council of Chiefs 
Airai 44 km2 2.723 15 Council of Chiefs 
Angaur 8 km2 320 5, + 4 chiefs 4 Chiefs in legislature 
Hatohobei 3 km2 44 9 Council of Chiefs 
Kayangel 3 km2 188 12 Council of Chiefs, Chief 
Rdechor is Head of State 
Koror 65 km2 12.676 16 Male + Female Council of 
Chiefs 
Melekeok 28 km2 391 5, + 10 chiefs Chiefs are majority in 
legislature, Chief Reklai  
has executive power 
Ngaraard 36 km2 581 10, + 5 chiefs 5 Chiefs in legislature 
Ngarchelong 10 km2 488 8, + 8 chiefs 8 Chiefs in legislature, 
Chief Uong-Er-Tei is Head 
of State 
Ngardmau 47 km2 166 9 Council of Chiefs 
Ngatpang 65 km2 317 -, 10 chiefs Only Chiefs in legislature, 
Chief Rebelkuul Head of 
State 
Ngchesar 47 km2 464 9, + 8 chiefs 8 Chiefs in legislature, 
Chief Ngirakebou Head of 
State 
Ngeremlengui 41 km2 254 11 Council of Chiefs 
Ngiwal 26 km2 223 7, + 10 chiefs Chiefs are majority in 
legislature 
Peleliu 13 km2 702 10, + 5 chiefs 5 Chiefs in legislature 
Sonsorol 3 km2 100 6, + 4 chiefs 4 Chiefs in legislature 





1998), the pervasiveness of corruption (Larmour 2005), and authoritarian, Big 
Man-style leadership (McLeod 2007).42 In the following sections, the 
applicability of this literature to Palauan politics will be examined by analyzing 
the influence of size on contestation and inclusiveness in this Pacific microstate. 
 
5. The Influence of Size on Democracy in Palau 
Whereas Dahl’s dimension of contestation can be translated into the presence of 
a political opposition (Dahl 1971: 3-4), the absence of a party system in Palau 
obfuscates attempts to examine the opposition, if it exists in the first place. In 
addition, indicators like party system fragmentation and alternation in office are 
either hard or impossible to measure in a situation in which no parties exist. In 
spite of these conditions however, both parliamentary and presidential elections 
in Palau have been contested by multiple individuals, which indicates that voters 
do have the opportunity to choose between different alternatives. Since both 
secondary sources and all my respondents confirmed that elections in Palau are 
free and fair, it can furthermore be ascertained that contestation is sincere, and 
that challengers to the incumbent politicians have a real chance of gaining office. 
According to Freedom House, which is the only aggregate index of democracy 
that does not exclude Palau, the country acquires most favorable scores on both 
political rights and civil liberties (Freedom House 2012).43 
 With regard to inclusiveness, the Palauan Constitution ensures that adult 
citizens have both active and passive suffrage rights. Whereas every Palauan 
citizen of at least eighteen years has the right to vote in both national and state 
elections, the minimum age for membership of parliament is twenty-five, and in 
order to contest presidential elections a candidate must at least be thirty-five 
years of age (Constitution of Palau 1981: Art. VIII: 3; IX: 6). Although the 
restrictions on passive suffrage rights are thereby somewhat higher than in the 
other microstates, in general it can be concluded that the Palauan system is, at 
least legally, inclusive to its citizens. In order to comprehensively investigate the 
effects of size on contestation and inclusiveness however, in the following 
sections an analysis is provided of the role of cleavages and ideologies, the 
horizontal balance of power between institutions, citizen-politician relations, and 
the characteristics of political participation and elections in Palau. 
                                                
42 In addition, in a cautionary article that was published in 2000 and is ominously titled the 
‘Africanisation of the South Pacific’, Ben Reilly observes a negative trend with regard to 
democratic development in the region (Reilly 2000). 
43 Since its independence in 1994, Palau has always received a score of 1 on both Freedom 







5.1. Contestation: The Role of Cleavages and Ideology, and the Absence of Parties 
In the absence of political parties, elections in Palau are exclusively contested by 
independent politicians. Parliamentary and presidential elections are held once 
in every four years, and on the state level elections are organized once in two, 
three, or four years.44 Since the President of Palau has the constitutional right to 
appoint the ministers in his government, the presidential election indirectly also 
constitutes a vote for the entire Palauan executive. As a consequence of passive 
suffrage rights, which are however due to age limits somewhat restricted, most 
Palauans have the right to take part in contestation and to stand for election. This 
means that the Palauan constitutional framework offers virtually all the 
opportunities for meaningful political competition to occur, and that political 
alternatives are at least legally and formally available to the Palauan electorate.  
The population of Palau is religiously and ethnically rather diverse, and 
the country receives a score of 0.43 in Alesina et al.’s fractionalization index 
(Alesina et al. 2003).45 Since the thirty percent of non-Palauans however do not 
have voting rights, on the basis of my interview data it appears that these 
societal cleavages are not really politicized.46 Since the articulation of interests 
on the aggregate party-level does not exist in Palau, individual politicians each 
campaign and fulfill their mandates based on their own political platforms. 
Fourteen of the fifteen respondents indicated that in doing so, individual 
politicians hardly campaign on the basis of substantial political issues, and often 
do not have a specific political program to run on. Whereas previous chapters 
have demonstrated that the absence of ideological demarcations in San Marino, 
St. Kitts and Nevis, and Seychelles has led to the prevalence of personalistic 
politics in these microstates, in Palau the absence of parties necessarily and 
automatically generates a personalized political environment as well. In contrast 
to the other microstates however, the Palauan political environment is primarily 
determined by clan-membership and inter- and intra-clan relationships, which 
according to Larry Gerston essentially assume the role of political parties (1990: 
                                                
44 The states of Angaur and Kayangel organize elections every two years, Ngatpang and Peleliu 
once in three years, and the other Palauan states once every four years (Davis and Hart 2002: 
206). 
45 This index measures ethnic, religious, and linguistic fractionalization, and ranges between 1 
and 0, with 0 indicating the absence of fractionalization, and 1 indicating a completely 
fractionalized society.  
46 Whereas thirty percent of the Palauan population consists of foreigners, these people have no 
suffrage rights and are therefore not represented in Palauan politics. In recent years tensions 





178). This is also confirmed by one of the politicians whom I interviewed, who 
pointed out that: 
 
“They [the US TTPI-administration, WV] tried political parties, but it never really 
matured and did not become strong because of the clan system. The clan system is 
absolutely more predominant and stronger than parties.” 
 
The vision expressed in this quote is shared by all fifteen of my 
respondents, of whom many also indicated that political alliances between 
politicians are primarily based on clan and family relationships (cf. Shuster 1994: 
197-198). As a consequence, the absence of political parties has not led to a 
hopelessly instable or unstructured political state of affairs in Palau, and virtually 
all of the people I interviewed could consistently indicate which MPs supported 
the government and which ones belonged to the informal ‘opposition’.  Because 
these political alliances are based on kinship- or clan-relations instead of 
ideological congruence or agreement, although invisible to an outsider these 
bonds are arguably even stronger than political parties. A wide majority of my 
respondents indicated that government-opposition dynamics are principally 
determined by clan relationships and the hierarchy between clans, and that 
politicians virtually never act against the interests of their own clans. In any case, 
on the basis of interviews it can be asserted that a political opposition has always 
been present in both Houses of the Palauan legislature. 
 Since interviews with Palauan respondents reveal that political dynamics 
and inter-elite relations are all primarily determined by clan membership, 
political ideas, programs, and policies appear to play an even more marginal role 
in Palau than in the other microstates. During my interviews, Palauan ministers 
and (former) members of the Senate and House of Delegates were unable to say 
which sort of ideology or ideas they supported and articulated, and could not 
even say whether they thought of themselves as being more left-wing or right-
wing, or more progressive or conservative. In short, as one journalist mentioned; 
 
“It’s really hard to pin them [Congressmen, WV] down on any particular ideology; 
they kind of move back and forth. I guess that is in a nutshell the whole politics of 
Palau.” 
 
According to some respondents, the formal institutional structure of Palau 
obscures the fact that politics is essentially personality-driven. As a high-ranking 
public official emphasized; 
 
“Many people say that in Palau you have an American system. But you know, it’s 
sort of like a façade. You can’t say that they don’t follow the rules and regulations, 







Since clan relations are the driving factor of Palauan politics, political candidates 
are not induced to present any political platform or manifesto in advance to 
elections. Most candidates announce their candidacy in the (social) media, and in 
doing so make a number of pledges and promises on varying issues. Even if 
candidates do announce programmatic issues in their election campaigns, it 
appears that they are not really held accountable to them, as one politician and 
traditional leader explains: 
 
“Everybody has a platform and ideas, but they forget them when they come to office. 
(…) They are not elected because of this, but because of family and clan 
relationships, and their personality.” 
 
Since contestation is thus personalistic rather than programmatic, political 
representation is also not based on substantive responsiveness, but appears to 
be descriptive or symbolic instead (cf. Pitkin 1967). When asked about it, 
respondents pointed out that there are no substantial differences between clans 
in terms of political preferences, and that the competition is in that sense 
primarily a struggle for power and control among clans rather than for the 
realization of specific political interests. This means that the articulation of 
substantive political interests appears to be virtually absent in Palau, as no 
substantive political cleavages exist in the country.   
Whereas various scholars hypothesize that small states have a more 
accommodating and consensus-oriented political culture, virtually all available 
sources indicate that Palauan politics is highly competitive, divisive, and 
polarized (Quimby and Iyechad 1983: 103, 108). According to the Palau-
specialist Donald Shuster, “[c]ompetition, factionalism, and intrigue characterize 
nearly all political activity in Palau. (…) There have been intense clan rivalries” 
(1994: 197-198). Interviewees from different backgrounds confirm this 
observation, and also highlight how personal relations can impede on rational 
decision-making; 
 
 “I would say that Palauan politics is very emotional, that the personalities are a 
very big part of the politics. (…) Interpersonal relations become part of how the 
discussion will be successful or not. So the success of policy-making is much more 
sort of a politicking process; all really depends on how well the people are cordial.” 
 
Within the clan-hierarchy some clans are traditionally more dominant than 
others, and members of the largest and most influential clans are usually most 
successful at the polls (Gerston 1990: 178). The current Palauan president 





clans and families,47 and is presently supported by a majority of senators and 
delegates, many of whom are in some way related to him. Furthermore, multiple 
respondents emphasize that the sheer size of the clan in large part determines a 
candidate’s electoral success, as the following politician points out; 
 
“It is very much those who have big families and clans, you know that they will win 
for sure. (…) A social network normally runs through the family and the clan, and so 
if you don’t have that as your base to run, it’s very slim to none for you to win”. 
 
This quote also accurately indicates that voting behavior in Palau is chiefly based 
on clan and family-relations, and more attention will be paid to this issue in 
section 4.4. 
  While contestation for elected offices in Palau is thus strong and 
divisive, respondents asserted that the same is true for the selection of 
traditional leaders. Palauan chiefs are traditionally selected by councils of female 
elders (Wilson 1995: 5; Hassall 2009: 175), and usually a choice has to be made 
between a handful of potential heirs to a deceased chief. Although this selection 
is by no means democratic, various interviewees point out that a certain degree 
of contestation for chiefly titles is unquestionably present, and that this system 
ensures that only qualified individuals can acquire positions of traditional 
leadership. One of the male traditional leaders I interviewed said that; 
 
“If you want to become a traditional chief, you have to be smart and you have to 
serve the people. So people who become traditional leaders are also well-respected; 
they also perform. And so it’s not enough that you are from a high clan and simply 
push your ideas around.” 
 
In its own way, the traditional system of leadership therefore also offers minimal 
degrees of contestation and inclusiveness, and chiefly titles are not just 
hereditarily passed on, but are only granted to persons who are seen as capable 
of being a chief. 
 Although political ideas do not seem to play a large role in the Palauan 
political context, contestation for political offices is not only present, but is also 
fierce and divisive. Whereas the traditional clan-system is responsible for 
personalistic contestation and appears to have assumed the function of a 
political party system, the size of Palau facilitates and exacerbates this tendency. 
As a consequence of the smallness of electoral districts and the country as a 
whole, political candidates can win elections on the basis of their clan affiliations 
                                                
47 Toribiong is the nephew of Roman Tmetuchl, who was Palau’s most prominent politician for a 
large part of the 1960s and 1970s, and spearheaded the movement that advocated separation of 
Palau from the rest of Micronesia. Two of his closest political allies are Senator Joel Toribiong, 
who is a brother of the President, and the President of the Senate Mlib Tmetuchl, who is a cousin 





alone, which would never be possible in a large country regardless of whether its 
society is clan-oriented or not. In similar fashion to the other three microstates, 
the size of Palau therefore generates the prevalence of personalistic over 
programmatic contestation. Furthermore, the personalistic politics and social 
interconnectedness that result from size can also be deemed to foster the 
polarization and divisiveness of Palau’s society as a whole. 
 
5.2. Contestation: The Horizontal Balance of Power between Institutions 
In line with part of the small-state literature, in earlier chapters the governments 
of St. Kitts and Nevis and Seychelles were found to occupy a supremely powerful 
position in their respective political systems, with very few checks and balances 
being provided by other societal and political institutions. In Palau a somewhat 
similar situation can be found with respect to Congress, state governments, and 
the media, whereas the judiciary and especially the Council of Chiefs do have the 
authority and independence to function as a restraint on executive power in the 
microstate. A first major similarity with the other three microstates can however 
be found in the difficulties that institutions face in trying to maintain an image of 
neutrality and impartiality. As a consequence of intimate social contacts and 
multiple-role relationships, the Palauan judiciary, media, and public service are 
repeatedly plagued by allegations of being biased, and this was confirmed in 
interviews with representatives and officials of these institutions, as the 
following quote from the Chief Justice shows; 
 
“You see, if I were having lunch with one lawyer more often than with others, that 
does not look good. So if that lawyer were to come to court and the case comes 
before me and he wins, now there is that perception; the appearance of impropriety. 
And that is what we are trying to avoid; it’s not just the reality but also the 
appearance of impropriety that we want to avoid. And in a small state that’s tough, 
it’s very tough.” 
 
In line with other presidential systems, the President of Palau is as head of 
state a dominating factor in the country’s political framework. Since they are 
appointed by the President and constitutionally serve at his will, other ministers 
in the government occupy a subordinate and dependent position in the cabinet. 
Interviews with Palauan respondents however reveal that most of the 
presidential power stems from his clan- and family-relations with other 
politicians, as one journalist pointed out; 
 
“You wonder if there are really checks and balances, because right now we have a 
lot of relatives of the President in parliament. The President is now so powerful and 






As the quote above reveals, in terms of executive-legislative relations a 
wide majority of twelve out of fifteen respondents expressed dissatisfaction with 
the functioning of the Palauan Congress (the OEK). During interviews with 
Palauan citizens and politicians (including members of parliament themselves), 
Palau’s legislature was mostly argued to be weak and submissive in relation to 
the government. According to most interviewees this situation is mainly an effect 
of personal relations, because as many Congressmen are related to the President 
or other government members through family or clan lines, they are supposedly 
unable or unwilling to effectively control government. As one politician 
remarked: 
 
“Well, there are supposed to be three equal branches of government. But the way 
the members of Congress are doing, I have not seen them to exercise their rights as 
an independent legislature. They have not exercised checks and balances with the 
executive branch. (…) There are too many friends of the President in the parliament, 
who are in the key positions.” 
 
The senators and delegates who are not aligned to President form the 
parliamentary opposition, but they are a relatively small minority.48 Although 
opposition members are often outspoken and critical of government, due to the 
significance of clan relations they told me they had little hope of attracting the 
support of other MPs. In short, Palau’s legislative branch appears to be not really 
independent from its executive counterpart, and the strict separation of powers 
that characterizes the American system on which it is modeled appears not to 
exist in Palau. More than the other microstates, the smallness of Palau appears to 
lead to political alliances based on relations and bloodlines, and this largely turns 
out to limit the capacities and autonomy of parliament. Although no data are 
available to prove it, my personal correspondence with ordinary Palauans 
furthermore reveals that people are very skeptical and suspicious of elected 
politicians, and trust in them in general appears to be quite low.    
As an alternative to parliament, both the literature on Palau and my own 
sources reveal that the Council of Chiefs is the institution that most effectively 
controls the actions of government. Whereas this institution itself is not 
democratically elected, all fifteen of my respondents cherished and praised the 
role of traditional leaders in the Palauan system, and perceived the chiefs to be a 
highly valuable component of Palau’s democracy. In this sense, some actually 
                                                
48 Palauan citizens and politicians have been consistently able to name the persons that formed 
the opposition in the Senate. In 2011, four out of thirteen senators were identified as part of the 





perceive the Council to be a substitute for parliament, and as one of the members 
of the Council itself pointed out; 
 
“The Council of Chiefs is providing the check on the government; the one that our 
Congress is supposed to be doing, but is not doing”. 
 
Although the constitutional role of traditional leadership is quite restricted, all 
available sources confirm that the influence of chiefs on Palauan politics is really 
extensive. According to Shuster “[g]enerally few things of significance can take 
place in Palau without the advice and consent of chiefs” (1994: 193), and Mita 
argues that “[w]hile what is prescribed in the Constitution is only an advisory 
function to the President, no modern leaders in the governments within Palau 
can be oblivious to the presence and role of traditional chiefs” (2009: 139-140). 
Moreover, Hassall points out that “[i]n practice, the authority of the chiefs is 
respected in ways beyond those called for in the constitution. Government 
departments may for instance seek permission from chiefs before undertaking a 
major investment in a region” (2009: 175). This observation is confirmed by 
interviews with Palauan politicians, and one of the leading figures in the 
government highlighted that: 
 
“The traditional leaders and traditional women leaders are still meeting to make 
sure that we keep and maintain our traditional way of doing things. Sometimes they 
notice that they way we [elected politicians, WV] do things are a little bit excessive, 
because of the new way of life and doing things. So then they try to talk to people to 
slow it down.” 
 
 As this quote exemplifies, in many ways the Council of Chiefs can be seen 
as a very influential interest group that every now and then attempts to correct 
or stop supposedly misguided politicians.49 Conflicts between the Palauan 
government and traditional leaders often boil down to questions of 
modernization versus tradition, and the protection of Palauan identity, culture, 
and customs. Whereas the Council operates as a conservative entity that 
habitually opposes changes that affect Palauan society or lifestyle, the 
government appears to be mostly attempting to modernize the country and to 
stimulate economic growth and foreign investments. One general concern of 
Palauans that the traditional leaders often refer to is the fear of being taken over 
by foreigners and larger countries, and the ensuing weakening or disappearance 
of Palauan customs and traditions. In this sense a political cleavage that centers 
                                                
49 A clear manifestation of this continuing influence is the Council’s resistance and subsequent 
action concerning a bill that would allow for the establishment of a casino in the winter of 2010-
2011. Whereas this bill was already approved by both Houses of the Olbiil Era Kelulau, the chiefs 
mobilized opponents to the bill to force President Toribiong to organize a referendum on the 





on the preservation of Palauan traditions appears to exist between the elected 
politicians and the traditional leaders. 
Like in other Pacific island states, Palauan politics is thus characterized by 
friction between modern and traditional forms of leadership. This was confirmed 
during the interviews, in which politicians and chiefs repeatedly criticized each 
other’s position in the Palauan system.50 In short, the relations between the two 
forms of leadership are sometimes far from harmonious, and this was confirmed 
by both politicians and traditional leaders. As one high-ranking politician stated; 
 
“I think it’s ongoing that the elected leaders want to assert themselves, trying to say 
that they are the legitimate ruling body, without being aware of it, or being aware of 
it without saying it. I think they [the two systems, WV] are competing; you cannot 
have two ruling entities in one society.” 
 
In this sense, the clash between traditional forms of leadership and modern 
democratic institutions that several scholars observe throughout the Pacific is 
therefore also clearly and continuously present in Palau. 
In addition to the Council of Chiefs, respondents pointed to the Palauan 
judiciary as a strong, impartial, and autonomous institution that lives up to its 
constitutional role. In similar fashion as in St. Kitts and Nevis, the Palauan 
judiciary somehow manages to escape the microstate’s polarized political 
climate, and with one exception all interviewees and other sources confirmed its 
neutrality (cf. Freedom House 2012). Whereas the pre-independence period in 
Palau was marked by strong political pressure on judges to rule in favor of the 
COFA, the country’s judiciary retained its independence and appeared immune to 
pressure (Leibowitz 1996: 93-94). According to a journalist I talked with, this is 
contemporarily still the case: 
 
“In the past, when we were debating the Compact, there were citizen groups who 
were pressuring the former Chief Justice, late Chief Justice Nakamura. (…) But the 
court has been able to withstand those, and I think it is much stronger now because 
of that experience.” 
 
In a small society like Palau where everyone knows each other, judges have to be 
extremely cautious not to run into conflicts of interests. Whereas this is easier for 
foreign judges, native Palauan judges are likely to personally know many of the 
lawyers, plaintiffs, and defendants that appear before them. The Palauan Chief 
Justice explained to me that social isolation is the most practical strategy in this 
respect; 
 
                                                
50 This was especially the case with regard to criticism from traditional leaders about elected 





“In our private life, we [judges, WV] avoid controversies (…). If we are seen to be 
mingling with people and their cases would come to court, we would not be able to 
hear those cases. When you have a small island, that becomes really, really much of 
a problem. It means isolation for judges; our social life is pretty confined.” 
 
Like their colleagues in the other three microstates, in order to safeguard 
impartiality judges in Palau are often foreigners. In the Palauan case, the hiring of 
foreign judges however results in conflicts because these judges are not always 
familiar with, or do not always accept the influence of traditions and traditional 
leadership (Hassall 2009: 172).51 Several Palauan chiefs that I talked to 
expressed discontent with the court’s handling of cases involving custom and 
traditions, for example when it comes to clan rivalries, as one academic 
mentioned to me: 
 
“What preoccupies a lot of people today is that there is very fierce confrontation 
within clans and among clans. And they are bringing this to the courts, and the court 
system is beginning to realize that the template of the modern system is just not the 
cut that is required to totally resolve the nature and complexities of a different 
system.” 
 
In general, both interviews and secondary sources reveal that Palauan society is 
very litigious, which is mostly ascribed to the broader polarization of Palau’s 
society, and the fierce inter-clan rivalries and competition for chiefly titles 
(Leibowitz 1996: 93). 
The role of the media in the Palauan political system is in many ways 
similar to the other three cases that were studied. Tia Belau and Island Times are 
the two newspapers that are published in Palau, and both appear once a week 
and are confronted with financial troubles resulting from limited revenues and a 
small readers’ public. Nevertheless, in the Freedom of the Press-index Palau has 
consistently received favorable ratings, and in 2011 the country obtained a score 
of 14 (or ‘free’) on a 100-point scale in which a score of 100 represents the least 
free situation (Freedom House 2012). In addition to the two newspapers, a 
handful of radio-stations are also active in Palau. One of these, WWFM 89.5, is 
owned by Senator Alfonso Diaz, who has used his broadcasts to draw attention to 
corruption and clientelism. Whereas Diaz’ radio station was popular and played 
an important role in anticorruption awareness in Palau (Shuster 2004b: 17), 
after his election to the Senate Diaz was repeatedly accused of using his radio 
station for his own political gain, and many of my respondents blamed him for 
doing this as well.   
                                                
51 As Hassall argues, “[d]omestic Palauan politics has in recent years featured clashes between 
American expatriates working for government agencies in Palau and Palauan high chiefs” 






Due to an inherently small public and the relatively high costs of printing, 
publishing a newspaper in Palau is not a lucrative business, which is why most 
journalists are volunteers, or see journalism merely as a hobby. As a 
consequence, like in other microstates many people and especially politicians 
complain about the quality of the news, as the following MP argues; 
 
“Palauan media is sufficiently independent; my complaint is the quality of it. They 
can say whatever, but it’s the quality you know; there are rumors and gossips and 
all that, and not so much informing the public. And you wonder, because some of 
our folks who are doing the media are not really journalists; they didn’t get out of 
journalism schools and it’s just a part-time job or a hobby.” 
 
The low quality of newspapers allows politicians to scorn and mock the media, as 
a result of which the position of journalists is further emasculated. Since there 
are no political parties in Palau, it would appear hard to pinpoint individual 
newspapers as being supportive of the government or the opposition. 
Nevertheless, in light of the polarization between individual politicians and 
especially clans, many respondents still complained about biases in news 
reporting. 
 The final institutions that at least constitutionally have the ability to 
restrain the power of the executive are the state governments of Palau. Although 
Palau is constitutionally a federation, most of my respondents argued that the 
state governments do not really serve a purpose, and primarily function as a 
massive drain on public resources. According to one journalist: 
 
“What makes the state governments not strong is that they don’t serve a real 
function to improve the life of the people. (…) The thing that weakens them in the 
eyes of the public is that they bring this 250.000 dollars budget from the national 
government. Most of that will go to the legislators in the government and the 
employees, and less is available for the important projects in the states.”  
 
Whereas the Palauans adopted the federal model from the United States, it seems 
particularly inefficient and costly in a country with such small dimensions. The 
duplication of political structure from the colonial power was also observed for 
the cases of St. Kitts and Nevis and Seychelles, and is discussed as one of the core 
features of microstate-politics in the academic literature (Sutton and Payne 
1993: 586-587; Sutton 2007a). Many Palauans however believe that it was a 
mistake to create a federation in Palau, as the following senior public official 
notes; 
 
“I think the biggest mistake we made is that we did not change or modify the system 
to improve it to fit us. And we instead created I would say a monster; a system that 
is totally ridiculous, with two Houses in the Congress. I mean that is ridiculous, and 
then we have eight ministers, with a President and a Vice-President. We have 





has its own executive and legislative branch. This is stupid; it costs too much. How 
can you have thirty-five people staying in Sonsorol and they are considered as a 
state?” 
 
Most of my respondents named financial arguments as the main disadvantage of 
Palau’s federal system, as the leader of the Chamber of Commerce pointed out: 
 
“Each Palauan state has a massive bureaucracy; massive in proportion to the 
population of that state. (…) You have a governor, their staff, their legislature; I 
mean it just doesn’t financially make sense. It’s not at all logical.”  
 
Since the national government has the final say with regard to the amount of 
money that state governments have at their disposal, state administrations are 
ultimately dependent on the generosity of the national executive, and therefore 
not as powerful as the label of ‘federation’ suggests (cf. Constitution of Palau 
1981: Art. XI: 4).  
 In analyzing the relations between Palau’s various political and societal 
institutions, the expectations that can be derived from the academic literature on 
politics in small states are partially confirmed. The governmental dominance that 
several authors refer to (e.g. Sutton 1987: 8; Sutton and Payne 1993: 592-593; 
Srebrnik 2004: 334-335) is found to exist in Palau as well, but to a lesser extent 
than in St. Kitts and Nevis and Seychelles. Palau’s judiciary is an unquestionably 
independent and neutral third branch of government, and the Council of Chiefs 
also functions as an effective check on governmental power. At the same time, 
Palau’s parliament, media, and state governments are weak or overshadowed by 
the national government. In large part, the weakness of these three institutions 
appears to be a consequence of the smallness of Palau, which leads to a lack of 
resources, a lack of professionalism, and the prevalence of personalistic over 
programmatic contestation. In short, the horizontal balance between Palauan 
institutions is still skewed in favor of the country’s executive, but apparently to a 
lesser extent than in the Caribbean and African cases that were studied in earlier 
chapters.  
 
5.3. Inclusiveness: The Relations between Citizens and Politicians 
To even a greater extent than in the three previously studied microstates, 
citizen-politician linkages in Palau are marked by closeness, direct contacts, and 
multiple-role relationships. This is partly a result of the fact that the population 
size of Palau is even tinier than that of the other cases, but it also derives from 
the federal nature of the Palauan system, as a result of which the state politicians 
are even closer to their people than those in the national government. The five 





that the legislatures and executives of these states are highly accessible to their 
constituents, but it can also be assumed that political dynamics in such an 
environment are markedly different from those in larger microstates without 
noteworthy sub-national administrations (like Seychelles). As a general 
conclusion, it can be said that the findings of the field research in Palau reveal 
that the effects of size with regard to citizen-politician relations are stronger and 
more perceptible than in the other microstates that were analyzed. 
 In line with part of the academic literature, many Palauan interviewees 
highlight the positive consequences of closeness and face-to-face contacts with 
regard to the quality of political representation (Dahl and Tufte 1973: 87; Anckar 
2002b: 387). As a result of proximity, Palauan voters appear to be generally 
aware and involved in politics, and according to many respondents talking and 
gossiping about politics is one of the favorite pastimes of the country’s citizens. 
According to one politician I interviewed:  
 
“You can look at it [closeness, WV] as positive, because you have direct contact with 
your constituents; you know what they want and what their concerns are, so you 
can address those”. 
 
In addition to greater opportunities for responsiveness of politicians to citizens, 
closeness also has advantages in the opposite direction, and the following 
academic explained to me how smallness results in increased awareness among 
citizens: 
 
“It’s good that everybody knows what’s going on; I mean even taxi drivers. So the 
checks and balances are there, because even people who are at the village level talk 
about issues and they discuss among themselves”. 
 
Although no data are available to support it, on the basis of interviews and my 
own observations, levels of awareness and political efficacy appear to really high 
in Palau. Talking or gossiping about politics appears to be one of the favorite 
pastimes of Palauans, and social media have offered additional opportunities in 
this regard.52 
Whereas citizens thus because of closeness have amplified opportunities to 
voice their political attitudes to their representatives, politicians on the other 
hand have the opportunity to know and talk to all their constituents. As one 
politician highlighted; 
                                                
52 Palauans are especially active on facebook, which has become a forum to discuss political 
issues, declare candidacies for public office, announce political events, or spread rumors about 
individual politicians. Several facebook groups have become very big online communities, and 
have several thousand members, which in light of Palau’s total population of 20.000 constitutes a 
major part of the population. One of the biggest facebook groups is Ngelekel Belau, which 






“I know maybe 95% of the people in the Republic. Now, I may not know their name, 
but when I see them I know their faces, and probably 80 – 85% of the time I know 
where that person lives. Because you campaign a couple of times and you meet 
these guys, the same people. And so these are our constituents, you know their 
mandate; they talk to you, get your number and talk to you, so it’s very, very close”. 
 
Since politicians and citizens are in constant contact with each other, in 
interviews Palauan politicians confirmed that they are incessantly questioned or 
pressured to act according to these citizens’ interests, and because the loss of a 
few supporters can make the difference at the polls the pressures by citizens can 
be more severe than in larger states.  
 As suggested by the academic literature, many prominent Palauans 
combine a number of societal and public functions, which leads to the emergence 
of multiple-role relationships. Most Palauan politicians and chiefs for example 
also have a private business, or are concomitantly active as journalists or interest 
group-representatives. Many of my interviewees combined several of such 
functions, and this evidently leads to problems, as one illustrative individual 
points out; 
 
“I have all these functions; I publish a newspaper, I have a traditional role, I have my 
own role in the court, a newspaper role; I run into conflicts all the time but I guess 
that’s the nature of the business. It’s a small country so we cannot afford to 
specialize in a particular mission or profession; practically all Palauan leaders are 
traditional leaders also, or church leaders, and they often have an own business.” 
 
  In addition to having multiple jobs however, many politicians and citizens 
also know each other because of their connections and relations in the private 
sphere. Whereas this holds for the three other cases as well, in the Palauan case 
an extra type of relationship can be added: the clan or extended family. 
Respondents and secondary sources underscore that clan-relations are of 
tremendous significance in Palau, and clan-members have strong social 
obligations towards one another. This can generate an additional form of 
conflicting interests, as an interest group-leader mentions: 
 
“They [politicians, WV] are in constant conflict between their private businesses 
and the good of the country; and then confused by the good of their clan”. 
 
Indeed, virtually all my respondents – also the politicians themselves – named 
conflicts of interests as the primary negative effect of closeness and multiple-role 
relationships. Especially the combination between being a politician and owning 
a business was often cited as problematic, because it leads to bad decisions at 







“From my personal perspective, it drives me crazy. Because consistently bad 
decisions are being made; both business decisions and political decisions. Just really 
bad because they [politicians, WV] are trying to protect their own interests.” 
 
In addition to politicians however, most traditional leaders also have their own 
business. This is especially problematic because their chiefly titles provide their 
businesses with unfair advantages, which undermines fair competition and 
efficiency, as the same respondent argues: 
 
“Most traditional leaders have businesses (…), they have been successful families 
for a long time and so they have first-movers advantage when it comes to business. 
But they are not particularly good at performing business, and they are not the best 
in class; it’s just the status that got them the head start.” 
 
Just like in the other three microstates, patron-client networks and 
particularism are key characteristics of Palauan politics. For the specific case of 
Palau however, the general literature on Pacific politics and societies also 
mentions clientelism as a core aspect of the islands in this region (Larmour 2005: 
4-5; Duncan and Nakagawa 2006). As for example various country reports of 
Transparency International emphasize, in Pacific countries the line between 
manifestations of traditional culture and corruption or clientelism is often 
difficult to draw, because the provision of money and gifts to clan members is an 
essential component of Pacific island cultures (e.g. Shuster 2004a: 8-10). In Palau 
wealthier individuals are expected to contribute and support their friends and 
families, and family occasions such as funerals, weddings, childbirths, or 
housewarmings are instances where politicians are expected to make donations 
to family members. This is however often linked to the substituted provision of 
political support, thereby creating a clientelistic exchange. As one politician 
mentioned: 
 
“In Palau there is a culture of offering food, this is a cultural tradition. An so they say 
that those who are affluent in terms of money or just other resources or wealth, 
tend to have a stronger influence because they have the capability of distributing 
food. And I have to admit, it’s very hard to win votes without giving food.”  
 
Various non-public respondents also pointed to the pressures that politicians 
face in this regard, as one chief explained to me: 
 
“A lot of these politicians, especially senators, delegates, ministers, and the 
president, I think their feeling is: (…) “I have to show up and give money. If I want to 
get reelected, I have to go to all these people whose funerals come up, or first births, 
or a new house custom.” And they have to give money, they have to represent.” 
 
The smallness of Palau can be argued to foster clientelistic tendencies, since 





base, and can reasonably estimate how many and which people they have to 
convince to vote for them. Conversations with ordinary Palauans demonstrated 
that they also strongly expect their politicians to provide them with services and 
benefits, even though most of them (paradoxically) denounced clientelistic 
practices. In trying to gain the support of citizens in a specific district or state, 
politicians often turn to traditional leaders, who appear to have a large influence 
on the voting behavior of citizens, as one of Palau’s academics told me: 
 
“They [the chiefs, WV] also control votes in their states, you know what I mean? Not 
so much control, but they have influence. (…) And when it comes to us [politicians, 
WV] and it comes to the President, he goes and says “ok, let’s see who has the most 
population, which state”. And then they kind of rub elbows with that particular chief 
in that state, and so on.” 
 
In addition to clientelism, patronage and nepotism (and mostly a 
combination of the two) also play a strong role in the Palauan political context, 
and again this can largely be ascribed to the smallness of the island state. As the 
literature on public administration in small states indicates, small-state 
bureaucracies tend to be oversized, dominated by government, and filled with 
political supporters, friends, and family members (Singham 1967; Sutton 1987: 
12; Bray 1991: 25-26; Sutton and Payne 1993: 587). All this appears to be true 
for the Palauan civil service as well, at least according to a journalist whom I 
interviewed: 
 
“It [patronage, WV] is definitely expected; if I am going to support you, you better 
give me a job. And the benefits of working in government are actually really, really 
phenomenal compared to working in the private sector. (…) The public sector is 
huge. I mean it’s ridiculous, it’s almost 2.500 people employed just in the national 
government.” 
 
The absence of parties can be hypothesized to limit patronage, because the 
selection of civil servants cannot be controlled by a party apparatus. Instead 
however, it appears that clan- and family-relations - which as we have seen to a 
certain extent replace political parties – are decisive factors in the hiring of 
bureaucrats. Whereas nepotism and cronyism were not found to play a large role 
in the political systems of the other three microstates, at least five respondents 
stressed their negative influence on Palauan politics, perhaps due to the fact that 
this microstate is even smaller than the other ones that were studied. As one 
traditional leader highlighted: 
 
“That is the number one problem: nepotism. Man, I can name people; brothers and 
sisters and cousins and cross-relatives, but I don’t want to name them. And people 
who are close political allies are not working and stay home while getting paid. The 






The number of people working for the national government is deemed 
excessive by a clear majority of respondents, but in addition to that a great 
number of Palauans is employed in state governments. In this light, a great 
difference can be seen between ethnic Palauans and guest workers; whereas a 
significant majority of Palauans (57%) are employed in the public 
administration, most private sector-jobs (about three-quarters) are being 
exercised by Filipinos and other Asians (Mita 2009: 133-134). Political patronage 
clearly damages the quality and efficiency of the Palauan bureaucracy, as 
incompetent or even criminal persons are being hired (ibid.). The costs of 
running the overstaffed and overpaid Palauan civil service are excessive, and can 
only be paid with money that flows from foreign investments.53 
 In combination with conflicts of interest, the size of the public sector also 
entails a number of negative consequences for Palau’s private sector. The 
absence of strict separations between the public and private sectors of Palau not 
only leads to politicians defending their private interests, but also to the 
establishment of an uncompetitive business climate. As one private sector-
representative complains: 
 
“If you are in politics and you have a store or a tour operation, you’re always going 
to be kind of mediocre. You’re never going to best in class, because you are not 
operating in a competitive environment. And this has long-term devastating effects, 
because (…) you are thinking “oh, is my business not going to do well because I am 
making this decision?” I mean it all gets too convoluted.” 
 
Palauan politicians have personal and private reasons not to implement 
economic reforms, even though Palau’s budget deficits continue to grow and the 
country’s external debt is increasing as well. As Mita argues, Palau’s economy is 
almost completely sustained by foreign investments and aid, which means that 
the country is almost completely dependent on external sources, especially the 
United States (Mita 2009: 3). In short, it can be concluded that the smallness of 
Palauan society has a mixed influence on linkages between citizens and 
politicians, whereas it appears to obstruct economic development in the 
microstate. Palauan traditional culture entails certain features that facilitate the 
development of particularistic linkages, as a consequence of which the pressure 
on politicians to bestow their constituents with favors is arguably even stronger 
than in the other microstates. 
                                                
53 According to Mita, “[t]he structure of Palau’s government and its national economy can only be 
sustained as long as foreign actors continue to invest capital in Palau, and if the scale of such 







5.4. Inclusiveness: Political Participation and Elections 
When it comes to the characteristics of political participation in Palau, it should 
first be mentioned that regrettably data are only available with regard to voter 
turnout, which means that the country’s score on indicators like participation in 
rallies, campaigns, or demonstrations is unknown. The absence of political 
parties further entails that figures of party membership are evidently 
unavailable as well. By and large, conclusions about participation therefore have 
to be drawn from the available interview data, which like in the other 
microstates suggests high levels of political involvement among the Palauan 
citizenry. Politicians indicated that they were in constant contact with their 
constituents, either on their own instigation or upon the initiative of citizens. 
Most interviewees emphasized that higher levels of participation in Palau are a 
consequence of higher levels of awareness and attachment to politics among 
voters, which they believed to stem from the smallness of the country and the 
psychological and physical closeness between politicians and the electorate. 
 The heavy involvement of Palauan voters in their country’s politics does 
not appear to result in the existence of an identifiable public opinion in the 
country. Several respondents indicated that citizens do not really have strong 
attitudes on substantive political issues, and that a public discourse about major 
substantive political or ideological issues is lacking; 
 
“One thing that Palauans have not reached is that they do not see how public 
opinion – individual and collective public opinion – is a critical component of a 
working political and democratic system. That is not happening here in Palau; there 
is no public discourse, for example when they brought in the Uyghurs there was no 
public debate on that.” 
 
Instead, political involvement of Palauan citizens appears to center on more 
particularistic exchanges with politicians, and on talking and gossiping about 
personal rivalries and intrigues. In light of the seeming insignificance of 
programmatic issues and the closeness between citizens and politicians, it is 
obvious that voting behavior or electoral participation is primarily motivated by 
personalistic concerns as well (Mita 2009: 24). None of my respondents named 
ideology or programmatic issues as a major source of voting behavior, but 
instead they named a whole list of other things;  
 
“We vote for people because of who they are, not for their performance. It’s really 
because they came to your funeral, or they assisted your kids with some problem, or 
your relatives go for medical treatment, or you had a house party where they 






Because every Palauan citizen personally knows at least one but mostly a 
number of politicians, the tendency to vote on the basis of personal relationships 
is largely a consequence of the smallness of the country. Because of this reason, 
but according to multiple sources also as a result of the fact that the direct 
consequences of voting are more clear to voters than in larger states, as table 3 
shows turnout figures in Palau have mostly been rather high. In most elections 
approximately 80 percent of Palauans have voted, but in the most recent two 
elections this figure has been markedly lower. Although I posed the question to 
various respondents, nobody had a clear idea why this was the case.  
 
Table 8.4: Voter Turnout at Palauan Elections54 
Election Year Voter Turnout 
1980 80.0 % 
1984 84.0 % 
1985 79.1 % 
1988 82.5 % 
1992 83.4 % 
1996 79.3 % 
2000 81.2 % 
2004 74.8 % 
2008 67.7 % 
 
In addition to turnout at the election itself, nearly all respondents 
emphasize that Palauans eagerly participate in the pre-election campaigns. Like 
in St. Kitts and Nevis and Seychelles, this appears at least partly a consequence of 
the many gifts and favors that are distributed by candidates for public office.55 
On the basis of interviews, it seems that the clientelistic link is hence most clearly 
visible in the campaign period: 
 
“I think quite a few people look forward to election time, because they look forward 
to making a lot of money. Because they know politicians will give them money to 
buy their fuel and their travels, they are trying to sell themselves. And some people 
are just very good at milking these politicians.” 
 
Although higher levels of participation at elections surely appear to be related to 
the size of the Palauan population, it appears that smallness primarily induces 
greater levels of particularism-based participation, and does not generate a 
greater interest in substantive political issues.  
 
                                                
54 Source: International IDEA website (International IDEA 2011).  
55 According to Mita, “[i]n the last few weeks before an election, a carnival atmosphere takes hold. 
Some candidates hold campaign barbecues and rallies. At these events, voters are treated to free 
food, drink, entertainment, and gifts. Some Palauans are critical of this kind of campaigning, while 





Table 8.5: Results of the 2008 House of Delegates-Election in Palau 
State Candidate Votes Percentages 
Aimeliik K. Ngirturong 269 59.6 
 W. Umetaro 182 40.4 
Airai T. Rengulbai 525 57.4 
 N. Secharraimul 389 42.6 
Angaur H. Rafael 172 58.7 
 N. Misech 121 41.3 
Hatohobei W. Andrew 40 37.0 
 H. Hosei 33 30.6 
 S. Marino 35 32.4 
Kayangel N. Kemesong 180 60.0 
 J. Titiml 120 40.0 
Koror A. Merep 1.845 72.5 
 S. Tellames 700 27.5 
Melekeok L. Basilius 171 41.6 
 T. Rengulbai 99 24.1 
 K. Asanuma 81 19.7 
 D. Ongelungel 60 14.6 
Ngaraard G. Kanai 422 54.1 
 S. Remoket 358 45.9 
Ngarchelong M. Madrangchar 203 27.2 
 F. Rehuher-Marugg 191 25.6 
 D. Saiske 188 25.2 
 D. Bukurrow 164 22.0 
Ngardmau R. Kesolei 193 67.7 
 B. Kumangai 92 32.3 
Ngatpang J. Nabeyama 97 52.2 
 V. Emesiochel 89 47.8 
Ngchesar S. Eldebechel 112 30.2 
 M. Uludong 99 26.7 
 S. Hideo 52 14.0 
 Z. Kotaro 44 11.9 
 M. Ngirkelau 42 11.3 
 B. Basilius 22 5.9 
Ngeremlengui S. Ongidobel 218 49.9 
 P. Franz 136 31.1 
 A. Kyota 83 19.0 
Ngiwal N. Idechong 125 57.3 
 K. Termeteet 52 23.9 
 F. Llecholch 41 18.8 
Peleliu J. Isechal 338 56.9 
 S. Soalablai 256 43.1 
Sonsorol C. Yangilmau 61 45.9 
 E. Mario 42 31.6 






Furthermore, as Mita points out, the smallness of Palau provides politicians with 
better opportunities to control whether citizens actually fulfill the duties that 
follow from clientelistic linkages;  
 
“Toward the end of the voting day, tally-keepers check their lists to make sure that 
all known supporters of their candidates have voted. If some have not, they send out 
cars to bring those voters to the polls. This practice helps to maintain a high voter 
turnout in Palau” (Mita 2009: 125). 
 
In table 8.5, the state-level results of the 2008 House of Delegates-Election in 
Palau have been presented. The table shows that at least two candidates 
contested elections in each of the states, whereas some states had four or even 
five candidates for office. According to several respondents, the limited number 
of candidates at elections can on the one hand be explained by the fact that 
people from the same clan mostly hesitate to run against each other, and on the 
other hand by the fact that candidates can often accurately estimate their 
chances of winning, which already discourages many less popular candidates 
from running. As one of the candidates in these elections explains: 
 
“Where I ran, there were four of us. And because of this it was really hard, since we 
all have connections; we are all related to one another at the same time, so that we 
kind of split the relationships in terms of the ones who are closer to me versus the 
ones closer to the others. If you are related and you run together, you sort of split 
the clan relations.” 
 
The table however also demonstrates that whereas in several states a few 
hundred voters participate in the elections, in the smallest states (Hatohobei, 
Ngatpang, Ngiwal, and Sonsorol) this figure is below 250. It is obvious that a 
single vote can make the difference in such elections, and also in some 
comparatively large states (like in this case Ngarchelong) a handful of votes 
determine the election outcome. In light of these factors, it is clear that the 
inclination of politicians to attract voters by means of material rewards is 
augmented in comparison to larger settings. The number of voters that have to 
be attracted by means of favors is never really high, which means that politicians 
can also afford to use their private resources to win elections.  
In addition to elections the referendum is recurrently employed as a 
mechanism to obtain popular approval for policy proposals in Palau, and the 
country has had notorious experiences with it in trying to establish its COFA with 
the United States between 1980 and 1994. Since independence, four 
referendums have been organized (in 1996, 2004, 2008, and 2011) to gain 
approval for constitutional amendments, dual citizenship, and on the legalization 





their respective levels of voter turnout have been presented, and it can be seen 
that turnout has generally reached above seventy percent. In the most recent 
referendum, this figure was markedly lower (31.3 %), which is probably a 
consequence of the fact that this referendum was not held in conjunction with a 
general election. Also with regard to referendums, Palau is therefore 
characterized by rather high levels of political participation. 
 
Table 8.6: Referendums in the Republic of Palau56 
Year Issue Voter Turnout Yes No 
1979 Constitution of Palau n.a. 92.0 8.0 
1983 COFA 78.5 % 62.1 37.9 
1984 COFA 71.3 % 67.1 32.9 
1986 (Feb.) COFA 71.3 % 72.2 27.8 
1986 (Dec.) COFA 82.0 % 66.0 34.0 
1987 (Jun.) COFA 76.1 % 67.6 32.4 
1987 (4 Aug.) Constitutional Modification n.a. 73.3 26.7 
1987 (21 Aug.) COFA 74.7 % 73.0 27.0 
1990 COFA 69.2 % 60.8 39.2 
1992 Constitutional Modification 83.2 % 62.4 37.6 
1993 COFA 64.4 % 68.4 31.6 




2004 Constitutional Modifications 74.8 % n.a.57 n.a. 
2008 Constitutional Modifications 67.7 % n.a.58 n.a. 
2011 Legalization of Casinos 31.3 % 24.5 75.5 
 
 
As in San Marino and St. Kitts and Nevis, Palauan expatriates also have 
voting rights. Most of the Palauan emigrant voters live on nearby islands like 
Guam, Saipan, and Hawaii, and respondents indicated that politicians always 
spend some time on these islands to campaign and appeal to voters who live 
there (Rechebei and McPhetres 1997: 354). In contrast to the other microstates 
however correspondence-voting is allowed in Palau, which means that 
irregularities such as paying for the travels of expatriates do not occur in this 
microstate. Nevertheless, Palauan politicians are aware of the potential influence 
of the external vote: 
 
“I have not really looked into it at the national level, but the number of external 
votes is a number to contend with, a significant number. So there are many who go 
to Guam and Hawaii to campaign, it can actually alter the balance.” 
                                                
56 Data retrieved from Nohlen et al. (2001), and Direct Democracy website (www.sudd.ch).  
57 Although the specific percentages are unknown, four out of the five proposed constitutional 
amendments were approved, whereas one proposal (the creation of a unicameral parliament) 
was rejected (Shuster 2006: 116). 






 In summary, it can be said that the smallness of Palau creates a number of 
particular characteristics with regard to political participation. Like in the other 
three microstates, political involvement of Palauan citizens appears to be 
inspired by personalistic and individual consideration rather than out of a 
concern for public issues. Although political participation in Palau is generally 
quite high, this can primarily be interpreted as a manifestation of particularistic 
exchanges. 
 
6. Discussion and Conclusion 
As the smallest of the four microstates that have been analyzed in this 
dissertation, politics and democracy in the Republic of Palau are to a significant 
degree comparable to the other three microstates. When it comes to aspects like 
the absence of ideology and the prevalence of personalistic and particularized 
politics, it appears to be the case that these factors play an even larger role in 
Palau than in the other microstates. This is most clearly palpable with regard to 
the absence of political parties in Palau, since parties are, however personality-
oriented and non-programmatic, still clearly at the basis of contestation in the 
three other examined cases. In addition, like in the other microstates the Palauan 
media and parliament are in a subordinate position in relation to the country’s 
executive branch of government, whereas its judiciary appears to be neutral, 
strong, and virtually free from government influence. In table 8.7, Palau’s scores 
on the various indicators of contestation and inclusiveness have been presented. 
The key thing that sets Palau apart from the other cases is the ongoing 
significance of its traditional culture and the persisting authority of traditional 
leadership. The uneasy coexistence of indigenous traditional leadership and 
imported democratic institutions strongly characterizes Palauan politics, and the 
ongoing power struggles between chiefs and elected politicians bear witness to 
this. As Erica Rosenthal argues, “[s]ome elements of Palauan tradition remain 
strong, either coexisting or conflicting with the superimposed system, while 
others are adapted to or superseded by the new ways” (1996: 17). As this 
citation reveals, the introduction of Western institutions has not been able to 
supersede Palauan culture and traditions, and there are no indications that it will 
do so in the near future. Paradoxically, virtually all my respondents argued that 
the influence of non-elected chiefs actually increases the quality of Palauan 
democracy, and they extensively praised and cherished the role of traditional 
leaders in preventing for abuses of power and misconduct on the part of elected 





that the democratic political-institutional structure as it exists in larger Western 
countries is largely unsuitable to the small-state social and societal context.  
 
Table 8.7: Palau’s Scoring on the Indicators of Contestation and Inclusiveness 
Dimension Section Indicator Classification of Palau 
Free and Fair 
Elections 
Present 
Party System Not applicable 
(Frequency of) 
Alternation in Office 




No parties, interest 













Freedom to Support 
the Opposition 
Present, but political 
branding is common 
Freedom of the Press Press free (FotP-score 
14), but weak and 
unprofessional 
Status of the 
Legislature 
Largely ineffective, not 
autonomous from 
government 
Status of the 
Judiciary 






















Status of the 
Bureaucracy 
Oversized and influenced 
by government due to 
patronage 
Contact with and 
Access to 
Representatives 
Continuous contact and 
access 












and Feelings of 
Efficacy of Citizens 
Appears to be high 
Universal Suffrage Present 
Turnout at Elections 
and other Plebiscites 
High at both elections and 
referendums 














No data, but appears to be 
high (especially in social 
media) 
 
As Palauans themselves are acutely aware of, the economic and political 
future of the microstate is closely bound to that of the United States. Although 





recently established international relations with the United Arab Emirates and is 
making cautious but definite apertures to mainland China, as one respondent 
remarked; “we live beyond our means, and the United States keeps the lights on”. 
In this sense Palau is absolutely the least independent of the four microstates 
that are analyzed in this dissertation, and despite the persistence of traditional 
Palauan culture and leadership, democracy in Palau is safeguarded as long as the 
country is economically, politically, and militarily tied to the United States. 
Although friction between traditional and modern institutions is at the order of 
the day, on the basis of my interviews it paradoxically appears that through their 
continuing influence, non-elected leaders actually contribute to good governance 


































1. The Four Microstates: Similarities and Differences 
The four case study-chapters have clearly exposed the many differences between 
the four microstates under scrutiny. On virtually all imaginable background 
characteristics, large differences can be observed between the cases that were 
analyzed. With its impressive political history, high level of economic 
development, and centuries-old political institutions, San Marino is clearly a 
member of the Western European continent. By comparison, St. Kitts and Nevis’ 
status as a former sugar colony run by the descendents of slaves, combined with 
its Westminster institutions adapted to the political culture of the Caribbean and 
the extreme polarization between parties and islands appears to constitute a 
political environment that could not be more unalike than that of San Marino. If 
the more authoritarian features of Seychelles, and especially Palau’s system with 
its traditional leaders and clan-oriented political dynamics are added to this list, 
it therefore definitely appears to be the case that the examined microstates are 
‘most different’ from each other. 
 In line with the method of agreement, the four cases under scrutiny 
however do score relatively similar on two key variables of this study; their small 
size and their democratic political structures. However, even though all four of 
the cases have less than 100.000 inhabitants and are classified as electoral 
democracies by Freedom House, also concerning these two variables there are 
considerable differences between them. For example, as the smallest case in the 
sample Palau has a population size (21.000) that is more than four times smaller 
than that of Seychelles (89.000), the largest of the four microstates. In similar 
fashion, although they can both be identified as electoral democracies, the 
political environment of Seychelles clearly diverges more from the democratic 
ideal than that of San Marino. In addition, major differences exist between the 
political structures of the microstates, for example with regard to parliamentary 
versus presidential forms of government, the role and variety of political parties, 





 In light of the numerous historical, geographical, cultural, economical, and 
institutional differences between the four observed countries, one would also 
expect to find completely divergent political dynamics and practices. However, 
the analysis has demonstrated that the four microstates are marked by 
surprisingly similar political dynamics and patterns, which in the absence of 
other commonalities appear to be principally understandable on the basis of 
their small size. In this sense, the political effects of size therefore appear to 
surpass those of geographical location and economic development, and the 
smallness of the microstates moreover appears to render institutional 
differences between them obsolete, since the analysis has revealed that political 
institutions are commonly ignored or circumvented in microstates. Since several 
political features have surfaced in all four microstates, and also emerge in the 
case study-literature on other microstates that was discussed in chapter 3, it can 
quite safely be assumed that smallness is at the basis of these patterns. 
 In this final, concluding chapter of the dissertation, the findings of the four 
case studies are united, summarized, and evaluated. In the following section, the 
research question and accompanying expectations of the study are briefly 
recapitulated, after which the answers and findings that have emerged from the 
analyses are presented. More specifically, this section aims to make some cross-
case comparisons between the four microstates with regard to the 
characteristics of contestation and inclusiveness, which in line with the method 
of agreement serves to enhance the generalizability of the findings. 
Subsequently, in section 3 the implications of these findings for the broader 
academic literature on size and democracy are outlined, and attention is also 
paid to a number of more methodological implications. In the final two sections, 
the societal and scientific relevance of the findings of this study are discussed, 
and a number of potential options and alternatives for future research are 
presented.  
 
2. Recapitulation of the Findings 
The aim of the present study was to examine the effects of size on politics and 
democracy. In this regard, the central research question that was presented in 
the introduction of this dissertation was formulated as follows: 
 
“What are the consequences of a small population size for the nature 






In order to find answers to this question, in chapters 2 and 3 the existing 
academic literature on the political effects of size was discussed. Whereas 
chapter 2 focused on the theoretical and variable-oriented literature on size, 
politics, and democracy, in chapter 3 attention was devoted to the more case-
oriented, empirical literature on the characteristics of contestation and 
inclusiveness in microstates. On the basis of these two strands of literature, a 
number of expectations that together compose the theoretical model of this 
study were presented and discussed in chapter 4. These expectations 
accentuated the disparity between formally democratic structures and a more 
antidemocratic political reality that is also repeatedly observed in larger third 
wave-democracies. On the basis of the academic literature, it was theorized that 
the democracy-undermining political dynamics that plague many third wave-
countries are further exacerbated by a limited population size. Regarding 
contestation, the primary expectations entailed that political competition is 
based on personalistic rather than programmatic or ideological differences, and 
that the executive branch of government assumes a dominant position in relation 
to other political and societal institutions. Concerning inclusiveness in 
microstates, it was expected that the proximity between citizens and politicians 
would primarily result in the development of particularistic role relationships, 
but would also generate higher levels of awareness, efficacy, and participation. In 
table 9.1, the expectations that were formulated as part of the theoretical model 
have been presented once more. 
 
2.1. Characteristics of Contestation in the Four Microstates 
On the whole, the theoretical model and accompanying expectations have been 
confirmed by the case study-analyses. With regard to the first sub-dimension, 
which measures the presence of political alternatives and a political opposition, 
in all four countries a tendency to personalistic instead of programmatic 
contestation was found, as a result of which the number of substantive, 
ideological, and programmatic political alternatives is inherently limited. In 
addition, in all four microstates a high degree of polarization between the 
different parties or factions was found, which suggests that personalistic 
competition can be more fierce than programmatic contestation, and which 
disconfirms the thesis of among others Katzenstein and Lijphart that small 
settings are characterized by increased consensus and accommodation (Lijphart 





microstates1 were found to have high levels of categorical homogeneity among 
the population, the analysis has shown that this does not generate higher levels 
of consensus. In all four microstates a political opposition can be identified in 
parliament, but in general it represents a personal rather than a substantive 
political or programmatic alternative.2 
 
Table 9.1: Theoretical Model and Expectations of this Study 
Sub-Dimension Expectations 
 






- Greater homogeneity of interests 
- Decreased number of factions and interests 
- Less political competition, weakened political opposition 







- Executive dominance in relation to other institutions 
(parliament, media, judiciary, and civil service) 
- Infrequent alternation of power 






- Increased accessibility of politicians 
- Increased direct contacts and communication between 
citizens and politicians 
- Conflicts of interest due to multiple-role relations 







- Increased opportunities for participation due to closeness 
- Equal or lower turnout levels in relation to larger states (on 
the basis of case study-literature) 
- Decreased political role for minorities and opposition 
 
In terms of the influence of size on the presence of political alternatives 
and a political opposition, the findings of this study therefore indicate that 
whereas multiple political alternatives are unquestionably present in 
microstates, the appearance of political parties and partisan contestation should 
not automatically be interpreted as indicative of ideological contestation as it 
occurs in (Western) consolidated democracies. Although political parties do 
contest national elections in San Marino, St. Kitts and Nevis, and Seychelles, the 
                                                
1 Seychelles is the exception, and Palau to a certain degree as well. 
2 To a certain degree Seychelles is an exception, since the opposition (SNP) here does represent 
an alternative in terms of the style and conduct of politics. However, since it has never been in 





analysis has revealed that these parties essentially function as supporting 
vehicles of individual politicians, and that inter-partisan differences are based on 
personal rather than ideological variation. Whereas the number of relevant 
parties in these microstates varies, due to the prevalence of personalistic 
contestation these party-systemic differences do not have a significant influence 
on the nature of political contestation. In this regard, the complete absence of 
political parties in Palau most accurately illustrates the lack of programmatic 
competition in microstates. 
Regarding the second sub-dimension of democracy, with the possible 
exception of San Marino the executive branch of government in microstates was 
to varying degrees found to dominate other institutions. More specifically, the 
lack of resources that result from smallness undermine the position of the 
judiciary and media, and as a result of government patronage the impartiality 
and autonomy of the civil service is in all four microstates affected. Furthermore, 
as a result of multiple-role relationships and the fact that government controls a 
majority of the available resources, the boundary between the private and public 
sector is in all microstates blurred, with conflicts of interest occurring constantly. 
As a result of government patronage, the public administrations of all four 
microstates are not only oversized and filled with government supporters and 
affiliates, but also largely incompetent and ineffective. Finally, the combination of 
executive dominance and person-oriented political competition entails that 
individual political leaders are often able to accumulate a large amount of power 
 This being said, notable differences were observed in the extent to which 
government was able to dominate other institutions in the four microstates, and 
which societal or political institutions were found to be subordinate to the 
executive. In this regard, only the Seychellois judiciary was found to be markedly 
influenced by the government, whereas the other judiciaries were largely free 
from government interference. Whereas a clear majority of respondents viewed 
the parliaments of St. Kitts and Nevis, Seychelles, and Palau as inferior to the 
executive, this was much less clear for San Marino. In general however, with 
concern to the influence of smallness on the horizontal balance of power 
between institutions it seems fair to conclude that a clear tendency to executive 
dominance can be observed, which stems from the lack of (financial) resources of 
other institutions, and the resulting dependency of these institutions on their 
government. In addition, the social intimacy that results from smallness also 
entails that institutional boundaries often become less relevant, since public 
officials from different institutional backgrounds often know each other in 






2.2. Characteristics of Inclusiveness in the Four Microstates 
With regard to the relations between citizens and politicians, the hypothesized 
physical and psychological closeness, opportunities for direct and open 
communication, and open access to politicians were indeed corroborated. 
However, as expected in all four countries under scrutiny citizens tend to 
primarily use these opportunities to demand personal favors from their 
representatives, and much less so to address substantive political or public 
concerns. In this sense, the closeness between citizens and politicians was mainly 
found to stimulate the development of patron-client relationships, and as a result 
of constant access and the increased significance of single votes, microstate-
politicians generally appear to be more susceptible to these pressures. 
Furthermore, the absence of programmatic or ideological contestation on the 
political level appears to reverberate on the societal level, which also explains 
the absence of a public debate on substantive political issues. If citizens interpret 
politics as a personalistic competition for office, it is reasonable to assume that 
their voting behavior is also primarily driven by personal and particularistic 
motivations, and this was confirmed by most respondents in all four cases. 
 The political effects of size can arguably be most closely observed when it 
comes to this particular aspect of democracy. In all four microstates, citizens and 
politicians were in constant direct contact and reciprocal communication, and 
encountered each other in numerous occasions and circumstances. Politicians 
from all four microstates asserted that this not only generates increased 
pressures to comply with the expectations of voters, but they also indicated that 
a disproportionate amount of their time is spent on the maintenance of these 
contacts, which comes at the cost of the time they have to govern their country. 
Furthermore, the citizens of all four microstates expressed a lack of confidence in 
their elected politicians and blamed them for misconduct and corruption, 
whereas they paradoxically did expect politicians to bestow them with favors in 
exchange for political support. Seeing that such circumstances were observed in 
all four cases under scrutiny, it can be concluded that smallness does indeed lead 
to increased proximity between citizens and politicians, but that the 
consequences of this closeness are apparently have a more negative impact on 
the quality of democracy than most of the academic literature assumes. 
 The final sub-dimension on which the four microstates were examined is 
the political participation of citizens. In each of the four cases this analysis was 
much hampered by data restrictions, which means that the conclusions are in 





provided during interviews. The available data on voter turnout revealed a 
comparatively high level of electoral participation in all microstates except St. 
Kitts and Nevis, where the picture was more mixed. Whereas no data was 
available on membership figures of political parties, which do not even exist in 
the case of Palau, in all four of the microstates participation in political activities 
such as demonstrations, electoral campaigns, and politically-oriented social 
media networks appeared to be quite high. However, according to most 
respondents and my own observations this participation was also primarily 
understandable on the basis of particularistic incentives, and not so much out of 
public concerns.  
 In table 9.2 (at the end of this chapter), the scoring of all four microstates 
on the fifteen indicators of democracy that were presented in chapter 4 has been 
presented. Whereas the table confirms the many similarities between the 
microstates that have been discussed above, it also exposes some of the 
differences between the cases. These differences are especially prominent with 
regard to the first sub-dimension, which captures the nature of political 
contestation. For example, whereas San Marino and St. Kitts and Nevis were 
found to have categorically homogenous populations, this does not apply to 
Seychelles and Palau. Furthermore, although alternation in office as a result of 
elections occurs frequently in San Marino and Palau, it occurs only rarely in St. 
Kitts and Nevis, and has until now never happened in Seychelles. Finally, it can be 
observed that whereas political parties are completely absent in Palau, there are 
mostly two of them in St. Kitts and Nevis and Seychelles, and more than five in 
San Marino. However, it can clearly be seen that these differences between the 
microstates are mostly institutional in nature, and the effective number of 
parties can for example in large part be explained on the basis of these 
microstates’ respective electoral systems. With regard to the more informal 
nature of politics and contestation, political institutions do not seem to be very 
significant, and the microstates are clearly more similar in this respect.  
 In line with the method of agreement (or most different systems design) 
that this study employed, the similar political dynamics in the four microstates 
can not be explained by another factor than their size, because the microstates 
have been selected with the purpose to ensure variation on all other potential 
explanatory variables. As a result, these political dynamics can neither be 
explained by the level of economic development, the political and colonial 
history, the political-institutional structure, or the geographical location of the 
microstates, nor by their own individual idiosyncrasies. As a consequence, it is 





similar findings would be observed in other microstates. This means that the 
results of this study can be incorporated into a general and universally valid 
theory on the political effects of smallness, which would presumably be 
extendable and generalizable to all other microstates in the world. This 
suggestion is confirmed by the case study-literature that was discussed in 
chapter 3, in which similar findings emerged. 
 
3. Implications of the Findings for the Debate on Size and Democracy 
The findings of this chapter have a number of significant implications for the 
more general academic debate on size and democracy. In a way, the results of 
this study offer a path to bridge the apparent gap between the statistical 
correlation between size and democracy on the one hand, and the more 
pessimistic theories on democratic development in small states on the other. By 
emphasizing the disparity between formally democratic structures and a more 
antidemocratic political reality, it also becomes clear why scholars have until 
now not found a convincing explanation of the prevalence of democracy in 
microstates, and in my opinion the further pursuit of such an explanation is 
fruitless and doomed to fail. By contrast, it appears more useful to compare 
microstates with (other) new democracies, in which scholars have found a 
comparable fusion between democratic structures and antidemocratic practices 
(cf. O'Donnell 1994, 1996; Carothers 2002; Diamond 2002; Levitsky and Way 
2002). In publications on the politics of many Latin American, Eastern European, 
African, and Asian democracies, more or less similar political patterns appear to 
surface as in the microstates that were examined in this study. 
 On the other hand, it can also be ascertained that their smallness does 
have a significant impact on microstate-politics, which in this sense renders 
microstates different from larger third wave-countries. The analyses in the case 
study-chapters have clearly revealed how size leads to a personalistic instead of 
ideological competition, and how the absence of resources that results from 
smallness generates executive dominance in these countries. In addition, these 
analyses have also shown how smallness creates a society characterized by 
intimacy and multiple-role relations, which in turn stimulates conflicts of 
interest, the circumvention or disregard of political institutions, and various 
forms of particularism. Therefore, it can unquestionably be asserted that size is 
at the root of most of the political dynamics that have been discussed in the case 
study-chapters. This contention is also supported by the fact that more or less 





new democracy. The case-oriented literature discussed in chapter 3 has revealed 
that these patterns can also be observed in the other European microstates of 
Andorra, Liechtenstein, and Monaco. 
 As Jefferson and Mill have argued, in larger settings democracy is only 
possible in the form of representation, since direct, participatory democracy 
requires a limited population size. However, on the basis of the observations of 
the present study, this line of argument can be reversed for the contemporary 
small states. Whereas all small states now basically employ the type of 
representative institutions that were initially designed for larger settings, but 
have been either imposed or adopted from former colonial powers, it has 
become clear that such institutions often decrease the quality of politics and 
democracy in microstates. Therefore, the question can be posed to what extent 
representative democracy is appropriate for small states, and whether more 
direct and participatory forms of decision-making cannot be deemed more 
practicable. As other scholars have argued, Westminster institutions essentially 
exacerbate the democracy-undermining features of Caribbean politics, which this 
study has clearly confirmed for the case of St. Kitts and Nevis. In similar fashion, 
the federal, bicameral, and presidential institutions that Palau has copied from 
the United States primarily appear to decrease the quality and efficiency of 
politics in this microstate. 
 If it can be concluded that microstates are characterized by a discrepancy 
between formal and informal political features, the question why microstates 
have adopted and maintained democratic political structures remains relevant. 
As the case-study analyses have demonstrated, the likelihood that the prevalence 
and persistence of these institutions is a direct product of their smallness is quite 
small. For example, whereas several authors have assumed that the popular 
homogeneity of microstates can explain their democratic structures, the analyses 
have shown that microstates are often not really homogenous in the first place, 
and that the fierce personalistic competition in microstates can actually be 
perceived to impede on democratic development. Instead therefore, it is more 
plausible to assume that democratic institutions are an effect of variables with 
which size has been found to overlap. On the basis of the case studies, the factors 
of colonial history, geographical location, and international politics appear to 
offer the most convincing explanations in this regard. However, the significance 
of these variables has also been found to differ for the various microstates. 
 Whereas colonial history cannot explain San Marino’s contemporary 
democratic structures, regional and diffusion effects appear to play a key role in 





surrounded by Italy, and in a state of constant dependence on this larger 
neighbor, at several times in the Sammarinese political history the Italians have 
had a major influence on the composition and nature of Sammarinese politics. By 
contrast, the survival of democratic structures in St. Kitts and Nevis seems 
primarily explainable on the basis of the country’s lengthy colonization and 
socialization in Westminster political institutions, the microstate’s geographical 
location in the US-dominated Caribbean basin, and its military, economic, and 
political dependence on this larger superpower. Whereas it is clear that the 
international environment of Seychelles is less democracy-stimulating, this 
country also maintains close links with Western (European) democracies, which 
have played a crucial role in the archipelago’s return to multiparty-democracy in 
1993. For Palau, finally, the enduring American influence through the Compact of 
Free Association, and the strategic importance of the Pacific region and 
Micronesia to the United States in general appear to provide a strong incentive to 
continuing democratic government. 
 If the conclusions and implications of this study are amalgamated, it can 
be observed that this dissertation clearly concurs with earlier studies by Burton 
Benedict (1967b), Paul Sutton (1987, 2007a), Donald Peters (1992) and Charles 
Farrugia (1993). In line with these publications, this research has found 
smallness to principally result in a number of democracy-obstructing features, 
although the current study pays more attention to the convergence of these 
practices with democratic institutions. By contrast, the outcomes of this study 
are to a certain extent in conflict with some of the theories that have been put 
forward by not only the classic philosophers, but more recently by Dag Anckar 
(2002b) and Dana Ott (2000). Together with scholars like Katzenstein and 
Lijphart, Anckar and Ott have interpreted attitudinal homogeneity in microstates 
as an indication of more consensus-oriented and accommodative politics. 
However, the present study shows that homogeneity does not limit competition, 
but rather takes it to another level, which is personalistic and individual rather 
than programmatic and ideological. With regard to the greater degree of 
homogeneity and decreased number of political factions in smaller settings, the 
findings of this research are therefore basically in line with Madison’s contention 
that democracy benefits from a greater number of political groups with diverging 
interests.  
 The greatest contribution of this study to the literature however, is 
probably its novel methodological approach. Whereas earlier studies generally 
1) were primarily theoretical in nature, 2) existed of quantitative statistical 





only one or a few microstate-cases without devoting further attention to the 
political effects of size, the current study is the first qualitative, comparative 
assessment of the political effects of smallness in microstates around the globe. 
Furthermore, due to the most similar systems design that this study has 
employed, the findings of this study appear to be extendable to other microstates 
around the globe as well, as a result of which they can be considered to be 
universally valid and applicable. Finally, it must be emphasized that the 
qualitative within-case analysis based on semi-structured interviews has 
strongly facilitated the observation and interpretation of less formal, more 
practical political dynamics, which would not have been discernible if the study 
was limited to an examination of formal political institutions. 
 As a final point, the results of this study also have implications for 
scholars who exclusively rely on aggregate indices of democracy such as 
Freedom House. As this study has demonstrated, as a result of such indices’ bias 
towards formal aspects of democracy, the informal and practical features of 
politics are mostly not captured in their rankings, and therefore remain 
essentially concealed. Furthermore, whereas Freedom House does not allocate 
the most favorable scores of democracy to most larger third wave-countries, its 
categorization of St. Kitts and Nevis as an optimal democracy is at least 
somewhat questionable. This also applies to the European microstates of 
Liechtenstein and Monaco, which despite the obvious and strong political 
influence of non-elected monarchs are still classified as full-fledged 
democracies.3 In any case, scholars should realize that potential errors in these 
large-N databases and indices are automatically reproduced in their own 
analyses if these scores are not triangulated or substantiated on the basis of 
other sources. 
  
4. Societal and Scientific Relevance of the Findings 
In the introduction of this dissertation, the societal and scientific relevance of 
this study was shortly discussed. Specifically, the inherent scientific value of 
studying a hitherto strongly under-researched group of cases was highlighted, as 
well as the aim of this study to find out why smaller states are inclined to have 
democratic forms of government. From a more societal perspective, the 
relevance of this study with regard to the increasingly significant political and 
                                                
3 As mentioned before, the position of the Liechtensteiner and Monegasque Princes is 
comparable to that of the monarchs of Jordan and Morocco (which are mostly classified as semi-
constitutional monarchies). Whereas Freedom House points to the strong political influence of 
these monarchs in justifying the partially free status of these countries, Liechtenstein and 





public debate on the merits of further decentralization and devolution was 
stressed. Now that the analysis is finished and the results of this research are 
clear, the implications of this study for these points can indeed be reasserted. 
One of the central recommendations that follow from this study is that the virtual 
exclusion of microstates from comparative politics is regrettable and 
unwarranted, and that much information is lost by studying microstates with an 
exclusively quantitative and statistical approach. Since the present study has 
revealed that informal, practical political dynamics are much more informative 
and illustrative of microstate-politics than their formal institutional frameworks, 
it would be decidedly regrettable if future studies on small state-politics remain 
restricted to statistical and quantitative analyses. 
 Both in academia and in politics, discussions about the merits of 
decentralization and subsidiarity have become fashionable in recent decades. In 
particular, decentralization has been hailed as the cure for the perceived growing 
‘gap’ between citizens and politicians and the increasing disenchantment and 
detachment from politics among voters in larger (Western) democracies. In an 
attempt to bring politics closer to the people, various countries have now 
transferred powers from the national government to sub-national jurisdictions 
such as federal states, regions, provinces, or municipalities, and in other 
countries an ongoing debate about political devolution is being held. This 
discussion is mirrored in academia, and various scholars have called for the 
increased decentralization of powers (cf. Diamond and Tsalik 1999; Weldon 
2006). According to Diamond and Tsalik, who refer to the predominance of 
democracy in microstates in explaining their support for decentralization, “[o]nly 
if political power over certain issuers and government functions is devolved to 
lower levels of authority that are democratically elected can government be truly 
responsive, representative, and accountable” (1999: 159). 
 The results of this study indicate that the organization of politics on a 
small scale does not only have advantages. It is of course questionable to what 
extent local governments can be compared to microstates, but it can certainly be 
hypothesized that smaller, sub-national administrations are also marked by 
closer relations between citizens and politicians, more personalistic forms of 
competition, and a greater incidence of conflicts of interest. However, since sub-
national units are often controlled by and accountable to national governments, 
and because the number of their tasks and competences is – even if increasing – 
still more limited than that of microstate-governments, factors like particularism 
and corruption can possibly be expected to play a lesser role in decentralized 





the ills of modern representative democracy is widespread, and the present 
study suggests that this is not always as unequivocally and universally accurate 
as many scholars and politicians believe. 
 The findings of this study are especially significant with regard to the 
debate about the quality of representation in smaller settings. The proximity 
between politicians and citizens in smaller polities has often been supposed to 
create better circumstances and opportunities for responsiveness and 
representation, and this study has indeed found that politicians and citizens of 
microstates are in constant and direct contact with each other. However, in 
contrast to Rousseau’s theories, in general the electorate of microstates has not 
been found to exhibit greater levels of attachment to the public good or 
substantive political interest. In combination with the general absence of 
ideological competition in politics, representation primarily assumes the 
character of particularism and constituency service (cf. Ashworth and Bueno de 
Mesquita 2006). In this sense, smallness therefore does not necessarily result in 
a higher quality of interest representation. 
 The greatest scientific relevance of this dissertation however, relates to its 
conclusions about the association between size and democracy. Whereas many 
scholars have pondered about explanations for the statistical correlation 
between these two variables, this study suggests that there is nothing 
intrinsically about size that produces a democratic political system, and that size 
actually creates a social and political environment that can in many ways be 
perceived to obstruct democratic development. At the same time, the prevalence 
and survival of democratic political institutions in microstates can be explained 
by factors with which size often (though not necessarily) co-varies, such as 
colonial history and international vulnerability and dependence. In any case, as 
with the contemporary optimism about the effects of decentralization on 
democratic performance, this study suggests that the overtly positive attitude of 
many scholars with regard to the incidence of democracy in microstates is often 
a little misplaced. 
 
5. Avenues for Future Research 
Although this study has aimed partially alleviate the lack of scholarly knowledge, 
as of yet microstates remain structurally under-researched cases in comparative 
political science. Mostly without convincing motivations, large-N comparative 
studies continue to exclude microstates, as a result of which the extent to which 





largely unclear. It actually often appears to be the case that scholars are 
unconscious about their exclusion of microstates, since most studies do not even 
devote attention to explaining the omission of these cases. As a first 
recommendation, I would therefore advice scholars of comparative politics to be 
aware of their general exclusion of microstates and its negative repercussions, 
and to clearly explain their choice to ban microstates from their analyses. 
Furthermore, if a choice is made to keep out microstates, in my opinion scholars 
should also explain and justify their threshold of exclusion, i.e. why countries 
below a certain size are less interesting cases of study than those that rank above 
this cut-off point. 
 By applying the scope condition of UN-membership, the present study 
examines the effects of size on politics by focusing exclusively on nation-states. 
As mentioned before, in several earlier publications their status as independent 
and sovereign states was deemed to have a significant influence on microstate-
politics, for example because many microstates have been found to exchange 
their vote in international organizations for material benefits (in accordance 
with the international patron-client model; cf. Carney 1989). Since further 
research on this issue is however lacking, the degree to which a sovereign status 
makes a difference is as of yet unclear. In this regard, the question can be posed 
whether the political dynamics of non-independent small (island) jurisdictions in 
the Caribbean (e.g. Guadeloupe, Martinique, the Caymans, or Curacao) and the 
Pacific (e.g. the Pitcairn Islands, Wallis and Futuna, the Northern Marianas, or 
French Polynesia) are comparable to those of the independent microstates in this 
region. Although various case studies on these non-sovereign islands indicate 
that this is indeed the case, no broader comparative research on this issue has to 
my knowledge ever been conducted.  
 In addition to non-independent overseas territories of larger states, a 
comparison could also be made between microstates and similar-sized 
municipalities of larger countries. On the question of whether sub-national units 
and small nation states can be compared, Dana Ott argues that: 
 
“Perhaps the greatest difference between small states and politically decentralized 
larger states is the question of mobility. It could be argued that the increased 
opportunity for mobility within a politically decentralized and larger state might 
prevent the formation of a social environment similar to that in small states” (Ott 
2000: 208). 
 
Indeed, it can be questioned whether the intimate social relationships and 
multiple-role relationships that characterize the societies of microstates would 





boundaries do not to a similar degree block the opportunities of citizens to move 
outside of their municipality and establish social relations elsewhere as in 
(island) microstates, the extent to which such settings are marked by 
comparable political characteristics is indeed questionable.4 In my opinion, this 
constitutes a puzzle that could very well be addressed in future studies. 
 The current study was organized along the lines of the method of 
agreement, or the most different systems design. In accordance with this 
approach, four cases were selected that scored relatively similar on the two 
variables of interest (size and democracy), whereas they ranked as dissimilar as 
possible on all other imaginable variables. On this basis, the similar political 
patterns that were observed across the four cases can most plausibly be 
attributed to their shared smallness. An alternative approach to studying the 
effects of size on politics, however, would be to create a focused comparison 
between at least one large and at least one small state along the lines of the 
method of difference (or most similar systems design). A possible example would 
be to compare Italy and San Marino, which differ a great deal in size but are 
otherwise similar on most (if not all) other background variables. Similar pairs of 
countries that can be compared in this way are Liechtenstein and Switzerland, 
France and Monaco, Jamaica or Trinidad and St. Kitts and Nevis, Madagascar or 
Mauritius and Seychelles, and Fiji or Papua New Guinea and Palau.  
 As the average size of countries around the globe continues to decrease, 
and in both larger and smaller countries a clear tendency towards 
decentralization and devolution of powers is observable, research on the 
political effects of size remains relevant and warranted. As this study 
demonstrates, such analyses should not be limited to the examination of formal 
structures and institutions, since the significance of size can generally not be 
observed in the character of institutional structures, but is particularly visible in 
more informal and practical political traditions, patterns, and dynamics. In my 
opinion, future studies should therefore devote more attention to precisely these 
non-institutional features of smaller settings that are caused by size. Since the 
informal political dynamics of larger countries have captured the attention of 
scholars for some time now, it is to be hoped that a similar development will 
occur in the field of small state research.  
                                                
4 On the other hand, as a landlocked microstate the in abitants of San Marino do have ample 
opportunities to visit Italy and meet with Italians, and in my experience they also do this constantly. 
Still however, the Sammarinese society was to a similar degree as other (island) microstates of this 





Table 9.2: Scoring of the Four Microstates on the Indicators of Democracy 
 San Marino St. Kitts and Nevis Seychelles Palau 
Free and Fair Elections Present Present, with minor 
limitations 
Disputed; governing 
party has significant 
advantages 
Present 
Party System Multiparty-system (ENP 
>5) 
Two-party system on 
each island (ENP around 
2) 
Two-party system (ENP 





Alternation in Office 
Regularly Sporadically Never by peaceful means Hard to measure exactly, 
but present 
Interest Articulation by 
Parties 
Does occur in 
manifestoes but voting 
behavior and political 
dynamics are person-
oriented 
Barely; parties primarily 
denounce the opposition 
Does occur to some 
extent in manifestoes, 
but political dynamics 
are person-oriented 
No parties, interest 
articulation by individual 
candidates minimal 
Freedom to Support the 
Opposition 
Present, but political 
branding is common 
Has major negative 
consequences; 
victimization 
Has major negative 
consequences; 
victimization and climate 
of fear hinders 
supporters of the 
opposition 
Present, but political 
branding is common 
Freedom of the Press Press free (FotP-score 
17), but weak and 
unprofessional 
Press free (FotP-score 
20), but weak, polarized, 
and unprofessional 
Press partially free 
(FotP-score 56), weak 
and unprofessional 
Press free (FotP-score 
14), but weak and 
unprofessional 
Status of the Legislature Not really clear; different 
opinions among 
respondents 
Largely ineffective, not 
autonomous from 
government 
Largely ineffective, not 
autonomous from 
government 







Status of the Judiciary Impartial, but concerns 
about appointment 
procedures of judges; 
most judges foreigners 
Impartial but sometimes 
pressured; mostly ECSC-
judges 
Not impartial, often 
pressured by 
government 
Impartial, strong, and 
autonomous 
Status of the Bureaucracy Oversized and influenced 
by government due to 
patronage 
Oversized, ineffective, 
and influenced by 
government due to 
patronage 
Oversized and influenced 
by government due to 
patronage 
Oversized and influenced 
by government due to 
patronage 
Contact with and Access 
to Representatives 
Continuous contact and 
access 
Continuous contact and 
access 
Continuous contact and 
access 
Continuous contact and 
access 
Nature of Contact 










Political Awareness and 
Feelings of Efficacy of 
Citizens 
No data, but appears to 
be high 
No data, but appears to 
be high 
No data, but appears to 
be high 
No data, but appears to 
be high 
Universal Suffrage Present Present Present Present 
Turnout at Elections and 
other Plebiscites 
(Very) high at elections, 
mixed at referendums 
Mixed (between 60 and 
80%) 
(Very) high at elections High at both elections 
and referendums 
Party Membership No data available No data available No data available Not applicable; no 
parties 
Participation in Political 
Activities 
No data, but according to 
respondents seems to be 
high 
No data, but appears to 
be high 
No data, but especially 
high in Parti Lepep-
activities 
No data, but appears to 
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Appendix A: List of Interviews 
 
San Marino: 
Beccari, Marco (17 November 2010, Domagnano, San Marino) Secretary General 
of the Confederazione Democratica Lavoratori Sammarinese (CDLS), 
Trade Union 
Chiaruzzi, Giorgio (10 November 2010, Città di San Marino, San Marino) Director 
of the Organizzazione Sammarinese degli Imprenditori (OSLA), 
Entrepreneurs’ Organization 
Ciavatta, Valeria (5 November 2010, Città di San Marino, San Marino) Secretary 
of State for Internal Affairs; former Captain Regent; Member of the 
Alleanza Popolare (AP; Liberal Party) 
Felici, Claudio (10 November 2010, Città di San Marino, San Marino) Leader of 
the Partito dei Socialisti e dei Democratici (PSD; Social-Democratic 
Party) in the Great and General Council 
Ghiotti, Massimo (11 November 2010, Fiorina di Domagnano, San Marino) 
Director-General of the Camera di Commercio della Repubblica di San 
Marino (Chamber of Commerce) 
Giorgetti, Roberto (12 November 2010, Borgo Maggiore, San Marino) Party 
Leader of the Alleanza Popolare (AP; Liberal Party) in the Great and 
General Council; former Captain Regent 
Michelotti, Francesca (10 November 2010, Città di San Marino, San Marino) 
Consigliere (MP) for Sinistra Unita (SU; New-Left Socialist Party) in the 
Great and General Council; Member of the Consiglio dei Dodici (Council 
of Twelve); Manager of the State Museums of San Marino 
Michelotti, Simona (11 November 2010, Fiorina di Domagnano, San Marino) 
Managing Director of Gruppo Stampa Imballagi Trasparenti (Gruppo 
SIT); One of the Leading Enterprises of San Marino; President of the 
Administrative Council of the Chamber of Commerce 
Morganti, Francesco (10 November 2010, Città di San Marino, San Marino), Staff 
Member of the Organizzazione Sammarinese degli Imprenditori (OSLA), 
Entrepreneurs’ Organization 
Morganti, Giuseppe Maria (9 November 2010, Città di San Marino, San Marino) 
Consigliere (MP) for the Partito dei Socialisti e dei Democratici (PSD; 
Social-Democratic Party) in the Great and General Council; Journalist for 





Morri, Romeo (19 November 2010, Città di San Marino, San Marino) Secretary of 
State for Education, Culture, and the University; former Captain Regent; 
former Leader of the Partito Democratico Cristiano Sammarinese (PDCS; 
Christian-Democratic Party); Now Affiliated with the Unione dei 
Moderati (Right-Wing Party) 
Muccioli, Stiven (15 November 2010, Città di San Marino, San Marino) Journalist 
for Notizie di San Marino – Libertas, Online Newspaper; Author of 
Several Publications on Sammarinese Politics and Media 
Oddone, David (17 November 2010, Borgo Maggiore, San Marino) Journalist for 
the Daily Newspaper l’Informazione di San Marino 
Rattini, Maurizio (16 November 2010, Borgo Maggiore, San Marino), Party 
Leader of the Nuovo Partito Socialista (NPS; Social-Democratic Party) in 
the Great and General Council; former Captain Regent 
Rondelli, Paolo (4 November 2010, Città di San Marino, San Marino), 
Ambassador of San Marino to the United States; Representative of San 
Marino at the Congrès des Pouvoirs Locaux et Régionaux d’Europe 
(CPLRE) 
Rossi, Laura (18 November 2010, Città di San Marino, San Marino), Professor in 
Sammarinese History; Master of the State Library 
Zani, Jeffrey (9 November 2010, Città di San Marino, San Marino), Journalist for 
the Daily Newspaper La Tribuna Sammarinese 
Zavoli, Luca (15 November 2010, Città di San Marino, San Marino), Journalist for 
Notizie di San Marino – Libertas, Online Newspaper 
 
St. Kitts and Nevis: 
Astaphan, Hon. G.A. Dwyer (10 January 2011, Basseterre, St. Kitts), Former 
Minister of National Security of St. Kitts and Nevis, Resigned in 2008 and 
Now a Strong Critic of the Labour Government 
Brantley, Hon. Mark A.G. (19 January 2011, Charlestown, Nevis), Leader of the 
Opposition in the National Assembly of St. Kitts and Nevis for the 
Concerned Citizens Movement (CCM) 
Condor, Hon. Sam T. (28 January 2011, Basseterre, St. Kitts), Deputy Prime 
Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of St. Kitts and Nevis 
Conway, Stanford (11 January 2011, Basseterre, St. Kitts), Editor in Chief of St. 






Grant, Hon. Lindsay F.P. (12 January 2011, Basseterre, St. Kitts), Leader of the 
People’s Action Movement (PAM), Opposition Party of St. Kitts 
Gumbs, Walford V. (17 January 2011, Basseterre, St. Kitts), Ombudsman of St. 
Kitts and Nevis; former Speaker in the National Assembly of St. Kitts and 
Nevis for the Labour Party 
Harris, Hon. Timothy S., PhD (14 January 2011, Basseterre, St. Kitts), Minister of 
Agriculture, Lands, and Housing of St. Kitts and Nevis for the Labour 
Party, Author of Several Publications on Kittitian-Nevisian Politics and 
History 
Inniss, Sir Probyn Ellsworth (17 January 2011, Basseterre, St. Kitts), Former 
Governor-General of St. Kitts and Nevis (1975-1981), Author of Several 
Publications on Kittitian-Nevisian Politics and History 
Richardson, Howard (18 January 2011, Basseterre, St. Kitts), Executive Officer of 
the St. Kitts and Nevis Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
Seaton, S.W. Tapley, QC (12 January 2011, Basseterre, St. Kitts), Former 
Attorney-General of St. Kitts and Nevis; President of St. Christopher’s 
National Trust; President of the OECS Bar Association 
Sebastian, Sir Cuthbert Montraville, GCMG, OBE (20 January 2011, Basseterre, St. 
Kitts), Governor-General of St. Kitts and Nevis (since 1995) 
Warner, Dr. Asyll (12 January 2011, Basseterre, St Kitts), Lecturer in Political 
Science at the University of the West Indies (UWI) Open Campus 
Williams, Kenneth (10 January 2011, Charlestown, Nevis), Editor in Chief of the 
St. Kitts and Nevis Observer 
 
Seychelles: 
Adam, Hon. Jean-Paul (17 February 2011, Mont-Fleuri, Seychelles), Minister of 
Foreign Affairs of Seychelles for the Parti Lepep 
Egonda-Ntende, Hon. Mr. Frederick M.S. (1 March 2011, Victoria, Seychelles), 
Chief Justice of Seychelles, former Chair of the Law Reporting Committee 
of Uganda 
Gay, Rita J. (2 March 2011, Victoria, Seychelles), Journalist at the Seychelles 
Nation (Newspaper) 
Hollanda, Ivan N. (2 March 2011, Victoria, Seychelles), Journalist at the 
Seychelles Nation (Newspaper) 
Lucas, Hon. Wilby LLB (4 March 2011, Île Perseverance, Seychelles), Deputy-
Speaker at the National Assembly of Seychelles, Elected as MP for the 





Mondon, Hon. Macsuzy (18 February 2011, Mont-Fleuri, Seychelles), Minister of 
Education, Employment, and Human Resources of Seychelles for the 
Parti Lepep 
Morgan, Hon. Joel (17 February 2011, Victoria, Seychelles), Minister of Home 
Affairs, Environment, and Transport of Seychelles for the Parti Lepep 
Payet, Dr. Rolph, FRGS (4 March 2011, Mont-Fleuri, Seychelles), President and 
Vice-Chancellor of the University of Seychelles; Special Advisor to the 
President of Seychelles 
Ramkalawan, Hon. Wavel (18 February 2011, Mont-Fleuri, Seychelles), Leader of 
the Seychelles National Party (SNP); former Leader of the Opposition in 
the National Assembly of Seychelles; former Editor in Chief of Regar 
(Newspaper) 
Sabino, Mr. Divino (1 March 2011, Victoria, Seychelles), Attorney-at-Law; 
Secretary of the Bar Association of Seychelles; Part-Time Lecturer at the 
University of Seychelles; former State Counsel at the Attorney-General’s 
Chambers 
Sinon, Hon. Peter (1 March 2011, Victoria, Seychelles), Minister for Investment, 
Natural Resources, and Industry of Seychelles for the Parti Lepep 
Volcere, Ralph (22 February 2011, Mont-Fleuri, Seychelles), Leader and former 
Presidential Candidate for the New Democratic Party (NDP); Editor in 
Chief of Le Nouveau Seychelles (Newspaper) 
Zatte, Dora (3 March 2011, Mont-Fleuri, Seychelles), Ombudsman of Seychelles; 
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1.  San Marino is comparatively a very small country. It is generally believed 
that politics and democracy in small countries are of a different nature 
than in other, larger countries. What would you see as some of the typical 
characteristics of Sammarinese politics? 
 
2. You are a (Profession). What is the influence of the smallness of San 
Marino on the way you do your own profession? 
 
3. In a small country like San Marino, it is likely that citizens and politicians 
know each other relatively well, and form a cohesive community. Do you 
think that this has an influence on Sammarinese politics? 
 
4. San Marino is a parliamentary democracy, with a government that is 
accountable to parliament. How would you describe the relations 
between the government and the parliament of San Marino, and relations 
between the government and the opposition? 
 
5. According to your experience and opinion, how are the relations between 
government and institutions such as the judiciary, the media, the 
bureaucracy, local governments, and interest groups? 
 
6. San Marino has a parliament (the Consiglio Grande e Generale) in which 
many political parties are represented. Could you tell me something about 
the differences between these parties in terms of ideology or policy 
proposals? 
 
7. Since San Marino is an autonomous society, it is likely that there is a 
distinctive Sammarinese identity, which might be shaped by certain 
traditions and conventions. Can you tell me something about the factors 
that define Sammarinese identity? 
 
8. For a small country such as San Marino, relations with other countries 
and international institutions are likely to be very important. Can you tell 
me something about the significance of these external relations? 
 
9. Are there issues about Sammarinese politics and the Sammarinese 












St. Kitts and Nevis 
 
1. St. Kitts and Nevis is comparatively a very small country. It is generally 
believed that politics and democracy in small countries are of a different 
nature than in other, larger countries. What would you see as some of the 
typical characteristics of the politics of St. Kitts and Nevis? 
 
2. You are a (Profession). What is the influence of the smallness of St. Kitts 
and Nevis on the way you do your own profession? 
 
3. In a small country like St. Kitts and Nevis, it is likely that citizens and 
politicians know each other relatively well, and form a cohesive 
community. Do you think that this has an influence on the politics of St. 
Kitts and Nevis? 
 
4. St. Kitts and Nevis is a parliamentary democracy, with a government that 
is accountable to parliament. How would you describe the relations 
between the government and the parliament of St. Kitts and Nevis, and 
relations between the government and the opposition? 
 
5. According to your experience and opinion, how are the relations between 
government and institutions such as the judiciary, the media, the 
bureaucracy, local governments, and interest groups? 
 
6. St. Kitts and Nevis is a federation that consists of two separate states. In 
your view, what is the effect of the federal nature of St. Kitts and Nevis on 
the way politics is conducted in the country?  
 
7. St. Kitts and Nevis has a parliament (the National Assembly) in which 
several political parties are represented. Could you tell me something 
about the differences between these parties in terms of ideology or policy 
proposals? 
 
8. Since St. Kitts and Nevis is an autonomous society, it is likely that the 
people here have a distinctive identity, which might be shaped by certain 
traditions and conventions. Can you tell me something about the factors 
that define identity of the people from St. Kitts and Nevis? Do you think 
that there is a difference between the identity of the people from St. Kitts 
and the people from Nevis? 
 
9. For a small country such as St. Kitts and Nevis, relations with other 
countries and international institutions are likely to be very important. 
Can you tell me something about the significance of these external 
relations? 
 
10. Are there issues about the politics and the political system of St. Kitts and 









1. Seychelles is comparatively a very small country. It is generally believed 
that the constitutional and legal organization of small countries are of a 
different nature than in other, larger countries. What would you see as 
some of the typical characteristics of the Republic of Seychelles in this 
respect? 
 
2. You are a (Profession). What is the influence of the smallness of Seychelles 
on the way you do your own profession? 
 
3. In a small country like Seychelles, it is likely that people know each other 
relatively well, and form a cohesive community. Do you think that this has 
an influence on the judiciary of Seychelles? 
 
4. According to your experience and opinion, how are the relations between 
government and the judiciary of Seychelles? 
 
5. In the past, Seychelles has been a colony of both France and the United 
Kingdom. Regarding the Seychellois constitutional and legal framework, 
which of these two colonial legacies would you say has had the greatest 
impact? 
 
6. According to your experience and opinion, how are the relations between 
the judiciary and the media of Seychelles? 
 
7. Since Seychelles is an autonomous society, it is likely that the people here 
have a distinctive identity, which might be shaped by certain traditions 
and conventions. Can you tell me something about the factors that define 
the identity of the Seychellois people?  
 
8. For a small country such as Seychelles, relations with other countries and 
international institutions are likely to be very important. Can you tell me 
something about the significance of these external relations? 
 
9. Are there issues about the politics and the legal and constitutional system 



















1. Palau is comparatively a very small country. It is generally believed that 
politics and democracy in small countries are of a different nature than in 
other, larger countries. What would you see as some of the typical 
characteristics of Palauan politics? 
 
2. In a small country like Palau, it is likely that citizens and politicians know 
each other relatively well, and form a cohesive community. Do you think 
that this has an influence on the politics of Palau? 
 
3. Palau is a presidential democracy, with a separation of powers between 
government and parliament. How would you describe the relations 
between the government and the parliament of Palau, and relations 
between the government and the opposition? 
 
4. According to your experience and opinion, how are the relations between 
government and institutions such as the judiciary, the media, the 
bureaucracy, local governments, and interest groups? 
 
5. Palau has a bicameral parliament (the Olbiil Era Kelulau) in which no 
formal political parties are represented. Could you tell me something 
about the influence of the absence of parties on Palauan democracy? 
 
6. Since Palau is an autonomous society, it is likely that the people here have 
a distinctive identity, which might be shaped by certain traditions and 
conventions. Can you tell me something about the factors that define the 
identity of the Palauan people?  
 
7. For a small country such as Palau, relations with other countries and 
international institutions are likely to be very important. Can you tell me 
something about the influence of external relations on Palauan politics? 
 
8. In addition to elected politicians, in Palau traditional leadership also plays 
an important role in society. According to your experience, how is the 
relation between traditional and “modern” politics and politicians? 
 
9. Are there issues about the politics and the political system of Palau that 














Politiek en Democratie in Microstaten 
 
Een Vergelijkende Analyse van de Effecten van 
Bevolkingsgrootte op Competitie en Inclusiviteit  
 
 
Uit enkele recente academische publicaties blijkt dat kleine staten significant 
vaker een democratisch politiek systeem hebben dan grotere staten. Doordat 
kleine staten echter grotendeels uitgesloten worden van vergelijkend politiek 
onderzoek, is weinig bekend over de oorzaken van het verband tussen 
bevolkingsgrootte en democratie. Er bestaat sinds de geschriften van Plato en 
Aristoteles een levendig debat over de effecten van kleinschaligheid op politiek 
en democratie, maar veel van de veronderstellingen die in dit debat naar voren 
komen zijn nooit empirisch getoetst aan de werkelijkheid. Aan de hand van de 
onderzoeksvraag wat de gevolgen van een kleine bevolkingsomvang zijn voor 
democratische competitie en inclusiviteit, biedt deze dissertatie door een 
kwalitatief vergelijkend onderzoek op basis van vier microstaten een empirische 
test van de reeds bestaande theorieën. Op basis van de resultaten van dit 
onderzoek kunnen antwoorden gevonden worden op de vraag waarom kleine 
staten statistisch gezien vaker een democratisch politiek systeem hebben. 
 De bestaande academische literatuur over de politieke consequenties van 
kleinschaligheid wordt gekenmerkt door een tweespalt. Van de Klassieke 
Oudheid tot de 18e eeuw werd een geringe bevolkingsomvang over het algemeen 
gezien als een voordeel voor de kwaliteit en het liberale karakter van het 
bestuur. Plato en Aristoteles merkten op dat kleinere bestuurseenheden 
gekenmerkt worden door een grotere sociale cohesie, omdat de geringe afstand 
tussen burgers leidt tot meer en intensiever persoonlijk contact. De 
Verlichtingsfilosofen Montesquieu en Rousseau voegden hieraan toe dat de 
burgers van kleinere samenlevingen over het algemeen groter belang hechten 
aan de publieke zaak, omdat zij constant direct contact hebben met hun 
gezagsdragers. Bovendien argumenteerde Rousseau dat burgers in een kleinere 
maatschappij relatief meer politieke invloed kunnen uitoefenen, waardoor de 
kans op een liberaal of republikeins bestuur hier groter is dan in meer 
omvangrijke bestuurseenheden. De opkomst van het nationalisme en de 





zorgden echter voor een verschuiving in het denken over kleinschaligheid, dat 
vanaf de 18e eeuw juist meestal als een nadeel voor goed bestuur wordt gezien.  
 De Amerikaanse Revolutie en het ontstaan van de Verenigde Staten 
demonstreerden dat liberaal en republikeins bestuur ook mogelijk is in zeer 
grote staten. De Amerikaanse Founding Fathers Madison en Jefferson 
weerspraken dan ook de door Montesquieu en Rousseau veronderstelde 
voordelen van kleinschaligheid, door te stellen dat democratie juist gebaat is bij 
variëteit en verscheidenheid in groepen en belangen. Volgens Madison bestaat in 
een kleine, homogene en sociaal vervlochten samenleving een groter gevaar dat 
één groep erin slaagt om de andere groepen te dominerend dan in grotere 
samenlevingen. Aan de andere kant argumenteren meer moderne 
wetenschappers als Katzenstein en Lijphart dat homogeniteit onder de bevolking 
juist een positieve invloed op democratische ontwikkeling heeft, omdat de 
politiek van kleinere staten hierdoor meer in het teken komt te staan van de 
bereidwilligheid om compromissen te sluiten en consensus te bereiken. In de 
gerenommeerde bundel Size and Democracy van Robert Dahl en Edward Tufte 
worden enkele van deze veronderstellingen empirisch onderzocht, maar wordt 
er weinig bewijs gevonden voor de veronderstelde causale verbanden. 
 Over het algemeen oordelen naoorlogse publicaties over de politieke 
gevolgen van een kleine bevolkingsomvang negatief over de kansen op 
democratische ontwikkeling in kleine staten. In verschillende studies wordt 
gesteld dat kleinschaligheid leidt tot personalistische en polariserende vormen 
van politieke competitie, particularistische relaties tussen kiezers en gekozenen, 
overvloedige dominantie van de uitvoerende macht ten opzichte van andere 
instituties, en een gemarginaliseerde rol voor de politieke oppositie en haar 
aanhangers. Bovendien zou de grote sociale en maatschappelijke verwevenheid 
ertoe leiden dat formele politieke instituties en rollen genegeerd of omzeild 
worden, en zouden de overlappende sociale en maatschappelijke rollen die 
burgers van kleinere staten vervullen leiden tot belangenconflicten en corruptie. 
Vanaf de jaren ’70 is als gevolg van dekolonisatie het aantal (zeer) kleine staten 
wereldwijd sterk gegroeid, en uit case studies waarin deze landen worden 
geanalyseerd lijken deze laatste theorieën grotendeels geverifieerd te worden. 
 De in dit onderzoek centraal staande concepten - bevolkingsgrootte en 
democratie - kunnen op meerdere manieren geoperationaliseerd worden. In 
deze dissertatie worden alle lidstaten van de Verenigde Naties met minder dan 
250.000 inwoners geclassificeerd als microstaten, wat resulteert in een groep 
van 21 analyseerbare staten. Op basis van Dahl’s klassieke conceptualisatie van 





wordt democratie in deze dissertatie gedefinieerd als een systeem waarin 
competitie plaatsvindt voor belangrijke publieke en politieke functies, en waarin 
geen grote groepen van deelname aan deze competitie zijn uitgesloten. Het 
karakter en de kwaliteit van democratie worden onderzocht aan de hand van 
vier subdimensies, te weten 1) de aanwezigheid van politieke alternatieven en 
oppositie, 2) de horizontale machtsbalans tussen instituties, 3) de relaties tussen 
burgers en politici en 4) de politieke participatie van burgers. Voor elk van deze 
dimensies is een aantal indicatoren opgesteld die leidend zijn bij het onderzoek. 
  Gezien het feit dat kwantitatieve analyses tot op heden niet geresulteerd 
hebben in een breed gedragen verklaring van het gevonden verband tussen 
bevolkingsgrootte en democratie, is in deze dissertatie gekozen voor een 
kwalitatieve, vergelijkende onderzoeksmethode op basis van case studies van 
vier microstaten. In elk van deze microstaten is tussen november 2010 en juli 
2011 een maand veldonderzoek verricht. Vanwege het beperkte aantal eerdere 
publicaties en het gebrek aan beschikbare data, is bij dit onderzoek gekozen voor 
semigestructureerde diepte-interviews met respondenten uit verschillende 
sectoren van de maatschappij. In elk van de vier geanalyseerde microstaten zijn 
tussen de tien en twintig interviews afgenomen, en de kwaliteit van deze data is 
gecontroleerd door middel van triangulatie met krantenartikelen, officiële 
documenten en beschikbare wetenschappelijke literatuur.  
 Bij de selectie van de te onderzoeken microstaten zijn de criteria van John 
Stuart Mill’s methode van verschil (of most similar systems design) leidend 
geweest. Op basis hiervan is gekozen voor vier casussen die een zo groot 
mogelijke overeenkomst vertonen op de in dit onderzoek centraal staande 
onafhankelijke variabele (bevolkingsgrootte), terwijl zij zoveel mogelijk 
verschillen wat betreft andere mogelijke verklarende variabelen, zoals 
geografische locatie, economische ontwikkeling, politieke en koloniale 
geschiedenis, cultuur, en politiek systeem. Aangezien de 21 microstaten 
geclusterd zijn in vier continenten, is uit elk van deze wereldregio’s een casus 
geselecteerd. Uiteindelijk is aan de hand van deze criteria voor San Marino 
gekozen in Europa, voor St. Kitts and Nevis in het Caribisch gebied, voor de 
Seychellen in Afrika, en voor Palau in Oceanië. De afzonderlijke vier 
hoofdstukken waarin de politieke systemen van de geselecteerde microstaten 
worden geanalyseerd hebben allen een gemeenschappelijke opbouw. Na een 
korte beschrijving van de politieke geschiedenis van elke microstaat volgt in elk 
hoofdstuk een bespreking van een aantal mogelijke verklaringen voor het 
democratisch gehalte van het bestuur. Vervolgens wordt een korte beschrijving 





uitgebreide presentatie volgt van de resultaten van het veldonderzoek. Ten slotte 
worden in elk hoofdstuk in een conclusie de onderzoeksresultaten samengevat. 
 In hoofdstuk vijf tot en met negen worden achtereenvolgens de resultaten 
van veldonderzoek in elk van de vier microstaten gepresenteerd. Als de naar 
eigen zeggen oudste republiek ter wereld, kent San Marino een lange traditie van 
democratisch bestuur. Al in de Middeleeuwen werd deze microstaat bestuurd 
door een raad waarin alle familiehoofden van het land vertegenwoordigd waren 
(de Arengo). Tijdens meer oligarchische periodes en bovenal tijdens het 
fascistische regime (1926 – 1944) kende San Marino ook soms een minder 
democratisch bestuur, maar na de Tweede Wereldoorlog werd deze microstaat 
het enige West-Europese land waarin democratisch gekozen communisten 
(tussen 1945 en 1957) deel uitmaakten van de regering. Na de Koude Oorlog 
fragmenteerde het Sanmarinese partijstelsel, waardoor er momenteel twaalf 
partijen vertegenwoordigd zijn in de Consiglio Grande e Generale. San Marino’s 
locatie in het hart van Italië en Europa vormt de belangrijkste verklaring voor 
het democratische gehalte van de microstaat, maar het politiek systeem bestaat 
uit een aantal unieke (en premoderne) instituties, waarvan het diarchische 
staatshoofdschap van de Capitani Reggenti het belangrijkste voorbeeld is. Het 
parlement van San Marino telt zestig leden, wat met een bevolkingsgrootte van 
30.000 betekent dat elk parlementslid ongeveer 500 burgers vertegenwoordigd 
– het kleinste aantal ter wereld. 
 Hoewel het politieke systeem van San Marino zonder twijfel als 
democratisch getypeerd kan worden, zorgt de beperkte bevolkingsomvang voor 
een aantal opmerkelijke politieke patronen. Respondenten uit San Marino gaven 
aan dat er bijvoorbeeld weinig tot geen inhoudelijke politieke verschillen tussen 
de politieke partijen van het land bestaan, die eigenlijk verhullen dat politieke 
competitie in essentie personalistisch van aard is. Daarnaast zorgt het gebrek 
aan professionele journalisten en het feit dat sommige journalisten hun baan 
combineren met een politieke functie ervoor dat de media van San Marino niet 
op een effectieve manier haar controlefunctie kunnen uitoefenen. Wat betreft de 
relaties tussen kiezers en hun vertegenwoordigers kan opgemerkt worden dat 
burgers weliswaar veel contact hebben met gezagsdragers, maar dat dit 
voornamelijk een stimulerende werking heeft op cliëntelistische relaties. 
Bovendien zorgt patronage in de publieke sector ervoor dat het 
ambtenarenapparaat van San Marino niet alleen relatief groot is, maar ook soms 
partijdig en onprofessioneel opereert. Volgens de meeste respondenten kan dit 
particularisme ook grotendeels de hoge politieke participatiegraad van 





 De Federatie van St. Kitts and Nevis is de jongste en met ongeveer 50.000 
inwoners ook de kleinste onafhankelijke staat van het Westelijk Halfrond. Na 
meer dan 300 jaar bestuurd te zijn geweest als Britse suikerkolonie werd deze 
voornamelijk door afstammelingen van Afrikaanse slaven bewoonde eilandstaat 
in 1983 onafhankelijk. Net als andere voormalig Britse eilandstaten in de regio 
bleef na onafhankelijkheid het Westminster-politieke systeem van St. Kitts and 
Nevis vrijwel volledig intact, met een Gouverneur-generaal als plaatsvervanger 
van de Britse vorst. Volgens verschillende auteurs heeft de eeuwenlange 
blootstelling aan het democratische Westminster-systeem bijgedragen aan het 
democratische karakter van de Caribische regio, maar andere auteurs 
beargumenteren dat de traditionele invloed die de Verenigde Staten in de regio 
uitoefenen de belangrijkste waarborg is voor het overleven van de democratie.  
 In tegenstelling tot andere eilandstaten in de regio is St. Kitts and Nevis 
een federatie die bestaat uit twee constituerende staten (St. Kitts en Nevis), die 
een historisch antagonistische verhouding met elkaar hebben. De afzonderlijke 
eilanden binnen de federatie hebben elk hun eigen sfeer van politieke competitie, 
waardoor er op elk eiland een tweepartijsysteem bestaat en er vier partijen in 
het federale parlement van St. Kitts and Nevis vertegenwoordigd zijn. Vrijwel alle 
respondenten gaven aan dat de verschillen tussen deze partijen voornamelijk 
persoonlijk van aard zijn. In tegenstelling tot de veronderstellingen van 
Katzenstein en Lijphart blijkt politieke competitie op St. Kitts and Nevis 
ongekend fel en polariserend van aard te zijn, en verschillende respondenten 
beschreven dit in termen van politiek tribalisme. Omdat door de kleinschaligheid 
politieke affiliaties breed bekend zijn, weten politici precies welke burgers zij tot 
hun aanhangers kunnen rekenen, en worden supporters van de oppositie in de 
regel getreiterd of geïntimideerd. Wat betreft de machtsbalans tussen instituties 
wezen interviews uit dat de media en het parlement van St. Kitts and Nevis 
grotendeels ineffectief en zwak zijn, terwijl de rechterlijke macht redelijk 
onafhankelijk functioneert. Relaties tussen kiezers en gekozen staan ook in deze 
microstaat voornamelijk in het teken van cliëntelisme en patronage, en ook hier 
leidt dit tot een partijdige en inefficiënte bureaucratie en een sterke onderlinge 
verwevenheid van de publieke en private sector. 
 In tegenstelling tot San Marino en St. Kitts and Nevis, worden de 
Seychellen door verschillende bronnen niet als een volledige democratie 
beschouwd. Met ongeveer 90.000 inwoners is deze in de Indische Oceaan 
gelegen archipel de kleinste staat van Afrika. De Seychellen maakten tot 1811 
deel uit van het Franse Rijk, en kwamen daarna officieel onder Brits bestuur 





zogenaamde Grand Blancs). Binnen een jaar na onafhankelijkheid vond in deze 
archipel een staatsgreep plaats, waardoor het land tussen 1977 en 1993 een 
Marxistische eenpartijstaat was. Hoewel het einde van de Koude Oorlog een 
terugkeer naar meerpartijendemocratie inluidde heeft de socialistische partij 
sindsdien alle verkiezingen gewonnen, waardoor zij inmiddels meer dan 35 jaar 
onafgebroken aan de macht is. Het Seychelse politieke systeem kent elementen 
van zowel de voormalig Franse als voormalig Britse kolonisator, maar na de 
herinvoering van de meerpartijendemocratie in 1993 is de microstaat een 
presidentiële republiek geworden. 
 Het veldonderzoek in de Seychellen bevestigt dat er behoorlijk wat aan te 
merken valt op het democratische karakter van deze eilandstaat. Zowel 
respondenten als eerdere publicaties en rapporten geven aan dat verkiezingen in 
de Seychellen niet compleet eerlijk verlopen, dat er geen duidelijke scheiding is 
tussen de staat en de regeringspartij, en dat de rechterlijke macht, media, 
bureaucratie en het parlement niet autonoom van de regering (kunnen) 
functioneren. Wat betreft de invloed van kleinschaligheid op het Seychelse 
politieke systeem kunnen grotendeels dezelfde politieke patronen worden 
geïdentificeerd als in de andere microstaten, maar de dominantie van de 
regeringspartij zorgt ervoor dat problemen rond particularisme, polarisatie 
tussen regering en oppositie, en de relatieve zwakte van non-gouvernementele 
instituties hier nog prangender zijn dan in de andere microstaten. Hoewel 
politieke oppositie sinds 1993 is toegestaan, heeft de voornaamste 
oppositiepartij uit frustratie niet deelgenomen aan de meest recente 
parlementsverkiezingen. In combinatie met de overvloedige invloed van de 
politiek op het privéleven van burgers, zorgt het ontbreken van democratische 
machtswisseling er bovendien voor dat aanhangers van de Seychelse oppositie 
een structureel gemarginaliseerde rol spelen in de maatschappij. 
  De meest bijzondere casus is waarschijnlijk Palau, dat sinds 1885 vier 
verschillende koloniale bestuurders heeft gekend, maar waar het kolonialisme er 
nooit in is geslaagd om de eeuwenoude lokale cultuur te verdrijven. Het systeem 
van rivaliserende clans en traditioneel leiderschap (in de vorm van zogenaamde 
chiefs) vormt naast het Amerikaans georiënteerde democratische systeem een 
geheel eigen politieke structuur, en traditionele leiders hebben hier samen met 
democratisch gekozen volksvertegenwoordigers een grote rol in het 
landsbestuur. Daarnaast is Palau één van de weinige democratieën in de wereld 
die zonder politieke partijen functioneert, en is deze minuscule eilandstaat een 
federatie die naar Amerikaans voorbeeld is opgedeeld in niet minder dan zestien 





onafhankelijke staat ter wereld, en de overweldigende economische 
afhankelijkheid van de Verenigde Staten speelt een belangrijke rol in de 
handhaving van Westerse democratische instituties, die vaak op gespannen voet 
staan met het lokale systeem van traditioneel leiderschap. 
 De afwezigheid van politieke partijen zorgt ervoor dat politiek in Palau 
inherent personalistisch van aard is. Interviews wijzen echter uit dat kandidaten 
vrijwel niet op ideologische of programmatische gronden van elkaar te 
onderscheiden zijn, en geïnterviewde politici konden bijvoorbeeld niet aangeven 
of zij zichzelf als links of rechts, of als progressief of conservatief beschouwden. 
Hoewel traditionele leiders niet democratisch gekozen worden gaven vrijwel alle 
respondenten aan dat zij een belangrijke bijdrage leveren aan de kwaliteit van de 
Palause democratie, doordat zij in tegenstelling tot het parlement en de media 
wel in staat blijken om de uitvoerende macht te controleren. Omdat het geven 
van aalmoezen onderdeel is van de traditionele cultuur van Palau, is 
particularisme hier niet alleen wijdverspreid maar ook grotendeels 
gelegitimeerd. Door een sterke onafhankelijke rechterlijke macht en de 
waarborgfunctie van chiefs lijken de democratie-ondermijnende effecten van 
kleinschaligheid in Palau voor minder grote problemen te zorgen dan in St. Kitts 
and Nevis en de Seychellen. 
 Het veldonderzoek in de vier geanalyseerde microstaten laat zien dat 
deze landen in weerwil van alle historische, culturele, en institutionele 
verschillen allemaal te maken hebben met de politieke effecten van een geringe 
bevolkingsomvang. Hoewel kleinschaligheid zeker wat betreft inclusiviteit en 
betrokkenheid van burgers een positief effect heeft op de kwaliteit van 
democratie, blijkt uit de vier landenstudies dat de politieke patronen die door 
meer pessimistische wetenschappers werden verondersteld toch grotendeels 
aanwezig zijn. Elk van de vier landen heeft in meer of mindere mate te kampen 
met personalistische politiek, polarisatie, particularisme, en overvloedige 
dominantie van de uitvoerende macht. Dit betekent dat het lastig is om een 
directe verklaring van het democratische karakter van microstaten te vinden aan 
de hand van hun bevolkingsgrootte, en wat dit betreft lijkt democratie eerder 
een bijproduct te zijn van aan kleinschaligheid gerelateerde geografische, 
historische, en internationaal-politieke factoren. Bovendien laat deze dissertatie 
zien dat er kanttekeningen te plaatsen zijn bij het huidige enthousiasme over 
decentralisatie en subsidiariteit in zowel de wetenschap als het bredere publieke 
en politieke debat, omdat kleinschaligheid zeker als het gaat om het karakter van 
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